

whaleCTF 杂项_Writeup

原创

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订阅专栏

最近比较忙, 杂项部分的wp断断续续完善, pwn和re部分的wp需要比较久, 持续更新~

如有错误或者疑问, 欢迎各位师傅留言指出~~~

Decode1

整道题的一个思路是 hex->ascii->url->base64->ascii->str

打开文本是一串数字, 发现每6个数字都是253开头, 试试16进制——>ascii

```
253444253534253435253335253433253641253435253737253444253531253646253738253444253434253637253442253446253
253446253531253646253738253444253434253435253442253444253534253435253332253433253641253435253738253444253534253637253442253446253534253
253433253641253435253738253444253431253646253738253444253534253633253442253444253534253435253331
```

```
a = ""253444253534253435253335253433253641253435253737253444253531253646253738253444253434253637253442253446253
534253642253442253444253534253435253738253433253641253435253737253446253531253646253738253444253434253435253442
5344425353425343525333225343325364125343525373825344425353125364625373825344425353425363725344225344425353425343
1253738253433253641253435253738253444253431253646253738253444253534253633253442253444253534253435253331""
print(''.join([chr(int(b, 16)) for b in [a[i:i+2] for i in range(0, len(a), 2)]]))
```


```
In [18]: a = ""253444253534253435253335253433253641253435253737253444253531253646253738253444253434253
...: 2535342534352537382534332536412534352537372534462535312536462537382534442534342534352534422534
...: 5373825344425353125364625373825344425353425363725344225344425353425343125373825343325364125343
...: 3534253633253442253444253534253435253331""

In [19]: print(''.join([chr(int(b, 16)) for b in [a[i:i+2] for i in range(0, len(a), 2)]]))
%4D%54%45%35%43%6A%45%77%4D%51%6F%78%4D%44%67%4B%4F%54%6B%4B%4D%54%45%78%43%6A%45%77%4F%51%6F%78%4D%44%
8%4D%54%67%4B%4D%54%41%78%43%6A%45%78%4D%41%6F%78%4D%54%63%4B%4D%54%45%31

In [20]: |
```

得到一串

url编码，解码得到base64，再解码，得到ascii码，转字符串得到flag



Decode5

滑键盘系列，按着给的字母在键盘上对应的画得到最后的flag，小写提交错误，换成大写即可

流量分析

这种题目一般密码强度不大，懒得生成字典直接用kali自带的字典，在/usr/share/wordlist目录下，得到密码是88888888

```
root@kali:~/Desktop# aircrack-ng shipin.cap -w /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
Opening shipin.cap
Read 16664 packets.

# BSSID          ESSID          Encryption
1 00:1D:0F:5D:D0:EE 0719          WPA (1 handshake)

Choosing first network as target.

Opening shipin.cap
Reading packets, please wait...

Aircrack-ng 1.2

[00:00:00] 112/7120712 keys tested (1851.24 k/s)

Time left: 1 hour, 4 minutes, 6 seconds          0.00%

KEY FOUND! [ 88888888 ]

Master Key      : B4 30 38 0F 24 7B 57 AC DE B5 3A 7F 2E FE 6B 45
                  0B 34 02 C3 89 F9 69 D5 B7 35 87 1B FB 4C EE 7F

Transient Key   : 17 AE 23 D0 69 7C 0D 45 2B 40 F6 7D 06 C9 C5 6F
                  25 F0 B0 48 7A 6C 22 7C E2 73 50 71 46 FE 5D 0C
                  8F 59 01 BE 66 56 DF 1E 58 DD 34 DB BF A7 2D FD
                  2C 53 11 7F B2 E5 F0 16 7F 57 F5 6A 04 36 F5 71
```

得到密码后接下来就是解析数据包，airdecap-ng shipin.cap -e 0719 -p 88888888，会发现多出一个数据包，用wireshark打开

```
root@kali:~/Desktop# airdecap-ng shipin.cap -e 0719 -p 88888888
Total number of packets read      16664
Total number of WEP data packets   0
Total number of WPA data packets  27
Number of plaintext data packets   0
Number of decrypted WEP packets    0
Number of corrupted WEP packets    0
Number of decrypted WPA packets    16

root@kali:~/Desktop# ls
exp_ub16.04.c Image-ExifTool-11.17 MyDeepin-blue MyDeepin-blue.tar.gz shipin.cap shipin-dec.cap wordpress-r
```

题目提示flag是第一条记录的视频网站，过滤dns协议，getflag!

Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
7	1.070674	58.240.57.33	192.168.1.104	DNS	170 Standard query response 0x0f59 A www.google.com A 173.194.72.99 A 173
9	2.064000	192.168.1.104	58.240.57.33	DNS	76 Standard query 0x63a6 A push.m.youku.com
11	2.536062	192.168.1.104	58.240.57.33	DNS	78 Standard query 0xb810 A asp.cntv.lxdns.com
12	2.536064	192.168.1.104	58.240.57.33	DNS	76 Standard query 0x20eb A api.3g.youku.com
13	2.572948	58.240.57.33	192.168.1.104	DNS	188 Standard query response 0xb810 A asp.cntv.lxdns.com CNAME cctv.video.g
14	2.573460	58.240.57.33	192.168.1.104	DNS	118 Standard query response 0x20eb A api.3g.youku.com CNAME zw-n-api-3g.y

Password

打开看了数据包，是nebula模拟器的数据传输，全是TCP协议直接追踪流，红蓝分别是两端发出的消息，可以看到红方在蓝方提示password后输入了”backdoor...00Rm8.ate“，“.”一般是非可见字符，可以在下方选择HEX DUMP来显示二进制数据

Hex	ASCII	
000000D6	00	
000000D7	0d	
000000D8	0a	
000000D9	50	
000000DA	61	
000000DB	73	
000000DC	73	
000000DD	77	
000000DE	6f	
000000DF	72	
000000E0	64	
000000E1	3a	
000000E2	20	
...	Passw ord:	
000000B9	62	b
000000BA	61	a
000000BB	63	c
000000BC	6b	k
000000BD	64	d
000000BE	6f	o
000000BF	6f	o
000000C0	72	r
000000C1	7f	.
000000C2	7f	.
000000C3	7f	.
000000C4	30	0
000000C5	30	0
000000C6	52	R
000000C7	6d	m
000000C8	38	8
000000C9	7f	.
000000CA	61	a
000000CB	74	t

hex 62对应的是ascii b ,7f是del键，0d是回车，因此最终得到的Password应该为backd00Rmate

Decode2

去掉头尾的±，末尾补上==，base64解码得到flag

请输入要解码的字符串: (已输入字符串: 00)

AGkAdABpAHMAbABpAGsAZQB2AGUAbG1AHMAdgBIAHIAeQBtAHUAYwBoAAOAC==

结果:


i t i s i k e v e n u s v e r y m u c h

Decode3

jsfuck解码,丢到控制台运行，%21是!

Decode4

一段js代码，eval函数改成alert弹窗，丢到控制台运行




```
In [14]: ''.join([chr(int(b,16)) for b in [a[i:i+2] for i in range(0, len(a), 2)]]).decode('hex')
Out[14]: 'alert|coolyougettheflag'
```

WTF?

base64解码得到65536个二进制(65536=256^2)，在notepad++上缩小字体大概可以看到一个二维码的轮廓，一种姿势是每256个字符换行，另一种办法是直接画图，得到一张二维码，getflag!

```
# -*- coding: UTF-8 -*-
# __Author__:pad0y
from PIL import Image
MAX = 256
with open('flag.txt', 'r') as f:
    c = f.read()
    newIm = Image.new('RGB', (MAX, MAX))
    white = (255, 255, 255)
    black = (0, 0, 0)
    for x in range(0,MAX):
        for y in range(0, MAX):
            if c[MAX*x+y] == '1':
                newIm.putpixel((x, y), black)
            else:
                newIm.putpixel((x, y), white)
    newIm.save('flag.png')
```

