


【WhaleCTF逆向题】第一期py转子——大结局！ writeup

转载

iqiqiya 于 2018-09-22 15:34:12 发布 876 收藏

分类专栏: [我的逆向之路](#) [我的CTF之路](#) [我的CTF进阶之路](#) 文章标签: [【WhaleCTF逆向题】第一期py转子——大结局！ writ py](#) [转子——大结局！ writeup](#)



[我的逆向之路](#) 同时被 3 个专栏收录

108 篇文章 10 订阅

订阅专栏



[我的CTF之路](#)

92 篇文章 5 订阅

订阅专栏

[我的CTF进阶之路](#)

108 篇文章 18 订阅

订阅专栏

题目信息:

py转子——大结局!

4

我们重建了python2.7的操作码! 并用它加密了flag, 请尝试恢复它~答案格式flag{xxx}

📄 py_d5764c6...

<https://blog.csdn.net/xiangshangbashaonian>

这个是OCTF的一道题

转载自<http://hebin.me/2018/01/24/%E8%A5%BF%E6%99%AEctf-py137/>

The archive contains a compiled Python file `crypt.pyc` and an encrypted flag file `encrypted_flag`.

As the description states, the compiled Python code is mangled. Using [uncompyle6](#) gives an error:

```

$ uncompile6 crypt.pyc
# uncompile6 version 2.9.9
# Python bytecode 2.7 (62211)
# Decompiled from: Python 2.7.13 (default, Jan 19 2017, 14:48:08)
# [GCC 6.3.0 20170118]
# Embedded file name: /Users/hen/Lab/0CTF/py/crypt.py
# Compiled at: 2017-01-06 01:08:38
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "/usr/local/bin/uncompile6", line 11, in <module>:
    sys.exit(main_bin())
  File "/usr/local/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/uncompile6/bin/uncompile.py", line 163, in main_bin
    **options)
  File "/usr/local/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/uncompile6/main.py", line 145, in main
    uncompile_file(infile, outstream, showasm, showast, showgrammar)
  File "/usr/local/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/uncompile6/main.py", line 72, in uncompile_file
    is_pypy=is_pypy, magic_int=magic_int)
  File "/usr/local/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/uncompile6/main.py", line 46, in uncompile
    is_pypy=is_pypy)
  File "/usr/local/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/uncompile6/semantics/pysource.py", line 2254, in deparse_cod
    tokens, customize = scanner.ingest(co, code_objects=code_objects, show_asm=showasm)
  File "/usr/local/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/uncompile6/scanners/scanner2.py", line 230, in ingest
    pattr = free[oparg]
IndexError: tuple index out of range

```

Let's turn to a [Python disassembler](#) to dump the file structure. Because the opcodes are messed up, let's comment out the part of the disassembler code that prints out the bytecode (`dis.disassemble(code)`). It was also necessary to comment out some failing timestamp analysis code, which was not important.

Running the disassembler over the challenge file gives the following result:

```

$ python dec.py crypt.pyc
magic 03f30d0a
moddate 66346f58 (0)
code
  argcount 0
  nlocals 0
  stacksize 2
  flags 0040
  code
    990000990100860000910000990200880000910100990300880000910200
    99010053
  consts
    -1
    None
  code
    argcount 1
    nlocals 6
    stacksize 3
    flags 0043
    code
      990100680100990200680200990300680300610100990400469905002761
      020061010027610300279906004627990500276102009906004627990700
      276804009b00006001006104008301006805006105006002006100008301
      0053
    consts
      None
      '!@#$$%^&*'

```

```

'abcdefgh'
'<>{}:"'
4
'|'
2
'EOF'
names ('rotor', 'newrotor', 'encrypt')
varnames ('data', 'key_a', 'key_b', 'key_c', 'secret', 'rot')
freevars ()
cellvars ()
filename '/Users/hen/Lab/0CTF/py/crypt.py'
name 'encrypt'
firstlineno 2
lnotab 00010601060106012e010f01
code
argcount 1
nlocals 6
stacksize 3
flags 0043
code
990100680100990200680200990300680300610100990400469905002761
020061010027610300279906004627990500276102009906004627990700
276804009b00006001006104008301006805006105006002006100008301
0053
consts
None
'!@#%&^&*
'abcdefgh'
'<>{}:"'
4
'|'
2
'EOF'
names ('rotor', 'newrotor', 'decrypt')
varnames ('data', 'key_a', 'key_b', 'key_c', 'secret', 'rot')
freevars ()
cellvars ()
filename '/Users/hen/Lab/0CTF/py/crypt.py'
name 'decrypt'
firstlineno 10
lnotab 00010601060106012e010f01
names ('rotor', 'encrypt', 'decrypt')
varnames ()
freevars ()
cellvars ()
filename '/Users/hen/Lab/0CTF/py/crypt.py'
name '<module>'
firstlineno 1
lnotab 0c010908

