



# 工控ctf

原创


[multi4](#)  于 2020-10-29 19:38:53 发布  3770  收藏 12

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本文链接: [https://blog.csdn.net/qq\\_45951598/article/details/109364567](https://blog.csdn.net/qq_45951598/article/details/109364567)

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## 黑客的大意

下载后得到mail, 在文件后面jpg

打开图片是一个这样的图片,



[https://blog.csdn.net/qq\\_45951598](https://blog.csdn.net/qq_45951598)

这里我们根据题目的意思:

黑客在入侵后不小心留下了这样一个文件, 请分析文件进行溯源, 找到黑客的邮箱. flag格式为flag{邮箱账号}

这里的主要关键词是对文件进行溯源, 以及flag格式为邮箱账号

然后我们看文件有什么特征, 然后发现下面有一句英文

我们去搜索一下, 这里说一下, 我们一般搜索都可以去github看一下, 有没有这个项目。

这里直接搜。

WATCHIN YUR SCREENZ

15 code results

danstoner/danstoner.github.io  
static\_wget\_thatlinuxbox.com/thatlinuxbox.com/blog/links/portal.php/link/20130701220512631

```
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 .....
9
10      IM IN YUR COMPUTERZ...
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18      WATCHIN YUR SCREENZ
19
20 .....
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29 .....

Showing the top four matches  Last indexed on 15 Jul 2018
```

adhdproject/webkit  
adhd\_docs/Tools/Gcat.md

```
63 .....
64
```

[https://blog.csdn.net/qq\\_45951598](https://blog.csdn.net/qq_45951598)

这里随便打开一个网页, 我打开的是第二个.

这里翻一下看到一个邮箱, 然后我们试试, 这里的格式是flag{}

发现这个就是flag。

Gcat works in two parts.

## Example 1: Deploying an Implant

Configuring gcat and its implant is quite simple. You need to have a gmail account that you plan to use. Then simply pop the username and password into the two scripts gcat.py and implant.py as the "gmail\_user" and "gmail\_pwd" variables.

```
#####  
gmail_user = 'gcat.is.the.shit@gmail.com'  
gmail_pwd = 'veryc00lp@ssw0rd'  
server = 'smtp.gmail.com'  
server_port = 587  
#####
```

After you have set both gcat.py and implant.py to be properly configured you can then run the implant on a target machine.

It's just a simple python script.

## Example 2: Running a Command & Retrieving Output

Once you have an implant or two running you can control them from gcat.py. To start we will want to get the list of all attached implants and their ids. To do this run gcat.py with the -list option.

```
/opt/gcat$ python ./gcat.py -list
```

```
f964f907-dfcb-52ec-a993-543f6efc9e13 Windows-8-6.2.9200-x86  
90b2cd83-cb36-52de-84ee-99db6ff41a11 Windows-XP-5.1.2600-SP3-x86
```

Now that we've got a list of attached implants, let's send a command to one.

[https://blog.csdn.net/qq\\_45951598](https://blog.csdn.net/qq_45951598)

## Modbus协议分析

题目：黑客通过外网进入一家工厂的控制网络，之后对工控网络中的操作员站系统进行了攻击，最终通过工控协议破坏了正常的业务。我们得到了操作员站在攻击前后的网络流量数据包，我们需要分析流量中的蛛丝马迹，找到FLAG。

