

2020 第四届强网杯 线上赛 Misc\_Writeup

末初  于 2020-11-07 17:00:12 发布


1110 收藏 4

分类专栏: [CTF](#) [MISC](#) [Writeup](#)

版权声明：本文为博主原创文章，遵循 CC 4.0 BY-SA 版权协议，转载请附上原文出处链接和本声明。

本文链接: <https://blog.csdn.net/mochu7777777/article/details/109549349>

版权



CTF MISC Writeup 专栏收录该内容

246 篇文章 46 订阅

订阅专栏

目录

[upload](#)

簽到

## 问卷调查

miscstudy

## upload

下载附件，打开是流量包文件，wireshark打开

data.pcapng

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephone Wireless Tools Help

Apply a display filter: ... (Ctrl+Shift+F)

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000	192.168.109.1	192.168.109.132	HTTP	564	GET / HTTP/1.1
2	0.002181	192.168.109.132	192.168.109.1	HTTP	650	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
3	1.014358	192.168.109.1	192.168.109.132	TCP	1514	61881 > 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=514 Len=1448 Tsvl=1927417686 Tscr=23681559 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
4	11.014360	192.168.109.1	192.168.109.132	TCP	1514	61881 > 80 [ACK] Seq=1449 Ack=1 Win=514 Len=1448 Tsvl=1927417686 Tscr=23681559 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
5	11.014360	192.168.109.1	192.168.109.132	TCP	1514	61881 > 80 [ACK] Seq=2897 Ack=1 Win=514 Len=1448 Tsvl=1927417686 Tscr=23681559 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
6	11.014363	192.168.109.1	192.168.109.132	TCP	1514	61881 > 80 [ACK] Seq=3445 Ack=1 Win=514 Len=1448 Tsvl=1927417686 Tscr=23681559 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
7	11.014364	192.168.109.1	192.168.109.132	TCP	1514	61881 > 80 [ACK] Seq=5793 Ack=1 Win=514 Len=1448 Tsvl=1927417686 Tscr=23681559 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
8	11.014364	192.168.109.1	192.168.109.132	TCP	1514	61881 > 80 [ACK] Seq=7241 Ack=1 Win=514 Len=1448 Tsvl=1927417686 Tscr=23681559 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
9	11.014365	192.168.109.1	192.168.109.132	TCP	1514	61881 > 80 [ACK] Seq=8689 Ack=1 Win=514 Len=1448 Tsvl=1927417686 Tscr=23681559 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
10	11.014366	192.168.109.1	192.168.109.132	TCP	1514	61881 > 80 [ACK] Seq=10137 Ack=1 Win=514 Len=1448 Tsvl=1927417686 Tscr=23681559 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
11	11.014367	192.168.109.1	192.168.109.132	TCP	1514	61881 > 80 [ACK] Seq=11585 Ack=1 Win=514 Len=1448 Tsvl=1927417686 Tscr=23681559 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
12	11.014367	192.168.109.1	192.168.109.132	TCP	1514	61881 > 80 [ACK] Seq=13033 Ack=1 Win=514 Len=1448 Tsvl=1927417686 Tscr=23681559 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
13	11.016436	192.168.109.1	192.168.109.132	TCP	1514	61881 > 80 [ACK] Seq=14481 Ack=1 Win=514 Len=1448 Tsvl=1927417689 Tscr=23681561 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
14	11.016437	192.168.109.1	192.168.109.132	TCP	1514	61881 > 80 [ACK] Seq=15929 Ack=1 Win=514 Len=1448 Tsvl=1927417689 Tscr=23681561 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
15	11.016438	192.168.109.1	192.168.109.132	TCP	1514	61881 > 80 [ACK] Seq=17377 Ack=1 Win=514 Len=1448 Tsvl=1927417689 Tscr=23681561 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
16	11.016441	192.168.109.1	192.168.109.132	TCP	1514	61881 > 80 [ACK] Seq=18825 Ack=1 Win=514 Len=1448 Tsvl=1927417689 Tscr=23681561 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
17	11.016441	192.168.109.1	192.168.109.132	TCP	1514	61881 > 80 [ACK] Seq=20273 Ack=1 Win=514 Len=1448 Tsvl=1927417689 Tscr=23681561 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
18	11.016442	192.168.109.1	192.168.109.132	TCP	1514	61881 > 80 [ACK] Seq=21721 Ack=1 Win=514 Len=1448 Tsvl=1927417689 Tscr=23681561 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
19	11.016443	192.168.109.1	192.168.109.132	TCP	1514	61881 > 80 [ACK] Seq=23169 Ack=1 Win=514 Len=1448 Tsvl=1927417689 Tscr=23681561 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
20	11.016443	192.168.109.1	192.168.109.132	TCP	1514	61881 > 80 [ACK] Seq=24617 Ack=1 Win=514 Len=1448 Tsvl=1927417689 Tscr=23681561 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
21	11.016444	192.168.109.1	192.168.109.132	TCP	1514	61881 > 80 [ACK] Seq=26665 Ack=1 Win=514 Len=1448 Tsvl=1927417689 Tscr=23681561 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
22	11.016445	192.168.109.1	192.168.109.132	TCP	1514	61881 > 80 [ACK] Seq=27513 Ack=1 Win=514 Len=1448 Tsvl=1927417689 Tscr=23681561 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
23	11.016445	192.168.109.1	192.168.109.132	TCP	1514	61881 > 80 [ACK] Seq=28961 Ack=1 Win=514 Len=1448 Tsvl=1927417689 Tscr=23681561 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
24	11.016446	192.168.109.1	192.168.109.132	TCP	1514	61881 > 80 [ACK] Seq=30409 Ack=1 Win=514 Len=1448 Tsvl=1927417689 Tscr=23681561 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
25	11.016447	192.168.109.1	192.168.109.132	HTTP	381	POST /stealthie.php HTTP/1.1 (JPEG/JIFF image)
26	11.020433	192.168.109.132	192.168.109.1	HTTP	269	HTTP/1.1 200 OK

