

# 2018年强网杯初赛 逆向题目 hide writeup (超详细)

原创

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1 篇文章 0 订阅

订阅专栏

这道题有壳, strings搜索是upx3.91。但是不能用upx -d。只好手动脱壳了。

难点在于本题目有反调试, 有些函数不能步过。

首先研究壳。

```
LOAD:000000000044EFB0 public start
LOAD:000000000044EFB0 start proc near ; DATA XREF: LOAD:0000000000400018 ↑ o
LOAD:000000000044EFB0 call loc_44F230
LOAD:000000000044EFB5 push rbp
LOAD:000000000044EFB6 push rbx
LOAD:000000000044EFB7 push rcx
LOAD:000000000044EFB8 push rdx
LOAD:000000000044EFB9 add rsi, rdi
LOAD:000000000044EFBC push rsi
LOAD:000000000044EFBD mov rsi, rdi
LOAD:000000000044EFC0 mov rdi, rdx
LOAD:000000000044EFC3 xor ebx, ebx
LOAD:000000000044EFC5 xor ecx, ecx
LOAD:000000000044EFC7 or rbp, 0FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFh
LOAD:000000000044EFCB call sub_44F020
LOAD:000000000044EFD0 add ebx, ebx
LOAD:000000000044EFD2 jz short loc_44EFD6
LOAD:000000000044EFD4 rep retn
LOAD:000000000044EFD6 ; -----
LOAD:000000000044EFD6 loc_44EFD6: ; CODE XREF: start+22 ↑ j
LOAD:000000000044EFD6 mov ebx, [rsi]
LOAD:000000000044EFD8 sub rsi, 0FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFCh
LOAD:000000000044EFDc adc ebx, ebx
LOAD:000000000044EFD E mov dl, [rsi]
LOAD:000000000044EFE0 rep retn
LOAD:000000000044EFE0 start endp ; sp-analysis failed
LOAD:000000000044FFF0 INAD:000000000044FFF0
```

第一句call必须步入。

```

LOAD:00000000004f230 loc_44f230: ; CODE XREF: start ↑ p
LOAD:00000000004f230 pop rbp
LOAD:00000000004f231 lea rax, [rbp-9]
LOAD:00000000004f235 mov r15d, [rax]
LOAD:00000000004f238 mov edx, 0C8h
LOAD:00000000004f23D sub rax, r15
LOAD:00000000004f240 sub r15d, edx
LOAD:00000000004f243 lea rcx, [rax+rdx]
LOAD:00000000004f247 call sub_44f1c5
LOAD:00000000004f24c jb short loc_44f254
LOAD:00000000004f24c ; -----
LOAD:00000000004f24E dw 0
LOAD:00000000004f250 db 6Ch, 5, 2 dup(0)
LOAD:00000000004f254 ; -----
LOAD:00000000004f254 loc_44f254: ; CODE XREF: LOAD:00000000004f24c ↑ j
LOAD:00000000004f254 or [rcx+19h], cl
LOAD:00000000004f257 add dh, bh
LOAD:00000000004f257 ; -----
LOAD:00000000004f259 db 2 dup(0FFh), 0E6h, 0E8h, 5Fh, 0, 2Fh
LOAD:00000000004f260 aProcSelfExe db 'proc/self/exe', 0
LOAD:00000000004f260

