2017年强网杯hide逆向



<u>追寻520</u> 于 2019-06-19 20:39:32 发布 分类专栏: 逆向 文章标签: 逆向 ctf 版权声明:本文为博主原创文章,遵循 <u>CC 4.0 BY-SA</u>版权协议,转载请附上原文出处链接和本声明。 本文链接: <u>https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_39285220/article/details/92845125</u>



逆向 专栏收录该内容

2篇文章0订阅 订阅专栏 1.先用file命令查看文件基本信息,文件为64位ELF文件,剥去了符号表信息。

<mark>zx@Emmanuel</mark>:~\$ file /mnt/hgfs/re/强网杯赛题/tmp1/hide /mnt/hgfs/re/强网杯赛题/tmp1/hide: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, stripped

2.用checksec查看文件,文件加了upx壳。

zx@Emmanuel:~\$ checksec /mnt/hgfs/re/强网杯赛题/tmp1/hide [*] Checking for new versions of pwntools To disable this functionality, set the contents of /home/zx/.pwntools-cache/ update to 'never'. [*] You have the latest version of Pwntools (3.14.0.dev0) [*] '/mnt/hgfs/re/\xe5\xbc\xba\xe7\xbd\x91\xe6\x9d\xaf\xe8\xb5\x9b\xe9\xa2\x98/t mp1/hide' Arch: amd64-64-little **RELRO:** Stack: NX: PIE: RWX: Packer: https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_39285220

3.ida静态分析,大概只看到了几个地址和长度。

		LOAD.000000004411CJ		
1	•	LOAD:00000000044F1C5	рор	rbx
1		LOAD:00000000044F1C6		
1		LOAD:000000000044F1C6 loc_44F1C6:		; CODE XREF: LOAD:loc_44F151↑j
1	•	LOAD:00000000044F1C6	push	1
1	•	LOAD:00000000044F1C8	push	40000Ch
1	•	LOAD:00000000044F1CD	push	rax
1	•	LOAD:00000000044F1CE	push	2DBB50h
1	•	LOAD:00000000044F1D3	push	rcx
1	•	LOAD:00000000044F1D4	push	r15
1	•	LOAD:00000000044F1D6	mov	edi, 800000h ; addr
1	•	LOAD:00000000044F1DB	push	7
1	•	LOAD:00000000044F1DD	рор	rdx ; prot
1	•	LOAD:00000000044F1DE	mov	esi, 2997072 ; len
1	•	LOAD:00000000044F1E3	push	32h
1	•	LOAD:00000000044F1E5	рор	r10 ; flags
1	•	LOAD:00000000044F1E7	sub	r8d, r8d ; fd
1	•	LOAD:00000000044F1EA	push	9
1	•	LOAD:00000000044F1EC	рор	rax
1	•	LOAD:00000000044F1ED	syscall	; LINUX - sys_mmap
1	•	LOAD:00000000044F1EF	cmp	edi, eax
1		LOAD:00000000044F1F1	jnz	loc_44F0EB
	•	LOAD:00000000044F1F7	mov	esi, offset dword_400000
	•	LOAD:00000000044F1FC	mov	edx, edi
	•	LOAD:00000000044F1FE	sub	edx, esi
r		LOAD:00000000044F200	jz	short loc_44F217
	•	LOAD:00000000044F202	add	ebp, edx
	•	LOAD:00000000044F204	add	[rsp+28h+var_20], edx
	•	LOAD:00000000044F208	add	[rsp+28h+var_10], edx
		LOAD:00000000044F20C		
		LOAD:00000000044F20C loc_44F20C:		; CODE XREF: LOAD:00000000044F1A5↑j

https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_39285220

4.gbd动态调试一下,发现起始地址是从0x400000开始的,一运行程序自动退出,应该是开启了反调试,那么下面直接运行程序,把内存dump出来看看。

gdb-peda\$ vmmap									
Start	End	Perm	Name						
0×00400000	0x00450000	r-xp	/mnt/hgfs/re/强网杯赛题/tmp1/hide						
0x006cc000									
0x00007ffff7ffa000	0x00007ffff7ffd000	rp	[vvar]						
0x00007ffff7ffd000	0x00007ffff7fff000	r-xp	[vdso]						
0x00007fffffde000									
0xfffffffff600000	0xffffffff601000	r-xp	[vsyscall]						
gdb-peda\$ c									
Continuing.									
[Inferior 1 (process 72893) exited normally]									
Warning: not runnin	าg								
gdb-peda\$			https://blog.csdp.net/weixin_39285220						
	1.1								