> Frame 1: 564 bytes on wire (4512 bits), 564 bytes captured (4512 bits) on interface \Device\NPF\_{98505797-1C4E-4249-B343-40A686F7B09D}, id 0

> Ethernet II, Src: VMware\_0:0:0:08 (00:50:56:c0:00:08), Dst: VMware\_25:4d:82 (00:0c:29:25:4d:82)

> Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.109.1, Dst: 192.168.109.132

> Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 61876, Dst Port: 80, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 498


Hypertext Transfer Protocol

查看 `http` 的句，追踪一下


No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000	192.168.100.1	192.168.100.132	HTTP	564	GET / HTTP/1.1

20 002181	192.168.109.132	192.168.109.1	HTTP	650 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
25 11.016447	192.168.109.1	192.168.109.132	HTTP	381 POST /steghide.php HTTP/1.1 (JPEG JFIF image)
26 11.020433	192.168.109.132	192.168.109.1	HTTP	269 HTTP/1.1 200 OK

很明显是POST上传的图片



File->Export Object->HTTP... 将文件 Save all 保存出来，得到如下：



%5c 有提示 steghide 隐藏

```
1 <html>
2   <meta charset="utf-8">
3   <body>
4     <form action="steghide.php" method="post"
5       enctype="multipart/form-data">
```

```
7         <label for="file">文件名:</label>
8         <input type="file" name="file" id="file" />
9         <input type="submit" name="submit" value="提交" />
10        <!--i use steghide with a good password-->
11    </form>
12  </body>
13</html>
14
```

steghide.php 用notepad++打开

```
steghide.php %6c
1 -----29061997724503521033788658882
2 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="steghide.jpg"
3 Content-Type: image/jpeg
4
5 xFFxD8xFFxE0NULDLEJFIFNULSOH$OHNULNULSOHNULNULNULNULxFFxDBNULCNUL
6
7 VT
8 DC1
9 VTNAKVT$OSO
```

去掉前面这四行，保存修改后缀为 `jpg` 或者 `png` 都行，得到如下图：



然后把照片丢进 kali 使用 steghide 工具提取隐藏信息

```
root@kali:/home/mochu7/Desktop# steghide info steghide.jpg  
"steghide.jpg":  
    format: jpeg  
    capacity: 1.6 KB  
Try to get information about embedded data ? (y/n) y  
Enter passphrase:  
steghide: could not extract any data with that passphrase!  
root@kali:/home/mochu7/Desktop#
```

