

IceCTF 2016

原创

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分类专栏: [CTF](#)

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涨姿势

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Corrupt Transmission

[原题](#)

Corrupt Transmission



分值：30分 类型：Basic 未解答

题目：We intercepted this image, but it must have gotten corrupted during the transmission. Can you try and fix it? [corrupt.png](#)

Flag :

http://blog.csdn.net/sinat_34200786

提交

解题思路

PNG图片格式

WriteUp

已知PNG是损坏的，拿张正常的PNG对比，一下就可以发现题目的PNG前几个字节不对

```
corrupt.png 配置.PNG
Offset(h) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
00000000 B9 50 4E 47 0D 0A 1A 0A 00 00 00 0D 49 48 44 52 PNG.....IHDR
00000010 00 00 03 E9 00 00 01 F8 08 06 00 00 00 36 28 AC
00000020 68 00 00 00 01 73 52 47 42 00 2F CF 1C F9 00 00
```

```
corrupt.png 配置.PNG
Offset(h) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
00000000 90 50 4E 47 0E 1A 0A 1B 00 00 00 0D 49 48 44 52 PNG.....IHDR
00000010 00 00 01 F4 00 00 01 98 08 06 00 00 00 B4 E0 10
00000020 7B 00 00 00 06 62 4B 42 44 00 2F CF 1C F9 00 00
```

将正确的字节替换错误的字节保存即可



Blue Monday

原题

Blue Monday



分值：80分 类型：Misc 已解答

题目：Those who came before me lived through their vocations From the past until completion, they'll turn away no more And still I find it so hard to say what I need to say But I'm quite sure that you'll tell me just how I should feel today. [blue_monday](#)

Flag :

提交

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解题思路

观察法

WriteUp

不知道是什么文件，用HxD看看再说

```
blue_monday
Offset(h) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
00000000 4D 54 68 64 00 00 00 06 00 01 00 01 00 DC 4D 54 MThd.....ÜMT
00000010 72 6B 00 00 01 BE 00 90 49 64 81 5C 80 49 00 00 rk...%.Id.\€I..
00000020 90 63 64 81 5C 80 63 00 00 90 65 64 81 5C 80 65 .cd.\€c...ed.\€e
00000030 00 00 90 43 64 81 5C 80 43 00 00 90 54 64 81 5C ...Cd.\€C...Td.\
```

可以知道这是MIDI文件，播放一遍后没发现异常，准备用Audacity看看，这时发现了关键信息

```
blue_monday
Offset(h) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
00000000 4D 54 68 64 00 00 00 06 00 01 00 01 00 DC 4D 54 MThd.....ÜMT
00000010 72 6B 00 00 01 BE 00 90 49 64 81 5C 80 49 00 00 rk...%.Id.\€I..
00000020 90 63 64 81 5C 80 63 00 00 90 65 64 81 5C 80 65 .cd.\€c...ed.\€e
00000030 00 00 90 43 64 81 5C 80 43 00 00 90 54 64 81 5C Cd.\€C...Td.\
00000040 80 54 00 00 90 46 64 81 5C 80 46 00 00 90 7B 64 €T...Fd.\€F...{d
00000050 81 5C 80 7B 00 00 90 48 64 81 5C 80 48 00 00 90 .\€{...Hd.\€H...
00000060 41 64 81 5C 80 41 00 00 90 63 64 81 5C 80 63 00 Ad.\€A...cd.\€c.
00000070 00 90 6B 64 81 5C 80 6B 00 00 90 31 64 81 5C 80 ..kd.\€k...ld.\€
00000080 31 00 00 90 6E 64 81 5C 80 6E 00 00 90 39 64 81 l...nd.\€n...9d.
00000090 5C 80 39 00 00 90 5F 64 81 5C 80 5F 00 00 90 6D \€9..._d.\€_...m
000000A0 64 81 5C 80 6D 00 00 90 55 64 81 5C 80 55 00 00 d.\€m...Ud.\€U..
000000B0 90 35 64 81 5C 80 35 00 00 90 49 64 81 5C 80 49 .5d.\€5...Id.\€I
000000C0 00 00 90 63 64 81 5C 80 63 00 00 90 5F 64 81 5C ...cd.\€c..._d.\
000000D0 80 5F 00 00 90 57 64 81 5C 80 57 00 00 90 31 64 €...Wd.\€W...ld
000000E0 81 5C 80 31 00 00 90 37 64 81 5C 80 37 00 00 90 .\€l...7d.\€7...
000000F0 68 64 81 5C 80 68 00 00 90 5F 64 81 5C 80 5F 00 hd.\€h..._d.\€_
00000100 00 90 6D 64 81 5C 80 6D 00 00 90 49 64 81 5C 80 ..md.\€m...Id.\€
00000110 49 00 00 90 44 64 81 5C 80 44 00 00 90 31 64 81 I...Dd.\€D...ld.
```

在字节数据中发现了IceCTF，这不就是flag的开头吗？接下来还有
' ('符号和') '符号，可以肯定flag就在其中，那么只要一个字符抄下来即可

Rotated!