题目附件连接：<https://pan.baidu.com/s/1jGu7-1EKc29HTQc-pCJZlw>（提取码：8kqx）

## 工业协议分析1

题目：工业网络中存在异常，尝试通过分析PCAP流量包，分析出流量数据中的异常点，并拿到FLAG。

题目附件连接：<https://pan.baidu.com/s/17jkHLBqcxP0o9FpGfObA>（提取码：95ds）

解题步骤：

打开流量包，发现存在PRES、TCP、COTP、MMS协议的流量，其中选择一个数据包，追踪TCP流发现存在关键字flag.txt，如图所示：

Seq	Source IP	Destination IP	Protocol	Details
9	1.811777	192.168.2.112	192.168.2.53	TCP 78 nmsigport(2817) → iso-tsap(102) [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 L
10	1.812398	192.168.2.53	192.168.2.112	TCP 74 iso-tsap(102) → nmsigport(2817) [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1
11	1.812460	192.168.2.112	192.168.2.53	TCP 66 nmsigport(2817) → iso-tsap(102) [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=2
12	1.812776	192.168.2.112	192.168.2.53	COTP 88 CR TPDU src-ref: 0x0010 dst-ref: 0x0000
13	1.845206	192.168.2.53	192.168.2.112	COTP 88 CC TPDU src-ref: 0x0008 dst-ref: 0x0010
14	1.845558	192.168.2.112	192.168.2.53	MMS 260 initiate-RequestPDU
15	1.891408	192.168.2.53	192.168.2.112	MMS 228 initiate-ResponsePDU
16	1.891696	192.168.2.112	192.168.2.53	MMS 103 430 confirmed-RequestPDU
17	1.938709	192.168.2.53	192.168.2.112	MMS 111 430 confirmed-ResponsePDU
18	1.939055	192.168.2.112	192.168.2.53	MMS 113 431 confirmed-RequestPDU
19	1.985634	192.168.2.53	192.168.2.112	COTP 1094 DT TPDU (0) [COTP fragment, 1021 bytes]
20	1.985889	192.168.2.53	192.168.2.112	COTP 1094 DT TPDU (0) [COTP fragment, 1021 bytes]
21	1.985936	192.168.2.112	192.168.2.53	TCP 66 nmsigport(2817) → iso-tsap(102) [ACK] Seq=301 Ack=2286
22	1.986239	192.168.2.53	192.168.2.112	MMS 173 431 confirmed-ResponsePDU
23	1.987083	192.168.2.112	192.168.2.53	MMS 142 432 confirmed-RequestPDU
24	2.032972	192.168.2.53	192.168.2.112	COTP 1094 DT TPDU (0) [COTP fragment, 1021 bytes]
25	2.033155	192.168.2.53	192.168.2.112	COTP 1094 DT TPDU (0) [COTP fragment, 1021 bytes]
26	2.033269	192.168.2.112	192.168.2.53	TCP 66 nmsigport(2817) → iso-tsap(102) [ACK] Seq=377 Ack=4449
27	2.033509	192.168.2.53	192.168.2.112	MMS 530 432 confirmed-ResponsePDU
28	2.035269	192.168.2.112	192.168.2.53	MMS 144 433 confirmed-RequestPDU

这里对多个数据包进行tcp追踪流

The screenshot shows a TCP stream analysis in Wireshark. The stream contains a file listing with the following entries:

```
.....NB10.....?@ ..F:\9782\VC98\mfc\MFC\src\MFC42D.pdb.....!.....a.0.....  
.....J..7/\.....a.0..... ..J...$......a.0.....M.....*.....a.0.....M.....  
0...0%... BCUGE.icd.....20141203033702Z0&...  
device.icd.....<..20150424054730Z0&...  
DF6501.icd.....5...20150306062628Z0".  
..flag.txt.... ..20180614111900Z0,....iec61850server.cfg.....20180614111220Z0.....iec61850server.exe.....6...20150929080116Z0%...  
logcfg.xml....#  
..20150421072322Z0&...  
MFC42D.DLL.....4..20090520063624Z0'.  
..MFC42D.DLL.....5..20090520063620Z0'.  
..MFC42D.DLL.....5..20090520063620Z0'.  
..MFC042D.DLL.....5..20090520063626Z0%'.  
..mms_log.sli.....20180614111224Z0'.  
..MSVCR7D.DLL.....L..20090520063620Z0%...  
osicfg.xml....$B..20130407145712Z0&...  
PRS778.icd.....20150911071124Z0(...PST1200U.icd.....^...20150515074912Z...-.....a 0.....H....  
BCUGE.icd.....j.....a.0,....'.%.....H....7/.....20141203033701Z.....a!0.....H....  
device.icd.....;.....a.0,....'.%.....H....7/\.....<..20150424054728Z.....a!0.....H....  
DF6501.icd.....;.....a.0,....'.%.....H....70.....5...20150306062628Z.....a.0.....H....  
..flag.txt.....9.....a,0*....%.#.....H....70d.... ..20180614111858Z...6.....a)0'.....". ..H....iec61850server.cfg.....
```