```

Sub\_44f1c5必须步入。

Sub\_44f1c5中，

```

LOAD:00000000004f1E5 pop r10 ; flags
LOAD:00000000004f1E7 sub r8d, r8d ; fd
LOAD:00000000004f1EA push 9
LOAD:00000000004f1EC pop rax
LOAD:00000000004f1ED syscall ; LINUX - sys_mmap
LOAD:00000000004f1EF cmp edi, eax
LOAD:00000000004f1F1 jnz loc_44f0EB
LOAD:00000000004f1F7 mov esi, offset dword_400000
LOAD:00000000004f1FC mov edx, edi
LOAD:00000000004f1FE sub edx, esi
LOAD:00000000004f200 jz short loc_44f217
LOAD:00000000004f202 add ebp, edx ; 增加偏移的地址差
LOAD:00000000004f204 add [rsp+28h+var_20], edx
LOAD:00000000004f208 add [rsp+28h+var_10], edx
LOAD:00000000004f20C loc_44f20C: ; CODE XREF: LOAD:00000000004f1A5 ↑ j
LOAD:00000000004f20C mov ecx, ebx
LOAD:00000000004f20E sub ecx, esi
LOAD:00000000004f210 shr ecx, 3
LOAD:00000000004f213 cld
LOAD:00000000004f214 rep movsq
LOAD:00000000004f217 loc_44f217: ; CODE XREF: sub_44f1c5+3B ↑ j
LOAD:00000000004f217 xchg eax, edi
LOAD:00000000004f218 mov rsi, rbx
LOAD:00000000004f21B push rax ; 这是04f248, 复制的最后一个地址, 作为返回地址。这句汇编是一个call函数。call调到44f2ac
LOAD:00000000004f21C xchg eax, edx
LOAD:00000000004f21D lodsd
LOAD:00000000004f21E push rax
LOAD:00000000004f21F loc_44f21F: ; CODE XREF: LOAD:00000000004f1A8 ↑ j
LOAD:00000000004f21F mov rcx, rsp
LOAD:00000000004f222 lodsd
LOAD:00000000004f223 xchg eax, edi
LOAD:00000000004f224 lodsd
LOAD:00000000004f225 movzx r8d, al
LOAD:00000000004f229 xchg rdi, rsi
LOAD:00000000004f22C call rbp ; 可以不进入, 不停止
LOAD:00000000004f22E pop rcx
LOAD:00000000004f22F retn
LOAD:00000000004f22F sub_44f1c5 endp ; sp-analysis failed

```

0x44f214的rep指令把0x400000到0x44f248复制到0x800000位置。

0x44f22c处，rbp是0x84efb5。这句话是start处的第二条指令。这里不必步入。如果步入，

在44EFCB处的call sub\_44F020，再步过就会卡死（不知道为什么，奇怪！如果卡死，按ctrl+c可以只是终止而不退出gdb）；步入之后可以使用finish命令运行到函数外，即0x44F22E处pop rcx。

在0x44f22f retn之后，到达0x84f248: call 0x84f2ac。

0x84f2ac是一开始没有复制的地址，可以考虑是0x84efb5的代码形成的新代码。此处内存开辟是在系统调用mmap处，刚开辟后此处全为0。

此时可以dump出来0x800000处的内存，见dump2。（我修改了ep，va，filesize）

```

LOAD:000000000084F2D7
LOAD:000000000084F2D7 loc_84F2D7: ; CODE XREF: start+33↓ j
LOAD:000000000084F2D7 cmp qword ptr [rsi], 0
LOAD:000000000084F2DB movsq
LOAD:000000000084F2DD movsq
LOAD:000000000084F2DF jnz short loc_84F2D7
LOAD:000000000084F2E1 lea r15, [rdi-8]
LOAD:000000000084F2E5 mov [rdx], rdi
LOAD:000000000084F2E8 mov eax, 3D202020h
LOAD:000000000084F2ED stosd
LOAD:000000000084F2EE mov edx, 1000h ; bufsiz
LOAD:000000000084F2F3 mov rsi, rdi ; buf
LOAD:000000000084F2F6 mov rdi, r9 ; path
LOAD:000000000084F2F9 push 59h
LOAD:000000000084F2FB pop rax
LOAD:000000000084F2FC syscall ; LINUX - sys_readlink
LOAD:000000000084F2FE test eax, eax
LOAD:000000000084F300 js short loc_84F306
LOAD:000000000084F302 mov byte ptr [rsi+rax], 0
LOAD:000000000084F306 loc_84F306: ; CODE XREF: start+54↑ j
LOAD:000000000084F306 add r9, 0Fh
LOAD:000000000084F30A pop rcx
LOAD:000000000084F30B pop rsi
LOAD:000000000084F30C pop rdi
LOAD:000000000084F30D sub rsp, 800h
LOAD:000000000084F314 mov rdx, rsp
LOAD:000000000084F317 mov r8, rbp
LOAD:000000000084F31A push 0
LOAD:000000000084F31C call sub_84F782 ; 可以步过
LOAD:000000000084F321 pop rdx
LOAD:000000000084F322 add rsp, 800h
LOAD:000000000084F329 pop rsi
LOAD:000000000084F32A pop rdi
LOAD:000000000084F32B pop rcx
LOAD:000000000084F32C pop rcx
LOAD:000000000084F32D shl ecx, 0Ch
LOAD:000000000084F330 add rdi, rcx
LOAD:000000000084F333 sub esi, ecx
LOAD:000000000084F335 push rax
LOAD:000000000084F336 push 0Bh
LOAD:000000000084F338 pop rax
LOAD:000000000084F339 jmp qword ptr [r15]
LOAD:000000000084F339 start endp
LOAD:000000000084F339