原题

Rotated!



分值 : 10分 类型 : Crypto 未解答

题目 : They went and ROTated the flag by 5 and then ROTated it by 8! The scoundrels! Any way once they were done this was all that was left VprPGS{jnvg_bar_cyhf_1_vf_3?}
tips : flag格式是IceCTF

Flag :

提交

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解题思路

ROT13

WriteUp

rot13

```
IceCTF {wait_one_plus_1_is_3?}
```

Rot13 编码 Rot13 解码 拷贝 剪切 粘贴 清除

http://blog.csdn.net/sinat_34200786

All your Base are belong to us

原题

分值：20分 类型：Misc 已解答

题目：What a mess... we got a raw flag but now what do we do... [flag.txt](#)

Flag :

提交

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解题思路

二进制转ASCII

WriteUp

```
01001001 01100011 01100101 01000011 01010100 01000110 01111011 01100001 01101100 00110001 01011111
01101101 01111001 01011111 01100010 01100001 01110011 01100101 01110011 01011111 01100001 01110010
01100101 01011111 01111001 01101111 01110101 01110010 01110011 01011111 01100001 01101110 01100100
01011111 01100001 01101100 01101100 01011111 01111001 00110000 01110101 01110010 01011111 01100010
01100001 01110011 01100101 01110011 01011111 01100001 01110010 01100101 01011111 01101101 01101001
01101110 01100101 01111101
```

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将前面两个转为十进制再转为ASCII对照一下就可以发现是要将所有二进制转为ASCII

```
f = open('01.txt','r')
numList = []

for line in f.readlines():
    numList += list(line.rstrip().split(' '))

s = ''
for n in numList:
    s += chr(int(n,2))

print(s)
```

Thor's a hacker now

[原题](#)

分值：60分

类型：Misc

已解答

题目：Thor has been staring at this for hours and he can't make any sense out of it, can you help him figure out what it is? [thor.txt](#)

Flag：

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提交

解题思路

LZIP是Linux压缩文件

WriteUp

```

00000000: 4c5a 4950 01b3 007f b61b edf0 8440 58e3 LZIP.....@X.
00000010: 91de 1027 5861 8a67 4282 46a4 92f9 4cad ...'Ya.gB.F...L.
00000020: 2d5d 14eb 3099 2c31 01c2 d13a 74d2 c620 -]..O.,1...:t..
00000030: de27 3a8f fa92 0644 5468 2d02 01fa 24bb .' :...DThr...$.
00000040: 719f a0fd a191 1678 8bff a2c4 2627 9871 q.....x...&'.q
00000050: 83bf cff2 f8af 99fa c465 2b7c 6bdf ee3c .....e+|k.<
00000060: b71b f61b 0b5e 0ce7 d14f f6a8 0466 6470 .....^...O...fdp
00000070: de67 02da 7be1 1abd e9f0 ac87 131a bcc0 .g..{|.....
00000080: 0b0b 9f31 9400 48e3 616a 8f3f 4804 79ad ...1..H.aj.?H.y.
00000090: a6bb 863a f641 01da b1ee c4fe b338 9289 ....:A.....8..
000000a0: 2a90 8302 4170 773c 88d3 2641 d274 f533 *...Apw<..&A.t.3
000000b0: 84cf e7d9 f687 3b12 1516 970e 04c2 cfdd .....;.....
000000c0: c1ca dc46 981d 2a7c 1b39 cb0b 4f8c 58cc ...F..*|.9..O.X.
000000d0: 46b4 9744 4cb1 fbd3 c632 f36d ecbf 4789 F..DL...2.m..G.
000000e0: 00b8 d4fc 51a8 394e de2a 1a2d 3c43 179c ....Q.9N.*-<C..
000000f0: 9623 f971 2935 9564 9e15 c771 c3d5 d8b1 ).#.q)5.d...q...
00000100: a7fa 3c0c f869 b829 f6d6 f145 6d57 b3a1 ..<..i.)...EmW..
00000110: bd3f 3fc2 a41f 7e35 089c de29 1d55 debf .??...~5...).U..
00000120: 5400 c548 5c02 cd6c f853 e3e6 56b2 e395 T..H\..l.S..V...
00000130: 29d8 3985 d307 d46e 854c 4987 aab8 a5cb ).9...n.LI.....
00000140: 2fea 6b20 6d24 34b3 a2a3 c8e4 247c 6681 /.k n$4....$|f.
00000150: 51db 7851 752e 4186 2db9 01ae 39ae fed0 Q.xQu.A.-...9...
00000160: 7a77 a8e7 82b2 c78c 272b e621 44d2 03a3 zw.....'+!D...
00000170: f3fb adf9 18b4 681a e4e4 5b17 3c66 128c .....h...[.<f..
00000180: f544 4124 0083 6db4 0e6b be29 2142 16b7 .DA$.m.k.)!B..
00000190: dd6e 9b78 26a6 71b1 2ec2 dfce 2d6e 8d01 .n.x&.q.....-n..
000001a0: 1786 d101 f184 a798 b0eb c3c8 8a0c a867 .http://blog.csdn.net/sinat_34200786
000001b0: 34e7 0e71 c350 722e e1bc 8913 cfb3 e6bf 4...P...