发现好像都有flag.txt，所以我们分析所有包都有的话，那么肯定不是这个的。

2、然而通过多次分析与flag.txt相对应的流量包中，没有发现flag.txt的内容，于是换一个思路，对流量包进行关键字（jpg、png、zip、rar、flag）搜索，查看是否存在其他的文件。在linux系统中使用grep指令，可以对文件进行指定关键字搜索。linux中grep命令用法，我们使用指令进行关键字搜索

```
grep "flag" -a test.pcap
```

```
grep: test.pcap: No such file or directory
[root@10-255-0-66 ~]# grep "flag" -a test.pcap
m_ctime = a CFileStatus at Warning: CFile::GetStatus() returns m_attribute without high-order flags.
lag.txti      20180614111900Z0, iec61850server.cfg20180614111220Z0. iec61850server.exei20150929080116Z0%

lag.txt38^L{{
    )±)`EmX^(5(pf
                Di7xna^
lag.txt438y{{
    )±)`EmX (5(pf
                Di:ondpo
lag.txti      20180614111900Z0, iec61850server.cfg20180614111220Z0. iec61850server.exei20150929080116Z0%

lag.txtm884{{
    )±)`Em@X0(5(pf
                Di>\ne5i
lag.txti      20180614111900Z0- iec61850server.cfgi20180614112204Z0. iec61850server.exei20150929080116Z0%

lag.txt[]8
    {{
    )±)`Em!@S(5(pf
                |^[]$
<!-- * as well as to set memory debug flags. This module is -->
m_ctime = a CFileStatus at Warning: CFile::GetStatus() returns m_attribute without high-order flags. https://blog.csdn.net/qq_45951598
```

```
grep ".zip" -a test.pcap
```

```
[root@10-255-0-66 ~]# grep ".zip" -a test.pcap
[root@10-255-0-66 ~]#
```

```
grep ".jpg" -a test.pcap
```

```
[root@10-255-0-66 ~]# grep ".zip" -a test.pcap
[root@10-255-0-66 ~]# grep ".jpg" -a test.pcap
```