Decode8



栅栏解密下，也没看到正确格式的flag

参照wp: <https://www.cnblogs.com/zqh20145320/p/5710072.html>

把恺撒后的字符串竖排可以得到flag字样

```
f__
|4}
a_
gf
{u
_n
J_
u0
s.
t0

flag[_Just_4_fun_0_0_]
```

Decode9

控制台运行得到: 十擁數倉整耀煥敵瑤∨?湊獵瑤≡-

把上面这串复制到记事本，另存为，编码选上“Unicode”，关闭。用WinHex等可以查看16进制的软件，直接打开，一目了然。如果想显示正常，把开头的FF FE两个字节删了，再用记事本打开就看到了。木马为 <% execute request(“? enusCtf”)%

我的USB

binwalk, tshark各种分析无果，上strings大法 (真的有点坑)

```
strings for1.pcapng | grep Pwn
```

```
root@kali:~/Desktop/UsbMiceDataHacker# strings for1.pcapng | grep Pwn
Pwnium{408158c115a82175de37e8b3299d1f93}
root@kali:~/Desktop/UsbMiceDataHacker#
```

我下载了什么

追踪流发现有个tar.gz压缩包，tar.gz压缩包是1f8b开头的，分离出来解压即可得到flag

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

分组 36, 0 客户端 分组, 1 服务器 分组, 0 turn(s). 点击选择.

192.168.1.10:80 → 192.168.1.2:1221 (396 bytes) ▾ 显示和保存数据为 原始数据 ▾

查找: 1f8b 查找下一个(N)

添加 提取 测试 复制 移动 删除 信息

C:\Users\Pamper\Desktop\1.tar\1.tar\var\www\

名称

flag.txt

日志记录

文件下载下来发现是个rar文件，改后缀，大概看了下是sqlmap注入日志，在notepad++搜索flag,可以发现flag出现很频繁，猜测是个表名。

```
!8flag%20AS%20CHAR%29%2C0x20%29%20FROM%20misc.flag%20ORDER%20BY%20flag%20LIMIT%
sqlmap.org)" "-"
```

```
!8flag%20AS%20CHAR%29%2C0x20%29%20FROM%20misc.flag%20ORDER%20BY%20flag%20LIMIT%
://sqlmap.org)" "-"
```

```
!8flag%20AS%20CHAR%29%2C0x20%29%20FROM%20misc.flag%20ORDER%20BY%20flag%20LIMIT%
lmap.org)" "-"
```

```
!8flag%20AS%20CHAR%29%2C0x20%29%20FROM%20misc.flag%20ORDER%20BY%20flag%20LIMIT%
lmap.org)" "-"
```

```
!8Flag%20AS%20CHAR%29%2C0x20%29%20FROM%20misc.flag%20ORDER%20BY%20flag%20LIMIT%
sqlmap.org)" "-"
```

```
!8Flag%20AS%20CHAR%29%2C0x20%29%20FROM%20misc.flag%20ORDER%20BY%20flag%20LIMIT%
```


https://blog.csdn.net/qq_34356800

一般日志分析的思路就是一步步缩小分析的范围，可以用grep匹配内容分离出来。

```
C:\Users\Pamper\Desktop
λ cat log | grep "misc.flag" > log2

C:\Users\Pamper\Desktop
λ |
```

把分离出来的日志丢到notepad++，都是url编码，notepad++有个插件可以全部解码



分析发现是二分法盲注的ASCII码爆破，通常当找到!=的时候就是正确的ASCII值，再次缩小分析分范围，把含有'!='的日志分离出来

```
C:\Users\Pamper\Desktop
λ cat log2 | grep '!=' > log3
```