有密码，在网上找个爆破steghide密码的脚本，如下：

```

# -*- coding: utf8 -*-
#python2
from subprocess import *

def foo():
    stegoFile='a.jpg'#这里填图片名称
    extractFile='hide.txt'#输出从图片中得到的隐藏内容
    passFile='english.dic'#字典,用的是Advanced Archive Password Recovery的字典

    errors=['could not extract','steghide --help','Syntax error']
    cmdFormat='steghide extract -sf "%s" -xf "%s" -p "%s"'
    f=open(passFile,'r')

    for line in f.readlines():
        cmd=cmdFormat %(stegoFile,extractFile,line.strip())
        p=Popen(cmd,shell=True,stdout=PIPE,stderr=STDOUT)
        content=unicode(p.stdout.read(),'gbk')
        for err in errors:
            if err in content:
                break
        else:
            print content,
            print 'the passphrase is %s' %(line.strip())
    f.close()
    return

if __name__ == '__main__':
    foo()
    print 'ok'
    pass

```

The screenshot shows a terminal window titled "QTterminal". The terminal output is as follows:

```

root@kali:/home/mochu7/Desktop# ls
a.jpg  brute.py  english.dic
root@kali:/home/mochu7/Desktop# python2 brute.py english.dic
wrote extracted data to "hide.txt".
the passphrase is 123456
ok
root@kali:/home/mochu7/Desktop# ls
a.jpg  brute.py  english.dic  hide.txt
root@kali:/home/mochu7/Desktop# cat hide.txt
flag{te11_me_y0u_like_it}root@kali:/home/mochu7/Desktop#
root@kali:/home/mochu7/Desktop# steghide extract -sf a.jpg
Enter passphrase:
wrote extracted data to "flag.txt".
root@kali:/home/mochu7/Desktop# ls
a.jpg  brute.py  english.dic  flag.txt  hide.txt
root@kali:/home/mochu7/Desktop# cat flag.txt
flag{te11_me_y0u_like_it}root@kali:/home/mochu7/Desktop#
root@kali:/home/mochu7/Desktop# ■

```

The terminal URL at the bottom right is <https://blog.csdn.net/mochu7777777>.

密码是: 123456

hide.txt 已经提取了隐藏的flag的内容, 或者也可以 steghide extract -sf a.jpg 然后输入密码, 得到 flag.txt

flag{te11\_me\_y0u\_like\_it}

签到



老天爷，哪次比赛让我签到拿个一血也行啊~

flag{welcome\_to\_qwb\_S4}

## 问卷调查

拿到flag啦，恭喜，感谢您的问卷调查  
flag{Welc0me\_tO\_qwbS4\_Hope\_you\_play\_h4ppily}

免费注册LIFEPOINTS会员，即可做调查赚钱，每个调查可赚7-10元

马上免费注册：[点击这里参与](#)

LIFEPOINTS是全球领先市场调查提供商KANTAR旗下公司。

因为LIFEPOINTS是国外公司，页面需时打开，请耐心等待。

提示：必须填真实地址和资料，系统才发问卷。

问卷星 提供技术支持  
<https://blog.csdn.net/mochu7777777>

枯了，比赛的时问卷调查最后出来的，竟然没看到，发现的时候已经结束了...orz

flag{Welc0me\_tO\_qwbS4\_Hope\_you\_play\_h4ppily}

## miscstudy

Hint：本题目flag由7个部分构成，第一个部分为flag{level1...，最后一个部分为}每一关都会存有flag的一部分，将所有flag的字符串拼接即为最后flag

首先下载附件解压是一个流量包，打开后筛选 http 的包，访问这个url

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
45	1.847155	192.168.43.109	39.99.247.28	HTTP	593	GET /fonts/1 HTTP/1.1
49	1.939128	39.99.247.28	192.168.43.109	HTTP	235	HTTP/1.1 304 Not Modified

> Frame 45: 593 bytes on wire (4744 bits), 593 bytes captured (4744 bits) on interface \Device\NPF\_{9852FC85-3552-41FD-84DC-FECBE8FDB874}, id 1  
> Ethernet II, Src: IntelCor\_56:6c:5b (38:00:25:56:6c:5b), Dst: Guangdon\_02:14:69 (a4:12:32:02:14:69)  
> Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.43.109, Dst: 39.99.247.28  
> Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 53105, Dst Port: 80, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 539  
▼ Hypertext Transfer Protocol  
  > GET /fonts/1 HTTP/1.1\r\n    Host: 39.99.247.28\r\n    Connection: keep-alive\r\n    Cache-Control: max-age=0\r\n    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\r\n    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/84.0.4147.125 Safari/537.36\r\n    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,\*/\*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9\r\n    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\r\n    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9\r\n    If-None-Match: "da4-5ad340100ca51"\r\n    If-Modified-Since: Wed, 19 Aug 2020 05:09:10 GMT\r\n\r\n[Full request URI: http://39.99.247.28/fonts/1]  
[HTTP request 1/1]  
[Response in frame: 49]