```

接着运行到0x84f31c: call 0x84f782, 可以步过。

在0x84f339: jmp QWORD PTR [r15], 跳转到0x40000c

此时可以dump处0x400000处的内存，见文件bindump.so。这就是脱壳后的文件了，但是不能运行，不清楚原因。可以看到ep是0x400890。

0x40000c: syscall (调用号11, sys\_munmap, 解除内存映射)

0x40000e: ret

上面两处是elf头部的padding中存储的，感叹做的壳之精准。

ret之后到达:

0x400890: xor ebp,ebp

下一部分，分析主逻辑。

| Direction | Type | Address              | Text   |
|-----------|------|----------------------|--|
| Up        | o    | sub_4009EF+4F        | mov esi, offset aEnterTheFlag; "Enter the flag:\n" |
| Down      | o    | LOAD:0000000004C8EC2 | mov rsi, offset aEnterTheFlag; "Enter the flag:\n" |

Line 2 of 2

发现Enter the flag出现了两次。

按照程序执行过程只会执行上面一个。

```

; Attributes: bp-based frame

sub_4009EF proc near

var_78= qword ptr -78h
var_70= byte ptr -70h
var_8= qword ptr -8

push    rbp
mov     rbp, rsp
add     rsp, 0FFFFFFFFFFFFFF80h
; 10:  v6 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
mov     rax, fs:28h
mov     [rbp+var_8], rax
; 11:  if ( anti_debug_43F380(0LL, 0LL, 0LL, 0LL) )
xor     eax, eax
mov     ecx, 0
mov     edx, 0
mov     esi, 0
mov     edi, 0          ; request
mov     eax, 0
call   anti_debug_43F380
mov     [rbp+var_78], rax
cmp     [rbp+var_78], 0
jz     short loc_400A39

; 12:  sub_40EAD0(0LL);
mov     edi, 0
call   sub_40EAD0

; 13:  write_43E9B0(1LL, (__int64)"Enter the flag:\n");

loc_400A39:
mov     edx, 10h
mov     esi, offset aEnterTheFlag; "Enter the flag:\n"
mov     edi, 1
call   write_43E9B0
; 14:  read_43E950(0LL, &v5, 32LL);
lea    rax, [rbp+var_70]

```

```

1 |__int64 sub_4009EF()
2 |{
3 |  const char *v0; // rsi
4 |  __int64 v1; // rdx
5 |  __int64 result; // rax
6 |  __int64 v3; // rcx
7 |  unsigned __int64 v4; // rt1
8 |  char v5; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-70h]
9 |  unsigned __int64 v6; // [rsp+78h] [rbp-8h]
10 |
11 |  v6 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
12 |  if ( anti_debug_43F380(0LL, 0LL, 0LL, 0LL) )
13 |      sub_40EAD0(0LL);
14 |  write_43E9B0(1LL, (__int64)"Enter the flag:\n");
15 |  read_43E950(0LL, &v5, 32LL);
16 |  if ( (unsigned int)sub_4009AE((__int64)&v5) != 0 )
17 |  {
18 |      v0 = "You are right\n";
19 |      write_43E9B0(1LL, (__int64)"You are right\n");
20 |  }
21 |  else
22 |  {
23 |      v0 = "You are wrong\n";
24 |      write_43E9B0(1LL, (__int64)"You are wrong\n");
25 |  }
26 |  result = 0LL;
27 |  v4 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
28 |  v3 = v4 ^ v6;
29 |  if ( v4 != v6 )
30 |      sub_442480(1LL, v0, v1, v3);
31 |  return result;
32 |}