分析文件log3需要对!=后边的ASCII提取并且转换成字符，编写py脚本，对文件log3进行处理

```
In [3]: with open('log3') as f:
...:     s = ''
...:     for i in f.readlines():
...:         begin = i.index('')!=')
...:         end = i.index(')', begin)
...:         s += (chr(int(i[begin+4:end])))
...:
In [4]: s
Out[4]: '1ROIS{m' ... 'Sis_nG1nx_Sim}\x05'
```

注入过程

0	20	00	00	00	C3	EB	C6	C6	B2	E2	CA	D4	42	79	CC	EC	ÃëÆÆ²âÊÔByìì
0	D2	D7	6C	6F	76	65	2E	74	78	74	00	79	6A	D2	34	78	Ò×love.txt yjò4x
0	4B	6D	D5	8B	0A	42	79	29	59	13	66	00	6C	6F	76	65	KmÖ< By)Y f love
0	00	2E	74	78	74	2E	2E	5B	7A	2D	7B	7D	2E	2E	39	42	.txt..[z-{}..9B
0	38	43	56	94	49	C8	69	1B	EC	76	8E	16	66	3C	5F	9E	8Cv"lÈi ivž f<_ž
0	D7	37	AE	6C	DD	C6	17	8C	08	37	F6	BB	88	DA	A8	35	x7@lÿÆ 6 7ö»^Ü5
0	6B	02	A7	00	C7	76	FC	0F	10	91	C1	D1	67	12	FC	07	k \$ Çvü 'ÁŅg ü
0	5A	01	1D	5B	5D	EF	7E	46	96	6E	8B	87	8B	80	DA	BC	Z []i~F-n<†<€Ú¼
0	DF	96	83	C4	91	65	FF	B9	93	A7	7C	DE	86	00	A1	26	ß-fÄ'eÿ¹"S Ð† ;&
0	22	00	F3	D3	D5	31	5D	F0	FC	4E	2B	3A	CA	A3	94	3F	" óóŌ1]öüN+:Ê£"?
0	14	2E	C4	3D	7B	00	40	07	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.Ä={ @

Decode10

直接解md5提交即可 ==

出题人的初衷应该是爆破列出所有的字符串组合的MD5值和给出的md5比较，如果相等，返回原字符串，得出flag。


黑客攻击

十几M的流量包，过滤http的东西看下，可以发现一堆base64，解码了解下hacker的行为

```
cd /d "c:\inetpub\wwwroot"&net use \\192.168.30.184\C$ /del&echo [S]&cd&echo [E]
```

Post data Referrer User Agent Cookies

用了个net use与目标机与目标机连接，一个个找太慢，因为题目提示Administrator用户的密码，所以逆向思维一下，在众多的http包一定会有Administrator的base64编码，所以只需要筛选出这个包就可以，对Administrator进行base64编码得到QWRtaW5pc3RyYXRvcg==，随便去掉后面几个字符，筛选http contains QWRtaW5pc3Ry



No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
449	40.632687	192.168.30...	192.168.30...	HTTP	1024	POST /config.php HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)

就剩下一个包，很完美的结果，对里面的base64解码即可看到密码

```
cd /d "c:\inetpub\wwwroot"&net use \\192.168.30.184\C$ "Test!@#123" /u:Administrator&echo [S]&cd&echo [E]
```

Decode11

这题主要考的是比较不常见的差分曼彻斯特编码，除了这个还有费纳姆密码（德军密码）、曼彻斯特解码都是比较少的编码。

首先将十六进制报文转为二进制串，然后按照差分曼切斯特编码就能得到编码前的二进制串，从而得到传感器ID

```
a = 0x3EAAAAA56A69AA55A95995A569AA9556556
b = 0x3EAAAAA56A69AA556A965A5999596AA95656
b2 = bin(b)
print b2
str = ""
for i in range(len(b2[2:])/2):

    a1 = b2[i*2:i*2+2]
    a2 = b2[i*2+2:i*2+4]

    if a2 != '10' and a2 != '01':
        continue
    if a1 != '10' and a1 != '01':
        continue
    if a1!=a2:
        str+='1'
    else:
        str+='0'
print str
print hex(int(ss,2)).upper()
```

