

Dark CTF 2020-Rev/strings-writeup

原创


y4ung 于 2020-10-10 19:48:07 发布 194 收藏

分类专栏: [ctf](#) 文章标签: [ctf](#)

版权声明: 本文为博主原创文章, 遵循 [CC 4.0 BY-SA](#) 版权协议, 转载请附上原文出处链接和本声明。

本文链接: https://blog.csdn.net/qq_35056292/article/details/109003201

版权



[ctf](#) 专栏收录该内容

35 篇文章 0 订阅

订阅专栏

1. 介绍

本题是dark ctf Reverse的第三题: [strings](#), 网址: <https://ctf.darkarmy.xyz/challs>

题目描述: Just manipulation of couple of strings...Note: Enclose the final output inside darkCTF{}

2. 分析

```
$ file strings
```

```
strings: ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2, BuildID[sha1]=ab02c0f8411dc8e2b15e968f6eb7f4b98722bf41, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, not stripped
```

```
$ chmod +x ./strings
```

```
$ ./strings
```

```
Use this as ur input: !8u)05/>!#,.W/%H-G
```

```
!8u)05/>!#,.W/%H-G
```

扔进IDA里, `Use this as ur input: %s` 在main函数中被使用。并且该提示语指定了我们的输入为: `!8u)05/>!#,.W/%H-G`

在main函数中, 以 `ZUB*aVrOUscPS;$R=Q` 和 `!8u)05/>!#,.W/%H-G` 这两个字符串为基础进行了提取, 异或等运算。反正最后赋值给 `dest` 变量, 这个变量应该就是我们需要查看结果的变量了。

```
int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
```

```
{
    size_t v3; // rbx
    size_t v4; // rbx
    char dest[8]; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-110h]
    __int64 v7; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-108h]
    __int16 v8; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-100h]
    char v9; // [rsp+12h] [rbp-FEh]
    __int64 v10; // [rsp+1Ch] [rbp-F4h]
    __int16 v11; // [rsp+24h] [rbp-ECh]
    __int64 v12; // [rsp+26h] [rbp-EAh]
    __int16 v13; // [rsp+2Eh] [rbp-E2h]
    char v14[32]; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-E0h]
    char v15[32]; // [rsp+50h] [rbp-C0h]
    char v16[8]; // [rsp+70h] [rbp-A0h]
    __int64 v17; // [rsp+78h] [rbp-98h]
    __int16 v18; // [rsp+80h] [rbp-90h]
    char v19; // [rsp+82h] [rbp-8Eh]
    char v20[32]; // [rsp+90h] [rbp-80h]
    int v21; // [rsp+B0h] [rbp-60h]
    int v22; // [rsp+B4h] [rbp-5Ch]
```

```

const char *v23; // [rsp+B8h] [rbp-58h]
char *s; // [rsp+C0h] [rbp-50h]
int n; // [rsp+C8h] [rbp-48h]
int v26; // [rsp+CCh] [rbp-44h]
int m; // [rsp+D0h] [rbp-40h]
int l; // [rsp+D4h] [rbp-3Ch]
int v29; // [rsp+D8h] [rbp-38h]
int v30; // [rsp+DCh] [rbp-34h]
int v31; // [rsp+E0h] [rbp-30h]
int k; // [rsp+E4h] [rbp-2Ch]
int j; // [rsp+E8h] [rbp-28h]
int v34; // [rsp+ECH] [rbp-24h]
int i; // [rsp+F0h] [rbp-20h]
int v36; // [rsp+F4h] [rbp-1Ch]
int v37; // [rsp+F8h] [rbp-18h]
int v38; // [rsp+FC] [rbp-14h]

setbuf(stdout, 0LL);
setbuf(stdin, 0LL);
setbuf(stderr, 0LL);
v38 = 0;
v37 = 1;
s = "ZUB*aVrOU$CPS;$R=Q";
v23 = "!8u)05/>!#,.W/%H-G";
printf("Use this as ur input: %s\n", "!8u)05/>!#,.W/%H-G");
__isoc99_scanf("%[^\\n]*c", v20);
*(__QWORD *)v16 = 0LL;
v17 = 0LL;
v18 = 0;
v19 = 0;
v36 = 0;
for ( i = 1; ; i += 2 )
{
    v3 = i;
    if ( v3 >= strlen(s) )
        break;
    v16[v38] = s[i] ^ v20[v36];
    v38 += 2;
    v36 += 2;
}
v34 = 1;
for ( j = 0; ; j += 2 )
{
    v4 = j;
    if ( v4 >= strlen(s) )
        break;
    v16[v37] = s[j] ^ v20[v34];
    v37 += 2;
    v34 += 2;
}
v22 = strlen(v16);
v21 = v22 / 2;
for ( k = 0; k < v21; ++k )
    v15[k] = v16[k];
v15[k] = 0;
v31 = v21;
v30 = 0;
while ( v31 <= v22 )
    v14[v30++] = v16[v31++];