```

从流程图上可以看到左枝非正常退出，猜测和反调试有关，进入43f380函数，看到调用了ptrace的系统调用，确实是反调试。由于没有脱壳成功，这里没办法修改判断条件，只好用gdb脚本修改eflags寄存器了。

接着分析0x4009AE函数：

```

1 |B00L8 __fastcall sub_4009AE(__int64 a1)
2 |{
3 |  return (unsigned int)sub_400360(a1, (__int64)"qwb{this_is_wrong_flag}") == 0;
4 |}

```

这个时候就应该认识到这是错误的分支了，毕竟告诉你是错的flag了。但是我继续分析了，

```

1 |__int64 __fastcall sub_400360(__int64 a1, __int64 a2)
2 |{
3 |  return qword_6C9050(a1, a2);
4 |}

```

具体函数还没有写入。根据动态调试，最后比较字符串的函数是42D820.

```

33  _asm
34  {
35      movdqu xmm1, xmmword ptr [rdi]; 简单说就是mov
36      movdqu xmm0, xmmword ptr [rsi]
37      pcmpeqb xmm0, xmm1; 比较, 相同byte置ff. 字符串的首字节存在最后byte
38      pminub xmm0, xmm1; 感觉是逐字节取小的
39      pxor   xmm1, xmm1
40      pcmpeqb xmm0, xmm1
41      pmovmskb eax, xmm0; 取每个字节的最高位
42  }
43  if ( _RAX )
44      goto LABEL_19;
45  _asm
46  {
47      movdqu xmm6, xmmword ptr [rdi+10h]; 自己输入
48      movdqu xmm3, xmmword ptr [rsi+10h]
49      movdqu xmm5, xmmword ptr [rdi+20h]
50      pcmpeqb xmm3, xmm6
51      movdqu xmm2, xmmword ptr [rsi+20h]
52      pminub xmm3, xmm6
53      pcmpeqb xmm3, xmm1; xmm1 是0
54      movdqu xmm4, xmmword ptr [rdi+30h]
55      pcmpeqb xmm2, xmm5
56      pmovmskb edx, xmm3
57      movdqu xmm0, xmmword ptr [rsi+30h]
58      pminub xmm2, xmm5
59      pcmpeqb xmm2, xmm1
60      pcmpeqb xmm0, xmm4
61      pmovmskb eax, xmm2
62      pminub xmm0, xmm4
63      pcmpeqb xmm0, xmm1
64      pmovmskb ecx, xmm0
65  }

