

BUUCTF逆向题刷题记录（一）

原创

又菜又爱倒腾 于 2021-11-02 20:55:06 发布 105 收藏 1

分类专栏: [ctf_writeup](#) 文章标签: [网络安全](#)

版权声明: 本文为博主原创文章, 遵循 [CC 4.0 BY-SA](#) 版权协议, 转载请附上原文出处链接和本声明。

本文链接: <https://blog.csdn.net/q943111495/article/details/121108941>

版权



[ctf_writeup](#) 专栏收录该内容

2 篇文章 0 订阅

订阅专栏

#BUUCTF逆向题刷题记录（一）#

一、reverse1

下载reverse_2文件, 拿到后丢进exeinfo PE, 为64位

用IDA x64打开

shift+F12 查看所有字符串, 搜索flag

Address	Length	Type	String
.rdata:000000...	0000000C	C	wrong flag\n
.rdata:000000...	00000019	C	this is the right flag!\n
.rdata:000000...	00000010	C	input the flag:

双击进去

```
.40019C86          db      0
.40019C87          db      0
.40019C88          dq  offset asc_140019C40 ; "H"
.40019C90 aThisIsTheRight db 'this is the right flag!',0Ah,0
.40019C90                                ; DATA XREF: sub_1400118C0:lo
.40019CA9          align  10h
.40019CB0 aInput          db 'input',0
.40019CB0                                ; DATA XREF: .rdata:000000014
```

x查看交叉引用, 跳到该处, F5查看伪代码

```

7  int j; // [rsp+24n] [rbp+4n]
8  char Str1[224]; // [rsp+48h] [rbp+28h] BYREF
9  __int64 v7; // [rsp+128h] [rbp+108h]
10
11 v0 = v4;
12 for ( i = 82i64; i; --i )
13 {
14     *(_DWORD *)v0 = -858993460;
15     v0 += 4;
16 }
17 for ( j = 0; ; ++j )
18 {
19     v7 = j;
20     if ( j > j_strlen(Str2) )
21         break;
22     if ( Str2[j] == 111 )
23         Str2[j] = 48;
24 }
25 sub_1400111D1("input the flag:");
26 sub_14001128F("%20s", Str1);
27 v2 = j_strlen(Str2);
28 if ( !strncmp(Str1, Str2, v2) )
29     sub_1400111D1("this is the right flag!\n");
30 else
31     sub_1400111D1("wrong flag\n");
32 sub_14001113B(v4, &unk_140019D00);
33 return 0i64;
34 }

```

CSDN @又菜又爱倒腾

发现存在字符串替换，r将ASCII码转换为字符。分析伪代码发现str2即为flag，但字符串str2中的'o'被替换为了'0'

```

j
for ( j = 0; ; ++j )
{
    v7 = j;
    if ( j > j_strlen(Str2) )
        break;
    if ( Str2[j] == 'o' )
        Str2[j] = '0';
}

```

双击跳到Str2处，将字符串替换后得到flag

```

0 ; org 14001C000n
0 ; char Str2[]
0 Str2 db '{hello_wdrld}',0 ; DATA XREF: sub_1
0 ; sub_1400118C0+67
E align 10h
0 : uintptr t security cookie

```

二、reverse2

下载reverse_2文件，拿到后丢进exeinfo PE，为64位

用IDA x64打开

找到main函数，F5查看伪代码

```
int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
    int stat_loc; // [rsp+4h] [rbp-3Ch] BYREF
    int i; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-38h]
    __pid_t pid; // [rsp+Ch] [rbp-34h]
    char s2[24]; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-30h] BYREF
    unsigned __int64 v8; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-18h]

    v8 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
    pid = fork();
    if ( pid )
    {
        waitpid(pid, &stat_loc, 0);
    }
    else
    {
        for ( i = 0; i <= strlen(&flag); ++i )
        {
            if ( *(&flag + i) == 105 || *(&flag + i) == 114 )
                *(&flag + i) = 49;
        }
        printf("input the flag:");
        __isoc99_scanf("%20s", s2);
        if ( !strcmp(&flag, s2) )
            return puts("this is the right flag!");
        else
            return puts("wrong flag!");
    }
}
```