好多苍蝇

首先尝试筛选下有没有包含压缩包，可以看到有rar的传输，但是有多个，目测是分段传输，而且全是POST请求。因此过滤 `http.request.method==POST`

```
[HTTP request 1/1]
[Response in frame: 18]
File Data: 143 bytes
HTML Form URL Encoded: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Form item: [{"path":"fly.rar","appid":"","size":525701,"md5":"e023afa4f6579db5becda8fe7861c2d3","sha":"eccbba7aea1d482684374b22e2e7abad2ba86749","sha3
Key: {"path":"fly.rar","appid":"","size":525701,"md5":"e023afa4f6579db5becda8fe7861c2d3","sha":"eccbba7aea1d482684374b22e2e7abad2ba86749","sha3":""}]
Value:
```

可以看到有五个相同的ip，也可以证实猜想

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
13	0.925023	192.168.1.101	14.17.42.24	HTTP	210	POST /cgi-bin/uploadunite?func=CreateFile&&inputf=json&outputf
163	1.864990	192.168.1.101	59.37.116.102	HTTP	110	POST /ftn_handler/0b126a291df43b53f99c4c71209c66fd?bmd5=0b126a
289	2.068360	192.168.1.101	59.37.116.102	HTTP	610	POST /ftn_handler/acbfc77208240d03e6af8c9847ccbdbb?bmd5=acbfc7
431	2.232611	192.168.1.101	59.37.116.102	HTTP	918	POST /ftn_handler/146b038670952f51f18d6e39e894c7de?bmd5=146b03
577	2.364839	192.168.1.101	59.37.116.102	HTTP	782	POST /ftn_handler/f6c7d6eef80795e032064212fd40f2a8?bmd5=f6c7d6
729	3.102710	192.168.1.101	59.37.116.102	HTTP	391	POST /ftn_handler/1ffd8670a499bfb6e90c5f75fffc6555?bmd5=1ffd86
738	3.394152	192.168.1.101	14.17.42.24	HTTP	499	POST /cgi-bin/uploadunite?func=CheckFile&inputf=json&outputf=j
767	5.751789	192.168.1.101	183.60.15.162	HTTP	867	POST /cgi-bin/getinvestigate?sid=x508ZuWvSp9yXFgM HTTP/1.1 (a
781	6.103926	192.168.1.101	14.17.42.24	HTTP	801	POST /cgi-bin/compose_send?sid=x508ZuWvSp9yXFgM HTTP/1.1 (app
10...	7.403270	192.168.1.101	183.60.15.162	HTTP	1042	POST /cgi-bin/getinvestigate?sid=x508ZuWvSp9yXFgM HTTP/1.1 (a

https://blog.csdn.net/qq_34356800

有一个fly.rar压缩包。size为525701，后面的md5主要用于文件传输中，它的目的主要是为了防止文件被篡改，以及验证文件的完整性和文件的版权。md5一出来更加验证了之前的想法。然后分析2-6包，5个数据包中的MediaType域的大小各为131436、131436、131436、131436、1777，共527521，比fly.rar大小525701大1820，多出来的猜想是包头类的信息，平均每个包大364，可以用dd命令去掉。

思路是先将这5个包导出来，然后合成一个完整的压缩包，再查看里面的数据。把5个包以二进制方式全部导出来(选中 media type 导出字节流)

将它们的前364个字节去掉

```
C:\Users\Pamper\Desktop\rar
λ dd if=1 of=new1 bs=1 skip=364
131072+0 records in
131072+0 records out
131072 bytes (131 kB, 128 KiB) copied, 0.603404 s, 217 kB/s

C:\Users\Pamper\Desktop\rar
λ dd if=2 of=new2 bs=1 skip=364
131072+0 records in
131072+0 records out
131072 bytes (131 kB, 128 KiB) copied, 0.687943 s, 191 kB/s

C:\Users\Pamper\Desktop\rar
λ dd if=3 of=new3 bs=1 skip=364
131072+0 records in
131072+0 records out
131072 bytes (131 kB, 128 KiB) copied, 0.598002 s, 219 kB/s

C:\Users\Pamper\Desktop\rar
λ dd if=4 of=new4 bs=1 skip=364
131072+0 records in
131072+0 records out
131072 bytes (131 kB, 128 KiB) copied, 0.634841 s, 206 kB/s

C:\Users\Pamper\Desktop\rar
```