<https://blog.csdn.net/mochu7777777>


得到 level1 和 level2 的flag

CLIENT_RANDOM ac85f424e7a74d096ea8e209a49552c1753811fd3d6ae74c9277bd30362c83f0 0e7ed0e07e726bc2f4277f3334ba7fb78896fe6973e7ecc1fc7246b362df1ff52057e74012bb4df0c2f87b1bf353c5d8
CLIENT_RANDOM 9e5fa9440e09a50ab5230594217eab0b5e8fcbbc48974acbc24484436b3b894b4 1f9f13ee505e3310b3b4cc3e43254e55906ad5f876179e45ad2904931f1e5ce2c943534fc4700082c7db79652b9fd57
CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET b1f1e098a93dd2e325923f65fcde5c67cb22a09374f2e44ac2c8368c931a1e c93077a6145373593fc6c17f2788ad3fcad6037ea62940e3ba7659a51b56eb
SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET b1f1e098a93dd2e325923f65fcde5c67cb22a09374f2e44ac2c8368c931a1e 87f165569e3e5a6526050820d934b3dd3df60e41fea13bc321a724bfce50570
CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 b1f1e098a93d62e325923f85fcde5c67cb22a09374f2e44ac2c8368c931a1c 5a292bc9764b239be6ba0d92615802e27fb8f9aa7acde3cb44bf24225a387d2
SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 b1f1e098a93d62e325923f85fcde5c67cb22a09374f2e44ac2c8368c931a1c 0f8439418b351620f2e6a733f50025582a3aafe9731bd3ade007b04ifa989bc
EXPORTER_SECRET b1f1e098a93dd2e325923f65fcde5c67cb22a09374f2e44ac2c8368c931a1e 0a51ca8275a7c20c9eacd486ff7b1a4252ab94714cec2f0dcf8fc62ff203d615
CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET b1f1e098a93dd2e325923f65fcde5c67cb22a09374f2e44ac2c8368c931a1e 7efd124b19eab96ead9dc2dabb01a12c904646e381c41d30e6934d1a9dc2c
SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET b1f1e098a93dd2e325923f65fcde5c67cb22a09374f2e44ac2c8368c931a1e 79d2c31214d0af9d4a397cbeaeb86ca44fbcb47c79b538894472b7e0fe4c970
CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 c52c413417f78c3d831a75ffd34dc3c434ede3cd456ff1e25f8ebc301e502 593cbe062157b7e56accd9626219e15d484e6a77b7cd09fd96d83f57c5e210208
SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 c52c413417f78c3d831a75ffd34dc3c434ede3cd456ff1e25f8ebc301e502 bf7de066c92d313d12tb427315f234cd504309bc33tbt7c8a87ed41093a0a4
EXPORTER_SECRET c52c413417f78c3d831a75ffd34dc3c434ede3cd456ff1e25f8ebc301e502 8e8da12784192f2aa07b4a4c5832836f0dedcc2c2c32f1bfff2522dc7bcd
CLIENT_RANDOM ba0694d4ce442f60d7debd17da0632be5167c4061a1e241597601220f12ee9 1f9f13ee505e3310b3b4cc3e43254e55906ad5f876179e45ad2904931f1e5ce2c943534fc4700082c7db79652b9fd57
CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET e9f981e3b3cfe26377db3e666af1d0b15f03025e24898da2bf58eald2bc45b 6c5786721b2605d8dee0f4a89367c221f10b71dd14eeff8862c056bbf2d4ec9
SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET e9f981e3b3cfe26377db3e666af1d0b15f03025e24898da2bf58eald2bc45b faf948ebf0c0lbc140ad222f8149a82fec2b1637b3d5bd45517b4585912c8
CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET f52dbb843bb7035d499c5b234e7615506decebfb1b09762dd93a5ac649e49eb 93f07c90d8e7827e945dc46e3844207808d9f78297a97d6279a6b9c52dcfb2c8
SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET f52dbb843bb7035d499c5b234e7615506decebfb1b09762dd93a5ac649e49eb 8d04cc7aa472ab4c803f96ae62322a8646b37f7019ba1c21c825826008e1d19a
CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 e9f981e3b3cfe26377db3e666af1d0b15f03025e24898da2bf58eald2bc45b f252c57801505de1828a5d6cbf30305828af4d895f1ba7e68028cc6d0c971b
SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 e9f981e3b3cfe26377db3e666af1d0b15f03025e24898da2bf58eald2bc45b 212b74eb937a3e90fc1a75440eecd017e593069afc7c2b79872b6e65f98f
EXPORTER_SECRET e9f981e3b3cfe26377db3e666af1d0b15f03025e24898da2bf58eald2bc45b 545be75716228b35e8602c2264502f86c94act2dd0d858e0be85291589e251b63
CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 f52dbb843bb7035d499c5b234e7615506decebfb1b209762dd93a5ac649e49eb d701e89f960d49d602f36c42deb07517f3e002198308d5e9dd32ef32d6c3
SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 f52dbb843bb7035d499c5b234e7615506decebfb1b209762dd93a5ac649e49eb 0d0daca29e47adc2b7e49t254fc391f1a5ec2b64658eb552cbc32c77121d
EXPORTER_SECRET e9f981e3b3cfe26377db3e666af1d0b15f03025e24898da2bf58eald2bc45b 6c5786721b2605d8dee0f4a89367c221f10b71dd14eeff8862c056bbf2d4ec9
CLIENT_RANDOM 97ae926d6fb1ba42e9ce6930d8f9c356c13b879492fe88a2e66d7e3d3c3f 1f9f13ee505e3310b3b4cc3e43254e55906ad5f876179e45ad2904931f1e5ce2c943534fc4700082c7db79652b9fd57
CLIENT_RANDOM e56fcacf341d4cf008e404792e7d77aeabb84f7363655768614561e72f29 1f9f13ee505e3310b3b4cc3e43254e55906ad5f876179e45ad2904931f1e5ce2c943534fc4700082c7db79652b9fd57
CLIENT_RANDOM b24763c3f62e0af76c7ab6e43ba27884900a9170559c5fb56f9831b5ee72d 1f9f13ee505e3310b3b4cc3e43254e55906ad5f876179e45ad2904931f1e5ce2c943534fc4700082c7db79652b9fd57
CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET d06c95c8b7e6ffbe3293cb652d097b31768c821fc25c7166f09e2e620c2d213e 096619e19789013c79f67362ce825747a7914964da61ce298b64d7135f9828d4
SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET d06c95c8b7e6ffbe3293cb652d097b31768c821fc25c7166f09e2e620c2d213e 88ddbd37dc096ea3f3c8258414607d7084cb04b00719231e08afc9b6e8bb657b
CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 d06c95c8b7e6ffbe3293cb652d097b31768c821fc25c7166f09e2e620c2d213e 8548a64e18bec1569bb87047a94901a0d1a45a3e5b27397bdc49227faa8126
SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 d06c95c8b7e6ffbe3293cb652d097b31768c821fc25c7166f09e2e620c2d213e 674ale1d86e48353ba50f6f906cabad65e440c3e5592225596e09cc04e045e6
EXPORTER_SECRET d06c95c8b7e6ffbe3293cb652d097b31768c821fc25c7166f09e2e620c2d213e 85b68b6e8e0541fb171319cc1c108a2a66fc4b47907fb5a99669b0e0db7fa3f