这里zip和jpg都没有东西


```
grep ".png" -a test.pcap
```

但是这里搜索png的时候出来了一些字符组合，这里在png后面有提示base64加密

```
[root@10-255-0-66 ~]# grep ".png" -a test.pcap

      1  *Ta0 i;I      data = "
U1BAACxjwv8YQUAAAAJcEhZcwAADsMAAA7ADcdvqGQAABzXSURBVHhe7Z2Js11Fncfn75maqZmaqZkaS0eLXAp1GHRUHGFQAQHYQFRFBWQRiBoBWQyyKaBsxo0t
CAGkQHAYQEL2jSxAyEoSIAH0VM/JPTPn9fv10d19+9z3bvqhqr5FkXe77z33nt0/7l//fr/+m0IIIIYQQ0ciACiGEEAnIgaohhBAJyIAKIYQQCciACiGEEAnIga
hhBAJyIAKIYQQCciACiGEEAnIgaohhBAJyIAKIYQQCciACiGEEAnIgaohhBAJyIAKIYQQCciACiGEEAnIgaohhBAJyIAKIYQQCciACiGEEAnIgaohhBAJyIAKIY
QQCciACiGEEAnIgaohhBAJyIAKIYQQCciACiGEEAnIgaohhBAJyIAKIYQQCciACiGEEAnIgaohhBAJyIAKIYQQCciACiGEEAnIgaohhBAJyIAKIYQQCciACiGEEA
l0Zkdff78oNm/ZV8xfuK2Y8fxx5W4v1K3cVe/Ye6L1CCCGEF6yGtC33n63u0PuNcW/fHJG8bcffsarf/3UjNLAVtz/h/Xm6/h3IYQQYiKsZYBUfePt4thT55qG0N
Xxp8/ttTqIDGj/vP30e+VKf/L1y4qTzppff0q/ni/+6bDpxY+ve7n3irHw/VrKzdsjE6tFL24v7p26rrhs0pLy8x3+pZnFhz/zbDnZ+th/PfD86auzi3MuWfHcc+Py4q
FpG4s1694cNcmKYf/+94oXfM4rbr1zdXHe9xcVn/+fwcVHPv7/wvK+YU371kXHbyN9nzd1a7JVXRHXAEgDknFi2Ylfx+FNbiql/3L8MPK8/+XJzcXLY3eWz80wcdxpc4t//s
SMciw55Zz5xXW/Wf4+zwc0D046shh0BqCjvzbHNIKWfnjVS72WB2HQtl7XxwB+KDjz9tbiM1+eaX6HTQbUej3KxZKXdXRTV5aehys92kThm/u/Dd6vbXD9sDd960tP
vH558z+fgKicfml5RGW4hBsnDx9lGT10q5YTUNyemHdn/WfAYQk8f3LqyeGPb271W3bl1X2l0bP0IPRxe6/ygwG1ru0Lx88uFr+0o/eqbsliQPlhrAvxiZVB
HW4Y63Vd3EiHGt0e2Gx+d5XGw4CuWLR0Pv8BwBfsXp25uu9XptZMDIQ+SYRoXrksU293oToFp6Rc7+3yLwPUS7ee+/94r6p64t//Ph0830sYWSffGZLr4duwLt
0wcWlzfdHGNE2fAYU/flHpxezR1ajXd03Ad24aW/xdx+xlLIY2cV0597rdj95v7y9y9e3/pys0FUEcGNA1mcKyer0/us0fNLF2iv/vjht6rx2K1Q6ngAvrLHa
u8900Kdu3a3+vdz2NPbs7ynq++tq/XoxDd8MrGvaUHzrr/6srbu+++Xlw5eanZf4gwwF2BXbDeslKIAWXhdtat3FSSHwL7nNiueXNP+/jRD30b0Ft+tcR88J/7y
sxi+/YwV4AMaBpTb1s55js75uQ5xcpVu3uvaMZtWymFnbveKc449wvz1Sxv9rG3BfeyGI8+d6E6IXt75VdvisjKz7z1U0MEJW3zF68un8K9E9ew6U+5bw+1UK
MaAvrGbJ9vj0F58f088fH3ql96pu6NuAEvzhfmjEDCMUGda08PXXv69/+Nj0c8j1LrbumLZsF0doD3wE8+cV9zzwLrS3cpqjz1LghrU0DjwBiyh0LAAK8nors
J2n3yC2Mfmkpfv2BB0QDQ9959B8pgph073iknGLi+l5+05P/2Z2+/a/S2ghA52LV7f3Hrr1eXwS7u/dmkfmla4bG4mfqndau3kBiDm+9YVfzbp+3Px/0BpysnN9
4yduLkVsaAVry4ZMeYfggi7JK+DCGrTPCDo3//3LNRkVAyoPGQMUR+X0SxwC2rxQDRunkrx80eD5d+MPFwaviiG0b9xSbNu/t/Z/NXfesNd+P/Z6/PtMehAAYc
aIRyVEVIjd4Uax7te39wGTRwo0hdIqVi8/E252QVYjYPhfs/YZ4jFIMKBBX++HbIQ6cuAwhYfff/yF3uvCEMGNB5r8tK2YnN21eK4wC3LDP7QAQjPPNsucc
iBvUfYMEq0shJgKsLn36FfPmFemWvk8eP1wz+/WmXl1XDCuPja8sse7U167v8IdfZk8ULV+/3a2fPngMNUA00fb0fvHJd0pcBfXrGq6M+bCvcFjHIGMaDa8j
9vnhwYndbVwpl/oJtZnvExv7qtXGzrhhdltvu9RJ85Jzh8VIjdl+0cdX/iPmVbGqK5DagBPL5tjVw2bbx69+uMdv+fMqK3iVSYT/S7Ze8zRMco4pSDShZB/
V+cEF3SV8G9M+PbBz1YSs1RX5ayIDGw2z0/b64+WnW21cK4cDI+20sRpA4UENM7hLC7K33nnL7qt4rhBh/e7JSyBhKqIFbHnUyW1AMUhwf6d/64Xek5ohnoFvM
9uez99PoQVys90cVAwnk13yvev/jLINK7qej9HHD2r95du6MuAYijrH7Zsb0STDGgargvzhL/GzRLrbesKgT1Gqy2i4LDXsG9pwtD5kjm1j6f/h03HSu3AAy0
idxFE0+FR9N+77IXz4I/kvFSt2Z0edgnqaVhpJqQL98wujv89RvhE0cUunLgPom33gaUGY0zHZw7BKeXBklcZnmfb45JLijI1yrLx89EvEjXfWvX8z4Pn8v09
```