- 合并压缩包

```
λ
C:\Users\Pamper\Desktop\rar
λ cat new{1,2,3,4,5} > fly.rar

C:\Users\Pamper\Desktop\rar
λ
```

- 为了防止切割错误导致整个压缩文件的损坏先验证md5


```
C:\Users\Pamper\Desktop\rar
λ md5sum.exe fly.rar
e023afa4f6579db5becda8fe7861c2d3 *fly.rar

C:\Users\Pamper\Desktop\rar
λ
```



```
encoded
":525701,"md5":"e023afa4f6579db5becda8fe7861c2d3","sha":"ecccb
i701,"md5":"e023afa4f6579db5becda8fe7861c2d3","sha":"ecccb7aea
```

打开后发现是空的【WTF?】




https://blog.csdn.net/qq_34356800

用winhex打开发现开头和结尾都没出现错误，所以猜想是出现伪加密导致

由于我使用的是7-zip，rar压缩包的伪加密在7-zip的表现是打开没有任何东西，而对于zip的伪加密则是会出现报错或者加密。

可参考 <https://ctf-wiki.github.io/ctf-wiki/misc/archive/rar/>

将7484改为7480保存即可，得到flag.txt，打开又是一堆乱码，file一下是个exe文件，改后缀运行【WTF?】在此终于理解了这题目的涵义



- 想着难道接下来要逆向一波？试试最后的挣扎，暴力分离

```

7800 0xE7658 PNG image, 60 x 60, 8-bit/color RGBA, non-interlaced
8758 0xE7A16 Zlib compressed data, best compression
1788 0xE85EC PNG image, 60 x 60, 8-bit/color RGBA, non-interlaced
2746 0xE89AA Zlib compressed data, best compression
5792 0xE9590 PNG image, 60 x 60, 8-bit/color RGBA, non-interlaced
6750 0xE994E Zlib compressed data, best compression
0140 0xEA68C PNG image, 60 x 60, 8-bit/color RGBA, non-interlaced
1098 0xEAA4A Zlib compressed data, best compression
4436 0xEB754 PNG image, 60 x 60, 8-bit/color RGBA, non-interlaced
5394 0xEBB12 Zlib compressed data, best compression
8740 0xEC824 PNG image, 60 x 60, 8-bit/color RGBA, non-interlaced
9698 0xECBE2 Zlib compressed data, best compression
3060 0xED904 PNG image, 60 x 60, 8-bit/color RGBA, non-interlaced
4018 0xEDCC2 Zlib compressed data, best compression
9947 0xEF3EB PC bitmap, Windows 3.x format, 49 x 23 x 8
0196 0xF1BF4 XML document, version: "1.0"
1232 0xF2000 PNG image, 280 x 280, 1-bit colormap, non-interlaced

```

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- binwalk分析最后有张png，dd分离出来得到一张二维码，GETFLAG

```

C:\Users\Pamper\Desktop
λ dd if=flag.txt.exe of=flag.png bs=1 skip=991232
646+0 records in
646+0 records out
646 bytes copied, 0.0155504 s, 41.5 kB/s

```

至此AK

杂项

Decode1 50	Decode5 50	流量分析 100	A记录 100
Password 100	Decode2 100	Decode3 100	Decode4 100
WTF? 100	Decode8 100	Decode9 100	我的USB 150
我下载了什么 150	日志记录 150	注入过程 150	Decode7 150
Decode10 150	黑客攻击 200	Decode11 200	好多苍蝇 250

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