```

```

v12 = 0LL;
v13 = 0;
v29 = 3;
for ( l = 0; l <= 8; ++l )
{
    *((_BYTE *)&v12 + l) += (v15[l] + v29 - 97) % 26 + 97;
    v29 += 3;
}
v10 = 0LL;
v11 = 0;
for ( m = 0; m <= 8; ++m )
    *((_BYTE *)&v10 + m) = *((_BYTE *)&v10 + m) - v14[m] - 37;
*(_QWORD *)dest = 0LL;
v7 = 0LL;
v8 = 0;
v9 = 0;
v26 = 0;
for ( n = 8; n >= 0; --n )
{
    strncat(dest, (const char *)&v12 + v26, 1uLL);
    strncat(dest, (const char *)&v10 + n, 1uLL);
    ++v26;
}
return 0;
}

```

输入已经被指定了，也没有什么输出，那么直接动态调试看 `dest` 最后的结果即可。

The screenshot shows a debugger window with two panes. The left pane displays assembly code with addresses and instructions. A red arrow points to the instruction `call strncat, sym.imp.strncat; char *strncat(char *s1, const char *s2)` at address `0x000014eb`. The right pane shows the corresponding decompiled C++ code, which includes a loop that concatenates characters to a string. The URL `https://blog.csdn.net/qq_35056292` is visible in the bottom right corner.

经过动态调试，最终得到flag为：`darkCTF{wah_howdu_found_me}`

```

文件(F) 动作(A) 编辑(E) 查看(V) 帮助(H)
[ Legend: Modified register | Code | Heap | Stack | String ]

registers
$eax : 0x00007fffffff80 → "wah_howdu_found_me" ←
$ecx : 0x12
$edx : 0x1c
$ebx : 0x65
$esp : 0x00007fffffff80 → "wah_howdu_found_me"
$ebp : 0x00007fffffff8000 → @main+894 → <_libc_csu_init@> push r15
$esi : 0x00007fffffff9c → "e no do a"
$edi : 0x00007fffffff91 → 0x800000380000065 ("m?")
$eip : 0x000055555554f3 → @main+894> add DWORD PTR [rbp-0x44], 0x1

$e8 : 0x1
$e9 : 0x00007fffffff80 → "wah_howdu_found_me"
$ea : 0x0000555555544cc → 0x007461636e727473 ("strncat?")
$ebx : 0x00007ffff4e5a8 → <_strncat_avx2@> mov r9, rdi
$ecx : 0x000055555554000 → <_start@> xor ebp, ebp
$edx : 0x0
$esi : 0x0
$edi : 0x0
$eip : 0x0

Software: [ZERO carry PARITY adjust sign trap INTERRUPT direction overflow resume virtualx86 identification]
$cs: 0x0033 $ss: 0x002b $ds: 0x0000 $es: 0x0000 $fs: 0x0000 $gs: 0x0000

stack
0x00007fffffff80 |0x0000: "wah_howdu_found_me" ← $rax, $rsp, $r9
0x00007fffffff80 |0x0000: "u_found_me"
0x00007fffffff90 |0x0010: 0x00003800000656d ("m?")
0x00007fffffff90 |0x0018: 0x6fe5f6500000380
0x00007fffffff90 |0x0020: 0x68770b915f6f645f ("_do_a?")
0x00007fffffff90 |0x0028: 0x000664756727768 ("huifuhm?")
0x00007fffffff90 |0x0030: "v|m|w|z"
0x00007fffffff90 |0x0038: 0x00003800000007a ("z?")

code:x86_64
0x5555555554e8 @main+883> mov r11, rcx
0x5555555554eb @main+886> mov rdi, rax
0x5555555554ee @main+889> call @x555555555060 <strncat@plt>
0x5555555554f3 @main+894> add DWORD PTR [rbp-0x44], 0x1
0x5555555554f7 @main+898> sub DWORD PTR [rbp-0x48], 0x1
0x5555555554fb @main+902> cmp DWORD PTR [rbp-0x48], 0x0
0x5555555554ff @main+906> jns 0x5555555554a5 <main+816>
0x555555555501 @main+908> mov eax, 0x0
0x555555555506 @main+913> add rsp, 0x108

threads
[00] Id 1, Name: "strings", stopped @0x5555555554f3 in main (), reason: SINGLE STEP

trace
[00] 0x5555555554f3 → main()
[01] 0x7ffff7e14cca → _libc_start_main(main=0x555555555175 <main>, argc=0x1, argv=0x7ffff7ffe188, init=<optimized out>, fini=<optimized out>, rtdl_fini=<optimized out>, stack_end=0x7ffff7ffe178)
[02] 0x5555555550ba → _start()

gdb> |

```

https://blog.csdn.net/q_35056292

3. 总结

1. 对于一些让用户输入的字符串与程序中经过变换以后的字符串相比较的题目、或是用户输入进行变换的题，可以直接上动态调试，运行到检查的那一个地方，看一下要比较的字符串长啥样即可。
2. 根据gdb调试中main函数的地址和cutter中main函数的地址，算一个差值diff
3. 然后根据cutter中Decompiler窗口的内容，定位到 Dissassembly窗口中伪代码对应的地址。
4. 最后，只需要调用下面的函数，即可根据kali中gdb调试时汇编指令的地址计算出cutter中的地址，从而判断当前是运行到程序中的哪个地方了。

```

def get_gdb(cut, diff):
    return hex(cut + diff)

def get_cut(gdb, diff):
    return hex(gdb - diff)

```

5. 群里问了下各位师傅，其中一位师傅提到，IDA中可以设置基地址：<https://blog.csdn.net/hgy413/article/details/5856827>