这里解密发现肯存在一张图片，因为开头有NG两个字，所以我们将



```
# coding = utf -8
import os , base64

img_str= '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
Xxp8/ttTqIDGj/vP30e+VKf/L1y4qTzppff0q/ni/+6bDpxY+ve7n3irHw/VrKzdsjE6tFL24v7p26rrhs0pLy8x3+pZnFhz/zbDnZ+th/PfD86auzi3MuWfHcc+Py4q
FpG4s1694cNcmKYf/+94oXfM4rbr1zdXHe9xcVn/+fwcVHPv7/wvK+YU371kXHbyN9nzd1a7JVXRHXAEgDknFi2Ylfx+FNbiql/3L8MPK8/+XJzcXLY3eWz80wcdxpc4t//s
SMciw55Zz5xXW/Wf4+zwc0D046shh0BqCjvzbHNIKWfnjVS72WB2HQtl7XxwB+KDjz9tbiM1+eaX6HTQbUej3KxZKXdXRTV5aehys92kThm/u/Dd6vbXD9sDd960tP
vH558z+fgKicfml5RGW4hBsnDx9lGT10q5YTUNyemHdn/WfAYQk8f3LqyeGPb271W3bl1X2l0bP0IPRxe6/ygwG1ru0Lx88uFr+0o/eqbsliQPlhrAvxiZVB
HW4Y63Vd3EiHGt0e2Gx+d5XGw4CuWLR0Pv8BwBfsXp25uu9XptZMDIQ+SYRoXrksU293oToFp6Rc7+3yLwPUS7ee+/94r6p64t//Ph0830sYWSffGZLr4duwLt
0wcWlzfdHGNE2fAYU/flHpxezR1ajXd03Ad24aW/xdx+xlLIY2cV0597rdj95v7y9y9e3/pys0FUEcGNA1mcKyer0/us0fNLF2iv/vjht6rx2K1Q6ngAvrLHa
u8900Kdu3a3+vdz2NPbs7ynq++tq/XoxDd8MrGvaUHzrr/6srbu+++Xlw5eanZf4gwwF2BXbDeslKIAWXhdtat3FSSHwL7nNiueXNP+/jRD30b0Ft+tcR88J/7y
sxi+/YwV4AMaBpTb1s55js75uQ5xcpVu3uvaMZtWymFnbveKc449wvz1Sxv9rG3BfeyGI8+d6E6IXt75VdvisjKz7z1U0MEJW3zF68un8K9E9ew6U+5bw+1UK
MaAvrGbJ9vj0F58f088fH3ql96pu6NuAEvzhfmjEDCMUGda08PXXv69/+Nj0c8j1LrbumLZsF0doD3wE8+cV9zzwLrS3cpqjz1LghrU0DjwBiyh0LAAK8nors
J2n3yC2Mfmkpfv2BB0QDQ9959B8pgph073iknGLi+l5+05P/2Z2+/a/S2ghA52LV7f3Hrr1eXwS7u/dmkfmla4bG4mfqndau3kBiDm+9YVfzbp+3Px/0BpysnN9
4yduLkVsaAVry4ZMeYfggi7JK+DCGrTPCDo3//3LNRkVAyoPGQMUR+X0SxwC2rxQDRunkrx80eD5d+MPFwaviiG0b9xSbNu/t/Z/NXfesNd+P/Z6/PtMehAAYc
aIRyVEVIjd4Uax7te39wGTRwo0hdIqVi8/E252QVYjYPhfs/YZ4jFIMKBBX++HbIQ6cuAwhYfff/yF3uvCEMGNB5r8tK2YnN21eK4wC3LDP7QAQjPPNsucc
iBvUfYMEq0shJgKsLn36FfPmFemWvk8eP1wz+/WmXl1XDCuPja8sse7U167v8IdfZk8ULV+/3a2fPngMNUA00fb0fvHJd0pcBfXrGq6M+bCvcFjHIGMaDa8j
9vnhwYndbVwpl/oJtZnvExv7qtXGzrhhdltvu9RJ85Jzh8VIjdl+0cdX/iPmVbGqK5DagBPL5tjVw2bbx69+uMdv+fMqK3iVSYT/S7Ze8zRMco4pSDShZB/
V+cEF3SV8G9M+PbBz1YSs1RX5ayIDGw2z0/b64+WnW21cK4cDI+20sRpA4UENM7hLC7K33nnL7qt4rhBh/e7JSyBhKqIFbHnUyW1AMUhwf6d/64Xek5ohnoFvM
9uez99PoQVys90cVAwnk13yvev/jLINK7qej9HHD2r95du6MuAYijrH7Zsb0STDGgargvzhL/GzRLrbesKgT1Gqy2i4LDXsG9pwtD5kjm1j6f/h03HSu3AAy0
idxFE0+FR9N+77IXz4I/kvFSt2Z0edgnqaVhpJqQL98wujv89RvhE0cUunLgPom33gaUGY0zHZw7BKeXBklcZnmfb45JLijI1yrLx89EvEjXfWvX8z4Pn8v09
```



```
ggqz1qw2qdQs1x/1n6aMMXadpU116U3Aau1abvH9w4QgqdEEH1taey11dy75d1QDn70+0nJQ15hqE1oL5UCV1K28DYWWIRG74EY4KXQmY71FZ1BS
Ohm0/OTZym3xjqbesKhSotTfVmwRGnnIYfSkoBC1i6bKc30XqQ7uccz4/VHsVgtUdtWG1QKDmuP0cfbbDStN4j5GzMNnIbUPAdrM1h6k2wQPCNTV
2u5Kz3SzGgnGHR9kPAY5cMrQE95Rw7/5PI1CY4ysw3eKK2FAaiunwHc1Mqbv4Cv8Eg+KatzGDMd+fweOUA4hjqueKgTq8Vh91XT5pSbFmbdxEBJ