5.直接运行程序,从0x400000开始,尝试dump出来一些内存,字节长度尝试2997072。dump了快10分钟,真的dump了一些东西。

zx@Emmanuel:~\$ sudo dd if=/proc/9058/mem of=/mnt/hgfs/re/3 bs=1 count=2997972 if lag=skip_bytes skip=\$[0x400000] dd: /proc/9058/mem: cannot skip to specified offset dd: error writing '/mnt/hgfs/re/3': Input/output error 1987643+0 records in 1987642+0 records out 1987642 bytes (2.0 MB, 1.9 MiB) copied, 513.647 s, 3.9 kB/s

6.ida分析dump出来的文件

😭 IDA - 3.i64 (3) F:\攻防\re\强网杯赛	蹇题\tmp1\3.i64							-	σ	×
File Edit Jump Search View D	Debugger Options	Windows Help								
📂 🔜 🗢 🕶 🕶 🍋 🏪 🦀) 🕽 🔊 🔊 🗛 🗛	🗏 🗷 🗽 👂 🗺 🕯	ት 🖨 🖉 📕 🗟 📾 🖬 🖓 🕶 💰	🕨 🚅 🗙 🛛 🕨 💷 No debug	er 🔹 🔹 🚮 🕈 🎬					
										-
Library function 📕 Regular	function 📕 Instruc	ction 📃 Data 📕 1	Unexplored 📒 External symb	ol						
📝 Functions window	□ & ×	🖪 IDA View-A	🛛 🖾 Strings window 🛙	🛛 🖸 Hex Viev-1 🖾	🖪 Structures 🗵 🖽 Enums	🗵 🛐 Imports 🗵	🛃 Exports 🖾			
Function name	Se ^									
Function name [7] sub_900208 [7] sub_900208 [7] sub_900208 [7] sub_900208 [7] sub_900300 [7] sub_90030	Se LO LO LO LO LO LO LO LO LO LO				<pre>Attributes: noreturn public start start proc near xor ebp, ebp mov r9, rdx pop rsi mov rdx, rsp and rsp, 0FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF0 push rax push rax push rax or rdi, offset sub_401600 mov rdi, offset sub_4009EF call sub_400000 start endp</pre>					
	10	0.00% (-603, -253	8) (1352, 709) 000008A6 00000	000004008#6: start+16 (Sync	hronized with Hex View-1)		https://blog.osc	n.net/wei	kin_3928	15220

找到start函数,start函数中赋值给rdi的就是main函数了,找到main函数,就好分析了。

```
1
     int64 sub 4009EF()
  2 {
  3
      const char *v0; // rsi
  4
      __int64 v1; // rdx
  5
     __int64 result; // rax
  6
      __int64 v3; // rcx
  7
      unsigned __int64 v4; // rt1
  8
      char v5; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-70h]
  9
      unsigned __int64 v6; // [rsp+78h] [rbp-8h]
 10
      v6 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
11
12
      if ( sub_43F380(0LL, 0LL, 0LL, 0LL) )
13
       sub_40EAD0(0LL);
      sub_43E9B0(1LL, (__int64)"Enter the flag:\n");
14
15
      sub 43E950(0LL, ( int64)&v5);
      if ( (unsigned int)sub_4009AE((__int64)&v5) != 0 )
16
 17
      {
       v0 = "You are right\n";
18 🔍
       sub_43E9B0(1LL, (__int64)"You are right\n");
19
 20
      }
 21
     else
 22
     {
23
       v0 = "You are wrong n";
       sub_43E9B0(1LL, (__int64)"You are wrong\n");
24
 25
      }
26
     result = 0LL;
     v4 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
27
     v3 = v4 ^{v6};
28
29
     if ( v4 != v6 )
       sub_442480(1LL, v0, v1, v3);
30
31
     return result;
32 }
```