```

很明显这是某种文件在十六进制查看工具下的数据分布，开头的前几个bytes说明了文件类型：LZIP

将数据部分提取出来后粘贴到HxD中生成文件，Linux下解压即可




```

f = open('in.txt', 'r')
f2 = open('out.txt', 'w')

for line in f.readlines():
    line = line[10:50]+'\\n'
    f2.write(line)

f.close()
f2.close()

```



Scavenger Hunt

原題

Scavenger Hunt



分值：40分 类型：Misc 已解答

题目：There is a flag hidden somewhere on our website, do you think you can find it? Good luck!

Flag:

提交

http://blog.csdn.net/sinat_34200786

解题思路

那就找吧

WriteUp

整个网站下载下来就容易找了

```
root@kali:~# wget -r https://icec.tf
--2017-09-28 21:04:40-- https://icec.tf/
正在解析主机 icec.tf (icec.tf)... 104.28.21.215, 104.28.20.215, 2400:cb00:2048:1
::681c:14d7, ...
正在连接 icec.tf (icec.tf)|104.28.21.215|:443... 已连接。
已发出 HTTP 请求，正在等待回应... 200 OK
长度：未指定 [text/html]
正在保存至：“icec.tf/index.html”

icec.tf/index.html [ <=> ] 9.97K 56.7KB/s in 0.2s
2017-09-28 21:04:43 (56.7 KB/s) - “icec.tf/index.html” 已保存 [10214]

正在载入 robots.txt；请忽略错误消息。
--2017-09-28 21:04:43-- https://icec.tf/robots.txt
再次使用存在的到 icec.tf:443 的连接。
已发出 HTTP 请求，正在等待回应... 404 NOT FOUND
2017-09-28 21:04:44 错误 404：NOT FOUND。

--2017-09-28 21:04:44-- https://icec.tf/apple-touch-icon-57x57.png
再次使用存在的到 icec.tf:443 的连接。
已发出 HTTP 请求，正在等待回应... 200 OK
长度：721 [image/png]
正在保存至：“icec.tf/apple-touch-icon-57x57.png”
```

```
root@kali:~/icec.tf# grep -ir icectf{ *
sponsors: 
root@kali:~/icec.tf#
```

R.I.P Transmission

原题

R.I.P Transmission



分值：40分 类型：Basic 已解答

题目：[this](#) seems to be receiving some sort of transmission. Our experts have been working around the clock trying and figure out what the hell it means with no hope of getting to the bottom of it. You're our only hope.

Flag:

提交

http://blog.csdn.net/sinat_34200786

解题思路

Binwalk, 爆破

WriteUp

直接仍Binwalk里面可以发现隐藏有zip文件

```
root@kali:~# binwalk rip
DECIMAL      HEXADECIMAL  DESCRIPTION
-----
0            0x0          ELF, 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1
(GNU/Linux)
993400      0xF2878     Unix path: /usr/lib/locale/locale-archive
1014524     0xF7AFC     Unix path: /proc/sys/vm/overcommit_memory
1024257     0xFA101     Unix path: /proc/sys/kernel/rtsig-max
1025342     0xFA53E     Unix path: /sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/getcwd.c
1027000     0xFABB8     Unix path: /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease
1093862     0x10B0E6    Unix path: /nptl/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/i386/./f
ork.c
1097017     0x10BD39    ELF, 32-bit LSB no file type, (SYSV)
1100142     0x10C96E    Unix path: /sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/dl-origin.c
1323949     0x1433AD    Zip archive data, encrypted at least v2.0 to extra
ct, compressed size: 112199, uncompressed size: 112190, name: rip.jpg
1436306     0x15EA92    End of Zip archive
```

提取出来发现需要密码，爆破即可



Audio Problems

原题

Audio Problems

分值: 20分 类型: Basic 未解答

题目: We intercepted [the audio signal](#) it sounds like there could be something hidden in it. Can you take a look and see if you can find anything?