```

仔细分析逻辑，需要保证输入地址的64字节和目标地址的64字节相等，而只能输入32字节，根本不能实现。

废了很久时间之后，想到了另一处Enter the flag。

```

LOAD:00000000004C8E92          align 20h
LOAD:00000000004C8EA0          xor     rdi, rdi
LOAD:00000000004C8EA3          xor     rsi, rsi
LOAD:00000000004C8EA6          xor     rdx, rdx
LOAD:00000000004C8EA9          xor     r10, r10
LOAD:00000000004C8EAC          mov     eax, 65h
LOAD:00000000004C8EB1          syscall                                ; LINUX - sys_ptrace
LOAD:00000000004C8EB3          cmp     eax, 0
LOAD:00000000004C8EB6          jnz    locret_4C8FD8
LOAD:00000000004C8EBC          xor     rdi, rdi
LOAD:00000000004C8EBF          inc     rdi
LOAD:00000000004C8EC2          mov     rsi, offset aEnterTheFlag ; "Enter the flag:\n"
LOAD:00000000004C8EC9          mov     rdx, 10h
LOAD:00000000004C8ED0          xor     eax, eax
LOAD:00000000004C8ED2          inc     eax
LOAD:00000000004C8ED4          syscall                                ; LINUX - sys_write
LOAD:00000000004C8ED6          xor     rdi, rdi
LOAD:00000000004C8ED9          xor     eax, eax
LOAD:00000000004C8EDB          mov     rsi, offset input_6CCDB0
LOAD:00000000004C8EE2          mov     rdx, 20h
LOAD:00000000004C8EE9          syscall                                ; LINUX - sys_read
LOAD:00000000004C8EEB          cmp     eax, 0
LOAD:00000000004C8EEE          jle    loc_4C8FA9
LOAD:00000000004C8EF4          ; 7:  if ( strlen(input_6CCDB0) == 21
LOAD:00000000004C8EF4          ; 8:  && input_6CCDB0[1] == 'w'
LOAD:00000000004C8EF4          ; 9:  && input_6CCDB0[2] == 'b'
LOAD:00000000004C8EF4          ; 10: && input_6CCDB0[3] == '{'
LOAD:00000000004C8EF4          ; 11: && input_6CCDB0[20] == '}' )
LOAD:00000000004C8EF4          ; ===== S U B R O U T I N E =====
LOAD:00000000004C8EF4
LOAD:00000000004C8EF4
LOAD:00000000004C8EF4          sub_4C8EF4          proc near
LOAD:00000000004C8EF4          mov     rdi, offset input_6CCDB0
LOAD:00000000004C8EF8          mov     rcx, 0FFFFFFFFFFFFFFh
LOAD:00000000004C8F02          xor     eax, eax
LOAD:00000000004C8F04          repne scasb
LOAD:00000000004C8F06          not     rcx
LOAD:00000000004C8F09          sub     rcx, 1

```

这里并未被ida识别成函数，0x4c8ef4处是我标记的函数，从这里标记可以使函数能使用f5.由于原程序并不会执行到此处，需要gdb脚本中修改pc值。

```
1 signed __int64 sub_4C8EF4()
2 {
3     _BYTE *v0; // rdi
4     __int64 *v1; // rsi
5     unsigned __int64 v2; // rdx
6     signed __int64 result; // rax
7
8     if ( strlen(input_6CCDB0) == 21
9         && input_6CCDB0[1] == 'w'
10        && input_6CCDB0[2] == 'b'
11        && input_6CCDB0[3] == '{'
12        && input_6CCDB0[20] == '}' )
13     {
14         encrypt1_4C8CC0((__int64)&input_4_6CCDB4);
15         sub_4C8E50((__int64)&input_4_6CCDB4);
16         encrypt1_4C8CC0((__int64)&input_4_6CCDB4);
17         sub_4C8E50((__int64)&input_4_6CCDB4);
18         encrypt1_4C8CC0((__int64)&input_4_6CCDB4);
19         v0 = &input_4_6CCDB4;
20         sub_4C8E50((__int64)&input_4_6CCDB4);
21         v1 = qword_4C8CB0; // target
22         v2 = 0LL;
23         while ( v2 < 0x10 && *v0 == *(_BYTE *)v1 )
24         {
25             ++v2;
26             ++v0;
27             v1 = (__int64 *)((char *)v1 + 1);
28         }
29     }
30     __asm { syscall; LINUX - sys_write }
31     result = 60LL;
32     __asm { syscall; LINUX - sys_exit }
33     return result;
34 }
```

下面是可以快速进入关键位置的gdb脚本。

```

#!/bin/bash
file hide
b *0x44f22f
r
si
si
d
b *0x84f339
#jmp    QWORD PTR [r15];0x40000c
c
d
si
si
si
b* 0x4009EF
c
set $rip=0x4C8EBC
b *0x4c8f11
c
set $eflags = $eflags |(1<<6)
5
b *0x4C8D09
c
c
d
b *0x4C8DFB
c

```

下面是本题目的exp

```

#coding=utf-8
import struct
import string
def u32(data):
    return struct.unpack("<I",data)[0]

def p32(data):
    return struct.pack("<I",data)

def u64(data):
    return struct.unpack("<Q",data)[0]

def p64(data):
    return struct.pack("<Q",data)

input1 = '1234567890123456'
input1 = bytearray(input1)
CONST_STR = 's1Ip3rEv3Ryd4Y3'
CONST = 0X676E696C
v4 = 0
v4_4=0
v4_4_arr = [0 for i in range(0,9)]
for i in range(1,9):
    v4_4_arr[i] = (v4_4_arr[i-1]+CONST)&0xFFFFFFFF

def re_block(byte_arr_8):