```

There is lots of interesting info that we can glean from this output (and by reading the Python [opcode documentation](#) and [source code](#)):

- this file uses the [rotor](#) library and defines 2 methods - `encrypt` and `decrypt`
- `encrypt` and `decrypt` method bodies look almost identical; naturally we need to look at `decrypt` closely
- rotor functions `newrotor` and `decrypt` are used
- there are some kinds of key variables `key_a`, `key_b` and `key_c` being used, and also something called a `secret` (a

decryption key?)

- there are some interesting constants embedded in the code, including `!@#$$%^&* , abcdefgh`, and `<>{ } : "`; do these correspond to `key_a` through `_c`?

In order to start analyzing the code let's create our own decryption function and decompile it. It would likely have the following components:

- a parameter passed in
- a result string returned
- some constant initialization
- some operations to create a decryption key
- code to decrypt the data

Here's a first version of that code. We will make some assumptions about how the variables in the challenge file (`data`, `secret`, etc.) are actually used:

```
import rotor
def decrypt(data):
    key_a = '!@#$$%^&*'
    key_b = 'abcdefgh'
    key_c = '<>{ } : "'
    secret = key_a + key_b + key_c
    rot = rotor.newrotor(secret)
    return rot.decrypt(data)

enc = open("encrypted_flag", "rb").read()
print decrypt(enc)
```

Let's re-enable opcode analysis in the disassembler and run it over this new file:

```
$ python -c "import py_compile;py_compile.compile('ex.py');"; python dec.py ex.pyc
magic 03f30d0a
moddate e2f2cf58 (0)
code
  argcount 0
  nlocals 0
  stacksize 3
  flags 0040
  code
    6400006401006c00005a00006402008400005a0100650200640300640400
    8302006a03008300005a0400650100650400830100474864010053
  1      0 LOAD_CONST          0 (-1)
        3 LOAD_CONST          1 (None)
        6 IMPORT_NAME         0 (rotor)
        9 STORE_NAME         0 (rotor)

  3      12 LOAD_CONST          2 (<code object decrypt at 0x7f664ada8530, file "ex.py", line 3>)
        15 MAKE_FUNCTION     0
        18 STORE_NAME         1 (decrypt)

 13      21 LOAD_NAME           2 (open)
        24 LOAD_CONST          3 ('encrypted_flag')
        27 LOAD_CONST          4 ('rb')
        30 CALL_FUNCTION       2
        33 LOAD_ATTR          3 (read)
        36 CALL_FUNCTION       0
```

```

39 STORE_NAME          4 (enc)

15  42 LOAD_NAME        1 (decrypt)
    45 LOAD_NAME        4 (enc)
    48 CALL_FUNCTION     1
    51 PRINT_ITEM
    52 PRINT_NEWLINE
    53 LOAD_CONST        1 (None)
    56 RETURN_VALUE

consts
-1
None
code
  argcount 1
  nlocals 6
  stacksize 2
  flags 0043
  code
    6401007d01006402007d02006403007d03007c01007c0200177c0300177d
    04007400006a01007c04008301007d05007c05006a02007c000083010053
4   0 LOAD_CONST        1 ('!@#$$%^&*')
    3 STORE_FAST        1 (key_a)

5   6 LOAD_CONST        2 ('abcdefgh')
    9 STORE_FAST        2 (key_b)

6  12 LOAD_CONST        3 ('<>{}:')
   15 STORE_FAST        3 (key_c)

8  18 LOAD_FAST         1 (key_a)
   21 LOAD_FAST         2 (key_b)
   24 BINARY_ADD
   25 LOAD_FAST         3 (key_c)
   28 BINARY_ADD
   29 STORE_FAST        4 (secret)

10 32 LOAD_GLOBAL        0 (rotor)
   35 LOAD_ATTR         1 (newrotor)
   38 LOAD_FAST         4 (secret)
   41 CALL_FUNCTION     1
   44 STORE_FAST        5 (rot)

11 47 LOAD_FAST         5 (rot)
   50 LOAD_ATTR         2 (decrypt)
   53 LOAD_FAST         0 (data)
   56 CALL_FUNCTION     1
   59 RETURN_VALUE

consts
None
'!@#$$%^&*
'abcdefgh'
'<>{}:'
names ('rotor', 'newrotor', 'decrypt')
varnames ('data', 'key_a', 'key_b', 'key_c', 'secret', 'rot')
freevars ()
cellvars ()
filename 'ex.py'
name 'decrypt'
firstlineno 3
lnotab 00010601060106020e020f01