CSDN @又菜又爱倒腾

发现有一处字符串比较，双击flag点进去查看

```
0 flag          db '{' ; DATA XREF: main+34↑r
0 ; main+44↑r ...
1 aHackingForFun db 'hacking_for_fun}',0
1 _data         ends
1
; =====
```

发现flag，记录下来，这还不是最后的flag，返回刚刚的伪代码，发现存在字符替换,r将ASCII码转换为字符

```
    for ( i = 0; i <= strlen(&flag); ++i )
    {
        if ( *(&flag + i) == 'i' || *(&flag + i) == 'r' )
            *(&flag + i) = '1';
    }
}
```

将i和r用1替换，得到flag

三、内涵的软件

下载后用IDA X86打开，找到main函数，F5查看伪代码

```
int __cdecl main_0(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
    char v4[4]; // [esp+4Ch] [ebp-Ch] BYREF
    const char *v5; // [esp+50h] [ebp-8h]
    int v6; // [esp+54h] [ebp-4h]

    v6 = 5;
    v5 = "DBAPP{49d3c93df25caad81232130f3d2ebfad}";
    while ( v6 >= 0 )
    {
        printf(&byte_4250EC, v6);
        sub_40100A();
        --v6;
    }
    printf(asc_425088);
    v4[0] = 1;
    scanf("%c", v4);
    if ( v4[0] == 89 )
    {
        printf(a0d);
        return sub_40100A();
    }
    else
    {
        if ( v4[0] == 78 )
            printf(&byte_425034);
        else
            printf(&byte_42501C);
        return sub_40100A();
    }
}
```

CSDN @又菜又爱倒腾

找到一串可疑字符，尝试包上flag提交，成功

四、新年快乐

下载后丢进exeinfo PE,发现有UPX加壳



尝试手工脱壳，丢进x64DBG，F9运行两次看到Pushad

新年快乐.exe - PID: 14716 - 模块: 新年快乐.exe - 线程: 主线程 12628 - x32dbg

文件(F) 视图(V) 调试(D) 跟踪(N) 插件(P) 收藏夹(I) 选项(O) 帮助(H) Oct 31 2021 (TitanEngine)

CPU 日志 笔记 断点 内存布局 调用堆栈 SEH链 脚本 符号 源代码 引用

EIP	ECX	EDX	0040E2F0	60	pushad
0040E2F1			BE 15D04000		mov esi,新年快乐.40D015
0040E2F6			8DBE EB3FFFFFF		lea edi,dword ptr ds:[esi-c015]
0040E2FC			57		push edi
0040E2FD			83CD FF		or ebp,FFFFFFFF
0040E300			EB 10		jmp 新年快乐.40E312
0040E302			90		nop
0040E303			90		nop
0040E304			90		nop
0040E305			90		nop
0040E306			90		nop
0040E307			90		nop
0040E308			8A06		mov al,byte ptr ds:[esi]
0040E30A			46		inc esi
0040E30B			8807		mov byte ptr ds:[edi],al
0040E30D			47		inc edi
0040E30E			01DB		add ebx,ebx
0040E310			75 07		jne 新年快乐.40E319
0040E312			8B1E		mov ebx,dword ptr ds:[esi]
0040E314			83EE FC		sub esi,FFFFFFFF

隐藏FPU

EAX	0060FFCC	
EBX	002CA000	
ECX	0040E2F0	<新年快乐.EntryPoint>
EDX	0040E2F0	<新年快乐.EntryPoint>
EBP	0060FF80	
ESP	0060FF74	
ESI	0040E2F0	<新年快乐.EntryPoint>
EDI	0040E2F0	<新年快乐.EntryPoint>
EIP	0040E2F0	<新年快乐.EntryPoint>