GATW2qgAlW4ZzRGLIwm1UzM1JfST9qJepCGhQ5nh+rPYrBao/asNqgUHCf2ofbDGEbNY0eVpynPLRqhQ1ndLDu0Wb0LkTRLSu1Q6DHBOEF1v1ni
kG1LHbHdttvvyu+TnkMQ2tAfYWo+QI5WNWFL5cZoy8goFKIC5hoNKttJdyAuGnJDyXdZtGL28ui123vjwK+03evwgozb6Letq4YeLBuuNkusu+KyQ
N7MUQ34m5hQkFwAMaS2qS4yqbcvqo47rSDK2uK9/twD4NmT5tTTFgtMEmiT4pK8/1TwQR324meA5grWXU+uyTH8201RzFY7VEbVhsUSo7rT+mDe/
aIo2eVk3Aq1/gS7Z1M+Vz9bJe0TbZD6MKAcn1nn28HweIxo50tZ/Ja5kINJW47KqMYXX1nqml/Phd6v1MujbuJ0RYhtaAMjA2rSQvuHhxZgqxd
aZrXh1Y1l1kZB9Akrq+Q4iDtWZ59k3e0h3x43vnoRDj8GqqLetKxYGEo5Ts/rqRhxch9feNLZQd+6cvLS8jsdJDmeH6s9isFqj9q2qBQc1x/Sh
94NuqvZRxh8kmwEEUHSJeggpkvUBER8ZmDLgwoMIGk8IhVn+Kaqcb1C6asxIS2a6z3TTWgZ5w72n2Nh6pLhtaAgltIIFtCNL5jkELPhStqtlopXy
o9WF8xAmAHITA7dttYTTG47Sulw1mKMYdZt41AMUovumDo3J1mP7ps0pLgwtc5yfH8W01RDFZ71IbVBoW54/pT+rDOrYwRxeVzrD6hKwMKe0J820
0hYhGScpZoLZNZ7pxpQt871MSfP6f21G4bagPLj+g7U9Y19L1wWCxbZarJm3ELh+LRLr15i9m0JWR8PLwbAZ0BDN70x4G7bmHMUwW1fqR/4/nyl/1
L00tKxwQt8702rg1DhzuIeyzUYxpLj+bHaoxis9qgNqwkKJcf1p/TRj/eIn0+cx/Z1aUCB7ZKQrSNXjGsp54imYL1/qgF1gzyJd+iSoTaggBF1Jd
rkzq1E8QIQ8gMDvfUa9itjISey6YBe8kQJpKkn9foM6LQnNvde0QzX4bYNzfWqcNtXygh7JrhFU1ekzJyZ6fv0Y8SIPjByf/gGoCbh2sIFnHLMU0
5yPD9WexSD1R61YbVBoeS4/pQ+MCqxrPtoVFI8crv5uzagQ0Bj6I1VLDC6uM4mrM+RakAZc+r9YBe6pC8Dy1DJjeoqdtM5Rz8EpLB3wV4G0anMuq
gNy+Y4Je/c1SwzK+s9+znTk1UheAfEpk449JcsHi7GaTgK0VoBUBZJW0Lrkyrualdf0oJ7hg+U7Yh8ZbwKkXBD9VriUmF/x0J501v5z13n3v2v
L1GMgQeNBjXXp42qZy9klgC0kz1YQKA4671wGE/ZyZc7Z21hAeS4773mqPYrDaozasNiiUHNffTx9Mzizj/xn1Hgfhqz5Cta+4h9tPYF1GyvitXJq
f1WJ+/C/h0eAZ41qprZZzk2tnzJUJ9UKv00tb1N2UzNHGCEyhIwZou6cuAinSIDqv/0JVWRytGuz1bPBScjyqEEB80WgnX0NECLKXyICOE5brhp
1lvZP7K50vHfnXgInYJssISQohBgPpF0hvad0B+LmRaxwH2Qt0tFgPgnGA0HhFv9HhbkC+UKF9c171AhhdJueOzJzWV1JaLorZQdtodyHn5uIQM6Dp
Cv6f7YiOIQsfh0oa/EyQpCCHGoZZGe0/UblefIAM6YNIot35sROWiWAhuu0ZGf1EBGVAhxKGIz4CyFcbKdBCRcxDKgiVayjvM4if4NgVzDh6Zt9K
bbpJwpWocC6Rxxv5tbH1QEVQhyKuAaUoMrp6zoK5MiFhnQR0p5n6T03Dd1FbFw8FbS506VIIozE8zDgbwYzqYi8iT0p6w+LZh1UU2J/las21Vs2j
Kxz+UUQogUKM1IURxSFHe/OT7ZBzKgCZDXGvK4IVS56moKIYQYHDKgCVDJxDKEKaLgghBCi0FDBjQBcossYxgj/PXzX1CKiRBCDCsyoi1wQjv1rz
50uH04s0/Hnjq3DEAa5MHNQggh8iMD2ich3n2/WL1qd1kE/tY7VxdXTV5a1nw9/6JF5X8paECR96dnvDruxcuFEELkQwZUCCGESEAGVAgghEhAB1
QIIYRIQAZUCCGESEAGVAgghEhAB1QIIYRIQAZUCCGESEAGVAgghEhAB1QIIYRIQAZUCCGESEAGVAgghEhAB1QIIYRIQAZUCCGESEAGVAgghEhAB1
4XBcAIzFfvoBoAAAAASUVORK5CYII='
```

```
img_data = base64.b64decode(img_str)
# 这里base64decode的意思是把base64编码转换成ascii码。


with open('1.png', 'wb') as f:
# wb+: 以二进制格式打开一个文件用于读写。如果该文件已存在则将其覆盖。如果该文件不存在，创建新文件。
    f.write(img_data)
# 这里这里write的意思是写入的意思。
print('successful')
```