<https://blog.csdn.net/mochu7777777>

flag{level1\_begin\_and\_level2\_is\_come}

除了flag之外，页面中这些其他的参数应该很明显就是 TLS 协议的 Master-Secret log file



<https://blog.csdn.net/mochu777777>

讲这些参数保存为 `ket.txt`

在wireshark中，`Edit->Preferences->Protocols->TLS->(Pre)-Master-Secret log filename` 中选择 `ket.txt` 然后点击 `OK`

添加成功后，再次查看http协议的包，发现多了个包

The screenshot shows the Wireshark interface with a packet list at the top and a detailed packet view below. The selected packet is a GET request for the URL `/images/4e5d47b2db53654959295bba216858932.png`. The packet details pane shows the following expanded information:

```
> Frame 444: 679 bytes on wire (5432 bits), 679 bytes captured (5432 bits) on interface \Device\NPF_{D0B35B52-0139-4D11-B315-94940C92D20D}, id 0
> Ethernet II, Src: LCFCHefE_0a:dd:05 (98:fa:9b:0a:dd:05), Dst: HuaweiTe_11:b7:42 (54:39:df:11:b7:42)
> Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.114.61.7, Dst: 47.244.9.130
> Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 62104, Dst Port: 443, Seq: 569, Ack: 153, Len: 625
> Transport Layer Security
  Hypertext Transfer Protocol
    GET /images/4e5d47b2db53654959295bba216858932.png HTTP/1.1\r\n
      Host: www.qiangwangbei.com\r\n
      Connection: keep-alive\r\n
      Cache-Control: max-age=0\r\n
      Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\r\n
      User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/84.0.4147.125 Safari/537.36\r\n
      Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9\r\n
      Sec-Fetch-Site: none\r\n
      Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\r\n
      Sec-Fetch-User: ?1\r\n
      Sec-Fetch-Dest: document\r\n
      Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\r\n
      Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9\r\n
    \r\n
    [Full request URI: https://www.qiangwangbei.com/images/4e5d47b2db53654959295bba216858932.png]
    [HTTP request 1/1]
```