看这段代码,关键就是要分析sub_4009AE函数,结果点开以后,直接告诉flag是错误的。



思路一下就断了,这个函数应该是估计是个假函数,那么就用那个关键字符串再搜索一下,看看有没有其他地 方还有提示。查找发现"Enter the flag:"出现了两次,第一次就是上面的函数,那现在来看看下面那个地方。

🖼 xrefs to aEn	terTheFlag										\times
Direction	Туре	Address	Text								
🖼 Up	0	sub_4009EF+4F	mov	esi,	offset	aEnterTheFlag	; "Enter	the	flag:\n	"	
📴 Down	0	LOAD:0000000004C8EC2	mov	rsi,	offset	aEnterTheFlag	; "Enter	the	flag:\n	11	
1											
1											
		OK Canc	-l	Search	h	Heln					
		OR	et	Dearch		nerb					
Line 1 of 2						'n	tps://blog	.cscl	n.net/wei	xin_392	185220

分析这段汇编代码,发现用户输入的字符串存到了unk_6CCDB0中。

	LOAD:000000004C8E91 ;	1	
	LOAD:0000000004C8E92	align 20	n
- 1	LOAD:0000000004C8EA0	xor	rdi, rdi
	LOAD:0000000004C8EA3	xor	rsi, rsi
	LOAD:0000000004C8EA6	xor	rdx, rdx
•	LOAD:0000000004C8EA9	xor	r10, r10
•	LOAD:0000000004C8EAC	mov	eax, 65h
•	LOAD:0000000004C8EB1	syscall	; LINUX - sys_ptrace
•	LOAD:0000000004C8EB3	cmp	eax, 0
	LOAD:0000000004C8EB6	jnz	locret_4C8FDB
•	LOAD:0000000004C8EBC	xor	rdi, rdi
•	LOAD:0000000004C8EBF	inc	rdi
•	LOAD:0000000004C8EC2	mov	rsi, offset aEnterTheFlag ; "Enter the flag:\n"
•	LOAD:0000000004C8EC9	mov	rdx, 10h
•	LOAD:0000000004C8ED0	xor	eax, eax
•	LOAD:0000000004C8ED2	inc	eax
•	LOAD:0000000004C8ED4	syscall	; LINUX - sys_write
•	LOAD:0000000004C8ED6	xor	rdi, rdi
•	LOAD:0000000004C8ED9	xor	eax, eax
•	LOAD:0000000004C8EDB	mov	rsi, offset unk_6CCDB0
•	LOAD:0000000004C8EE2	mov	rdx, 20h
•	LOAD:0000000004C8EE9	syscall	; LINUX - sys_read
•	LOAD:0000000004C8EEB	cmp	eax, 0
. •	LOAD:0000000004C8EEE	jle	loc_4C8FA9
•	LOAD:0000000004C8EF4	mov	rdi, offset unk_6CCDB0
•	LOAD:0000000004C8EFB	mov	rcx, 0FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
•	LOAD:0000000004C8F02	xor	eax, eax
•	LOAD:0000000004C8F04	repne so	asb
•	LOAD:0000000004C8F06	not	rcx
•	LOAD:0000000004C8F09	sub	rcx, 1
•	LOAD:0000000004C8F0D	cmp	rcx, 15h
. 2	LOAD:0000000004C8F11	jnz	loc_4C8FA9
	000C8E91 0000000004C8E91: sub_4C8E50+41 (Synchroniz	ed with Hex View-1)