Flag:

提交


http://blog.csdn.net/sinat_34200786

解题思路


Audacity? 还是要sox

WriteUp

惯例先上Audacity，频谱图有发现，不过好像太模糊了



怎么看都看不清，怎么办，sox试试啊



涨姿势点

sox, the Swiss Army knife of sound processing programs
掌握基本用法

Intercepted Conversations Pt.1

原题

Intercepted Conversations Pt.1

分值：60分 类型：Basic 已解答

题目：This traffic was picked up by one of our agents. We think this might be a conversation between two elite hackers that we are investigating. Can you see if you can analyze the data? [intercept.pcapng](#)

Flag：

提交

http://blog.csdn.net/sinat_34200786


解题思路

键盘数据包，tshark提取数据，Dvorak键盘

WriteUp

参考资料

从后缀 '.pcapng' 为截取的数据包，Wireshark查看证实是usb通信的数据包




No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
325	39.912984	host	3.21.1	USB	64	URB_INTERRUPT in
324	39.912965	3.21.1	host	USB	72	URB_INTERRUPT in
323	39.800984	host	3.21.1	USB	64	URB_INTERRUPT in
322	39.800965	3.21.1	host	USB	72	URB_INTERRUPT in
321	39.712994	host	3.21.1	USB	64	URB_INTERRUPT in
320	39.712974	3.21.1	host	USB	72	URB_INTERRUPT in
319	39.536985	host	3.21.1	USB	64	URB_INTERRUPT in
318	39.536952	3.21.1	host	USB	72	URB_INTERRUPT in
317	39.336976	host	3.21.1	USB	64	URB_INTERRUPT in
316	39.336950	3.21.1	host	USB	72	URB_INTERRUPT in

那么应该就是要从里面提取键盘输入的数据，用tshark完成

```
tshark -r interceptpt1.pcapng -T fields -e usb.capdata -Y 'usb.capdata && usb.transfer_type == 0x01 && frame.len == 72' >cap.txt
```

提取的数据如下

02 和 20 开头的数据表示输入的是大写
02 = 20 = shift



学过汇编应该都知道系统在读取键盘输入时在缓冲区存储的是字母的代码，例如G的代码是0x0a，前面的02或者20控制大写，那么我们就把代码转换为字母

可是转换后会发现根本就不是flag，这个时候就要用到另一种键盘，Dvorak键盘，它的字母排列和我们常用的键盘不同，只要在根据：

```

#代码修改自 @Jhonathan Davi
hids_codes = {"0x04":"a","0x05":"b","0x06":"c","0x07":"d","0x08":"e","0x09":"f","0x0A":"g","0x0B":"h","0x0C":"i",
,"0x0D":"j","0x0E":"k","0x0F":"l","0x10":"m","0x11":"n","0x12":"o","0x13":"p","0x14":"q","0x15":"r","0x16":"s",
"0x17":"t","0x18":"u","0x19":"v","0x1A":"w","0x1B":"x","0x1C":"y","0x1D":"z","0x1E":"1","0x1F":"2","0x20":"3","0x
21":"4","0x22":"5","0x23":"6","0x24":"7","0x25":"8","0x26":"9","0x27":"0","0x36":",","0x33":":","0x28":"\n","0x2
C":",","0x2D":"_","0x2E":"=","0x2F":"{","0x30":"}"}

layout_dvorak = { 'q':'"', 'w':',', 'e':'.', 'r': 'p', 't': 'y', 'y': 'f', 'u': 'g', 'i': 'c', 'o': 'r', 'p': 'l', '_':
'_', ':': 's', '[': '/', '{': '{', '}'': '}', ']': '=', 'a': 'a', 's': 'o', 'd': 'e', 'f': 'u', 'g': 'i', 'h': 'd', 'j': 'h', '
k': 't', 'l': 'n', ';': 's', "'": '-', 'z': ';', 'x': 'q', 'c': 'j', 'v': 'k', 'b': 'x', 'n': 'b', 'm': 'm', ',': 'w', '.': 'v
', ':': 'z', ' ': ' ', 'Q': '"', 'W': ',', 'E': '.', 'R': 'P', 'T': 'Y', 'Y': 'F', 'U': 'G', 'I': 'C', 'O': 'R', 'P': 'L', 'A':
'A', 'S': 'O', 'D': 'E', 'F': 'U', 'G': 'I', 'H': 'D', 'J': 'H', 'K': 'T', 'L': 'N', ';': 'S', "'": '-', 'Z': ';', 'X': 'Q',
'C': 'J', 'V': 'K', 'B': 'X', 'N': 'B', 'M': 'M', '0': '0', '1': '1', '2': '2', '3': '3', '4': '4', '5': '5', '6': '6', '7': '7', '7':
'7', '8': '8', '9': '9'}

flag = ''

file = open('cap.txt','r')
for line in file.readlines():
    spli = line.split(':')
    conv = '0x'+spli[2].upper()
    if conv in hids_codes:
        if spli[0] == '00':
            flag += layout_dvorak[hids_codes[conv]]
        else:
            flag += layout_dvorak[hids_codes[conv].upper()]

print(flag)