The bottom status bar shows the URL `qiangwangbei.com/images/4e5d47b2db53654959295bba216858932.png`.

<https://blog.csdn.net/mochu777777>



<https://blog.csdn.net/mochu7777777>

保存图片，使用010 Ediotr或者winhex之类的16进制编辑工具查看

	十六进制(H)	运行脚本	运行模板:	PNG_bt	▷
	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F	0123456789ABCDEF			
3:FE10h:	2D B0 28 3B EC 60 E5 97 E1 CE FC C7 DC F3 4C 18	-°(;i'å-áîuçüôL.			
3:FE20h:	61 AD DB CB 40 F5 63 31 D7 AD B5 5F 2A 44 4C F1	a-ÛÉ@ôcl-x-u *DLñ			
3:FE30h:	9A 8D C5 8C CB B4 CD A5 5C EF C6 3F F3 BB DF 32	š.ÄŒÉÍ¥\iE?ó»ß2			
3:FE40h:	EE D2 A7 17 7E 18 FE 7F 76 67 DA E3 96 D2 B0 DB	iØS.~.p.vgÚâ.ººÙ			
3:FE50h:	D0 00 03 20 49 44 41 54 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77	... IDATMDAwMDAw			
3:FE60h:	4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77	MDAwMDAwMDAwMDAw			
3:FE70h:	4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77	MDAwMDAwMDAwMDAw			
3:FE80h:	4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77	MDAwMDAwMDAwMDAw			
3:FE90h:	4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 (77)	MDAwMDAwMDAwMDAw)			
3:FEA0h:	4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77	MDAwMDAwMDAwMDAw			
3:FEB0h:	4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77	MDAwMDAwMDAwMDAw			
3:FEC0h:	4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77	MDAwMDAwMDAwMDAw			
3:FED0h:	4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77	MDAwMDAwMDAwMDAw			
3:FEE0h:	4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77	MDAwMDAwMDAwMDAw			
3:FEF0h:	4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 78 4D 54 45 78	MDAwMDAwMDAxMTEX			
3:FF00h:	4D 54 45 78 4D 54 45 78 4D 54 45 77 4D 44 41 77	MTEXMTEXxMTEwMDAw			
3:FF10h:	4D 44 41 77 4D 54 41 77 4D 54 45 77 4D 44 41 77	MDAwMTAwMTEwMDAw			
3:FF20h:	4D 54 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 45 78	MTAwMDAwMDAwMDEX			
3:FF30h:	4D 54 41 77 4D 44 41 78 4D 54 45 78 4D 54 45 78	MTAwMDAxMTEXxMTEX			
3:FF40h:	4D 54 45 78 4D 54 41 77 4D 44 41 78 4D 54 45 78	MTEXxMTAwMDAxMTEX			
3:FF50h:	4D 54 45 78 4D 54 45 78 4D 54 45 77 4D 44 41 77	MTEXxMTEXxMTEwMDAw			
3:FF60h:	4D 44 41 77 4D 54 45 77 4D 54 45 78 4D 44 41 77	MDAwMTEwMTEXxMDAw			
3:FF70h:	4D 54 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 45 78	MTAwMDAwMDAwMDEX			
3:FF80h:	4D 54 41 77 4D 44 41 78 4D 54 45 78 4D 54 45 78	MTAwMDAxMTEXxMTEX			
3:FF90h:	4D 54 45 78 4D 54 41 77 4D 44 41 78 4D 54 41 77	MTEXxMTAwMDAxMTAw			
3:FFA0h:	4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 54 45 77 4D 44 45 77	MDAwMDAwMTEwMDEW			
3:FFB0h:	4D 44 45 78 4D 54 45 78 4D 54 45 77 4D 44 45 77	MDEXxMTEXxMTEwMDEW			
3:FFC0h:	4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 78 4D 54 41 77	MDAwMDAwMDAwMTEX			