对这段代码进行反编译,提示没有函数,那么新建一个函数,在jle跳转指令之后添加一个函数。这样按f5就能反编译了。

LOAD:0000000004C8EF4				
LOAD:0000000004C8EF4				
LOAD:0000000004C8EF4	sub_4C8EF4	proc nea	ar	
LOAD:0000000004C8EF4		mov	rdi, offset	unk_6CCDB0
LOAD:0000000004C8EFB		mov	rcx, ØFFFFF	FFFFFFFFFh
LOAD:0000000004C8F02		xor	eax, eax	
LOAD:0000000004C8F04		repne so	asb	
LOAD:0000000004C8F06		not	rcx	
LOAD:0000000004C8F09		sub	rcx, 1	
LOAD:0000000004C8F0D		cmp	rcx, 15h	
LOAD:0000000004C8F11		jnz	loc_4C8FA9	
LOAD:0000000004C8F17		mov	rdi, offset	unk_6CCDB0
LOAD:0000000004C8F1E		cmp	byte ptr [ro	di+1], 77h
LOAD:0000000004C8F22		jnz	loc_4C8FA9	
LOAD:0000000004C8F28		cmp	byte ptr [ro	di+2], 62h
LOAD:0000000004C8F2C		jnz	short loc_40	C8FA9
LOAD:0000000004C8F2E		cmp	byte ptr [ro	di+3], 7Bh
LOAD:0000000004C8F32		jnz	short loc_40	C8FA9
LOAD:0000000004C8F34		cmp	byte ptr [ro	di+14h], 7Dh
LOAD:0000000004C8F38		jnz	short loc_40	C8FA9
LOAD:0000000004C8F3A		mov	rdi, offset	unk_6CCDB4
LOAD:0000000004C8F41		call	sub_4C8CC0	
LOAD:0000000004C8F46		mov	rdi, offset	unk_6CCDB4
LOAD:0000000004C8F4D		call	sub_4C8E50	
LOAD:0000000004C8F52		mov	rdi, offset	unk_6CCDB4
LOAD:0000000004C8F59		call	sub_4C8CC0	
LOAD:0000000004C8F5E		mov	rdi, offset	unk_6CCDB4
LOAD:0000000004C8F65		call	sub_4C8E50	
LOAD:0000000004C8F6A		mov	rdi, offset	unk_6CCDB4
LOAD:0000000004C8F71		call	sub_4C8CC0	
LOAD:0000000004C8F76		mov	rdi, offset	unk_6CCDB4
LOAD:0000000004C8F7D		call	sub_4C8E50	
LOAD:0000000004C8F82		mov	rsi, offset	qword_4C8CB0
LOAD:0000000004C8F89		mov	rdx, 0	
LOAD:00000000004C8F90				

看到了核心算法部分。输入的字符串格式应该为qwb{XXXXX},中间有16个字符.输入字符串存储在 unk_6CCDB0中,而后面处理的数组为unk_6CCDB4,刚好是中间那16个字符。

_ & ×

```
signed __int64 sub_4C8EF4()
{
  _BYTE *v0; // rdi
  _____int64 *v1; // rsi
  unsigned __int64 v2; // rdx
  signed __int64 result; // rax
  if ( strlen((const char *)&unk_6CCDB0) == 21
    && *((_BYTE *)&unk_6CCDB0 + 1) == 'w'
    && *((_BYTE *)&unk_6CCDB0 + 2) == 'b'
    && *((_BYTE *)&unk_6CCDB0 + 3) == '{'
    && *((_BYTE *)&unk_6CCDB0 + 20) == '}')
  {
    sub_4C8CC0((__int64)&unk_6CCDB4);
    sub_4C8E50((__int64)&unk_6CCDB4);
    sub_4C8CC0((__int64)&unk_6CCDB4);
    sub_4C8E50((__int64)&unk_6CCDB4);
    sub 4C8CC0(( int64)&unk 6CCDB4);
    v0 =  & unk 6CCDB4;
    sub_4C8E50((__int64)&unk_6CCDB4);
    v1 = qword_4C8CB0;
    v2 = 0LL;
    while ( v2 < 0x10 && *v0 == *(_BYTE *)v1 )
    {
                                                          ++v2;
      ++v0;
      v1 = (__int64 *)((char *)v1 + 1);
    }
  }
  __asm { syscall; LINUX - sys_write }
  result = 60LL;
  __asm { syscall; LINUX - sys_exit }
  return result;
}
.tls:00000000006CCDB0 unk_6CCDB0
                                     db
                                           0
                                                             ; DATA XREF: LOAD:000000004C8EDBto
.tls:0000000006CCDB0
                                                              ; sub_4C8EF41o ...
.tls:0000000006CCDB1
                                     db
                                           Ø
.tls:0000000006CCDB2
                                     db
                                           Ø
.tls:0000000006CCDB3
                                     db
                                           0
                                                              ; DATA XREF: sub_4C8EF4+461o
.tls:00000000006CCDB4 unk_6CCDB4
                                     db
                                           0
.tls:0000000006CCDB4
                                                              ; sub_4C8EF4+521o ...
.tls:0000000006CCDB5
                                     db
                                           Ø
.tls:0000000006CCDB6
                                     db
                                           0
.tls:0000000006CCDB7
                                     db
                                           0
.tls:0000000006CCDB8
                                     db
                                           0
.tls:0000000006CCDB9
                                     db
                                           0
.tls:0000000006CCDBA
                                     db
                                           0
.tls:0000000006CCDBB
                                     db
                                           0
.tls:0000000006CCDBC
                                     db
                                           0
.tls:0000000006CCDBD
                                     db
                                           0
.tls:0000000006CCDBE
                                     db
                                           0
.tls:0000000006CCDBF
                                     db
                                           0
.tls:0000000006CCDC0
                                     db
                                           0
.tls:0000000006CCDC1
                                     db
                                           0
.tls:0000000006CCDC2
                                     db
                                           0
.tls:0000000006CCDC3
                                     db
                                           0
.tls:0000000006CCDC4
                                     db
                                           0
.tls:0000000006CCDC5
                                     db
                                           0
.tls:0000000006CCDC6
                                     db
                                           0
.tls:0000000006CCDC7
                                     db
                                           0
.tls:0000000006CCDC8
                                     db
                                           0
.tls:0000000006CCDC9
                                     db
                                           0
.tls:0000000006CCDCA
                                     db
                                           0
```