```



```

i = 0
v3 = u32(byte_arr_8[0:4])
v4 = u32(byte_arr_8[4:8])
print 'round', v3, v4
for i in range(7,-1,-1):
    v30 = (v3 << 4) & 0xffffffff
    v2c = v3 >> 5
    edx = v30 ^ v2c
    v30 = (v3 + edx) & 0xffffffff

    v28 = (v4_4_arr[i+1] >> 11) & 3
    edx = u32(CONST_STR[v28 * 4:(v28 + 1) * 4])
    v2c = (v4_4_arr[i+1] + edx) & 0xffffffff # xxxx
    # print 'v2c',hex(v2c)
    print v30 ^ v2c
    v4 = (v4+0x100000000-(v30 ^ v2c)) & 0xffffffff

    v30 = (v4 << 4) & 0xffffffff
    v2c = v4 >> 5
    edx = v30 ^ v2c

    v30 = (v4 + edx) & 0xffffffff

    v28 = v4_4_arr[i] & 3
    edx = u32(CONST_STR[v28 * 4:(v28 + 1) * 4])
    v2c = (v4_4_arr[i] + edx) & 0xffffffff

    v3 = (v3+0x100000000-(v30 ^ v2c)) & 0xffffffff

    print 'round',i,v3,v4
byte_arr_8[0:4] = p32(v3)
byte_arr_8[4:8] = p32(v4)
return byte_arr_8
def xor16(byte_arr_16):
    for i in range(0,16):
        byte_arr_16[i]^=i
def re_all(str16):
    byte_arr = bytearray(str16)
    xor16(byte_arr)#传入整个bytearray, 就是传入地址
    byte_arr[0:8] = re_block(byte_arr[0:8])#传入部分bytearray, 就是复制之后再传入
    byte_arr[8:16] = re_block(byte_arr[8:16])
    xor16(byte_arr)
    byte_arr[0:8] = re_block(byte_arr[0:8])
    byte_arr[8:16] = re_block(byte_arr[8:16])
    xor16(byte_arr)
    byte_arr[0:8] = re_block(byte_arr[0:8])
    byte_arr[8:16] = re_block(byte_arr[8:16])
    return str(byte_arr)

def block(str8):
    i=0
    input1=bytearray(str8)
    v3 = u32(input1[8 * i:8 * i + 4])
    v4 = u32(input1[8 * i + 4:8 * (i + 1)])
    v4_4 = 0 ##0000
    for j in range(0, 8):

        v30 = (v4 << 4) & 0xffffffff
        v2c = v4 >> 5

```

```

edx = v30 ^ v2c

v30 = (v4 + edx) & 0xffffffff

v28 = v4_4 & 3
edx = u32(CONST_STR[v28 * 4:(v28 + 1) * 4])
v2c = (v4_4 + edx) & 0xffffffff

v3 = ((v30 ^ v2c) + v3) & 0xffffffff

v4_4 = (v4_4 + CONST) & 0xffffffff

v30 = (v3 << 4) & 0xffffffff
v2c = v3 >> 5
edx = v30 ^ v2c
v30 = (v3 + edx) & 0xffffffff

v28 = (v4_4 >> 11) & 3
edx = u32(CONST_STR[v28 * 4:(v28 + 1) * 4])
v2c = (v4_4 + edx) & 0xffffffff # xxxx
print v30 ^ v2c
v4 = ((v30 ^ v2c) + v4) & 0xffffffff

print 'round', j, v3, v4

input1[8 * i:8 * i + 4] = p32(v3)
input1[8 * i + 4:8 * (i + 1)] = p32(v4)
str8_1=str(input1)
return str8_1
def block2(str8):
    input1 = bytearray(str8)
    for i in range(0,8):
        input1[i]=input1[1]^i
    return str(input1)
des = ('52B8137F358CF21B'+ 'F46386D2734F1E31').decode('hex')
print len(des)

print block('12345678').encode('hex')
des1 = '5b90ef3f91b58fe6'.decode('hex')
print re_all(bytearray(des))

```