这里出来了flag



## MMS

提示：工业网络中存在的异常，尝试通过分析PACP流量包，分析出流量数据中的异常点，并拿到FLAG，flag形式为 flag{}





2941 643.891370	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 188	confirmed-ResponsePDU
2953 648.890928	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 189	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
2954 648.891215	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 189	confirmed-ResponsePDU
2969 653.891024	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 190	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
2970 653.891310	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 190	confirmed-ResponsePDU
2988 658.891109	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 191	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
2989 658.891390	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 191	confirmed-ResponsePDU
2992 663.890466	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 192	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
2993 663.890797	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 192	confirmed-ResponsePDU
2995 668.890812	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 193	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
2996 668.891110	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 193	confirmed-ResponsePDU
3052 673.891272	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 194	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
3053 673.891547	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 194	confirmed-ResponsePDU
3061 678.890597	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 195	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
3062 678.890815	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 195	confirmed-ResponsePDU
3068 683.890492	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 196	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
3069 683.890778	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 196	confirmed-ResponsePDU
3071 688.891141	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 197	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
3072 688.891403	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 197	confirmed-ResponsePDU
3091 693.891030	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 198	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
3092 693.891300	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 198	confirmed-ResponsePDU

> Frame 3189: 124 bytes on wire (992 bits), 124 bytes captured (992 bits)  
 > Ethernet II, Src: VMware 1d:07:17 (00:0c:29:1d:07:17), Dst: VMware 75:b2:38 (00:0c:29:75:b2:38)

0000 00 0c 29 75 b2 38 00 0c 29 1d 07 17 08 00 45 00 ..)u.8...).E.