```

```

root@kali:~# python cap.py
IceCTF{wh0_l1K3S_qw3R7Y_4NYw4y5}
http://blog.csdn.net/sinat\_34200786

```

涨姿势点

- Wireshark能抓取不同端口的数据包
- tshark的基本用法
- Dvorak键盘的排列不同于普通键盘

Intercepted Conversations Pt.1

[原题](#)

Intercepted Conversations Pt.2



分值 : 50分 类型 : Basic 未解答

题目 :

We managed to intercept more of the [hacker traffic](#) unfortunately since our last encounter they have figured out that they're being watched. They've gotten more clever in their communication so we need you to try to make sense of this traffic.

Flag :

http://blog.csdn.net/sinat_34200786

提交

解题思路

Wireshark发现关键信息及提取文件，反编译pyc，算法逆向

WriteUp

参考资料

Wireshark分析数据包可以发现有个IRC网络的，解析几个数据包可以发现有人正在通信

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000000	192.168.1.149	176.31.102.84	IRC	90	Request (PRIVMSG)
2	0.094464960	176.31.102.84	192.168.1.149	TCP	66	6667-58558 [ACK]
3	4.367527129	176.31.102.84	192.168.1.149	IRC	135	Response (PRIVMSG)
4	4.367561200	192.168.1.149	176.31.102.84	TCP	66	58558-6667 [ACK]
5	6.456027201	192.168.1.149	176.31.102.84	IRC	105	Request (PRIVMSG)
6	6.624287283	176.31.102.84	192.168.1.149	TCP	66	6667-58558 [ACK]
7	9.487549734	176.31.102.84	192.168.1.149	IRC	137	Response (PRIVMSG)
8	9.487590355	192.168.1.149	176.31.102.84	TCP	66	58558-6667 [ACK]
9	11.808372854	192.168.1.149	176.31.102.84	IRC	94	Request (PRIVMSG)
10	11.866230921	176.31.102.84	192.168.1.149	TCP	66	6667-58558 [ACK]
11	14.505332780	176.31.102.84	192.168.1.149	IRC	160	Response (PRIVMSG)
12	14.505368211	192.168.1.149	176.31.102.84	TCP	66	58558-6667 [ACK]
13	17.787394926	192.168.1.149	176.31.102.84	IRC	92	Request (PING)
14	17.845304334	176.31.102.84	192.168.1.149	TCP	66	6667-58558 [ACK]
15	17.845729391	176.31.102.84	192.168.1.149	IRC	122	Response (PONG)
16	17.845758936	192.168.1.149	176.31.102.84	TCP	66	58558-6667 [ACK]
17	23.004562251	176.31.102.84	192.168.1.149	IRC	174	Response (PRIVMSG)
18	23.004599105	192.168.1.149	176.31.102.84	TCP	66	58558-6667 [ACK]
19	25.824179096	192.168.1.149	176.31.102.84	IRC	112	Request (PRIVMSG)
20	25.918741233	176.31.102.84	192.168.1.149	TCP	66	6667-58558 [ACK]
21	30.889809106	176.31.102.84	192.168.1.149	IRC	136	Response (PRIVMSG)
22	30.889860207	192.168.1.149	176.31.102.84	TCP	66	58558-6667 [ACK]
23	30.889860207	192.168.1.149	176.31.102.84	TCP	66	58558-6667 [ACK]

▼ Request: PRIVMSG Cold_Storm :Hi
 Command: PRIVMSG
 ▼ Command parameters
 Parameter: Cold_Storm
 Trailer: Hi

```

0000 b4 75 0e e3 73 54 28 b2 bd 02 f8 32 08 00 45 00 .u..sT(. ...2..E.
0010 00 4c 65 58 40 00 40 06 fc a2 c0 a8 01 95 b0 1f .LeX@.@. ....
0020 66 54 e4 be 1a 0b e9 69 88 83 1a 98 5f 56 80 18 fT.....i ..._V..
0030 01 2b 72 5f 00 00 01 01 08 0a 04 9b 18 55 40 87 .+r.... ....U@.
0040 48 77 50 52 49 56 4d 53 47 20 43 6f 6c 64 5f 53 HwPRIVMSG G Cold_S
0050 74 6f 72 6d 20 3a 48 69 0d 0a torm :Hi .net/sinat_34200786
  