名称	值	开始	大小	颜色	注释
> struct PNG_SIGNATURE sig		0h	8h	Fg: Bg: #	
> struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[0]	IHDR	(Critical, ... 8h	19h	Fg: Bg: #	
> struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[1]	sRGB	(Ancillary, ... 21h	Dh	Fg: Bg: #	
> struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[2]	gAMA	(Ancillary, ... 2Eh	10h	Fg: Bg: #	
> struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[3]	pHYs	(Ancillary, ... 3Eh	15h	Fg: Bg: #	
> struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[4]	IDAT	(Critical, ... 53h	FFB1h	Fg: Bg: #	
> struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[5]	IDAT	(Critical, ... 10004h	10000h	Fg: Bg: #	
> struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[6]	IDAT	(Critical, ... 20004h	10000h	Fg: Bg: #	
> struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[7]	IDAT	(Critical, ... 30004h	FF4Ch	Fg: Bg: #	
> struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[8]	IDAT	(Critical, ... 3FE50h	32Ch	Fg: Bg: #	
> struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[9]	IDAT	(Critical, ... 4017ch	36Ch	Fg: Bg: #	
> struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[10]	ENDI	(Critical, ... 404581h	5Ch	Fg: Bg: #	

struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[10]	IDAT	(Critical, ... 404E8h	0Ah	Fg:	Bg:	
struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[11]	IDAT	(Critical, ... 41134h	20h	Fg:	Bg:	
struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[12]	IEND	(Critical, ... 41154h	Ch	Fg:	Bg:	

<https://blog.csdn.net/mochu7777777>

chunk8-chunk11 的 IDAT 标志 后都跟着一串类似base64的编码，而且除了 chunk11 其他 chunk 的base编码看着应该就是大量的 01，其中 chunk11 中的 IDAT 后的内容比较不一样，复制出来解密得到：

4:1100h: 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77	MDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAw
4:1110h: 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77	MDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAw
4:1120h: 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77 4D 44 41 77	MDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAw
4:1130h: AC 22 3C 02 00 00 00 14 49 44 41 54 62 47 56 32	-"<....IDATbGV2
4:1140h: 5A 57 77 7A 58 33 4E 30 59 58 4A 30 58 32 6C 30	ZWwzX3N0YXJ0X210
4:1150h: A6 E9 37 2D 00 00 00 00 49 45 4E 44 AE 42 60 82	;é7-....IEND0B`,
4:1160h:	

模板结果 - PNG.bt

名称	值	开始	大小	颜色	注释
struct PNG_SIGNATURE sig	0h	8h	Fg: Bg:		
struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[0]	IHDR (Critical, ... 8h	19h	Fg: Bg:		
struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[1]	sRGB (Ancillary, ... 21h	Dh	Fg: Bg:		
struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[2]	gAMA (Ancillary, ... 2Eh	10h	Fg: Bg:		
struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[3]	pHVs (Ancillary, ... 3Eh	15h	Fg: Bg:		
struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[4]	IDAT (Critical, ... 53h	FFB1h	Fg: Bg:		
struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[5]	IDAT (Critical, ... 10004h	10000h	Fg: Bg:		
struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[6]	IDAT (Critical, ... 20004h	10000h	Fg: Bg:		
struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[7]	IDAT (Critical, ... 30004h	FE4Ch	Fg: Bg:		
struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[8]	IDAT (Critical, ... 3FE50h	32Ch	Fg: Bg:		
struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[9]	IDAT (Critical, ... 4017Ch	36Ch	Fg: Bg:		
struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[10]	IDAT (Critical, ... 404E8h	C4Ch	Fg: Bg:		
struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[11]	IDAT (Critical, ... 41134h	20h	Fg: Bg:		
struct PNG_CHUNK chunk[12]	IEND (Critical, ... 41154h	Ch	Fg: Bg:		

<https://blog.csdn.net/mochu7777777>

## Base64编码转换

bGV2ZWwzX3N0YXJ0X210

解密结果以16进制显示

level3\_start\_it


<https://blog.csdn.net/mochu7777777>

level3\_start\_it

chunk8-chunk10 三段中得到base64编码如下：

base64解密得到：

将base64解密得到的这些二进制保存为 `file.txt`




总长度: 3600

使用01二进制转二维码脚本：



得到二维码，使用 QR Research 扫描



网盘下载得到压缩包 `level4.zip`，解压得到 `level4.jpg`


使用 `stegdetect` 检测发现有 `jphide`

```
→ level4 stegdetect level4.jpg  
level4.jpg : jphide(*)  
→ level4
```