分析代码发现,数组主要进过两个函数处理,共处理六次,最后得到的加密数组qword_4C8CB0逐位比较,相等即可。

LOAD:0000000004C8CB0 qword_4C8CB0 dq 1BF28C357F13B852h, 311E4F73D28663F4h

qword 4C8CB0为16字节采用小端存储,所以恢复成字节数组时,要逆序。

byte target[] = { 0x52, 0xb8, 0x13, 0x7f, 0x35, 0x8c, 0xf2, 0x1b, 0xf4, 0x63, 0x86, 0xd2, 0x73, 0x4f, 0x1e, 0x31 };

函数sub 4C8CC0 主要是通过中间的for循环进行加密。

```
1unsigned __int64 __fastcall sub_4C8CC0(__int64 input_str)
2 {
   unsigned __int64 result; // rax
   unsigned __int64 v2; // rt1
4
   unsigned int v3; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-48h]
5
6
    _int64 v4; // [rsp+1Ch] [rbp-44h]
   signed int i; // [rsp+24h] [rbp-3Ch]
7
   signed int j; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-38h]
8
   int v7; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-20h]
9
   int v8; // [rsp+44h] [rbp-1Ch]
0
   int v9; // [rsp+48h] [rbp-18h]
1
2
   int v10; // [rsp+4Ch] [rbp-14h]
   unsigned __int64 v11; // [rsp+58h] [rbp-8h]
3
Δ
5
   v11 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
   v7 = 1883844979;
6
   v8 = 1165112144;
7
   v9 = 2035430262;
8
9
   v10 = 861484132;
0
   for (i = 0; i \le 1; ++i)
1
   {
2
     v3 = *(_DWORD *)(8 * i + input_str);
     v4 = *(unsigned int *)(input_str + 4 + 8 * i);
3
4
     for ( j = 0; j \le 7; ++j )
5
6
        v3 += (*(&v7 + (BYTE4(v4) & 3)) + HIDWORD(v4)) ^ ((((unsigned int)v4 >> 5) ^ 16 * v4) + v4);
       HIDWORD(v4) += 0x676E696C;
8
       LODWORD(v4) = ((*(\&v7 + ((HIDWORD(v4) >> 11) \& 3)) + HIDWORD(v4)) ^ (((v3 >> 5) ^ 16 * v3) + v3)) + v4;
9
0
     *(_DWORD *)(input_str + 8 * i) = v3;
     *(_DWORD *)(input_str + 4 + 8 * i) = v4;
1
2
   }
   v2 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
3
   result = v2 \wedge v11;
4
   if ( v2 != v11 )
5
6
     result = ((__int64 (*)(void))loc_4C8B9A)();
7
   return result;
8
```

sub 4C8E50函数进行逐字节异或处理。

```
1_BYTE *__fastcall sub_4C8E50(__int64 a1)
 2{
 3
    _BYTE *result; // rax
    signed int i; // [rsp+14h] [rbp-4h]
 4
 5
 6
    for (i = 0; i \le 15; ++i)
 7
    ł
 8
      result = (_BYTE *)(i + a1);
 9
      *result ^= i;
10
    }
11
    return result;
12}
```