```

```

-----
28 b2 bd 02 f8 32 b4 75 0e e3 73 54 08 00 45 00 (...2.u ..sT..E.
00 79 e8 93 40 00 37 06 82 3a b0 1f 66 54 c0 a8 .y..@.7. ...fT..
01 95 1a 0b e4 be 1a 98 5f 56 e9 69 88 9b 80 18 ....._V.i....
00 e3 30 11 00 00 01 01 08 0a 40 87 58 8c 04 9b ..0..... ..@.X...
18 55 3a 43 6f 6c 64 5f 53 74 6f 72 6d 21 7e 66 .U:Cold_Storm!~f
69 6e 61 6c 43 40 6c 6f 63 61 6c 68 6f 73 74 20 inalC@lo calhost
50 52 49 56 4d 53 47 20 49 63 65 5f 56 65 6e 6f PRIVMSG Ice_Veno
6d 20 3a 49 74 27 73 20 6e 6f 74 20 73 61 66 65 m :It's not safe
20 68 65 72 65 0d 0a here..
  
```

```

892329124 192.168.1.149 176.31.102.84 TCP 66 58558-6667 [ACK] Seq=19
747782532 176.31.102.84 192.168.1.149 IRC 159 Response (PRIVMSG)
747844288 192.168.1.149 176.31.102.84 TCP 66 58558-6667 [ACK] Seq=19
tamps: TSval 1082628712, TSecr 77287540
d: Time Stamp Option (8)
gth: 10
estamp value: 1082628712
estamp echo reply: 77287540
bd 02 f8 32 b4 75 0e e3 73 54 08 00 45 00 (...).2.u ..sT..E.
e8 a0 40 00 37 06 82 15 b0 1f 66 54 c0 a8 ....@.7. ....fT..
1a 0b e4 be 1a 98 61 ce e9 69 89 40 80 18 ..... a..i.@..
ed cf 00 00 01 01 08 0a 40 87 9a 68 04 9b ..... ..@..h..
3a 43 6f 6c 64 5f 53 74 6f 72 6d 21 7e 66 Pt:Cold_Storm!~f
61 6c 43 40 6c 6f 63 61 6c 68 6f 73 74 20 inalC@lo calhost
49 56 4d 53 47 20 49 63 65 5f 56 65 6e 6f PRIVMSG Ice_Veno
3a 01 44 43 43 20 53 45 4e 44 20 65 6e 63 m :.DCC SEND enc
65 2e 70 79 63 20 31 34 39 34 33 32 32 30 ode.pyc 14943220
20 31 31 31 37 20 31 37 33 37 01 0d 0a 64 1117 1737...

```

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从截取的对话可以发现通信方发送了一个名为 encode.pyc 的文件，我们可以在接下来的几个TCP协议的数据包的data段获取该文件

```

34 75.337855123 89.17.139.144 192.168.1.149 TCP 66 [TCP Window]
35 75.343092841 89.17.139.144 192.168.1.149 TCP 1514 1117-52694
36 75.343120176 192.168.1.149 89.17.139.144 TCP 66 52694-1117
Timestamp echo reply: 77295773
▶ [SEQ/ACK analysis]
Data: (1448 bytes)
Data: 160d0d0ac1b1a757a8030000e30000000000000000000000...
[Length: 1448]
40 70 9d 16 0d 0d 0a c1 b1 a7 57 a8 03 00 00 e3 00 p..... .W.....
50 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 40 ..... @...@
60 00 00 00 73 a8 02 00 00 64 00 00 64 01 00 6c 00 ...s.... d..d..l.
70 00 5a 00 00 64 00 00 64 01 00 6c 01 00 5a 01 00 .Z..d..d ..l..Z..
80 64 02 00 64 03 00 64 04 00 64 05 00 64 06 00 64 d..d..d. .d..d..d
90 07 00 64 08 00 64 09 00 64 0a 00 64 0b 00 64 0c ..d..d.. d..d..d.
a0 00 64 0d 00 64 0e 00 64 0f 00 64 10 00 64 11 00 .d..d..d ..d..d..
b0 64 12 00 64 13 00 64 14 00 64 15 00 64 16 00 64 d..d..d. .d..d..d
c0 17 00 64 18 00 64 19 00 64 1a 00 64 1b 00 64 1c ..d..d.. d..d..d.
d0 00 64 1d 00 64 1e 00 64 1f 00 64 20 00 64 21 00 .d..d..d ..d .d!.
e0 64 22 00 64 23 00 64 24 00 64 25 00 64 26 00 64 d" d# d$ .d% .d& d
f0 27 00 64 28 00 64 29 00 64 2a 00 64 2b 00 64 2c ".d(.d). d*.d+.d,