使用 `stegbreak` 爆破密码，得到密码为： `power123`

```
→ level4
→ level4 stegbreak -r /usr/share/stegbreak/rules.ini -f pawd_list.txt level4.jpg
Loaded 1 files ...
level4.jpg : jphide[v5](power123)
Processed 1 files, found 1 embeddings.
Time: 0 seconds: Cracks: 734,      inf c/s
→ level4 ■
```

使用 **JPHS** 工具打开图片，点击 **Seek** 输入密码




然后会导出个文件（不需要输入文件后缀什么的，直接随便输入文件名导出即可）这里导出为 `level14`

```
level4
1 | https://pan.baidu.com/s/1o43y4UGkmleP-RViC25a0w
2 | mrpt
3 |
4 | level4_here_all
```


level4 here all

网盘下载附件，得到压缩包 `level5.zip`，解压，如下：



level5 is aaa

level6.zip 和 level7.zip 都有压缩密码，解不开，先看到 level6.zip



原始文件大小都是<=5 Byte，猜测CRC32碰撞，网上很多其他的CRC32碰撞脚本都试了不行，最后找到这个Zip-CRC32碰撞脚本：

Zip-CRC32碰撞脚本: <https://github.com/kmyk/zip-crc-cracker>

注: 该脚本笔者运行环境为Linux, Windows试过几次不行


```
→ level6 ls
crack.py level6.zip zip-crc-cracker
→ level6 python3 crack.py level6.zip
reading zip files...
file found: level6.zip / 2.txt: crc = 0xeed7e184, size = 4
file found: level6.zip / 3.txt: crc = 0x289585af, size = 5
file found: level6.zip / 1.txt: crc = 0x9aeacc13, size = 5
compiling...
searching...
crc found: 0xeed7e184: "6_is"
crc found: 0x9aeacc13: "level"
crc found: 0x289585af: "n*=em"
crc found: 0x9aeacc13: "p**dx"
crc found: 0x289585af: "ready"
crc found: 0x9aeacc13: "M;f\x0c "
crc found: 0x289585af: "Ot-\x0c!"
crc found: 0x9aeacc13: "Qt:\x0d4"
crc found: 0x289585af: "S;q\x0d5"
crc found: 0x289585af: "?H\x5c\x09q"
done
level6.zip / 2.txt : '6_is'
level6.zip / 3.txt : 'n*=em'
level6.zip / 3.txt : 'ready'
level6.zip / 3.txt : 'Ot-\x0c!'
level6.zip / 3.txt : 'S;q\r5'
level6.zip / 3.txt : '?H\\\\tq'
level6.zip / 1.txt : 'level'
level6.zip / 1.txt : 'p**dx'
level6.zip / 1.txt : 'M;f\x0c '
level6.zip / 1.txt : 'Qt:\r4'
→ level6
```

<https://blog.csdn.net/mochu7777777>

按照 1,2,3 的顺序排好

level6\_isready

使用 ARCHPR 打开 level7.zip , 1.png 压缩成 1.zip 添加到明文密钥进行明文爆破





根据网上的师傅的说法, 等到 剩余时间 小于 1h 即可停止





然后会自动保存名为 level7\_decrypted.zip 的已经解开加密的压缩包





直接解压 `level7_decrypted.zip`, `4.png` 和 `5.png` 分辨率一样, size不一样, 盲水印






BlindWaterMask: <https://github.com/chishaxie/BlindWaterMark>

```
PS D:\Tools\Misc\BlindWaterMark> python3 .\bwmforpy3.py decode .\4.png .\5.png result.png
image<\4.png> + image(encoded)<\5.png> -> watermark<result.png>
```



level7ishere

并且得到最后一关的相关地址: [http://39.99.247.28/final\\_level](http://39.99.247.28/final_level)



## html snow隐写

html snow隐写解密网站: <http://fog.misty.com/perry/ccs/snow/snow.html>

把网址格式填对，Password为题目注释中的括号里的内容

---

## Decryption

URL containing concealed message:

[http://39.99.247.28/final\\_level/](http://39.99.247.28/final_level/)

Password: no one can find me

---

点击 Decrypt



---

综上所述，flag为其部分拼接：