最后加密要得到的目标数组即为qword_4C8CB0。

```
7.加密算法逆向。
```

```
⊟#include <stdio.h>
         #include "windows.h"
         #include <string.h>
         #include <stdlib.h>
  #include "defs.h"
        uint64 v4_4_arr[9];
       int array[4] = { 0x70493173, 0x45723350, 0x79523376, 0x33593464 };
       - E
     ⊡void xor16(byte byte_arr_16[]) {
                   for (int i = 0; i < 16; i++)
                            byte_arr_16[i] = byte_arr_16[i]^i;
       |}
     □ int bytesToInt(byte* bytes, int size = 4)
         {
                  int addr = bytes[0] & 0xFF;
                  addr |= ((bytes[1] << 8) & 0xFF00);
                   addr |= ((bytes[2] << 16) & 0xFF0000);
                   addr |= ((bytes[3] << 24) & 0xFF000000);
                  return addr;
        }
     Image: Second Seco
          {
                  memset(bytes, 0, sizeof(byte)* size);
                  bytes[0] = (byte)(0xff & i);
                  bytes[1] = (byte)((0xff00 & i) >> 8);
                  bytes[2] = (byte)((0xff0000 & i) >> 16);
                  bytes[3] = (byte)((0xff000000 & i) >> 24);
                  return;
       }
pvoid re_block(byte byte_arr_8[]) {
             int i = 0;
             uint32 v3 = bytesToInt(byte_arr_8);
             uint32 v4 = bytesToInt(byte_arr_8 + 4);
              for (i = 7; i > -1; i--)
              {
                       uint64 v30 = (v3 \ll 4) & 0xfffffff;
                       uint64 v2c = v3 >> 5;
                       uint64 edx = v30 ^ v2c;
                       v30 = (v3 + edx) & 0xfffffff;
                       uint64 v28 = (v4_4_arr[i + 1] >> 11) & 3;
                       edx = array[v28];
                       v2c = (v4_4_arr[i + 1] + edx) & 0xfffffff;
                       v4 = (v4 - (v30 ^ v2c)) & 0xfffffff;
                       v30 = (v4 << 4) & 0xfffffff;
                       v2c = v4 >> 5;
                        edx = v30 ^ v2c;
                       v30 = (v4 + edx) \& 0xfffffff;
                       v28 = v4_4_arr[i] & 3;
                       edx = array[v28];
                       v2c = (v4_4_arr[i] + edx) & 0xfffffff;
                       v3 = (v3 - (v30 ^ v2c)) & 0xfffffff;
                       intToByte(v3, byte_arr_8);
                       intToByte(v4, byte_arr_8 + 4);
             }
   | }
```

```
pyte * re_all(byte strict));
     byte byte_arr[16];
     memcpy(byte_arr, str16, sizeof(byte)*16);
     xor16(byte_arr);
    re_block(byte_arr);
     re_block(byte_arr + 8);
     xor16(byte_arr);
    re_block(byte_arr);
    re_block(byte_arr + 8);
     xor16(byte_arr);
    re_block(byte_arr);
     re_block(byte_arr + 8);
     return byte_arr;
}
\exists int main()
 {
      for (int i = 1; i < 9; i++)
         v4_4_arr[i] = (v4_4_arr[i - 1] + 0x676E696C) & 0xFFFFFFF;
     byte target[] = { 0x52, 0xb8, 0x13, 0x7f, 0x35, 0x8c, 0xf2, 0xlb, 0xf4, 0x63, 0x86, 0xd2, 0x73, 0x4f, 0x1e, 0x31 };
     byte rs[16];
     memcpy(rs, re_all(target), sizeof(byte)* 16);
     for (int i = 0; i < 16; i++)
    printf("%c", rs[i]);</pre>
}
```