EFLAGS 00000244
ZF 1 PF 1 AF 0
OF 0 SF 0 DF 0
CF 0 TF 0 IF 1

CSDN @又菜又爱倒腾

F7步进一步发现只有ESP寄存器发生变化，可根据ESP定律。

CPU 日志 笔记 断点 内存布局 调用堆栈 SEH链 脚本 符号 源代码 引用

ECX	EDX	ESI	0040E2F0	60	pushad
			BE 15D04000		mov esi,新年快乐.40D015
			8DBE EB3FFFFFF		lea edi,dword ptr ds:[esi-c015]
			57		push edi
			83CD FF		or ebp,FFFFFFFF
			EB 10		jmp 新年快乐.40E312
			90		nop
			90		nop
			90		nop
			90		nop
			90		nop
			90		nop
			90		nop
			8A06		mov al,byte ptr ds:[esi]
			46		inc esi
			8807		mov byte ptr ds:[edi],al
			47		inc edi
			01DB		add ebx,ebx
			75 07		jne 新年快乐.40E319
			8B1E		mov ebx,dword ptr ds:[esi]
			83EE FC		sub esi,FFFFFFFF
			11DB		adc ebx,ebx
			72 ED		jb 新年快乐.40E308
			B8 01000000		mov eax,1
			01DB		add ebx,ebx

隐藏FPU


EAX	0060FFCC	
EBX	002CA000	
ECX	0040E2F0	<新年快乐.EntryPoint>
EDX	0040E2F0	<新年快乐.EntryPoint>
EBP	0060FF80	
ESP	0060FF54	"荷@"
ESI	0040E2F0	<新年快乐.EntryPoint>
EDI	0040E2F0	<新年快乐.EntryPoint>
EIP	0040E2F1	新年快乐.0040E2F1

EFLAGS 00000246
ZF 1 PF 1 AF 0
OF 0 SF 0 DF 0
CF 0 TF 0 IF 1


LastError 00000000 (ERROR_SUCCESS)

默认 (stdcall) 55D...@...解锁...倒腾

选择ESP寄存器，右键在内存窗口中转到



在内存窗口中选择地址，右键设置硬件访问断点-4字节



再次F9运行程序后，程序停下来的位置上即popad-壳代码结束位置。在下面大跳转jmp处F2下断点。继续F9运行程序，直到jmp断点处，F7单步步进，找到OEP

●	0040E482	53	push ebx
●	0040E483	FFD1	call ecx
●	0040E485	61	popad
→	0040E486	8D4424 80	lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp-80]
→	0040E48A	6A 00	push 0
●	0040E48C	39C4	cmp esp,eax
●	0040E48E	75 FA	jne 新年快乐.40E48A
●	0040E490	83EC 80	sub esp,FFFFFF80
●	0040E493	E9 E82DFFFF	jmp 新年快乐.401280
●	0040E498	EB 00	jmp 新年快乐.40E49A
●	0040E49A	56	push esi
●	0040E49B	BE 04704000	mov esi,新年快乐.407004
●	0040E4A0	FC	cld

CSDN @ 又菜又爱倒腾

CPU				日志	笔记	断点	内存布局	调用堆栈	SEH链	脚本	符号
EIP	→	00401280	83EC 1C	sub esp,1C							
●		00401283	C70424 01000000	mov dword ptr ss:[esp],1							EAX 00601
●		0040128A	FF15 04614000	call dword ptr ds:[<&_set_app_type>]							EBX 00301
●		00401290	E8 6BFDFFFF	call 新年快乐.401000							ECX 00401
●		00401295	8D7426 00	lea esi,dword ptr ds:[esi]							EDX 00401
●		00401299	8DBC27 00000000	lea edi,dword ptr ds:[edi]							EBP 00601
●		004012A0	83EC 1C	sub esp,1C							ESP 00601
●		004012A3	C70424 02000000	mov dword ptr ss:[esp],2							ESI 00401
●		004012AA	FF15 04614000	call dword ptr ds:[<&_set_app_type>]							EDI 00401
●		004012B0	E8 4BFDFFFF	call 新年快乐.401000							EIP 00401
●		004012B5	8D7426 00	lea esi,dword ptr ds:[esi]							EFLAGS 0
●		004012B9	8DBC27 00000000	lea edi,dword ptr ds:[edi]							ZF 0 PF 1
●		004012C0	A1 1C614000	mov eax,dword ptr ds:[<&atexit>]							OF 0 SF 0
●		004012C5	FFE0	jmp eax							CF 1 TF 0
●		004012C7	89F6	mov esi,esi							LastError
●		004012C9	8DBC27 00000000	lea edi,dword ptr ds:[edi]							<
●		004012D0	A1 10614000	mov eax,dword ptr ds:[<&_onexit>]							默认 (stdcal
●		004012D5	FFE0	jmp eax							< 1: [esp+4]
●		004012D7	90	nop							
●		004012D8	90	nop							
●		004012D9	90	nop							
●		004012DA	90	nop							
●		004012DB	90	nop							
●		004012DC	90	nop							
●		004012DD	90	nop							