```

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然后我们在通信的最后可以发现通信方发送了一个字符串
 'wmkvw680HDzDqMK6UBXCHDXtC7CosKmw7R9w7JLwr/CoT44UcKNwp7D1lpWwo3Dts0ID8OPTcOWwrzDp13CTMOKw4PCoIrCpXUYRh

52	107.978385597	192.168.1.149	176.31.102.84	TCP	66 58558-6667
53	123.120288443	192.168.1.149	176.31.102.84	IRC	224 Request (P
54	123.216982291	176.31.102.84	192.168.1.149	TCP	66 6667-58558

▼ Request: PRIVMSG Cold_Storm :Wmkvw680HDzDqMK6UBXChDXCtC7CosKmw7R9w7JLwr/CoT44UcKNwp7
Command: PRIVMSG
▼ Command parameters
Parameter: Cold_Storm
Trailer: Wmkvw680HDzDqMK6UBXChDXCtC7CosKmw7R9w7JLwr/CoT44UcKNwp7D1lpPwo3Dts0ID80PT

0020	66 54 e4 be 1a 0b e9 69 89 8c 1a 98 62 9b 80 18	fT.....ib...
0030	01 2b dc ae 00 00 01 01 08 0a 04 9b a8 9d 40 87	.+.....
0040	bd d4 50 52 49 56 4d 53 47 20 43 6f 6c 64 5f 53	..PRIVMSG G Cold_S
0050	74 6f 72 6d 20 3a 57 6d 6b 76 77 36 38 30 48 44	torm :Wm kvw680HD
0060	7a 44 71 4d 4b 36 55 42 58 43 68 44 58 43 74 43	zDqMK6UB XChDXCtC
0070	37 43 6f 73 4b 6d 77 37 52 39 77 37 4a 4c 77 72	7CosKmw7 R9w7JLwr
0080	2f 43 6f 54 34 34 55 63 4b 4e 77 70 37 44 6c 6c	/CoT44Uc KNwp7D1l
0090	70 50 77 6f 33 44 74 73 4f 49 44 38 4f 50 54 63	pPwo3Dts 0ID80PTc
00a0	4f 57 77 72 7a 44 70 69 33 43 74 4d 4f 4b 77 34	0WwrzDpi 3CtMOKw4
00b0	50 43 6f 6c 72 43 70 58 55 59 52 68 58 43 68 4d	PColrCpX UYRhXChM
00c0	4b 39 77 36 50 44 68 78 66 44 69 63 4f 64 77 6f	K9w6PDhx fDic0dwo
00d0	41 67 77 70 67 4e 77 35 2f 43 76 77 3d 3d 0d 0a	AgwpgNw5 /Cvw==...

Google之后知道 .pyc文件是python文件编译后的文件，那么我们反编译后就可以获得 .py 文件，推测和最后一个字符串的加密有

把获取到的文件数据粘贴进HxD中生成 .pyc 文件

接下来进行反编译，网上有在线反编译的，不过对于这个文件来说效果不好，那么就自己反编译，这里用到python的'uncompyle6'，

这里顺便提一下文件开头的 16 0D的含义，这是magic number，不同版本编译出来的 .pyc 文件的magic number是不同的，具体python 3.5b2 这在uncompyle6进行反编译时也会有提示

```
root@kali: ~
文件(F) 编辑(E) 查看(V) 搜索(S) 终端(T) 帮助(H)
root@kali:~# uncomply6 1.pyc
# uncomply6 version 2.11.5
# Python bytecode 3.5 (3350)
# Decompiled from: Python 2.7.12+ (default, Aug 4 2016, 20:04:34)
# [GCC 6.1.1 20160724]
# Embedded file name: encode.py
# Compiled at: 2016-08-08 06:10:09
# Size of source mod 2**32: 936 bytes
import random
import base64
P = [
    27, 35, 50, 11, 8, 20, 44, 30, 6, 1, 5, 2, 33, 16, 36, 64, 3, 61, 54, 25, 12, 21,
    1, 26, 10, 57, 53, 38, 56, 58, 37, 43, 17, 42, 47, 4, 14, 7, 46, 34, 19, 23, 40,
    63, 18, 45, 60, 13, 15, 22, 9, 62, 51, 32, 55, 29, 24, 41, 39, 49, 52, 48, 28,
    31, 59]
S = [68, 172, 225, 210, 148, 172, 72, 38, 208, 227, 0, 240, 193, 67, 122, 108, 2
    52, 57, 174, 197, 83, 236, 16, 226, 133, 94, 104, 228, 135, 251, 150, 52, 85, 56
    , 174, 105, 215, 251, 111, 77, 44, 116, 128, 196, 43, 210, 214, 203, 109, 65, 15
    7, 222, 93, 74, 209, 50, 11, 172, 247, 111, 80, 143, 70, 89]
inp = input()
inp += ''.join((chr(random.randint(0, 47)) for _ in range(64 - len(inp) % 64)))
ans = ['' for i in range(len(inp))]
for j in range(0, len(inp), 64):
    for i in range(64):
        ans[j + P[i] - 1] = chr((ord(inp[j + i]) + S[i]) % 256)
ans = ''.join(ans)
print(base64.b64encode(ans.encode('utf8')).decode('utf8'))
```