```

```
encrypted_flag'  
'rb'  
names ('rotor', 'decrypt', 'open', 'read', 'enc')  
varnames ()  
freevars ()  
cellvars ()  
filename 'ex.py'  
name '<module>'  
firstlineno 1  
inotab 0c02090a1502
```

Disassembler gives us more useful information:

- most instructions are either a single opcode, or an opcode and a 2-byte parameter
- parameter offsets are 0-based (duh)
- Python instructions heavily use the stack - data is pushed on it and many opcodes process the top one or two items on the stack
- at least one opcode (53 - RETURN_VALUE) was not obfuscated - it's the same in the code for the challenge
- some of our guesses about names and meanings of different variables worked - `names` and `varnames` fields match corresponding challenge file fields perfectly

Now we will break down the challenge binary opcode stream into individual operations and try to match them to instructions in our decryption code. Looks like `rotor` call functionality can be matched directly (assuming we are correct about `secret` being the decryption key):

```
990100
680100
990200
680200
990300
680300
610100
990400
46
990500
27
610200
610100
27
610300
27
990600
46
27
990500
27
610200
990600
46
27
990700
27
680400 STORE_NAME 4 (secret)
9b0000 LOAD_GLOBAL 0 (rotor)
600100 LOAD_ATTR 1 (newrotor)
610400 LOAD_FAST 4 (secret)
830100 CALL_FUNCTION 1
680500 STORE_NAME 5 (rot)
610500 LOAD_FAST 5 (rot)
600200 LOAD_ATTR 2 (decrypt)
610000 LOAD_FAST 0 (data)
830100 CALL_FUNCTION 1
53 RETURN_VALUE
```

This gives us the following translation for opcodes:

- 68 - STORE_NAME
- 9b - LOAD_GLOBAL
- 60 - LOAD_ATTR
- 61 - LOAD_FAST
- 83 - CALL_FUNCTION (was not obfuscated)

Also it looks like 99 is actually LOAD_CONST. Let's fill in this information:

```

990100 LOAD_CONST 1 ('!@#%&*')
680100 STORE_NAME 1 (key_a)
990200 LOAD_CONST 2 ('abcdefgh')
680200 STORE_NAME 2 (key_b)
990300 LOAD_CONST 3 ('<>{}:"')
680300 STORE_NAME 3 (key_c)
610100 LOAD_FAST 1 (key_a)
990400 LOAD_CONST 4 (4)
46
990500 LOAD_CONST 5 ('|')
27
610200 LOAD_FAST 2 (key_b)
610100 LOAD_FAST 1 (key_a)
27
610300 LOAD_FAST 3 (key_c)
27
990600 LOAD_CONST 6 (2)
46
27
990500 LOAD_CONST 5 ('|')
27
610200 LOAD_FAST 2 (key_b)
990600 LOAD_CONST 6 (2)
46
27
990700 LOAD_CONST 7 ('EOF')
27
680400 STORE_NAME 4 (secret)
9b0000 LOAD_GLOBAL 0 (rotor)
600100 LOAD_ATTR 1 (newrotor)
610400 LOAD_FAST 4 (secret)
830100 CALL_FUNCTION 1
680500 STORE_NAME 5 (rot)
610500 LOAD_FAST 0 (rot)
600200 LOAD_ATTR 2 (decrypt)
610000 LOAD_FAST 0 (data)
830100 CALL_FUNCTION 1
53 RETURN_VALUE

```

This looks very promising. We only need to find what kinds of manipulations are done on the encryption key and we will be done.

Opcodes 46 and 27 are the remaining unknowns. 46 works on a string and a numeric argument, and 27 works on 2 strings. Essentially we have the following expression:

```
secret = (key_a OP46 4) OP27 '|' OP27 ((key_b OP27 key_a OP27 key_c) OP46 2) OP27 '|' OP27 (key_b OP46 2) 0
```

After some trial and error with our code, we find that 46 is a multiplication operation, and 27 is an addition. This gives us the following final version of decryption code:


```
import rotor
def decrypt(data):
    key_a = '!@#$$%^&*'
    key_b = 'abcdefgh'
    key_c = '<>{}:'''
    secret = key_a*4 + '|' + (key_b+key_a+key_c)*2 + '|' + key_b*2 + 'EOF'
    rot = rotor.newrotor(secret)
    return rot.decrypt(data)
i = open("encrypted_flag", "rb").read()
print decrypt(i)
```