[https://blog.csdn.net/qq\\_45951598](https://blog.csdn.net/qq_45951598)

这里先分析一下mms协议

MMS.pcap

文件(F) 编辑(E) 视图(V) 跳转(G) 捕获(C) 分析(A) 统计(S) 电话(Y) 无线(W) 工具(I) 帮助(H)

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
3300	759.063405	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 211	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
3301	759.063635	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 211	confirmed-ResponsePDU
3316	764.062874	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 212	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
3317	764.063174	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 212	confirmed-ResponsePDU
3325	769.062872	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 213	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
3326	769.063098	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 213	confirmed-ResponsePDU
3335	774.051361	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 214	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
3336	774.051678	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 214	confirmed-ResponsePDU
3419	779.069071	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 215	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
3420	779.069408	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 215	confirmed-ResponsePDU
3431	784.076631	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 216	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
3432	784.076825	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 216	confirmed-ResponsePDU
3438	789.068864	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 217	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
3439	789.069121	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 217	confirmed-ResponsePDU
3441	794.082668	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 218	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
3442	794.082964	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 218	confirmed-ResponsePDU
3455	799.098713	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 219	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
3456	799.098906	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 219	confirmed-ResponsePDU
3460	804.114113	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 220	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
3461	804.114385	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 220	confirmed-ResponsePDU
3473	809.113503	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 221	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs

然后我们一定要相信一个原则，事出反常必有妖。

分析mms的包发现，这两个包的内容有点不太一样，后一个似乎是16进制字符串

文件(F) 编辑(E) 视图(V) 跳转(G) 捕获(C) 分析(A) 统计(S) 电话(Y) 无线(W) 工具(I) 帮助(H)

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
3133	703.891295	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 200	confirmed-ResponsePDU
3143	708.890659	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 201	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
3144	708.890842	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 201	confirmed-ResponsePDU
3156	713.890993	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 202	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
3157	713.891286	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 202	confirmed-ResponsePDU
3171	718.891063	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 203	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
3172	718.891348	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 203	confirmed-ResponsePDU
3189	723.890659	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 204	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN666i5250356j4249
3190	723.890985	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 204	confirmed-ResponsePDU
3196	728.891287	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 205	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN616732557968356j
3197	728.891562	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 205	confirmed-ResponsePDU
3213	733.891417	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 206	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
3214	733.891705	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 206	confirmed-ResponsePDU
3229	738.890584	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 207	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
3230	738.890760	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 207	confirmed-ResponsePDU
3241	743.890765	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 208	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
3242	743.890958	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 208	confirmed-ResponsePDU
3247	748.891442	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 209	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
3248	748.891624	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 209	confirmed-ResponsePDU
3275	754.092560	192.168.142.148	192.168.142.133	MMS	124 210	confirmed-RequestPDU IEDRelay1 LLN0\$EX\$OpTmh\$cdcNs
3276	754.092806	192.168.142.133	192.168.142.148	MMS	86 210	confirmed-ResponsePDU

> Frame 3196: 124 bytes on wire (992 bits), 124 bytes captured (992 bits)  
 > Ethernet II, Src: VMware 1d:07:17 (00:0c:29:1d:07:17), Dst: VMware 75:b2:38 (00:0c:29:75:b2:38)

```
0000 00 0c 29 75 b2 38 00 0c 29 1d 07 17 08 00 45 00  ..)u·8.. ).....E·
0010 00 6e 2f 4a 40 00 80 06 2c d5 c0 a8 8e 94 c0 a8  ·n/3@·... ,.....
MMS: Protocol | 分组: 8843 · 已显示: 1024 (11.6%) | 配置: Default
```

不过存在i和j这种不属于16进制字符串的字符，想到i和j是连在起的，第位66转成字符是f，6c的话转陈字符是l，于是将i替换成c，j替换成d，脚本转下

```
# coding = utf-8

s = "666c5250356d4249616732557968356d"

flag = " "

for i in range(0, len(s), 2):
    # 表示从0开始，长度为s的字符串，步长为二。

    flag += chr(int(s[i:i+2], 16))
    # 这里chr的意思是把里面的内容转换成字符串
    # s[i:i+2]这个表示在是在里面取是里面长度为2的内容，因为一开始i为0
    # 后面的16表示为16进制。

print(flag)
# fLRP5mBIag2Uyh5m
# flag{RP5mBI2Uyh5m}
```

有待更新。。。