直接利用x64 DBG自带的Scylla将程序dump下来，核对原始地址填写正确。

Attach to an active process

18408 - 新年快乐.exe - C:\Users\xmn\Desktop\新年快乐.exe

Pick DLL

Imports



Show Invalid

Show Suspect

Clear

IAT Info

OEP 00401280

VA

Size

IAT Autosearch

Get Imports

Actions

Autotrace

Dump

Dump

PE Rebuild

Fix Dump

Log

Module parsing: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\kernel32.dll
Module parsing: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\KernelBase.dll
Module parsing: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\apphelp.dll
Module parsing: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvcrt.dll
Loading modules done.
Imagebase: 00400000 Size: 00010000

Imports: 0

Invalid: 0

Imagebase: 00400000

新年快乐.exe @又菜又爱倒腾

1. IAT扫描
2. 获取导入表
3. 修复Dump文件

Attach to an active process

18408 - 新年快乐.exe - C:\Users\xmn\Desktop\新年快乐.exe Pick DLL

Imports

- kernel32.dll (12) FThunk: 000060C4
- msvcrt.dll (20) FThunk: 000060F8

Show Invalid Show Suspect Clear

IAT Info

OEP	00401280
VA	004060C4
Size	00000084

Actions

Autotrace

Dump PE Rebuild


Fix Dump

Log


CSDN @又菜又爱倒腾

The screenshot shows the Scylla x86 v0.9.8 application window. At the top, it says 'Attach to an active process' with a dropdown menu showing '18408 - 新年快乐.exe - C:\Users\xmn\Desktop\新年快乐.exe' and a 'Pick DLL' button. Below this is the 'Imports' section, which lists two DLLs: 'kernel32.dll (12) FThunk: 000060C4' and 'msvcrt.dll (20) FThunk: 000060F8'. There are 'Show Invalid', 'Show Suspect', and 'Clear' buttons. The 'IAT Info' section contains three input fields: 'OEP' with value '00401280', 'VA' with value '004060C4', and 'Size' with value '00000084'. Below these are 'IAT Autosearch' and 'Get Imports' buttons. The 'Actions' section has an 'Autotrace' button. To the right, there are 'Dump', 'PE Rebuild', and 'Fix Dump' buttons. A 'Log' button is at the bottom left. Three numbered callouts are present: '1' points to the 'IAT Autosearch' button, '2' points to the 'Log' button, and '3' points to the 'Fix Dump' button. The 'Fix Dump' button is highlighted with a blue border. The bottom right corner has the text 'CSDN @又菜又爱倒腾'.

最终生成新年快乐dump.SCY.exe文件，再丢进exeinfo查看区段，脱壳成功



丢进IDA中能看到完整的函数结构，F5查看main函数伪代码



分析代码，在比较函数中输入的str1会与str2进行比较，str2的"HappyNewYear!"应该就是flag的值，提交成功。

五、参考链接

[使用x64dbg脱壳之开源壳upx](#)

[借助 x64dbg 的 UPX 手工脱壳](#)

[x64 DBG下载地址](#)

六、标签

CTF逆向、X64DBG、手工脱壳