然后我们就得到了加密的 .py 文件

```
import random          #加密 .py
import base64

P = [
    27, 35, 50, 11, 8, 20, 44, 30, 6, 1, 5, 2, 33, 16, 36, 64, 3, 61, 54, 25, 12, 21, 26, 10, 57, 53, 38, 56, 58, 3
    7, 43, 17, 42, 47, 4, 14, 7, 46, 34, 19, 23, 40, 63, 18, 45, 60, 13, 15, 22, 9, 62, 51, 32, 55, 29, 24, 41, 39,
    49, 52, 48, 28, 31, 59]

inp = input()
inp += ''.join((chr(random.randint(0, 47)) for _ in range(64 - len(inp) % 64)))
ans = ['' for i in range(len(inp))]

for j in range(0, len(inp), 64):
    for i in range(64):
        ans[j + P[i] - 1] = chr((ord(inp[j + i]) + S[i]) % 256)

ans = ''.join(ans)
print(base64.b64encode(ans.encode('utf8')).decode('utf8'))
```

分析加密代码后写出解密代码，解密最后一个字符串即可

```

# Offsec Research CTF Team

import random, base64, string, sys

P = [27, 35, 50, 11, 8, 20, 44, 30, 6, 1, 5, 2, 33, 16, 36, 64, 3, 61, 54, 25, 12, 21, 26, 10, 57, 53, 38, 56, 5
8, 37,
 43, 17, 42, 47, 4, 14, 7, 46, 34, 19, 23, 40, 63, 18, 45, 60, 13, 15, 22, 9, 62, 51, 32, 55, 29, 24, 41, 39, 49
,
 52, 48, 28, 31, 59]

S = [68, 172, 225, 210, 148, 172, 72, 38, 208, 227, 0, 240, 193, 67, 122, 108, 252, 57, 174, 197, 83, 236, 16, 2
26, 133,
 94, 104, 228, 135, 251, 150, 52, 85, 56, 174, 105, 215, 251, 111, 77, 44, 116, 128, 196, 43, 210, 214, 203, 109
,
 65, 157, 222, 93, 74, 209, 50, 11, 172, 247, 111, 80, 143, 70, 89]

# comment these lines if not running under python2
reload(sys)
sys.setdefaultencoding('utf8')

# Get the encoded flag and do the conversions in reverse order
ans = ((base64.b64decode(sys.argv[1])).encode('utf8')).decode('utf8')

# Create a list with length of character in ans (encoded flag)
ans_list = list(ans)

# Create empty inp list
inp = ['' for i in range(len(ans))]

for j in range(0, len(ans), 64):
    for i in range(64):
        # Try every printable ascii character and if the equation is satisfied, we've found one character of the
        initial input
        for c in string.printable:
            if (ans_list[j + P[i] - 1] == unichr(((ord(c) + S[i]) % 256))):
                inp[j + i] = c

inp = ''.join(inp)
print(inp)

```

```

root@kali:~# python 111.py Wmkvw680HDzDqMK6UBXChDXCtC7CosKmw7R9w7JLwr/CoT44UcKNw
p7Dl1pW03Dts0ID80PTc0WwrrzDpi3CtM0Kw4PCoLrCpXUYRhXChMK9w6PDhxfDic0dwoAgwpgNw5/Cv
W==
IceCTF{4Lw4y5_US3_5s1_AnD_n3VR4r_mAKe_Y0ur_0wN_cRyp70}
IceCTF{4Lw4y5_US3_5s1_AnD_n3VR4r_mAKe_Y0ur_0wN_cRyp70}
http://blog.csdn.net/sinat_34200786

```

涨姿势点

IRC网络
Wireshark从数据流中提取文件的方式
不同版本的python编译后的 .pyc 文件的magic number不同
uncomple6反编译 .pyc 文件，也有在线反编译的网站

备注

虽然文件是python 3.5的版本编译的，不过用uncompyle6反编译时的python版本为 2.7
